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Abstract 
 
The topic for this thesis is the package of policies referred to as “Co-
development”. Co-development or Cooperation for Development comprises the 
actions of formal institutions at the national and regional levels as well as those 
of non-governmental organisations which are designed to stem immigration by 
fostering development in the source-country. The thesis examines co-
development by comparing the migratory regimes in the European-
Mediterranean Partnership and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
areas, focusing on Spain and the United States as host countries, Mexico, and 
Morocco as primarily sending - but increasingly transit and host - countries. The 
starting point for the thesis are the two trade oriented development programmes 
under way in each region - the MEDA Programme in Morocco and the Plan 
Puebla Panamá in Mexico-Central America. 
The thesis critically examines the “development-migration” nexus, 
particularly conventional ways of analysing the relationship between migration 
and development, and the way in which these models inform official policies for 
trade and development. 
The comparison draws upon a Multi-level Governance analytical 
framework which examines the interaction of state and non-state actors at the 
three main levels (Macro, Meso, and Micro) where Co-development takes 
places. The analysis of the multi-level interaction allows understanding the 
vertical or horisontal interrelation among actors in the process of co-
development. Moreover, it allows a fuller understanding of the contribution of 
“bottom up” as much as “top down” co-development. Within this framework, the 
migrant emerges as a central actor - a transnational agent who is able to foster 
co-development by comparison with many national and international 
programmes.  
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Glossary 
AFC-LIO 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations 
AFD Agence Française de Développement  
CONAGO Confederación Nacional de Gobernadores 
CONAPO  Consejo Nacional de Población 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
EU  European Union 
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FTA Free Trade Agreements 
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HLWG The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration 
IADB Inter-American Development Bank 
IME Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Extranjero 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INM Instituto Nacional de Migración 
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 
IRCA Immigration Reform and Control Act 
MEDA Mesures d‟accompagnement 
MIC Middle Income Countries 
MRE Marocain Résident a l‟Étrangère 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
PP Partido Popular 
PPP Plan Puebla-Panamá 
PSOE Partido Popular Socialista de España 
RIAs Regional Integration Agreements 
SEDESOL Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
SPP Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America  
 TIEM Taller de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos 
USA United States of America 
WB World Bank 
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CHAPTER 1  KEY CONCEPTS, OVERVIEW AND 
METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS  
1.1 Introduction  
This thesis compares the dynamics of migration flows and policies in the North 
American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. In each case, the countries in these 
regions lie at the heart of a complex set of arrangements governing economic 
development and migration. On one level, these frameworks constitute 
economic regimes consisting of rules and institutions which aim to foster 
regional economic integration. On another level, they can be regarded as 
broader regimes in which issues such as migration are debated and controlled. 
Regional integration aims to be the driving force for trade-oriented agreements, 
while migration issues are increasingly addressed on regional security agendas. 
Studying these two regions allows us to explore the relationship between 
regional integration, economic development and migration in both theoretical 
and policy terms. Following the neoclassical development paradigm, 
liberalisation of markets and an export-led economy for high–rate migrant 
sending countries were considered the ideal formula for stemming migration. In 
practice, however, the ways in which development and migration interact are 
more complex. 
In recent years, the migration-development nexus has been much debated 
in academic and policy communities. From the point of view of many decision-
makers, migration is an outcome of the lack of development. Hence, North-
South cooperation (as embodied in policies of “co-development”) provides a 
mechanism to stem migration. Definitions of co-development, however, vary 
and include different policy and theoretical approaches, while the variety of 
forms co-development takes includes both official “top-down” programmes and 
“bottom-up” initiatives, in which migrants are more active participants, to spur 
local development.  
From the bottom-up perspective, co-development policies are based on a 
cooperative approach focusing on the migrant as a factor of economic 
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development in both sending and receiving countries. NGOs and/or states 
collaborate with migrants to achieve co-development. The process is 
transnational given the circulation and recirculation of migrants (and their 
potential as agents of local development). Migrant-based organisations in the 
host countries carry out communal activities seeking the improvement of their 
own communities of origin. The migrant is at the heart of a consensual-
community process conducted to foster local development through a variety of 
remittances (financial, political, and cultural). This is in contrast to the top-down 
strategy of co-development which has emerged as a policy attempting to 
address the migration-development issue between the governments of 
receiving and sending states on the basis of economic liberalisation. 
The thesis examines the role of co-development by comparing the 
experience of such policies in Mexico and Morocco, two countries with long-
established histories of migration. An analysis of the historical and ongoing 
trends in emigration in both cases is at the heart of this comparison. Overall, the 
institutional regional framework has used financial aid and trade-oriented 
agreements as mechanisms to reduce the pressure to migrate. More recently, 
remittances are also regarded as a mechanism to achieve development in the 
sending regions and thereby have an impact on emigration rates. The dynamics 
of co-development are apparent at different levels of policy-making and involve 
a variety of governmental and societal actors, including migrants themselves. 
Our examination therefore adopts a “multi-level governance” approach, 
embracing the international, national and local levels as well as public and 
private actors. 
In this chapter, we outline the theoretical basis of the thesis, both in terms 
of the substance of the migration-development debate and the approach 
adopted. We start by outlining the key research questions which the thesis 
seeks to answer, providing the basis for a review of the key literatures which 
inform our approach. Substantively, we address the debate on the relationship 
between migration and development and co-development in particular. In terms 
of approach we focus on ideas of regional integration and governance and the 
way in which concepts from these literatures can be used to analyse migration 
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policy in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. The second part 
of the chapter provides a brief overview of the issues at stake regarding 
migration policy in the two regions. Finally, the chapter outlines some 
background on the methodology underlying the research and sets out the 
structure of the rest of thesis. 
1.2 Research Questions  
The main research questions centre on ways to identify: the elements of 
co-development policy and the actors who participate in policy design; the 
differences between governance of migration in the North American and Euro-
Mediterranean regions; and the way in which the multi-level governance 
approach to analysis of the issue of migration helps us understand the 
dynamics of both top-down and bottom-up co-development policies. Firstly, in 
order to understand the similarities and differences between Mexico and 
Morocco regarding the economic and social dimension, the study addresses the 
question of migration trends in both countries: what are the similarities and 
differences between Mexico and Morocco as sending countries in terms of their 
migration trends? 
Secondly, the debate about migration and development from mainstream 
international organisations and the global community of scholars and 
stakeholders leads to the question on how the policy of development is linked to 
the migration issue. In this sense, what are the main objectives of MEDA and 
PPP as development programmes and what has been the impact on Morocco 
and Mexico regarding development and migration? What has been the effect of 
the emergence of security concerns on the way in which the migration-
development nexus has been governed? 
Thirdly, the concept of co-development as depicted by a Euro-centric 
policy, poses the question how the components of migration policy are 
managed in a multi-level setting. From a comparative perspective, what has 
been the role of the different levels of governance in managing co-development 
strategies? How effective have transnational actors been in influencing or 
pursuing such strategies? How is the state responding in terms of migration 
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policies at the regional and national level and how are transnational actors 
involved in local development and its achievement at the local level 
1.2.1 The Link between Migration and Development 
Mexico and Morocco have traditionally been sending countries and, while 
different theories have attempted to identify their continuous processes of 
emigration, these countries have also become receivers of Southern migration 
flows. Lack of a successful development policy is underlined as the determining 
factor for this phenomenon. Remittances in a broad range of categories 
(technical, political, financial, and cultural, etc.) are also considered 
development factors for the same sending countries. Therefore, migration is 
considered both a consequence of the lack of development and a factor serving 
to promote development.  
In recent years, conventional wisdom concerning development has placed 
greater emphasis on the issue of migration. International organisations have 
formulated economic policies favouring trade–oriented regional agreements to 
improve the global competitiveness of less developed countries. The link 
between the causes and effects of migration has been reduced to a question of 
global labour market tendencies. Economic factors can be used to explain the 
historical and geographical destination of both Mexican and Moroccan migrants. 
Moreover, diversification of the demographic characteristics of their migratory 
phenomena can also be explained by the way social networks serve as a factor 
perpetuating migration. As a consequence, regional agreements should be 
expected to include the issue of migration. Here the question is why migration is 
still excluded from regional trade-oriented agreements when migrants are also 
considered a factor of regional production, as well as the way migration is 
addressed in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regional settings. 
Co-development is a policy adopted by receiving countries to control 
migration and in particular historically traditional flows. Critics of this model 
promote a theoretical debate on co-development, which focuses on regional 
and national policy as well as its ameliorated deployment in European receiving 
countries. Assumptions centring on the migrant‟s role in co-development draw 
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attention to the potential of transnational links for improving well-being in both 
sending and receiving countries. Employing a decentralised formula, local 
governments attempt to integrate migrants as a factor of development. However, 
due to the different political approaches adopted in the North American and 
Euro-Mediterranean regions, the practice of co-development reflects two distinct 
regional processes. Therefore, the question here is precisely who the 
proponents of co-development are. Furthermore, how do authorities and other 
actors in sending and receiving countries evolve as counterparts in a co-
development strategy? From a comparative perspective, what are the strengths 
and weaknesses of the Euro-Mediterranean and North American regions as 
spaces for fostering co-development? Moreover, to what extent could co-
development stem immigration in our case studies? Who are the institutional 
and non-institutional actors involved in the design of economic development 
policies intended to stem migration flows within the economic regions? 
1.2.2 MEDA and the PPP as Integration Mechanisms 
The other main question is related to the process of regional integration 
experienced by Morocco and Mexico. The PPP and MEDA are development 
programmes designed to extend the scope of rich neighbouring markets. The 
lack of competitiveness of agricultural sectors is the central problem to be 
addressed by trade agreements. Dislocation of the agricultural labour force, 
which in turn participates in international migration, is considered the result of 
an imbalance in trade. After more than a decade, NAFTA has failed to reduce 
migration despite more intensive trade between Mexico and its two partners, 
whilst its migratory rate has greatly increased over the same period. Therefore, 
trade-oriented development programmes can be said to correspond to 
economic expansion where migration is conceived as a negative effect in the 
short run as well as proving inefficient in the long run as a means to curtail 
migration. 
The political dimension refers to those security and political factors 
influencing the perceptions of policy makers involved in addressing migration 
issues in both sending and receiving countries. Thus, the description of the 
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institutions, actors, and processes involved in the direction of migration policy at 
different levels of policy design and implementation and how migration is 
reduced to a secured border control agreements are central in this comparative 
analysis. The question is how the components of migration policy are managed 
by multi-level policymaking.  
1.3 Literature Review 
This research utilises a variety of bibliographical sources spanning the migration, 
development, and political science disciplines including literature which 
examines the various approaches to the immigration phenomena in Europe and 
North America; literature which debates the economic dynamics of migration 
and its relationship to development; and literature which analyses the policy 
process in international settings. The thesis draws on migration and 
development literature in order to highlight the potential and problems of co-
development relative to other immigration policies, and on political science 
literature concerning multi-level governance as a way of understanding the 
dynamics of immigration policy in these two regions. While the overall approach 
is a synthesis of these different areas, this review considers each of them in 
turn.  
1.3.1 The Theoretical Debate on the Migration – Development Nexus: 
Migration, Trade and Development 
At the heart of debates on the “migration and development nexus” is the 
interaction between migration, development and trade. From an economics 
perspective, this relationship is the subject of contentious debate. The 
perspective of many “orthodox” economists is that, as free trade blocs, both 
NAFTA and EuroMed will ease migration pressures if trade and migration are, 
indeed, substitutes  (de Melo and Faini, 1995; Faini and de Melo, 1996; Martin 
and Taylor, 1996: 413; Taylor, 1996; Martin, 2003a). Hence, cooperation 
through regional integration should enable countries to deal with migration flows. 
However, according to Martin and Taylor (1996), this is not the case for our 
current trade and migration models. Factors such as differences in technology 
and skills affect comparative advantages within the trade relationship. 
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Furthermore, following research by Martin and Taylor (1996) that refers to 
the “migration hump”, development could result in a short term increase in 
migration between sending and receiving countries since increasing incomes 
would permit further migration before income equilibrium is achieved. In the 
longer term, however, it is suggested that employment as a result of free trade 
in fair conditions along with improvements in labour force skills might lead to a 
reduction in immigration (Martin, 1996; Martin and Taylor, 1996; Taylor, 1996).  
The debate has continued by examining the consequences of trade 
liberalisation on differences in the wages and welfare of unskilled workers in a 
“North-South” economic regional area (what the economist Faini refers to as the 
“trade-jobs debate”). International economists have argued that trade 
liberalisation does not affect workers‟ welfare in the industrial countries. 
Moreover, when talking about developing countries, they are in agreement 
concerning the positive effects on unskilled workers in a liberalised region 
versus those in a protected one. In his review of Wood‟s work, Faini notes that 
Wood supports the idea that liberalisation has a negative impact on skilled 
workers even in developing countries. Furthermore, Wood (1996) suggests that 
African and Latin American countries could receive the benefits of trade 
liberalisation provided they expand their semi-skilled labour force, although 
semi-skilled workers would tend to migrate to developed countries in search of 
better prospects. Wood warns, however, that the above statement might only be 
true to a certain extent, pointing to the different distributional effects of trade 
openness in the cases of Latin America and East Asia. He highlights such 
factors as a greater international mobility of capital, discriminatory trade 
liberalisation, and perverse trade-policy effects that serve to undermine a 
benign process of trade liberalisation (Wood, 1997).   
In an earlier defence of trade liberalisation as a positive influence in 
deterring migration, Martin and Taylor concluded that trade liberalisation could 
reduce migration pressure both by contributing to higher domestic income and 
by fostering employment growth (Martin and Taylor, 1996). On the other hand, 
the authors Schiff and Winters contest this theory of migration and trade as 
substitutes. They argue that North–South trade and migration might be 
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complements leading to increased migration.  From this perspective, trade can 
supply the capital required to pay for travel as well as information about the 
destination country (Schiff and Winters, 2003). 
An opposing perspective on the effect of development argues that this 
cannot be used as a device to stem emigration since development increases 
migration (at least in the short run), making it no longer a middle class 
phenomenon (Massey, 1988; Tapinos, 2002). It was the high cost of travel that 
previously kept the poorest sector of the population from participating in 
migration (Bustamante, Reynolds, and Hinojosa Ojeda, 1992; Castles and Miller, 
1993). Hinojosa (2001) suggests a scenario where the legalisation of migrant 
workers and investment in the sending regions of Mexico would break up the 
current labour dynamics between the US and Mexico. He argues that current 
anti-migration policies are based upon the US economy‟s dependence on low-
income migration which is a factor that increases demand for undocumented 
workers. This fact, along with the lack of investment in sending communities 
and the negative impacts of free trade liberalisation, serves to widen the gap in 
low-wage incomes and equity among those FTA members. 
Beyond the effects of trade liberalisation on labour markets, Faini 
concludes that globalisation intensifies the interaction between foreign direct 
investment, trade and migration(Faini, 2004). Economic policies in the 1990s 
considered free trade and FDI as complements which would foster development. 
Meanwhile, migration and trade have been seen as substitutes. According to 
this approach, the capability of a developing country to expand the traded 
services sector is positively correlated to migration. However, Faini outlines the 
risk of the lack of coherence between policies that curtail immigration on the 
one hand, and others which foster trade and foreign investment on the other, as 
these are co-dependent. The lack of skilled workers discourages FDI in 
developing countries and, consequently, its absence deters investment in 
further education. The scenario is aggravated because the industrial world 
attracts skilled workers provoking a brain drain in the developing world. Trade 
policy and migration are linked; the restriction in trade would inhibit exports from 
developing countries and increase the push factors. Thus, a disruption in the 
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liberalised market would have consequences for migration where a protected 
sector in an industrial country would create demand for migrants from 
developing countries. From his perspective, trade and migration are 
complements rather than substitutes (Faini, 2004).  
According to Pastor (2003), in the case of NAFTA integration may have 
negative effects on different parts of the economy, varying from sector to sector 
as well as between geographical regions. In the same line, Hanson concludes 
that the globalisation process in Mexico since 1985 has increased wage 
inequalities and poverty between those regions with a low and high exposure to 
foreign investment and trade (Hanson, 2005).  Nevertheless, it is the political 
factor which constrains full integration since such an objective would require 
extensive development policies.  
Skeldon (1997) seems to support Lewis‟s theory of development in 
concluding that migration might be necessary for development since it is a 
natural process by which surplus labour in the rural sector is released to provide 
the workforce for the modern urban industrial economy. As Jolly notes, “one of 
the reasons given for trying to increase productivity in the agricultural sector 
was to release sufficient labour for urban industrialisation” (Jolly, 1970: 4). 
Todaro argues that this assumption is no longer held among economists 
because of the low capacity for integrating rural migration into the urban sector, 
and that therefore migration is perceived as both a symptom of, and contribution 
to, underdevelopment (Todaro and Smith, 2003). 
In some of the literature on economic development and political economy 
there is a comparison between Mexico and Morocco as migrant-sending 
countries. This literature highlights similarities in terms of their historical, 
geographical, economic, and political links with their neighbouring partners 
within a regional economic framework (Faini and de Melo, 1996; Schiff, 1996b; 
Taylor, 1996; Castles and Miller, 1998; Mansvelt Beck and De Mas, 2001; 
Salama, 2002). In both cases, Mexico and Morocco have attempted to include 
in their free trade area negotiation agendas the issue of the liberalisation of 
agricultural products. This is a sensitive issue due to economic policies which 
protect local producers in the US and the EU. However, according to some 
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economists, the liberalisation of agricultural products, whereby trade could be 
carried out on equal terms, might indeed be an effective mechanism for 
stemming migration to the North (Martin, 1996). Furthermore, Martin and Taylor 
(1996) suggest that one does not rely solely on free trade given the short-term 
negative impacts leading to increased migration flows and the decreased 
economic dynamics of sectors in which the impact is negative on agriculture 
while services enjoy increased productivity. Therefore, the surplus labour force 
that cannot be absorbed by dynamic sectors will be attracted by another labour 
market. As an alternative, the issue could be included in trade negotiations and 
in the development of cooperative policies with emigrant countries for the 
management of migration flows. 
1.3.2 The consequences of migration for development: remittance 
and “brain drain” effects. 
A review of policy maker assessments and mainstream development theories 
would conclude that migration is the outcome of a lack of development.  As 
Massey explains, “a common belief among lawmakers, policy specialists, and 
the public is that migration from developing countries stems from a lack of 
economic development” (Massey, 1988: 383).  An important part of the debate 
on development and migration relates to whether migration has a positive or 
negative impact on development in the sending country (de Haas, 2003b; Kapur 
et al., 2003; Farrant et al., 2006).  If one takes the view that underdevelopment 
is the cause of migration, development should reduce the pressures for 
migration.  Whether migration causes underdevelopment or development 
causes migration are assumptions that have been contested by migration 
scholars throughout the history of migration studies (Massey, 1988). However, 
there is also the question of whether migration is a factor shaping development. 
In considering the effects of migration on development, two particular issues 
have been debated – the impact of remittances and the consequences of “brain 
drain” effects. 
Remittances as capital flows for investment in sending regions have been 
seen as potentially important in fostering development (OECD, 2005). There is 
16 
 
 
moreover a debate about the possible beneficial or detrimental effects of 
remittances in a broader sense, not only as capital flows but as political, 
educational and social remittances (Levitt, 2001).  So far, financial remittances 
have been the most studied element, whether in the analysis of macroeconomic 
effects by international development institution or in studies of the impacts at 
the national level. However, there is still a need to examine the micro level 
which focuses on strategies in households and sending communities as units of 
analysis. Such studies require more multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary 
analytical frameworks. For instance, to measure educational or cultural 
remittances as an influence on migration would require longitudinal research, 
although some insights can be deduced in the short term. Instead, local 
infrastructure in sending communities as well as business and households 
financed with remittances are the most tangible benefits of migration in terms of 
local development. Overall, therefore, remittances-based development as a 
mechanism to inhibit migration can be assessed only in the long term. 
Remittances as flows of capital used to sustain economic growth have an 
undoubtedly beneficial effect on the sending country‟s macroeconomic 
indicators (Adams and Page, 2003; Ratha, 2003; Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; 
Guptaa et al., 2008). However, there is less of a consensus concerning the 
microeconomic benefits of migration in general. Several studies focus on the 
use of remittances by households, the unit of analysis used for measuring 
benefits (Cohen, 2001; Adams, 2007; Alarcón and Rabadán, 2009). On the one 
hand, those claiming there are benefits conclude that remittances are used to 
alleviate poverty and represent a strategy for supporting migrants‟ families 
(Stark, 1991; Adams and Page, 2003). On the other hand, there are studies 
claiming that the inequity generated by those receiving remittances leads to 
inflation in real estate and commodity prices in sending communities. There are 
also debates as to whether remittances are used for investment in “productive 
projects” or only for the consumption of goods. Duran et al. (1996) survey high 
rates of consumption  in sending regions in Mexico and conclude that, even if 
most remittances are used to acquire consumer goods rather than for 
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investment in productive projects, such expenditure leads to an indirect 
“multiplier” effect.  
Research conducted by international development agencies has focused 
on the macroeconomic potential of remittances to boost development as well as 
the extent to which migrants are able to send financial resources (López 
Cordova, 2004; OECD, 2005). The question of whether remittances translate 
into development seems to depend upon the migrant per se as the channel for 
financial flows. In contrast, the microeconomic level study focuses on the 
migrant as part of a household within a community that interacts with and 
impacts upon local development. Policy makers from sending countries have 
considered migration as a safety valve for containing unemployment, a source 
of capital for stabilising the balance of payments and even as a substitute for 
the government‟s budget destined for sending communities. By contrast, 
migration researchers have questioned the contribution of remittances to boost 
development due to economic and infrastructure constraints in developing 
countries (de Haas, 2003b; Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004). 
The extent to which migration entails a “brain drain” from developing 
countries with adverse effects on development is also contested. Taylor and 
Mora argue that there is a vicious circle whereby underdevelopment provides 
the incentives for migration and migration perpetuates underdevelopment since 
it acts as a drain on the labour force required to boost development (Taylor and 
Mora, 2006: 11). It might be argued that, if the unskilled labour force is 
abundant in sending countries then migration would have a positive impact in 
the sending region. However, if the number of skilled workers or the productive 
human capital emigrating from rural sectors is larger than that remaining, then 
the consequences are a negative impact on production: effectively, migration 
fosters a “brain drain” from the sending country (Taylor, 2006: 3).  
In the debate on the costs and benefits of migration for developing 
countries, Faini and other authors believe that the “brain drain” is detrimental to 
development (Lowell B. and Findlay, 2001: 11). Schiff‟s work on brain drain 
versus brain gain approaches concludes that the brain drain surpasses brain 
gain due to the limited return assets from highly skilled migrants (Schiff, 2005). 
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While skilled workers are considered “welcome” immigration in industrial 
countries, they represent a drain on investment in education for most 
developing countries. In contrast, the brain gain approach assumes that the 
return of highly-skilled workers is a factor that increases productive efficiency in 
developing countries (Stark et al., 1997; Patterson, 2006). This debate is 
centred on the likelihood of skilled migrants returning  (Weil, 2002: 42; Martin et 
al., 2002) and increased investment in education as factors having a positive 
impact on human capital and economic growth. This is despite the fact that 
human capital theory correlates higher levels of education with a greater 
likelihood to migrate (Adams, 2007: 5). Returning migration for short-term 
periods, which includes high-skilled workers as well as less-skilled migrants, 
has been shown to have a positive impact on development (Black et al., 2003). 
In contrast, those claiming there is a brain drain argue that the reduction in 
overall levels of education in sending countries diminishes their competitiveness 
and attractiveness for foreign investors (Faini, 2004). 
The relative effects of these two features of migration – remittances and 
brain drain – have also been debated. Sriskandarajah (2005) identifies positive 
and negative effects of migration on development. The positive effects are 
those related to the transfer of a wide range of remittances such as technology 
transfer, investment and capital from diasporas, and the associated social 
consequences of investing in communal projects. The sending country benefits 
from increased trade with the receiving country and reduced unemployment in 
certain sectors. The main negative effects are associated with a possible brain 
drain, which could reduce growth and productivity, and with the adverse effects 
of remittances on inflation, income distribution and dependency.  
Reinforcing a positive perspective of migration as an element of 
development, Levitt and Nyber-Noressen assert that remittances are a decisive 
factor in the economic development of sending communities. They also reject 
the idea of brain drain as a negative consequence of migration  for developing 
countries and instead focus on brain gain as a positive result of 
transnationalism (Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004). 
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Given the lack of consensus on whether migration is beneficial or 
detrimental to development, a number of theories have sought to explain the 
impact of migration on development. The historical–structuralist school 
considers migration detrimental to the sending country since it loses strong, 
young and healthy workers. The concept of cumulative causation promoted by 
Myrdal (1956: 9) considers migration as a determining factor for persisting 
underdevelopment. According to this argument, migrants are “pushed” to serve 
the capitalist developed world while draining labour and raw materials from the 
developing world, maintaining a relationship of dependency (de Haas, 2003b: 
41). In contrast, neoclassical theory, which assumes that the best allocation of 
resources will foster economic development, sees migration as a response to 
labour market forces (Todaro, 1977). In a further explanation of the “pulling” 
factors, the dual labour approach focuses on the economic dependence from 
the industrial countries on the immigration labour (Piore, 1979). 
From the socio-demographic perspective, some authors consider 
differences in population growth rates as another pull factor for continuing 
emigration. Growing populations in the sending country versus aging 
populations in receiving countries contributes to push-pull migration dynamics 
(Castles, 1998; Copeland, 2000a; Stalker, 2002). Along with this approach, we 
find those authors who emphasise social networks and economic instability as 
factors perpetuating emigration (Massey et al., 1987). These same approaches 
consider transnational migrant organisations as key actors for the channelling of 
economic, social, technological, and even political remittances as instruments 
for co-development (Portes et al., 2001; Martin et al., 2002). 
The literature on the new economics of labour migration has reviewed the 
unit of analysis used in the migration-development debate and provided 
answers to empirical evidence demonstrating that migrant communities pursue 
communal livelihood strategies (Stark and Bloom, 1985). How much a migrant 
sends is a question that has prompted several studies which target households 
rather than individual migrants as a unit of analysis. As households are part of a 
community, social network theories understand migration as a strategy used to 
increase household income, spread the risk and gain access to capital. Social 
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and political remittances are also taken into account as migrants participate in 
the activities of their communities of origin (Goldring, 2002b). This theoretical 
framework offers a broadly positive perspective of the relationship between 
migration and development and advocates circular and managed migration. 
Taking into account the role of remittances in income growth in sending 
countries, economic policy analysts propose a set of mechanisms to ensure that 
a steady flow of remittances is maintained and that migration flows are 
managed. Cooperation between sending and receiving countries is seen as a 
basic element to enhance a positive interaction between migration and 
development (Dayton-Johnson et al., 2007). 
1.3.3 Co-development: a Contested Concept. 
The interaction between migration and development and the need for 
cooperation between sending and receiving countries around this interaction 
have been central to the debate on “co-development”. The concept of co-
development was initially developed by the French government as part of a 
policy to encourage return migration (Malgesini, 2003). This return policy 
involved migrants as the main actors since they would foster development in the 
place of origin by means of self-employment generated by the provision of 
financial and technical assistance. Sami Nair is considered the “father” of 
French Co-development policy. In 1997 he was appointed the Chargé de la 
Mission Interministérielle Migrations/Codéveloppement with the main task of 
defining the political guidelines for co-development (El Mouaatamid et al., 2005). 
New elements in his approach were the involvement of migrants in an 
innovative return policy for the purposes of economic reintegration and 
migration while maintaining the previous inter-state coordinated policy. Visas, 
instead of economic aid, would be granted to those successfully reintegrated in 
the sending country (Nair, 1997). However, the policy failed to achieve the 
expected massive deportation: in 2001 the total number of returning migrants 
was just 575 for all origin countries (Lacroix, 2005). The problem with the policy 
was that it was based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the likelihood of 
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migrants returning to their home countries. Table 1-1 provides additional 
information on these attempts to apply co-development principles in practice.  
Although the policy can be criticised for its limited impact, it had some 
positive aspects. It brought together the components of a transnational 
relationship enabling the diaspora to liaise with and invest in communities of 
origin. Assessing the policy‟s impact in terms of inhibiting migration is more 
complex and requires consideration of local development projects positively 
affecting the hometowns of migrants. As Nair states, the originality of co-
development is to make the migrant an actor with a key role in development 
(Nair, 1997). 
Subsequently, non-governmental organisations debated the efficacy of 
such initiatives for financing return migration and the use of remittances to 
replace aid and entrepreneurial aid for local development in sending countries. 
One of the main arguments was that the mainstream policy did not take into 
account the migrant-led investment projects already pursued by the migrants for 
their origin communities and the focus on return rather than integration in the 
host country. A distinction between co-development as a policy and as a 
migrant experience is evident in the academic debate on co-development which 
has challenged co-development as a policy and proposed that it be revised to 
centre on the well-being of migrants and their role as agents of development.  
The early attempts at such a policy prompted an academic debate on the 
nature of co-development and its relationship to the migration-development 
nexus. The theoretical approach adopted by some authors envisaged co-
development as a policy involving governments from sending and receiving 
countries in “the management of both legal and illegal migratory flows” along 
with policies that foster “the economic and demographic development of both 
sending and receiving countries” (Weil, 2001: 2) Moreover, it should be 
designed “not to block, but smoothly regulate the circulation and re-circulation of 
the majority of foreigners and immigrants” (Weil, 2002: 45). It would link 
immigration policy with development, with host countries seeking to encourage 
voluntary return accompanied by financial assistance and/or technical training 
(Martin et al., 2002 ). 
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In recent years the debate on co-development has moved in many 
directions. A conceptual review of the term “co-development”, as described in 
several official documents as well as in the migration policy literature, reveals a 
differentiation in terms of its meaning. Throughout this thesis the concept is 
explored in different contexts in order to analyse how it is used by those actors 
involved in the theoretical debate as well as in migration policy. This review of 
the literature on co-development explores the concept‟s diverse meanings.  
An attempt to provide a global approach to co-development was presented 
in the First High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 
conducted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 (UN General 
Assembly, 2006a: 3). This dialogue highlighted how migrant communities had 
significant potential to contribute to the development of their countries of origin. 
A number of countries had taken measures to strengthen ties with their 
nationals abroad and to encourage highly skilled workers in the direction of 
return and circular migration (UN General Assembly, 2006a: 3) Moreover, “... 
through co-development projects, migrant entrepreneurs had been agents of 
development in their countries of origin. The role of international migrants in 
transferring know-how, skills, technology, expertise, and new ways of thinking to 
their countries of origin is also underscored” (Al Khalifa, 2006: 969). 
Support for the principle was also provided by a report for the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. From this perspective, “the 
interaction between migration and development could be most successfully 
achieved through co-development policies, given the fact that migration 
contributes to sustainable development and that, in turn, development 
contributes to the management of migration. Co-development is of value for 
European as well as North-South co-operation” (Parliamentary Assembly, 2006). 
According to Weil, co-development can be regarded as a “coherent policy 
of cooperation between receiving and source states in the management of 
migrant flows - also known as co-development - in order to effect positive 
outcomes for host nations, countries of origin, and for immigrants themselves” 
(Weil, 2002: 45). His definition implies a migration-management policy which 
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could bring benefits to both sides only if it permits the circulation of immigrants, 
the recirculation of skilled persons, retirees, and seasonal workers (Weil, 2002).  
Graciela Malgesini, a Spanish scholar, describes elements from her own 
definition of what co-development should mean, including: “equal treatment for 
migrants, as individuals with full rights”; “a participative proposal emerging from 
dialogue and consensus which includes the participation of migrant-based 
organisations, development-related NGOs, host and sending country 
governments as well as the European Union”; measures which are “voluntary 
(non-compulsory, not linked to forced repatriation) and progressive”; “financial 
resources and sufficient means in relation to proposed objectives and volume”; 
“realism in terms of time and effectiveness”; “adaptation of each subprogramme 
to the socio-economic and cultural conditions of each flow”; “special attention to 
the problematic of gender”; “the conversion of migrants into local development 
actors” and “public messages to favour development within the society we are 
born into as a basic human right” (Malgesini, 2003: 97). From her perspective, 
co-development policy should be accompanied by a fair migratory policy which 
considers migrants‟ rights, penalties for traffickers, revision of quotas, a broader 
list of bases for seeking asylum, as well as public messages discouraging 
xenophobic reactions (Malgesini, 1998). 
In the Spanish academic sphere, intellectuals, journalists, scholars and 
Arabic world researchers have intensively discussed the concept of co-
development together with the elements it should embody, its main objectives 
and mechanisms. They generally agree that co-development should be based 
on promoting an increase in the living standards of the migrant population as 
transnational communities should be able to promote welfare in their sending 
region as well as in the receiving one (Rodríguez Gil, 1998; Casas Alvarez, 
2000; Alonso et al., 2003; Malgesini, 2003). 
As this review shows, therefore, there is no single definition of co-
development but rather a number of factors which are featured in all 
approaches, such as greater North-South cooperation and the role of migrants. 
Policy perspectives tend to emphasise greater North-South cooperation to 
manage migration as well as institutional arrangements for managing financial 
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aid or remittances with the aim of promoting development. Sending countries 
and their migrants emerge as active participants in stemming migration, either 
cooperating on the restriction of flows and/or increasing living standards in the 
communities of origin (Fernández, 2006: 40). In contrast to this policy 
perspective – which is focused more on management than development – are 
those theoretical perspectives which envisage the development of highly flexible 
migration policies (Malgesini, 2003). 
In sum, the meaning of co-development is not precisely defined in the 
literature and different usages refer to different instruments linking the 
management of migration to the promotion of development. Moreover, this 
process of involving sending and receiving countries is not always fully 
embodied in immigration management proposals. Nevertheless, co-
development has become part of the political and academic debate on how 
development policies should address the migration issue. The debate between 
migration scholars has its basis in the concept of cooperation between both 
sending-receiving countries and the promotion of development though migration 
rather than restrictive policies related to co-development. My own definition 
refers to “co-development” as a policy which aims to improve the economic 
situation of migrants in both sending and receiving countries by fostering a 
cooperative approach between migrant communities on the one hand and 
NGOs and/or Public Authorities on the other. This process is essentially 
transnational in nature, spurring the circulation and recirculation of migrants 
who become the agents of local development.  
The following table provides an overview of the different dimensions of co-
development whether as a state-led policy or as a migrant-led strategy. 
Although the migrant is always present as the subject, the approaches differ in 
the extent to which the migrant plays an active or passive role.  Moreover, there 
are important distinctions in the mechanisms of co-development and the 
governmental and non-governmental actors involved. Table 1.2 presents a 
stylised characterisation of the approaches, making a distinction between state-
led (top-down) and migrant-led (bottom-up) models. As we will see, however, in 
practice this distinction is blurred and the relationships more interlinked. 
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1.3.4 Understanding Migration Policy: from Governments to 
Governance 
So far we have focused on the debates surrounding migration and development.  
While these constitute the issues which are substantively at the heart of the 
dissertation, our other objective is to explore the dynamics of how migration and 
development issues were played out in policy terms.  The migratory policies 
pursued by governments in the US and the EU have been based on two main 
approaches: the control approach where the main issue is to establish 
restrictive legislation in the destination countries (Cornelius et al., 1994; 
Brochmann, 1999; Cornelius, 2001) and the developmental approach which 
aims to foster equitable and sustained growth in the sending countries (Martin, 
1995; Taylor et al., 1996; Martin et al., 2002 ; Faini, 2004). Immigration and 
security are linked in their migration control policies (Kostakopoulou, 2000; 
Leiken, 2002) while development is based on free-trade agreements with the 
goal of preventing illegal immigration (Martin, 1995; Taylor et al., 1996; Martin et 
al., 2002; Faini, 2004). 
International migration might be explained as an element of this current 
economic order, but migratory policy has generally been dealt with politically 
within nation states and, to some extent, international organisations (Soysal, 
1994; Hoffmann-Nowotni, 1997; Milner, 1998). Such approaches assume that 
the state is at the heart of immigration policy. While this may be true in many 
respects, it is possible to argue that other factors affect migration and migration 
policy. In this sense, migration may be an example of the growing importance of 
other forms of governance beyond those provided by traditional state actors. In 
recent years there has been increasing academic debate about the erosion of 
the nation state relative to authorities at the sub- and supranational levels as 
well as to other political actors. Authority is dispersed upwards, downwards and 
sideways from the nation state: governance is becoming as important as 
government in understanding how and where policy is made. Guy Peters 
outlines various circumstances where the state‟s capabilities are transmitted to 
other realms such as markets, networks, or international organisations (Peters, 
2000). 
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Migration as a phenomenon involving governments and transnational 
societies can also be analysed through this lens of governance. From Peters‟ 
perspective, every aspect of a government‟s intervention is performed to 
differing degrees with other groups whether at other levels of public authority or 
with civil society. At the international level, regional organisations are adopting 
wider-oriented objectives while multilateral organisations have been important in 
setting the terms for programmes of economic reform and development.  At the 
level of the nation state, Peters and Pierre highlight the importance of networks 
as a central component shaping the goals and preferences of governments 
(Peters and Pierre, 2002: 8). Regarding the local level, Peters refers to formal 
and informal relations between local governments and private organisations. 
Decentralisation emerges as a new form of governance which allows the 
participation of local governments. Local development is a field of action where 
migrants and government are converging in this kind of governance. Informal 
relations give way to migrant organisations which are certainly now a political 
force in the decision making process for the allocation of public and private 
resources. 
A key component of the thesis will therefore be an analysis of the political 
context for immigration and immigration policy which takes into account this 
governance perspective. While traditionally the focus of analysis would be on 
the nation state, the case studies offered here highlight the way in which 
migration as a phenomenon transcends national borders and the increasingly 
coordinated response among countries in at least a regional setting. 
1.3.5 Approaches to Regional Integration 
This leads us to ask whether the use of current economic-political 
approaches to regional integration could help in our understanding of this 
process. At the heart of the thesis are developments within two core regions – 
North America and the EU – both of which have been extensively examined by 
theorists of regional integration. NAFTA and the EU as regional agreements are 
at the centre of various comparative studies in terms of the degree and nature 
of integration, leading to the theoretical review of their similarities and 
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differences (Anderson and O‟ Dowd, 1999). International relations theory 
approaches the formation of regional blocs from different angles. The study of 
regionalism can be divided into two main periods: 1950 to 1980 and from 1980 
onwards (O'Brien, 1995). These periods have been referred to as constituting 
“old” and “new” regionalisms by, amongst others, Splinder (2002) to explain 
changes in the evolution and construction of regional arrangements. 
Accordingly, post World War II regionalism emerged as a liberal response to 
interwar protectionism whereas new regionalism refers to an open world system 
in the process of globalisation (Lawrence, 1996). 
From a more multi-dimensional perspective, O‟Brien reviews different 
theoretical approaches to explain regionalism during these two main periods. 
Neo-functionalism and state interest theories have dominated much of the 
literature historically (though there have also been more structurally based 
approaches). Despite the varied emphasis given to each factor involved, these 
theories still take into account a geo-strategic spatial dimension within a 
delimited region. State centric approaches stress the state‟s interest while neo-
functionalism emphasises transnational interaction between interest groups and 
bureaucrats (O'Brien, 1995).  
The second period of regional integration theory has been marked by an 
adaptation of older debates and in particular the emergence of globalisation as 
a phenomenon. High rates of interaction between states, societies and 
economies are stressed when using this perspective. Following this theoretical 
revision, interstate bargaining stresses the behaviour of the state as an 
influential factor to slow or accelerate integration which is shaped by the 
traditional state interests of sovereignty and security. Global Political Economy 
emerges in this analysis as a way of comparing the evolution of regionalisation 
in NAFTA and the EU and how systemic forces influence regional, national and 
transnational responses. Epistemic communities play a decisive role in policy 
making as they embody “a network of professionals with recognised expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy –
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992: 3; Cited in 
O'Brien, 1995: 710). In the case of NAFTA, Mexicans and Canadians were 
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professionals acting as transnational actors belonging to the political and 
economic elite sharing “the prescription of the neoclassical economics for 
economic growth” (O'Brien, 1995: 710). The behaviour of states in this sense 
reflects a liberal project to establish low cost production as a comparative 
advantage to compete with other regions where they are contested by popular 
groups. 
In their attempts to explain the new regionalism, IR theorists have studied 
those factors constraining and shaping regions and the categorisation of 
regionalism varies according to the social, geopolitical and economic orientation. 
Hurrell identifies five categories in his review of the theoretical and empirical 
dimensions of regionalism: regionalisation, regional awareness and Identity, 
interstate cooperation, state-led integration and regional consolidation. Of 
particular relevance to this study is his first category of regionalisation which 
underlines economic and commercial factors as driving forces that delimit a 
region. It highlights an increased interdependence resulting from the intense 
interaction of economic actors (markets, private traders and investors as well as 
companies) within a determined geographical area. States have a limited 
influence on such regionalisation processes; instead, cross-border interactions 
(migrants, markets and social networks) are the drivers of “transnational 
regionalism”. Hurrell uses the Northern Mexico-Southern California area as an 
example comparable to trans-border growth triangles within Europe (Hurrell, 
1995). 
Another current has centred the debate on the regionalisation-
globalisation relationship. Does regionalisation facilitate globalisation or is it a 
reaction to it? Several authors attempt to analyse regionalisation in terms of its 
contrast vis-à-vis globalisation. On the one hand, the process of creating 
delimited geopolitical or geo-economic spaces as a result of nation-state 
arrangements describes regionalisation, on the other; the process of an open 
world without boundaries enabling flows of capital and goods refers to 
globalisation (Nesadurai, 2002). 
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1.3.6 The concept of Multi-level Governance 
While the relationship between regionalisation and globalisation has been at the 
heart of much debate on regionalism, there has also been a debate on the 
dynamics of particular regional processes which draws on the concept of 
governance highlighted above. In a European setting, the traditional 
approaches of neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism have been 
challenged by the multi-level governance perspective. Inter-governmentalist 
approaches would see member states remaining central to policy (only 
cooperating within strict limits) while neo-functionalists would see a common 
approach to immigration issues as "spilling over" as a result of economic 
pressures within the region. Both, however, would emphasise the formal and 
harmonised aspects of European policy, either reinforcing or transcending the 
nation-state. The macro, meso and micro levels envisaged by multi-level 
governance scholars do not deny that the state is a unit of analysis, but argue 
that it interacts with different state and non-state actors, thereby producing a 
multi-level politics framework (Smith, 1997; Benz, 1999; Scharpf, 2000; Sutcliffe, 
2000).  
Hooghe and Marks have described at least two types of multi-level 
governance. The first type “conceives of dispersion of authority to multi-task, 
territorially mutually exclusively jurisdictions in a relatively stable system with 
limited jurisdictional levels and limited units” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 4). The 
second type, “pictures specialised, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a 
relatively flexible, non-tiered system with a large number of jurisdictions”   
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 9). Taking these concepts of multi-level governance 
in tandem with broader notions of governance, such as those developed by 
Peters and Pierre (2002), may provide the basis for a better understanding of 
the overall migration regime in the Euro-Mediterranean and North American 
regions.  Indeed, while it has generally been used to analyse intra-EU policy 
making, multi-level governance as an approach is more easily applicable to 
cases involving the EU's relations with its neighbours (such as EuroMed) and 
other examples of regional integration (such as NAFTA) than are the 
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traditionally EU-centric approaches of neo-functionalism and inter-
governmentalism. 
1.3.7 Regionalism and Migration 
Having considered some of the ways in which questions of governance 
have addressed regional issues, we now turn to their relevance in analysing 
migration.  The need to address migration issues from a regionalist perspective 
is clear but what sorts of frameworks have been applied and what kinds of 
assumptions have been made? For some authors, Regional Integration 
Agreements (RIAs) are potential mechanisms for creating links between 
strategic geopolitical neighbours and for addressing sensitive issues such as 
migration. These agreements aim to increase free trade as a political channel to 
ease political relationships with non-democratic neighbours (Schiff and Winters, 
2002; Schiff and Winters, 2003). Schiff explains RIAs “as a means of preventing 
or reducing the spread of civil disturbances or civil war from neighbouring 
nations for controlling migratory flows” (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 196). 
Accordingly, this is the ulterior motive of the EU in its promotion of Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements. Moreover, “mutual investment or migration flows 
also can stimulate trust, as can the meetings between public servant that are 
necessary for policy cooperation” (Schiff and Winters, 1998: 277). 
However, this literature does not explore the policy-making processes 
undertaken in the regional framework to deal with the migration issue. It 
reduces the migration issue to a sending-receiving relationship framework and 
limits discussion to the lack of harmonised policies (Paul-Marie, 1996). These 
facts lead us to believe that cooperation should underline this relationship and 
therefore political willingness should prevail. According to some authors, 
however, this is not self-evident when immigration control policies in the 
receiving countries are analysed. Nevertheless, the development project is 
limited to liberalising economies and expanding markets (García Alvarez-Coque, 
2002). 
One attempt to examine the way in which regional integration agreements 
have dealt with migration issues has been presented by Pellerin. Examining the 
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cases of NAFTA and the EU, Pellerin considers the relevance of theories of 
integration to their engagement with migration policy. From her perspective, the 
neofunctionalist theory “emphasises the role of regional institutions in migration” 
and “overlooks the shift from the public to the private sector in the management 
of migration” (Pellerin, 1999b: 998). In this sense, convergence of migration 
policies at the regional level is the result of a decision-making process shaped 
by the eroded state and the emergence of private actors (migrants and 
business sectors). Thus, the idea of further harmonisation of migration polices 
can be explained by the need of the state to seek supranational rules to reach 
agreements at the regional level. However, as we will see, while migration is an 
important regional issue, the institutional responses have varied considerably. 
The diversity of levels of authority and the engagement of a variety of 
actors with those authorities is apparent in the development of policy in the EU 
and, arguably, the North American region. In the case of the EU it is clear there 
is a well developed set of institutions which preside over policy making along 
with a practice of “intensive interactions between national policy makers” 
(Wallace, 2000: 6). But the role of these national and supranational actors 
varies and often involves a range of other non-governmental players. 
According to Helen Wallace, there are not only different levels of 
interactions, or locations, as she calls them, but also different domains where 
transnational actions define the policy making process. Non-state and 
transnational actors are influencing domestic economic regimes and 
international politics (Wallace and Wallace, 2000). Thus, the issue of 
international migration is not confined to only one EU institution and certain 
state interests or local powers but depends on the sphere of influence of every 
institution, delimited by its procedural system at different levels of governance 
and with different degrees of interaction among partners (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001). Therefore, even though in the case of immigration management 
functions are concentrated in state institutions, the inputs and outputs of its 
policy dynamics include different levels of interactions among state institutions 
and global agreements 
 
34 
 
 
1.3.8 Migration and Multi-level Governance 
One way of approaching the regional dimension of migration is through 
multi-level governance. Moreover, although initially developed in an EU setting, 
this approach has the potential to be applied to regional settings other than the 
EU. Harlan Koff‟s studies of cross border integration have examined the 
interaction between units from a multi-level perspective. He sees the US border 
as a space created by interactions between two communities which have 
influenced the overall international framework, a process similar to the bottom–
up process of multi-level governance (Koff, 2008: 563). In an analysis of the 
similarities and differences between regional integration processes which 
focuses on cross border interactions, Blatter distinguishes between a “multi-
level” system in the EU and a “multi-polity” system in the NAFTA (Blatter, 2001). 
He believes the multi-level governance approach offers a contrast between the 
different layers of the EU‟s highly institutionalised system on the one hand and 
the more weakly institutionalised but intensely interactive NAFTA region on the 
other (Blatter, 2001).  
In what ways has this approach been applied to analysis of migration and 
migration policies? Based on a review of literature on migration studies, 
Giovana Zincone and Tiziana Caponio identify a “fourth and half generation” of 
studies on “the issue of the multi-level governance of immigrants and 
immigration” (Zincone and Caponio, 2004:1). The design of migration policies 
has mainly been studied from a top-down perspective which assesses the 
impact of supranational institutions on the state. However, there is a trend 
towards looking at local level policy using a bottom up perspective. 
Nevertheless, migrant associations and their impact on the EU‟s migration 
governance have not been studied using a comparative perspective. 
Comparative studies between the EU and NAFTA are mainly concerned with 
the process of integration and its impact on migration as a collateral issue rather 
than as an element of regional integration. 
There are other references to the NAFTA and EU regionalism regarding 
integration of the migration issue using a systemic approach. Despite the 
regular distinction between the two entities on the basis of different stages of 
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interdependence and organisational governance, migration flows from North 
Africa to Spain and from Mexico to the US are referred to as being at similar 
stages (Muus and van Dam, 1996; King et al., 2001). The Euro-Mediterranean 
has been described as an “EU mini-NAFTA” in terms of the dynamics of 
regional integration and cooperation on migration policies (Miller and Stefanova, 
2006: 563). Irregular migration and control of the external border is also a point 
of comparison in different studies which share a state-centric approach to 
analysis of the governance of migration in both regions (Cornelius et al., 1994; 
Martin et al., 2002; Pastor, 2003; Weintraub, 2004b). However, the inclusion of 
immigrants as a unit of analysis and their influence on migration policies is out 
the scope of these comparisons, largely ignoring its influence on the dynamics 
of regional migration governance. This gap in the multi-level analysis is 
addressed by recent studies that also compare both regions and the potential of 
migrants as actors in development (de Haas, 2006b).  
The policy-making process of migratory policies has been traditionally 
studied as a component of the state‟s domestic politics. Within a state-centric 
framework, the main unit of analysis is the central government influenced by 
both domestic and, to some extent, international considerations. The multi-level 
governance approach reviews the “vertical” interactions between the different 
levels of those engaged in EU policy. At the macro level, there are 
“supranational” constraints on the pursuit of national policies at the meso level 
(given the willingness of member states to transfer some sovereignty to the EU 
in this area). The framework becomes more complex when the micro level of 
analysis integrates informal and non-governmental actors whose interests are 
driven by societal factors contesting the political economic interests of the state 
and regional institutions.  
While the EU has created a supranational structure whereby the state 
cedes certain functions, the level of analysis for the interaction of transnational 
actors is limited to the macro-level. Analysis of the institutional structure of EU 
transnationalism is absent and this impedes understanding of the link to multi-
level governance. In a critical assessment of the multi-level governance 
approach, Peters and Pierre claim there has been an extensive analysis of the 
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inter-governmental relationship and the inclusion of local units in the making of 
policy and policy decisions. However, the novelty of taking into account 
international politics as a external factor shaping the relationship between sub-
national and supranational levels is recovered by multi-level governance (Peters 
and Pierre, 2002). Nevertheless, study of the migration issue has been limited 
to supranational agreements for the control of external borders whilst there is a 
consensus to create a borderless European Union. Despite this fact, the 
relationship with third countries is approached from a state-centric perspective 
in which the EU simulates a state (Collinson, 1999). 
1.3.9 Transnationalism as a theoretical approach 
Our framework of multi-level governance and regionalism takes into 
account both state and non-state actors in its analysis of the migration 
development nexus.  Within such a framework, the roles of transnational actors 
and factors are important but are often implicit in the literature on regional 
integration.  It is therefore worth examining in some detail the way in which 
transnationalism has been debated, particularly in the context of migration.  As 
with regionalism and governance, the term transnationalism has taken on a 
number of meanings in the social sciences. For international relations literature 
it refers to the role of groups and organisations operating below and between 
states (Keohane and Nye, 1989). In the field of migration studies, 
transnationalism has emerged as an approach which attempts to explain the 
relationship between migrant communities in both the host and the home 
country.  
Pioneering work is attributed to the anthropologists Glick-Schiller, Basch, 
and Szanton as they explain the relationship between migrants and their 
homelands in the transition from one country to another. In this sense, “new” 
transnationalism refers to the actions of “transmigrants” who “…. maintain, build, 
and reinforce multiple linkages with their countries of origin” (Waldinger and 
Fitzgerald, 2004: 1180). Further studies detail the experiences of migrants in 
maintaining ties with their home countries while attempting to integrate in the 
receiving country. The characteristics of transmigrants found in these early 
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studies assume mobility within a North-South push and pull framework and are 
limited to the observation of economic migrants. 
Initial studies of transnationalism focused on potential benefits for the 
origin country. Patterson suggests that it is possible to overcome African 
poverty on the basis of a closer two-way relationship between communities in 
the diaspora and their homeland (Patterson, 2006). However, the mechanisms 
to achieve such a goal are unclear unless support is given for the development 
of a communal capacity among transmigrants. Moreover, Patterson‟s simplistic 
approach excludes the cultural and political benefits associated with 
transnationalism. Migrants contribute to the political and cultural spheres in both 
the origin and receiving countries.  
Guarnizo et al. (2003) provide a sense of the limits and potential of 
transnationalism based on individual and communal capabilities and 
characteristics. Classical theories of transnationalism analyse the level of 
assimilation of the individual on the basis of educational and socio-economic 
characteristics. Contemporary theories concerning the context of the 
immigration process explain how transmigrants maintain links with their 
homeland because of unfulfilled economic expectations and persisting cultural 
differences in the host country. Arguing this assumption, Lucassen reviews the 
experience of Western European immigrants in the US in order to define 
assimilation processes and the experience of migrant associations, thereby 
seeing transnationalism as a consequence of new migration trends rather than 
the absence of assimilation (Lucassen, 2004). In contrast, social network 
approaches examine the development of networks which support immigrants in 
the host country with social capital allowing them to maintain links with their 
communities by engaging in communal activities (Guarnizo et al., 2003). This 
latter theoretical framework has been used in the cases of Mexico and Morocco 
to analyse interaction between the diaspora and communities of origin (Massey 
et al., 1987; de Haas, 2006a). 
A different approach is offered by the sociologist Portes. On the basis of 
research into migrants settled in the US, he seeks to identify the new 
components of transnationalism. First, he asserts that modern communications 
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have made it possible to reinforce ties with the homeland, resulting in an 
intensive exchange of cross-border activities. “New immigrants” experience dual 
lifestyles, cultures, citizenship, and social spaces which have been made 
possible due to technological and global change (Portes, 1996). The unit of his 
analysis is the individual rather than the community and he focuses on 
transnationalism from below as opposed to the transnational activities pursued 
by multilateral and governmental actors  (Portes and Walton, 1976). 
The potential and limitations of transnationalism have been widely 
explored. Waldinger and Fitzgerald criticise the assumption of Portes et al. that 
“regular and sustained” interaction is an intrinsic characteristic excluding the 
fact that the state is still in control of the borders inhibiting such bi-directional 
movement (Portes et al., 1999; Cited in Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004: 1178) . 
The capacity and willingness to become involved in political or social activities 
related to transnationalism – particularly in the case of the Bosnian and Eritrean 
refugee population – are also analysed by (Al-Ali et al., 2001). They conclude 
that, regardless of their legal status as refugees, this cohort can be compared 
with economic migrants in terms of their transnational dynamic. In this way, 
transnationalism as a theoretical approach is currently defining the role of 
migrants in the process of migration as a link between host and receiving 
countries.  
Several other case studies have been recently developed in order to 
characterise and define how transnationalism as a theoretical approach could 
be applied to understanding co-development (Cohen, 2001; Grillo and Riccio, 
2003; Ceschi et al., 2005; Coslovi, 2005; de Haas, 2006a). The increasing 
participation of migrants in both host and origin countries allows us to explore 
the complexities of the role of migrants. This thesis draws on ideas of 
transnationalism to analyse the involvement of migrants in the co-development 
process and policy. If co-development as a policy can be translated into local 
development in the sending country and improvement of well-being in the 
receiving country, transnationalism is a core element for understanding the role 
governments, social organisations and migrants can play.  
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Central to transnationalism as an approach are transnational communities. 
Transnational communities  are defined by Portes et al. as “groups based in two 
or more countries which engage in recurrent, enduring and significant cross-
border activities, which may be economic, political, social or cultural” (Portes et 
al., 1999: 863).  
According to Kivisto, the theoretical contribution of Glick-Schiller is the 
introduction of transnationalism as a phenomenon that needs to be revisited 
along with a description of its characteristics in current migration studies. 
Whether transnationalism appears as a new term in the literature or not, there is 
an identification of cross-border activities involving immigrants. From Glick´s 
perspective, the distinction between so-called “uprooted immigrants” from the 
beginning of the 20th century and “assimilated” immigrants in the 21st century 
lies in the depth and expansion of their transnational links. However, Kivisto 
remarks that there is no unit of analysis that can be assertively used to explain 
the transnational engagement experience for both categories of immigrants. 
Ethnic identity, political ties to the home country, remittances and all types of 
migration (permanent, circular and seasonal) are constant variables in the 
history of migration. Kivisto critically reviews the reductionist approach of 
assimilation used by Glick to explain the degree of transnational actions (Kivisto, 
2001). In this sense, the current transnationalism process is enabled by the new 
technologies of transportation and communication that allow faster interaction 
across boundaries (Portes, 2003: 875).   
From a political science approach, Faist and Ozveren focus on the 
transboundary actions of non-state organisations. They consider globalisation a 
catalyst that serves to reinforce ties between communities identifying 
themselves on the basis of cultural, religious or other common interests. The 
ties between members of these communities develop regardless of territorial 
boundaries since new communication technologies facilitate interaction and the 
mobilisation of joint actions. Even though state authorities may participate as 
mediators between host and sending migrant communities, the authors argue 
that the state is a non-intervening actor (Faist and Ozveren, 2004).  In a further 
revision of the implications of transnationalism for development theory, Faist 
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highlights migrant communities and associations as agents of development. He 
points out how communities and the state function along with the market to 
boost remittances as the driving force for development in the new transnational 
paradigm (Faist, 2008).  
Vertovec adopts an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the 
transnational aspect of migration. He agrees that the new conception and 
understanding of transnationalism is primarily concerned with new forms of 
engagements in a transnational social space. Along with the anthropological 
approach of Glick, Schiller et al. and the sociological perspective of Portes, he 
asserts that the difference between old and new transnationalism lies in the 
technological changes, which have made cross-border communications easier, 
and related changes in the scope and intensity of migrant relationships with 
their homeland. The extent of migrant transnationalism is demonstrated by the 
increase in non-state actors (such as home town associations), the increasing 
importance of remittances, the home state‟s policy for engaging with their 
diaspora, political engagement with homeland affairs, the dual belonging in 
terms of citizenship,  cultural links, ethnic identity, and diaspora consciousness 
(Kivisto, 2001: 550; Vertovec, 2009: 15).  
Guarnizo and Smith (1998) distinguish between two different forms of 
transnationalism: ¨transnationalism from above¨ and “transnationalism from 
below”. In a critical review of the theoretical conceptualisation of 
transnationalism, they identify the local level as the spatial dimension for 
analysing cross-border relations between immigrants and their homeland. The 
other spatial dimension of transnationalism refers to all activities carried out by 
multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and even multinational corporations. They also 
assert that a common element in the process is the erosion of a state-centric 
system, where actors from “above” and “below” constrain the classic structural 
role played by the state. However, the state also plays an active role in this new 
transnationalism. Regardless of the political implications of incorporating the 
diaspora into national political and social arenas, sending countries have found 
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it economically expedient to include “transnational migrants” as part of a policy 
to reinforce links with migrants abroad. 
In this sense, it is important to outline who the actors participating in a 
transnational activity are, while distinguishing their role in what is called co-
development within a broader conceptual framework. A useful typology is that 
described by Alejandro Portes (2009: 876) where he establishes three 
categories of transnational actors: national states, global multicentre institutions, 
and private non-corporate actors.  Following this typology, he also contrasts 
top-down action, related to national governments and multilateral organisations, 
with bottom–up action which is intrinsic to the immigrant. He has also made an 
important distinction by reviewing contemporary  transnationalism literature 
centring on cross border activities carried out by civil society and immigrants 
(Portes, 2009).  
The increase of migrant participation in both host and origin countries 
allows us to explore the complexities of the role of migrants. The spatial 
dimension, level of analysis and new trends in migrant participation in host 
countries and homeland affairs are determinant variables for the definition of 
how transnationalism can be used as a feasible mechanism for the promotion of 
co-development. The extent to which there is interconnection between the 
“above” and “below” analytical dimensions of transnationalism is a core 
question to be analysed using a multi-level approach. Focusing on the analogy 
of the level, Guarnizo and Smith “transnationalism from above” is broadly 
equivalent to the “top down” policies which are produced by actors at the macro 
level interacting across national boundaries. By contrast, his “transnationalism 
from below” is equivalent to those examples of “bottom-up” initiatives in which 
migrants are the main actors interacting at the micro level. Our multi-level 
approach enables us to explore these relationships both individually and in 
relation to their interaction with the state. 
Empirical research on transnationalism ranges across various approaches 
– nation-state, ethnic identities or regions - which bring into the question who 
transnational migrants are and the nature of the spatial dimension they share. 
Thus, Levitt‟s approach to transnationalism as a process by which both the 
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community of origin and the settlement country form part of the units of analysis 
represents a starting point for analysis of the different levels and different actors 
intervening in transnationalism. Cultural, political and social transformations 
affect both who stays and who leaves, with social networks serving as a 
mechanism to  ensure the continuity of transnational communities (Levitt, 2001).  
1.4 An Overview of the Issues.  
So far we have outlined the state of the debate regarding the migration-
development nexus (and co-development in particular), the nature of regional 
integration and multi-level governance and the phenomenon of transnationalism. 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of how these aspects converge in 
relation to our case studies. 
The extent to which co-development as a policy is explicitly articulated 
varies in the two cases examined. The concept is widely promulgated in 
European contexts both in the policies of member states such as the French 
and Spanish governments as well as at the EU level. Indeed, the policy was 
articulated as part of the Barcelona Process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation 
which stressed the need to bring development to sending countries as a 
mechanism to reduce the pressure to migrate to EU countries(European Union, 
1995). In contrast, the term co-development is not explicitly deployed in either 
the initiatives of NAFTA or other trilateral US-Canada-Mexico agreements. 
However, cooperation for development was mentioned in the Asencio Report1 
from the early 1990s. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 
approved in 1986, provided for the creation of a bipartisan commission which 
also involved “Mexico and other sending countries in the Western Hemisphere” 
(U. S. Congress, 1990). The Commission‟s report stressed the need to promote 
development as the most feasible and desirable instrument to stem migration 
from Mexico, Central America and Caribbean countries. Moreover, in other 
respects it is clear that, de facto, co-development policies have been applied 
with the aim of containing migration from Mexico and beyond.  
 
                                            
1  
Commonly named Asencio after the Chair of the Commission for the Study of 
International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. 
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It is also worth noting that the North American and Euro-Mediterranean 
regions are increasingly defined by security as well as economic concerns. This 
has had a significant effect on the way migration issues have been addressed 
and debated. The nature of cooperation on the migration issue has developed 
along the lines of security as much that of co-development. This “securitisation”2 
of migration issues has arguably strengthened the role of nation states and put 
greater emphasis on policies of border control.  However, it is also clear that the 
emphasis on security potentially provided a wider space for dialogue on the way 
in which migration is handled in both regions. An important function of the 
research has been to highlight the intensity of such interactions in varied 
sectors at different levels in each region (Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005).  
The core issue in this thesis is a comparative analysis of the emergence of 
co-development mechanisms in Mexico and Morocco in the context of the North 
American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. In the first case, we address a 
complex of bilateral and regional arrangements, particularly US-Mexican 
relations in the first instance and the NAFTA and PPP agreements in the 
second. In the second case, we examine relations between Morocco and Spain 
as well as the broader framework of the EUROMED and MEDA. Within these 
two regions, the PPP and MEDA are analysed as policies designed to expand 
the economic benefits of integration while fostering economic growth to reduce 
the pressure to migrate. In this respect, we study the actors involved in the 
debate on migration in each region. On this basis, it is possible to develop an 
understanding of both the “top-down” and “bottom-up” dynamics of the debates 
on migration and development.  
The thesis explores these relationships at the macro, the meso and the 
micro levels (see Table 1.3.). The macro level comprises the principal 
international organisations (notably the WB) and regional agreements (EU, 
EUROMED, NAFTA, ASPAN, PPP and IADB) which impinge on the migration-
                                            
2
 The term is used in the Theory of Securitization coined by the Copenhagen School, a 
group of scholars including Buzan and Waever. From this analytical approach, the securitisation 
process legitimises issues as security matters based on rhetorical actions. See Buzan, B., 
Wæver, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998). 
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development nexus. In this regard, I analyse how these organisations and 
agreements have been involved in developing policies that are indirectly or 
directly designed to foster growth and alleviate poverty. The macro level also 
includes bilateral executive relations between national governments. 
The meso level focuses on those national actors (principally governmental) 
in both receiving and sending countries that have been involved in pursuing 
policies that could inhibit international migration. These organisations are in turn 
constrained by political, administrative and other factors in the performance of 
their roles. 
The micro level focuses on actors at the sub-national and community 
levels, including local authorities, migrant organisations and civil society groups 
in both sending and receiving countries. 
 
Table 1-3 Economic and Political Units Working on Migration: Mexico and 
Moroccan  
 NAFTA EU 
MACRO  Multilateral meetings working on 
development and Plan Puebla-Panamá 
NAFTA 
Executive Bilateral Meetings 
Treasury and Bank of Mexico Ministry 
of Economy  
Washington's IADB: Joint program 
between Southern local authorities 
Border States Governors 
European Union (Council, Commission, Parliament)  
General Affairs and External Relations Council 
Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona 
Process (officials from the current and next 
presidencies of EU and from the 12 Non-EU 
Mediterranean (countries).  
MESO  US  
Labour Department 
Department of Homeland Security:  
Customs Enforcements.  
Mexico:  
Secretary of Social Development 
Secretary of Transport 
Secretary of Labour  
Interior Ministry 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs  
Congress representatives  
Commission on Migration  
 
 
Mediterranean EU Member States: Bordering 
country governments of Spain and Morocco. 
Spain:  
Development Cooperation 
Secretary of State for International Cooperation and 
Iberoamerica  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Inter-Ministerial Commission for International Co-
Operation 
Council for Development Co-operation (advisory 
body) 
Spanish Agency for International Cooperation  
Morocco:  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Labour and Employment 
 
MICRO Municipalities of Southern Mexican 
States. 
Economic or social operators and 
NGOs. 
 
 
Southern Spanish municipalities and Moroccan 
authorities in sending regions.  
Economic or social operators and civil society. 
Migrations and Development (Marrakech, Morocco). 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
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1.4.1 Migration Policies and Regional Governance. 
The aim of this project is to evaluate migration policies in the Euro-
Mediterranean and NAFTA regions. The use of multi-level governance means 
analysis is conducted on three main levels which embed different processes of 
negotiation between participating actors. Transnational interaction between 
governmental and non-governmental actors is analysed from both top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives. But while sub-national entities are capable of 
shaping supranational institutions, they are in constant dialogue with other 
actors horizontally and vertically.  
Transnationalism from above and from below, as described by Guarnizo 
and Fitzgerald, also implies a multi-level structure. However, the analytical 
framework used distinguishes interaction between central state and societal 
actors and non-governmental actors. Seeking to bring transnational politics into 
the multi-level decision-making process, Rosenblum (2004) explains how 
transnational politics at the regional level are influenced by transnational politics 
from the Mexican and Central American migrant population in the US which 
converge in a bidirectional interaction. Demands for the protection of human 
rights have created political pressure at the different levels of governmental 
structure within the central state, thereby raising the migration issue at the 
regional and binational level as transnational migrants gain political access in 
both countries.  
The transnationalism of migrants is constrained by limits on the possibility 
to move between boundaries and activities that define them as transnational 
migrants. The multi-level approach allows us to untangle the decision making 
process to distinguish actors and interests as relevant factors in migratory policy 
outcomes. Therefore, assessment of the influence of transnational activities at 
the supranational level demands the deconstruction of the Nation State. Rather 
than detaching migrants from the Nation State, the multi-level approach allows 
us to detect bottom-up organisations that influence the state and see how the 
state‟s behaviour is conditioned by regional constraints. 
At first glance, it might be argued that since the development of regional 
integration is much weaker in the North American context, the governance of 
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migration may be more under the control of nation states themselves. However, 
as we will see, the roles of regional arrangements overlapping with NAFTA 
members, of sub-national authorities within countries and of civil society have 
also been significant.  
The wider literature on regional integration indicates a growing interest in 
questions of migration, particularly in the EU. There has been a debate within 
the EU, as identified in the policy literature, concerning the degree to which 
national immigration policies are converging with an emerging common policy at 
the EU level (Philip, 1994; Copeland, 2000b; Huysmans, 2000; Geddes and 
Wallace, 2001; Terri and Adam, 2004). This relatively underdeveloped initiative 
– at the time of my research – suggests that migration policies are not only 
shaped by national interests and conditions but also by the interests of other 
states and non-state actors. The state is a central actor in this process but it is 
not the only one; it plays its role in a context of supranational and sub-national 
agreements and actors. In the case of Southern European countries such as 
Spain, which lacks a “tradition of cooperative inter-governmental relations” 
(Benz and Eberlein, 1999: 344), I suggest that their own domestic politics are 
not easily accommodated by the EU or the Schengen Group in terms of 
controlling immigration from North Africa. A multi-level governance approach 
can potentially offer a better approach than one focusing on the nation state. 
1.5 Methodology 
The thesis focuses on the role of Mexico and Morocco as sending, transit and 
receiving countries within the North American and the Euro-Mediterranean 
regions. It centres on the issue of co-development and the way in which this has 
become an element in regional migration debates, particularly in Spain and the 
US. Thus, the primary sources of national information regarding regional 
migration issues are from these four countries. The data mainly comes from 
interviews with the different actors as well as statistical and official documents 
issued by international organisations and governments.  
The research consisted of a set of 50 semi-structured interviews with 
different actors involved in the migration-development nexus debate at three 
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levels: macro, meso and micro. At the macro level, interviews were conducted 
with international development organisation researchers, officials involved in the 
administration of NAFTA/PPP and Euro-Mediterranean/MEDA, and foreign 
office representatives. The meso level comprises interviews with national 
officials from the Ministries of Labour, Social Affairs and the Economy, 
Congressional representatives, and Migration-related national officials in both 
sending and receiving study countries. Finally, the micro level is based on 
interviews conducted with regional and local authorities, development and 
migration-related NGOs, migrant-based associations, scholars and migrants. A 
list of interviewees is included in Annex I. In most cases, details of interviewees‟ 
comments have been provided in the text along with attributions.  Most of the 
interviews were recorded and the material stored with the exception of those 
officials who spoke “off the record”. In such cases, no direct attribution has been 
made and the details are anonymised in the Annex. 
The fieldwork was divided into several phases. From October 2003 to  
February 2004, I conducted interviews and collected bibliographical and 
statistical data in Mexico. The central questions were for government officials, 
scholars and NGOs involved in the debate concerning Mexico-US bilateral 
relations with respect to the issue of migration and its links to the PPP. The next 
phase was to map out the equivalent actors and institutions in Spain for 
comparison with the information collected in Mexico. The institutions, political 
actors, scholars and NGOs were selected on the basis of their participation in 
the migration-development nexus debate, specifically focused on the Morocco-
Spain bilateral relationship. This second phase took place from March to June 
2004; I spent most of the time in Madrid, although the information provided led 
to the collection of information from the Andalusia and Catalonia regions.  
On the basis of my research into the Spanish-Moroccan relationship, I was 
able to identify the key protagonists in the co-development debate. As a result, 
it was possible to conduct interviews with meso and micro level actors pursuing 
initiatives of cooperation for development in Moroccan sending regions. The 
information gathered during these interviews allowed me to identify co-partners 
in non-governmental initiatives and policies carried out in Morocco. I was 
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therefore able to develop a networking strategy for conducting my fieldwork in 
Morocco.  
The third phase centred on Morocco with the holding of interviews with all 
those referred to as co-partners by Spanish governmental institutions and non-
governmental organisations. A period of 4 months, from July to September 
2004, was spent in Rabat visiting the Tangierian Peninsula and the Southern 
Region of the Souss Massa-Drâa. These regions were selected on the basis of 
their being influenced by development programmes  financed by EU funds, as 
well funds from other European Members including Spain. 
The final phase was divided into two visits, one to Washington, DC in the 
US and another to the state of Chiapas in Mexico. This period covered the last 
two weeks of September and part of October 2004. The objective at this stage 
of the fieldwork was to fill the information gaps after performing fieldwork in 
Mexico. In addition, it was possible to make contact with officials in the principal 
international development organisations as well as those involved in the 
development of policies affecting the North American region, thereby offering 
me a broader perspective of the ongoing debate on the migration-development 
nexus. The information collected complemented my analysis of the theoretical 
discussion on development and migration. Finally, the main purpose of 
fieldwork conducted in Chiapas was to identify the macro-policy of development 
at the local level. Using as a contrast the case of Veracruz, which is also a 
member of the PPP, these two cases were used as local instances for the 
discussion of co-development initiatives versus macro development policies. 
It is important to stress that the fieldwork for this PhD thesis was largely 
completed in 2005, followed by an extensive period of analysis and writing-up. 
Therefore, while I have sought to develop my analysis in the intervening period, 
the events covered in the thesis reflect the period of my primary research. I 
have drawn upon secondary sources which have been published since 2005 
but only insofar as they deal with the period covered by the rest of the thesis.  
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
describes the evolution of migration trends in the case studies of Mexico and 
Morocco. This section discusses, from the perspective of different authors, the 
factors leading to changes in the current characteristics of migration flows. It 
focuses on their role as sending as well and receiving and transiting countries 
and takes into account the geopolitical context. Chapter 3 reviews the link 
between conventional international wisdom on the migration-development 
nexus and the macro policies oriented towards the establishment of trade-
based economic policies as a mechanism to stem migration. Chapter 4 
analyses the application of mainstream development policy and its 
consequences for migration governance in the NAFTA and Euro-Mediterranean 
regions. It centres the discussion on how development policies within a regional 
agreement are intended to complement trade and market liberalisation in order 
to reduce emigration. The PPP and the MEDA programmes are analysed from 
a theoretical approach as instances of development programmes influencing 
migration at the regional level. Chapter 5 analyses the political and economic 
factors shaping the bilateral relationships between sending and destination 
countries. It centres on national politics as a driving force in the shaping of the 
bilateral relationship and the consequences for agreements reached to promote 
cooperation for development at this level of governance. Chapter 6 analyses 
bottom-up co-development initiatives - where migrant-based organisations and 
NGOs play a central role in spurring local development - and considers the role 
of subnational governments in both receiving and sending countries. Finally, 
Chapter 7 discusses the main conclusions regarding the distinctive process of 
co-development. 
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CHAPTER 2 MIGRATION TRENDS IN THE NAFTA AND 
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGIONS 
2.1 Introduction  
Theoretical frameworks that attempt to explain migration flows from Mexico and 
Morocco highlight the nature of sending-receiving country relationships in terms 
of geographical proximity, historical linkages, development standards, and 
differential wage and labour market conditions. The relative impact of these 
factors varies according to the theoretical approach adopted. According to the 
neoclassical paradigm, factors such as geographical proximity translate into low 
travelling costs while differential wages and a gap in development standards 
between sending and receiving countries increase the potential for migration 
(Borjas, 1989b; Martin, 1996; Schiff, 1996a: 215; Gordon and Spilimbergo, 1999; 
Borjas, 2000; Todaro and Smith, 2003). The historical–structural paradigm 
focuses on polarisation of the labour market caused by the struggle between 
labour and capital, resulting in the internationalisation of labour forces 
(Bustamante et al., 1992; Castles and Miller, 1993; Sassen, 1996; Portes, 1997; 
Hanson, 2005). The social capital paradigm considers the social network 
system developed by the diaspora as the driving force that perpetuates 
migration (Massey et al., 1987; Castles, 2000; Alarcón, 2006). While the 
different approaches help to explain continuities in the migration process, we 
also need to recognise that the phenomenon itself is becoming more complex 
with important changes in the composition of these flows and in the destinations 
of migrants over the last decade.  
Of particular salience are the directional shifts in migration as countries 
that were classified as senders are now also receivers, and the way traditional 
sending countries such as Mexico and Morocco are becoming a transit point for 
“Southern” migrants in search of new labour markets. For almost a century, 
various authors have always referred to Mexico as the main exporter of labour 
to the US. However, less well studied is Mexico‟s status as a transit country for 
Central American migrants moving to the US as a final destination, or its status 
as a recipient of migrants, primarily in the Southern states. Similarly, there has 
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been relatively little study of the growing role of Canada as a labour market for 
both highly skilled and unskilled Mexican migrants. Moreover, there have been 
significant changes in the demographic profile and geographical origin of 
Mexican migrants. 
A similar pattern of long-term relationships and more recent changes can 
be seen in the Moroccan case. Morocco has strong historical migration links to 
specific countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. While these 
countries have been the primary destinations for the Moroccan migrant 
population over the last 40 years, it is worth noting there have been changes in 
terms of the destination of migrants over the last decade or so since they have 
shown a preference for Spain and Italy (King, 2001). Morocco, like Mexico, is 
part of a group of sending countries which are currently experiencing changes 
in the demographic characteristics of their migration flows.  
The current chapter focuses on the evolution of these migration flows 
through a discussion of the factors influencing migration flow trends in these two 
specific case studies. The chapter compares economic, geographical and 
historical factors which have shaped Mexican and Moroccan flows and their 
current links to receiving countries. The first section of this chapter draws on 
existing literature to explain the historical development of migration from Mexico 
and Morocco. It also explores those factors that have shaped more recent 
changes in migration. The second section considers changes in the role played 
by Mexico and Morocco not only as sending, but also as transit and receiving 
countries for their “Southern” regional neighbours. The fact that their role is 
increasingly complex requires analysis of the effects these changes are having 
on their relationships with receiving countries on a regional basis. 
  
2.2 A Historical and Economic Overview of Migration Flows in 
Mexico and Morocco  
2.2.1 Mexican Migration, a Historical Overview 
Initial studies of Mexican emigration adopted a historical perspective, explaining 
Mexican migration as a natural consequence of the division of Mexican territory 
after the war with the US in 1847 when it lost almost half of its national territory, 
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an area which remains heavily populated by people of Mexican-origin (Corwin, 
1970). However, perhaps more influential in shaping the profile of Mexican-US 
Southern States are the economic dynamics in states such as California and 
Texas. This data is supported by the findings from the 2006 Survey on 
Migration at the North Mexican border,1 which established that California was 
the most preferred destination for 37.4% of those surveyed, followed by Texas 
(17.2%) and Arizona (12.2%). The Mexican influence can still be perceived in 
the culture and architecture of the main cities of these states, whether in terms 
of Spanish colonial times or the more recent impact of Mexican arrivals. In 
addition, major industrial cities such as Chicago and Detroit have been 
significant destinations for Mexican migrants. Map 2.1 shows the concentration 
of the Mexican-origin population per county district with data from the Census 
held in 2000. 
The study of Mexican emigration to the US over the last century is 
commonly divided into three historical periods: the first is related to construction 
of the railways and the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution in the period 1910-
1920. The second is related to the period following World War II (or the 
“Bracero” period), 1945-1964; and the third follows the Bracero Program, 
covering the period from 1970 to the present. Weintraub also highlights the 
southbound migration wave during the US Depression of the 1930s as a fourth 
period to be studied (Corwin, 1970; Weintraub, 1992). For Cornelius (1989), the 
dynamics of Mexican migration to the US in the post-industrial economic era is 
explained not only by supply factors, but also by the particular character of US 
demand for Mexican labour. He underlines the selectivity of this demand based 
on the preferences of specific sectors (Cornelius, 1989). 
  
                                            
1  
The Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico is a sample survey of 
Mexican nationals age 12 and older encountered along the main crossing point along the 
Mexican side of the US-Mexico border. This survey has been conducted since 1993 on yearly 
basis and targeted the Southern migrants in transit to the US  Further information on EMIF 
methodology is available on line: www.colef.mx  
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The history of Mexican migration shows that at the beginning of the 20th 
century there was significant mass migration to the US. This was created on the 
one hand by US demand during WWI, and on the other by the political turmoil 
and negative economic effects of the Mexican Revolution. Statistics from that 
period show that almost 10% of Mexico‟s population emigrated to escape the 
economic instability brought on by the end of the Mexican Revolution in the 
1920s (Corwin, 1970). Despite the expected economic change when the 
Mexican Revolution came to an end in the early 1920s, as well as efforts to 
restrict Mexican migration flows to the US, low wages and misery in rural areas 
persisted as factors leading to emigration together with the demand for labour in 
the US (Bustamante and Cornelius, 1989). 
Some authors indicate that during this period Mexico‟s federal government 
adopted a nationalistic policy towards Mexican migrants and considered them a 
lost labour force (Fitzgerald, 2006). At this time, immigration to the US was not 
yet restricted by American government policy. Early studies of Mexican 
immigrants therefore attempted to refute official statistics provided by the US 
government which claimed the number of migrants was at least one million up 
to 1929  (Durand and Massey, 1992b: 5). 
This migration process stagnated temporarily during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s when a part of the population was deported and others returned 
voluntarily. The lack of demand for labour effectively curtailed Mexican 
immigration. At the same time, the Mexican Government enforced a restrictive 
emigration policy on the grounds that the phenomenon was having a negative 
effect on the demographic and workforce profile of Mexico. Massive repatriation 
was the principal characteristic of the period; 600,000 migrants were estimated 
to have taken part in the southbound wave (Weintraub et al., 1997). Therefore, 
repatriation, consular protection, and reabsorption of the Mexican population 
were the main concerns of the Mexican government during this period. 
The role played by Mexico‟s Northern Central States in migration flows is 
traced back to the 1920s and 1930s by historians. Some historians report US 
requirements for labour extending from the population of Northern Mexico to the 
region of Northern-Central states such as Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán. 
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Accordingly, this region became a region of ongoing emigration throughout the 
century (Durand et al., 2001). Other authors explain how the active emigration 
policy of local authorities during the Cristero Wars shaped migration flows from 
Mexico. Emigration was inevitably from Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato and 
Zacatecas as they were involved in the civil war fought between the Catholic 
Church and the state. At this time these states were already contributing 60% of 
the total emigrant population (Fitzgerald, 2006: 268). Fitzgerald(2006) explains 
the policy contradictions between local authorities from these states and central 
government in the following way: the former regarded emigration as a safety 
valve given the struggle for resources prompted by the civil war while the latter 
sought to exercise a restrictive emigration policy. The central government 
proposed a full agrarian reform in order to retain the rural labour force while the 
main objective of local oligarchies was to avoid the creation of a class of 
landless workers who would target property owners in these states by 
demanding compliance with the Agrarian Reform initiated by the central 
government (Fitzgerald, 2006: 261). 
The second historical period was defined by the Bracero Programme in 
1942 which began as a response to US labour force demands during World 
War II and lasted until 1964. This was a temporary agreement between the 
governments of the US and Mexico which initially provided a work force to be 
employed in agriculture and railroad construction but which expanded into other 
sectors throughout the post-war period. According to Durand and Massey, who 
compared statistics on immigrants and deportees, there were officially up to 4.6 
million bracero migrants during the course of the programme (Durand and 
Massey, 1992a). 
Parallel to the “Bracero Program”, undocumented flows were also 
appearing. Mexican migrants started to be apprehended and deported and the 
numbers increased after the bilateral agreement came to an end. The reason 
for this increase lies in the unrealistic quotas established by the programme 
which failed to satisfy the demand for and the supply of legal and illegal migrant 
workers. According to Calavita, the Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) shaped immigration policy and “ignored the demands of growers when 
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those demands jeopardised agency priorities”(Calavita, 1992: 73). This fact 
established the model of an immigration policy whereby US demand for labour 
confronted a restrictive policy leading to a mixed illegal and legal migration 
system. The current period is therefore clearly defined by the legal status of the 
migrant: legal or illegal. The end of the Bracero Programme represented the 
end of a process of regularised labour force vis-à-vis ongoing non-regularised 
temporary migration. In the aftermath of the Bracero Programme it was clear 
that the demand for labour exceeded the total supplied; in 1973, 70,141 
Mexicans entered the US, legally whereas 576,823 were apprehended as illegal 
entrants (Calavita, 1992). 
The Bracero Programme has been studied as the pillar of Mexican 
migration in the US. Bustamante (1975) identifies the main reason for migration 
in the lack of economic opportunities in an unequal socio-economic system. In 
an empirical work conducted under the guise of a “wet back” worker at the 
beginning of the 1970s, he concluded that the demand for Mexican workers was 
a result of the unfair employment practices of US farmers combined with the 
supply of mostly unskilled men seeking an income to sustain their impoverished 
families (Bustamante, 1976b). The ending of migration or the repatriation of 
migrants was therefore regarded by authors such Bustamante as the result of 
the gap between the rural and urban dimensions which gave way to the study of 
rural-international Mexican migration (Bustamante et al., 1997).  
2.2.2 The Profile of Mexican Migrants 
Studies conducted by Mexican migration researchers in the early 1970s sustain 
a commonly accepted paradigm of the Mexican migrant profile (Bustamante, 
1975). They indicated that these flows were composed mainly of temporary 
male workers from rural areas located in eight traditional states who were drawn 
to the US agricultural sector. Migrant workers were reacting to a combination of 
“push and pull” factors where wage differentials were the principal determinant 
shaping migration (Bustamante, 1975; Bustamante, 1976a; Cornelius, 1989; 
García y Griego, 1989; Jenkins, 1997). García y Griego (1989) previously 
identified an emigrant offer set based on a set age range and regional origin. He 
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concluded that the demographic and regional concentration of emigration has 
remained stable. Also, he identifies eight states with the highest emigration 
rates: these are Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, 
Michoacán, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas. 
The classical assumption about the Mexican migrant profile refers to low-
skilled young male migrants travelling alone from certain rural areas in Northern 
Central Mexico on a temporary and cyclical basis. Indeed, it was the Bracero 
Programme that established such a typology, as later confirmed by research 
performed in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in contrast to the conclusions 
provided by studies carried out by Cornelius and Bustamante (1989) referring to 
male predominance in migration, data offered by the US government show that 
women also strongly participated in this process. According to US statistics, 
women outnumbered men between 1964 and 1971 as well as in 1993 and 1994 
(US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997: 20). 
The main destination for Mexican workers has traditionally been the US 
(though there has also been migration to Canada on the basis of a seasonal 
worker agreement between the two countries dating back to the 1970s). The US 
destinations where the population of Mexican origin is most highly concentrated 
are urban areas such as Los Angeles, San Antonio, the South Texas Rio 
Grande Valley, Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, El Paso, Fresno and Phoenix (US 
Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997). This pattern of destinations can 
largely be explained by the existence of social networks.  
2.2.3 The History of Moroccan Migration 
Analyses of the Moroccan case assume that the “massive” migratory flows from 
Morocco to Europe were a result of labour-supply agreements and colonial ties 
between the Moroccan and European governments (Stark, 1991; Mynz, 1995; 
Hollifield, 1997; Belguendouz, 1999a; Stalker and García, 2002; Charef, 2003). 
These agreements provided a supply of labour that was required for post-war 
reconstruction in Europe. Populations of Moroccan origin were the result of 
labour force flows to destination countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands 
and France.  
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There have been three main stages in Moroccan migration to Europe. The 
first era covered the period prior to 1960, when Moroccan agricultural workers 
were hired by French-colonisers settled in Algeria (including those mobilised to 
participate in both World Wars). The second period was characterised by 
massive migration to France at the end of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, 
a time when the post-war French economy required a fresh labour force to 
stimulate the economy (Belguendouz, 2000). The final period is known as the 
zero-immigration Western Europe policy after the oil crisis that led to the closure 
of borders to the foreign labour force. From this point on, undocumented 
migration along with family reunions have been the principal immigration trends 
(Belguendouz, 1999b; de Haas, 2003a).  
As in the case of Mexican migration, some authors explain the existence 
of EU-Morocco migration links on the basis of a long established shared history. 
However, we need to distinguish between those population movements 
produced by historical events and migration flows produced by the demand for 
labour (Lahlou, 2005a). From this perspective, Moroccan migration began at the 
end of the nineteenth century when temporary workers moved to Algeria in 
response to colonial agrarian reform. This period marks the beginnings of 
international migration as France demanded more labour for industrialisation. 
An important stage in the development of mass migration was the First World 
War when 35,000 Moroccans were taken to France to participate in the war 
(Bennoune, 1975: 2). The period 1960-1974 was characterised by a major shift 
in the levels of Moroccan migration. The demand for labour from European 
countries was the principal factor stimulating the northbound wave (Tapinos, 
1965a), as was the case in Mexico, although the labour supply created by 
changes in the demographic and economic factors also helps foster the 
phenomenon (Tapinos, 1965b; Berriane, 2004b).  
The origins and destination of these waves of migrants were also a result 
of the history of their recruitment by French entrepreneurs and Moroccan 
emigration policies. The Moroccans recruited to participate in the First World 
War had their origins in the Southern region of the Souss (Atouf, 2003). The 
destination was primarily France where entrepreneurs employed them. In the 
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mass migration period of the 1960s, the region of the Riff was the principal 
sending region. It has been calculated that the number of Moroccans in France 
increased from 10,700 in 1954 to 33,300 in 1962 before reaching 247,000 in 
1971 (Krotki and Beaujot, 1975).  Both the Souss and the Riff were considered 
conflict zones because of the political problems provoked by opponents to the 
Monarchy (López García et al., 1996). As was the case in 1930s Mexico, the 
Moroccan government fostered emigration from those regions that would 
otherwise have been a source of socio-political instability. The history of 
Moroccan migration also shows how traditional sources of emigration were 
shaped by migrant networks. Migrants from regions such as Agadir, Chtouka-Ait 
Baha, Taroudannte, Tiznit and Ouarzazate are mostly settled in Belgium, Italy 
and Spain, while Tangier and Tetouan  are the main sources for Moroccan 
immigrants in Spain (Berriane, 1996). 
Map 2.2. was prepared by Mohammed Berriane and Bernabé López for 
the “Atlas de la inmigración Marroquí en España” (2004). It shows the sending 
regions by order of participation throughout the history of Moroccan labour 
migration. Both the Souss and the Rif Central and Oriental have been the main 
sources, followed by the Tangierian Peninsula. 
Temporary migratory agreements between Morocco and its European 
partners produced a migrant profile similar to that of the Mexican Bracero: 
single men from rural areas mainly seeking to return home after a short period. 
Berriane explains how social networks reinforced the selective migration 
movement from rural areas in specific regions. This fact led to concentration of 
the Moroccan population in specific areas where they reproduced their cultural 
and social networks (Berriane and López García, 2004). Several studies 
therefore focus on the development of transnational communities which have 
helped to maintain migration flows (Massey, 1987; Lacroix, 2005: 36).  
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2.2.4 Patterns of Moroccan Migration 
An emigration policy based on bilateral agreements established the 
pattern for Moroccan flows. Temporary guest worker agreements between the 
European and North African countries peaked in the 1960s, channelling these 
workers to specific industrial sectors (Fargues, 2005). During this period 
destinations were geographically limited to those countries with colonial, 
linguistic and cultural ties, primarily France and secondly Belgium. The French 
Census shows a presence of Moroccan workers in the post-war period. 
However, demand from industrialised Northern European Countries led to an 
extension of the Moroccan migrant presence to include the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Sweden and Germany (Belguendouz, 1999b; Berriane, 
2004b). Accordingly, the number of Moroccan immigration rose in the period 
1968-1973 as a result of Morocco's emigration policy. Part of its development 
was intended as a safety valve to prevent high rates of unemployment and 
social unrest.  
There are further similarities to the Mexican case insofar as the 
international migration wave in Morocco was usually a rural rather than an 
urban movement with rural-international flows feeding the migrant labour force 
in European countries. Likewise, Mexico and Morocco experienced the 
development of social networks based on those previous rural-international 
flows (Lee, 2002). 
2.3 Current Trends in Migration in Mexico and Morocco  
2.3.1 The Mexican Case 
The debate on the degree of continuity or change in migration patterns ranges 
from those such as Durand (2001),who argues that the “the typical migrant is a 
working-age male from western Mexico”, to Cornelius and Marcelli, who find 
that today the migrant comes from the centre or the south, often from urban 
areas and with more education, and is more likely to be female and to settle 
permanently (Cornelius and Marcelli, 2000). 
The profile of the Mexican migrant offered by Bustamante in the 1970s – 
unskilled males from rural areas migrating on a seasonal basis – is no longer 
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applicable to that of current migrants (Canales, 2003). Characteristics such as 
gender, age and length of migration have changed, as have the geographical 
patterns. The destinations of migrants (legal or illegal) have shifted in response 
to labour market requirements: states such as Florida, Arizona, New Mexico, 
and North Carolina are now the main geographical destinations. At the same 
time, the sources of migration are also changing with non-traditional regions 
accounting for a greater share of migrant origins. Traditionally, the West Central 
states of Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Colima accounted for 38% of all 
migrants, according to data from 1992. Another important region is that of the 
Northern Border states with 21% and other Northern Central states with 22%, 
whereas Southern and South Western states represented 10% and Central 
states 9% (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997). They also showed 
increasing participation from Southern states such as Veracruz, Oaxaca, 
Puebla and Guerrero.  
The rate of migration from Mexico to the United States intensified over this 
period. The US Census Bureau calculates that 4.7 million Mexicans migrated to 
the US between 1990 and 2000, between 277,000 and 315,0000 per year (US 
Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997: 63).  Moreover, the trend continued 
in the following years. According to official Mexican statistics from the CONAPO 
(National Council for Population), the total number of people of Mexicans living 
in the US increased from 8.8 million in 2000 to nearly 11.2 million in 2005 
(Consejo Nacional de Población. CONAPO, 2009).  
An indication of the patterns of the destinations of the migrants can be 
obtained from the Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico carried 
out by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana, Mexico (a research institute 
specialising in border issues). Map 2.3 and Table 2.1 show the origins of 
migrants and their primary destinations according to the survey of 2006. The 
survey shows particular concentrations in terms of the origins and destinations: 
for example, 66.4% of all migrants from Jalisco declared California as their 
destination whilst 55.9% of migrants from Guanajuato showed a preference for 
Texas and 68.6% of those from Sonora headed to Arizona.  
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Table 2-1 Origin in Mexico and destination in the United States of Mexican 
migrants 2006  
 Origin State in 
Mexico 
Origin State in the US  
 
 Arizona California Colorado Florida Illinois Nevada New 
York 
North 
Carolina 
Texas Washington Other 
States 
Total 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
%
 H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l  
Aguascalientes 12.5% 33.5% 8.5% 10.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 1.0% 15.9% 0.0% 15.4% 100.0 
Baja California 0.0% 62.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.6% 0.0% 7.3% 100.0 
Baja California Sur 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0 
Campeche 0.0% 12.6% 0.0% 7.3% 3.2% 0.0% 10.8% 29.2% 30.8% 2.4% 3.7% 100.0 
Coahuila 0.0% 6.0% 1.1% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 87.2% 0.0% 3.1% 100.0 
Colima 6.4% 52.2% 0.0% 5.9% 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.3% 17.4% 100.0 
Chiapas 9.9% 37.3% 0.5% 29.3% 2.7% 1.8% 0.7% 13.0% 0.9% 2.1% 1.8% 100.0 
Chihuahua 20.9% 6.8% 35.1% 3.1% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 19.1% 0.0% 14.3% 100.0 
Distrito Federal 7.4% 30.6% 1.1% 2.0% 2.0% 5.6% 7.4% 0.0% 36.9% 1.7% 5.3% 100.0 
Durango 19.4% 22.5% 5.3% 4.7% 0.2% 6.1% 1.0% 5.7% 14.2% 3.2% 17.7% 100.0 
Guanajuato 3.4% 19.8% 1.1% 5.2% 1.6% 0.5% 1.1% 2.5% 55.9% 1.4% 7.5% 100.0 
Guerrero 9.7% 45.3% 0.8% 12.2% 2.5% 3.7% 0.8% 0.8% 10.7% 5.1% 8.4% 100.0 
Hidalgo 4.7% 23.4% 3.0% 39.1% 3.1% 1.6% 4.4% 1.8% 9.7% 1.2% 8.0% 100.0 
Jalisco 5.3% 66.4% 0.5% 4.1% 1.4% 0.8% 1.0% 1.7% 7.1% 2.6% 9.1% 100.0 
México 14.6% 47.1% 0.6% 5.3% 1.3% 2.1% 7.1% 0.5% 13.5% 1.8% 6.1% 100.0 
Michoacán 5.6% 52.1% 0.5% 8.3% 3.4% 3.4% 1.4% 2.7% 11.3% 3.8% 7.5% 100.0 
Morelos 10.1% 45.9% 1.2% 7.9% 2.9% 0.8% 18.0% 0.0% 8.6% 0.5% 4.1% 100.0 
Nayarit 22.4% 60.1% 1.4% 4.0% 1.4% 2.3% 0.6% 0.1% 2.8% 3.3% 1.6% 100.0 
Nuevo León 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 6.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 4.1% 76.9% 0.0% 8.3% 100.0 
Oaxaca 9.0% 57.3% 1.1% 8.6% 0.2% 0.2% 2.4% 12.2% 2.5% 2.6% 3.9% 100.0 
Puebla 10.6% 30.3% 10.7% 24.4% 3.2% 2.0% 3.5% 1.6% 2.2% 5.0% 6.5% 100.0 
Querétaro 2.9% 37.0% 2.7% 5.2% 1.3% 1.2% 0.0% 5.5% 37.6% 0.0% 6.6% 100.0 
Quintana Roo 0.0% 32.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 22.8% 0.0% 41.8% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 100.0 
San Luis Potosí 4.0% 12.0% 0.3% 2.4% 4.2% 0.0% 3.0% 8.6% 36.2% 2.6% 26.7% 100.0 
Sinaloa 70.0% 25.6% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 100.0 
Sonora 68.6% 23.9% 1.1% 0.1% 0.4% 1.0% 0.5% 0.3% 1.0% 0.0% 3.1% 100.0 
Tabasco 9.4% 39.0% 2.5% 10.0% 8.8% 0.0% 1.5% 1.5% 23.1% 3.0% 1.2% 100.0 
Tamaulipas 2.5% 6.9% 0.7% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 88.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0 
Tlaxcala 9.8% 59.8% 1.0% 3.6% 5.4% 0.0% 4.1% 0.0% 2.2% 9.5% 4.6% 100.0 
Veracruz 8.1% 43.4% 0.8% 17.7% 3.3% 3.6% 0.7% 8.2% 7.2% 1.3% 5.7% 100.0 
Yucatán 0.0% 73.2% 0.0% 23.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 100.0 
Zacatecas 6.7% 40.3% 13.3% 3.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 19.2% 3.9% 12.9% 100.0 
Total  12.2% 37.4% 2.1% 12.0% 2.0% 1.7% 1.9% 4.7% 17.2% 2.2% 6.6% 100.0 
Source: Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico, El Colegio de la Frontera 
Norte, 2006. 
2.3.1.1 Socio-Demographic Profile 
According to Lozano (2002), emigration to the US became a source of 
demographic change in Mexico from the beginning of the 1980s. The number of 
migrants in the US increased from 760,000 in 1970 to 2.2 million in the 1980s. 
He highlights settlement and high rates of emigration as the main 
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characteristics of the changing migration pattern as reflected in the socio-
demographic profile of migrants and their integration to the labour market. 
Moreover, illegal migration became the central issue for immigration 
stakeholders. Policy makers sought to halt migration by legalising 
undocumented settlers: in 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
permitted family reunification and regularisation of migrants. These changes 
modified the classical Mexican migrant profile in terms of both the numbers and 
the nature of migration flows. This section explores those demographic, 
economic, and geographical changes.  
Geographically speaking, the regionalisation of migration flows can be 
classified according to the intensity and longevity of their participation in 
international migration flows to the US. The table below shows the rate of 
participation by state in terms of migration intensity (defined by Verduzco and 
Unger (Verduzco and Unger, 1998a; Verduzco and Unger, 2002) as the 
percentage of emigrants relative to the economically active population.  
 
Table 2-2 Mexican Emigration: Indicators of Migration 
States Degree of Migratory Intensity 
Zacatecas, Michoacán, Durango, Nayarit, Guanajuato. Very High 
San Luis Potosí, Guerrero, Jalisco, 
Colima, Aguascalientes, Morelos, Hidalgo. 
High 
Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Oaxaca,  Baja California, Querétaro, 
Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Puebla, Sonora. 
Medium 
 
Veracruz, Nuevo León, Tlaxcala, México State , Baja California 
Sur 
Low 
México City, Yucatán, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Chiapas and 
Tabasco. 
Very Low 
Source: National Council of Population, Mexico 2000 
 
The differing levels of intensity are partly related to the longevity of 
sending regions. Lozano divides the migrant-origin states into the traditional 
(nine states: Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, 
Nayarit, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas) and the non-traditional (the other 22 
states). Durand (1992) offers a different geographical classification based on 
sending-regions. Drawing on ethnographic interviews conducted for the 
Mexican Migration Project in a number of Mexican states, he classified them 
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into three main cohorts: a “historical” region (Western-Central Mexico) 
comprising Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Durango, Nayarit, San 
Luis Potosí, and to a lesser extent, in terms of migration intensity and territory, 
Colima and Aguascalientes; a second region focused upon the Northern Border 
Region, comprising Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Chihuahua, Sonora, 
and Baja California, as well as two other non-border states Sinaloa and Baja 
California Sur; and new sending and receiving regions, comprising Mexico City, 
Querétaro, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, Mexico State, Guerrero, Morelos, and 
Oaxaca.  
Overall, it appears that there are at least nine states (Zacatecas, Durango, 
Michoacán, Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, and 
Sinaloa) which are clearly recognised as traditional sending regions. These 
states of origin have participated in migration1 trends for almost a century. The 
Border states have become a more important source of migration in recent 
times (many of those who were unsuccessful in crossing to the US have been 
obliged to settle in the border towns). 
It is in the 1980s that border cities started to be populated by Mexican 
migrants in transit or migrants attracted by the maquiladora industries2 However, 
even before then the settled population had become a potential labour force for 
cities on the US side of the border. Transborder workers are not considered in 
these statistics, but their numbers are estimated as being in the region of 7 
million (Del Castillo 2001). These workers commute between twinned border 
cities on a daily basis. Given these characteristics, the Border states could be 
regarded as a transnational space where regional economic integration is 
embodied in the development of twin assembly plants and transnational flows of 
commuters (Border Conference of Governors, 2009). According to del Castillo, 
researcher from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, transborder workers 
represent a very flexible labour force that responds to the demands of the local 
                                            
2
 Maquiladora refers to factories, mainly built along the border, which import materials on 
a duty free basis and then assemble and re-export the finished products.   The maquiladora 
were in a range of industries, with manufacturing on the Mexican side of the border and storage 
and distribution on the US side. 
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Californian economy (del Castillo Vera, 2001). As an example of the growth of 
twin border town, are the San Diego-Tijuana area (where the total population is 
2.4 million) and El Paso-Cd. Juárez (which accounts for up to 1.8 million) 
(Hagan and Rodriguez, 2001).  
The states surrounding Mexico City are considered as new sending 
regions. Interestingly, this is a highly urbanised area which attracts internal and 
intra-regional flows from all over Mexico. Rural-urban and urban-urban internal 
migration occurred in central Mexico for over half a century due to 
industrialisation (Fussell, 2004). 
Finally, the Southern region is characterised in these typologies as a non-
traditional region, only emerging as a source of migration since the 1990s, and 
accounting for the lowest share of the Mexican-origin population residing in the 
US. It should be noted that the typology of the Binational Commission Study 
about Southern states and that of Durand both include Oaxaca, Guerrero, 
Puebla and Morelos as recent participants with low shares of total migration. By 
contrast, Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo 
are considered the least important in terms of their share of total migration 
according to the Binational Commission emigrant offer set (and, in his analysis, 
Durand did not consider them as new sending regions) (US Commission on 
Immigration Reform, 1997). As Table 2.2 showed, these states show a low level 
of emigration intensity. However, since the 1990s their significance has 
increased.  
In terms of the characteristics of migrants it is worth contrasting the 
experiences of unskilled and highly skilled Mexicans who have migrated to the 
US and Canada (often the same destinations). In his doctoral thesis, Rafael 
Alarcón(1995a) explains continuity of migration in the high-tech era as a result 
of the polarisation of the market in the US (Silicon Valley attracts both skilled 
and unskilled migrants) and the contribution of social networks which according 
to Alarcon constitute a driving force that make foreign employment increasingly 
accessible. However, these new destinations in the US, along with a growing 
demand under the seasonal workers bilateral agreement with Canada, have 
been explained as being fundamentally driven by labour market demands rather 
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than social networks. More specifically, the Government of Canada has been 
increasing its annual quotas while the Mexican Government has played the role 
of a job centre.  
At the same time, US detention statistics appear to indicate the supply of 
cheap labour from undocumented migrants is not diminishing. According to US 
border authorities, illegal migrant detentions reflect an increase in the total 
number of migrants (US Government, 2000). However, the data provided by the 
Mexican government shows a decline in deportations as noted in Table 2.3. 
Quantitative indicators such as the number of deportations provided by both 
governmental border control institutions are not reliable indicators of 
undocumented illegal entries because they include all crossing attempts by 
would-be migrants. National Population Census Statistics perhaps offer a more 
realistic number of undocumented migrants residing in the US The Pew 
Hispanic Centre has calculated that the undocumented Mexican population in 
the US is steadily growing by up to 500,000 per year, reaching 5.9 million in 
2004 (Passel, 2005: 1). Although Mexican statistics also show an increasing 
emigration rate, by 2001 the undocumented population had increased to 3.4 of 
8.5 million Mexican migrants living in the US while the INS estimated that 4.8 of 
9.1 million were undocumented (OECD, 2004). 
 
Table 2-3 Total Number of Mexican Migrants Deported from the US 
Year 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total Mexican migrants 
deported by the Border 
Patrol 
853,000 791,000 583,000 559,000 514,000 
Source: National Migration Institute, Mexican Government, 2004. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Mexican Southern States: their emergence as sending 
regions 
This leads us to consider how recent and how intensive the trend of “South 
East Mexican flows” is. It also raises the question as to why they had not 
participated at the same time as other states and why they have begun to 
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participate recently.  According to a study by the World Bank analysing the 
correlation between poverty and international migration, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and 
Chiapas represent the new patterns of migration from southern states since 
they also have the highest levels of poverty in Mexico (Wodon et al., 2003). The 
Bank‟s research has also sought to explain the correlation between poverty, low 
productivity, and international migration (in the process providing a basis for the 
design of a regional development programme for Southern Mexico which 
included the Plan Sur (PS) and the PPP). Deichmann et al. (2002) identify and 
explain sub-regional differences, defining Southern states as spatial poverty 
traps based on low levels of productivity where the lack of infrastructure and 
resources inhibits access to education and social and economic opportunities. 
Here, “out-migration” and its local development benefits are ignored while public 
investment is recommended as a means to stimulate private sector growth and 
bring improvements in employment and welfare.  
Regional differences are clear when comparing Mexico City and the states 
of Mexico, Jalisco, and Nuevo León, on the one hand, and the Southern states 
of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca, on the other: the former account for nearly 
50% of domestic production while the latter scarcely reach 5%. Per capita 
income in the Southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca is just 62% of 
the per capita income in Nuevo León (a leading industrial-export state) (Pastor, 
2005: 51). 
Even so, international migration rates from these richer states are 
comparable to those from the South. In this sense, migration is a broad based 
phenomenon in Mexico, regardless of geographical location. Moreover, 
emigration cannot simply be attributed to levels of poverty. Other factors such 
as the demographic pressure on unemployment rates as well as the lack of 
resources to produce enough jobs for young people are likely to be causes of 
migration.  
In order to understand the economic characteristics of Southern Mexico, 
the well-being indicator shows that while the percentage of the population in 
poverty at the national level is between 42% and 45%, the levels in Oaxaca, 
Chiapas and Guerrero are closer to 68%, and CONAPO‟s Marginality Index 
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shows that Chiapas ranks first in the country (Wodon et al., 2000: 1). Migration 
flow data indicates that Guerrero and Oaxaca are the states of origin for 
international migration whereas Chiapas supplies the intraregional labour force 
in a rural-rural or rural-urban direction. This simple correlation seems to support 
the theoretical assumption that it is not the poorest people who migrate since 
travelling costs are beyond their means. Nevertheless, the case of Guerrero 
and in particular Oaxaca‟s international migration cannot be exclusively 
explained on such an economic basis. Networks and well-organised 
communities might be the reasons for their having settled in the fields of 
California for more than a decade. 
In the Mexican Census of 2000, data showed an important increase in 
migration from Mexico City and Veracruz as sending regions while traditional 
regions indicated high return rates. The explanation for this seems to be related 
to changes in the demographic profile of the population, low productivity in the 
rural sector, and a lack of incentives for social mobility (Wodon et al., 2003: 4). 
Looking at the case of Southern Mexico, we cannot talk of traditionally 
homogenous characteristics aside from it being an area which is rich in natural 
resources. Veracruz, Tabasco and Campeche, states along the Gulf of Mexico, 
are the main producers of Mexican oil, agricultural products, and fish. Guerrero, 
Chiapas, and Oaxaca (where the Acapulco, Huatulco and Puerto Escondido 
beach resorts are popular with North American and European tourists) are 
diverse also in terms of their natural resources, but important tourist resorts are 
concentrated in these areas which makes the tourist services sector the most 
import source of employment. Yucatán and Quintana Roo are also southern 
states with very prosperous tourist industries, such as Cancún and the Riviera 
Maya, and this account for the important role of services in the region‟s 
economy.  
Veracruz and Chiapas have more recently experienced migration flows to 
the US even though neither of them belongs to the group of high migration 
regions traditionally studied by many scholars. Verduzco and Unger 
(2002)when examining migrant participation rates classified by municipality, 
show that the South East (Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Tabasco and 
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Campeche, all of them states participating in the PPP) had an emigration rate of 
34.5%, whereas central states (Veracruz, Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tlaxcala, 
Hidalgo, Querétaro, State of Mexico and Morelos) averaged 66.6%. They 
establish that “in the country as a whole, the states with the least participation 
are Tabasco, Chiapas, Veracruz, Yucatán and Quintana Roo” (Verduzco and 
Unger, 1997: 403). From their previous research, they concluded that the 
highest emigration rates per municipal participation are mainly from Zacatecas, 
Michoacán and Jalisco states (Verduzco and Unger, 1998b: 208). The authors 
argue that the “intensity of migration does not occur throughout the length of the 
republic, but is limited to only 4.5% of the country‟s municipalities, and of these 
half are found in only three states: Jalisco, Michoacán and Zacatecas” 
(Verduzco and Unger, 1997: 403). They add that those municipalities with the 
highest rates are rural, although urban migration is growing in importance for 
international migration flows. Other migration researchers such as Cortina et al. 
(Cortina et al., 2005) question the causal relationship between poverty and 
migration given that Veracruz has the lowest share of migration as well as the 
lowest economic performance indicators. In the same sense, according to the 
former President‟s Office for Mexicans Abroad, only Ocosingo and Chenhalo in 
Chiapas are recognised among 90 micro regions3 with high rates of emigration 
and marginalisation levels.  
However, all Southern Mexico has been identified as a potential and in 
some cases a new source of migrants; in particular, Veracruz has become one 
of the new principal origin-states along with Mexico City‟s metropolitan area 
(Wodon et al., 2000). Here, the causes of migration are not fully explained by 
unemployment or poverty, or by the existence of social networks facilitating the 
migration process. Instead, wage differentials and a lack of social mobility for 
both the skilled and unskilled labour force are perceived as the main reasons for 
emigration. Employment opportunities for the economically active local 
population in the rural sector of Veracruz are limited by very low agricultural 
                                            
3  
Micro-region is the unit representing a cohort of municipalities that share socio-
economic characteristics (linguistic, cultural, productive activity, geography and climate among 
others). Mexico was divided into 263 micro regions in order to apply the development policy 
launched by President Fox during the period 2000-2006. 
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productivity while urban employment has been affected by the poor 
performance of the industrial sector. Researchers highlight the neoliberal 
policies of recent presidents, specifically since President Salinas de Gortari 
signed the NAFTA agreement (which came into force in January 1994). This 
agreement emphasised an export-led policy based on maquiladoras, 
privatisation and macroeconomic measures which restricted wages, 
consumption and savings. In the specific case of Veracruz, neoliberal policies 
are regarded as the main cause of increased unemployment rates and the 
disappearance of the “uncompetitive” industrial sector. The oil industry 
experienced the loss of 24,000 permanent jobs and witnessed a decrease in 
terms of average annualised rates of employment by enterprise from 13.7% in 
1988 to 7.4% in 1993 and 6.5% in 1998 (Chávez Lomelí et al., 2002: 5). The 
traditionally pivotal agricultural sector has seen production and employment 
affected by world prices for coffee and sugar. The decline of the agricultural 
sector has led to the rise of the tertiary sector, a tendency apparent across the 
Mexican economy.  
Canales (2000) points out the constant demand caused by, “a strategy of 
labour flexibility and deregulation (which) seems to provide the basis for a fresh 
supply of jobs for the migrant population” (Canales, 2000: 413) in the US 
economy. This statement offers an explanation for continuing migration linked to 
changes in the socio-demographic profile, such as polarisation of the 
employment structure whereby the new information economy creates a gap 
between high and low skilled jobs, both of which are attractive to different 
segments within the origin-country migrant population. Sassen argues that 
globalisation shapes the US labour market which strongly differentiates levels of 
pay, qualifications and forms of contract regulation and maintains the demand 
for migrant labour (Sassen, 1998). The other factor highlighted is the degree of 
change in the Mexican economy provoked by the 1982 financial crisis, 
something which led to the impoverishment of a large section of the population 
(Canales, 2003: 752).  
While urban areas have also contributed to the emigration trend, this more 
skilled labour force is seeking employment in highly industrialised labour sectors 
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with the aim of improving their wages and quality of life. Therefore, 
unemployment per se cannot be seen as a reason for migration when we 
consider skilled migrants who are finding better opportunities in terms of wages 
or related-jobs in the Northern maquiladora states or in the US and Canada. 
Statistical data provided by the Mexican Census of 2000 shows that, in 
terms of the share of migrants in the population, Veracruz ranked first alongside 
traditional sending regions such as Guanajuato or Michoacán and in second 
place if we look at the net international migration rate (Chávez Lomelí et al., 
2002: 17; Tuirán Gutiérrez et al., 2005). Northern border cities are also 
attracting Southern flows to the maquiladora industry. A weaker regional 
economy such as that of Veracruz, with high rates of unemployment among the 
young, became a source not only for international migration but also for internal 
migration. Whether the migrants stop at the Northern farm labour states or not, 
agricultural workers are migrating from rural to rural areas or participating in 
rural-international migration (Canales, 2003). It is also true that rural and urban 
migrants from Southern states like Veracruz use border cities as a transit point 
on their way to the US or Canada. The migration rate doubled in the 1990s, with 
Veracruzans accounting for 41.9% of migrants in Northern Border states 
(Chávez Lomelí et al., 2002: 14).  
2.3.2 New Trends in Moroccan Migration 
From the early 1990s, North African migration trends changed as 
destinations were diversified in the face of increasingly restrictive immigration 
policies in traditional European destination countries. Southern Europe became 
one of the more accessible destinations for North African migrants. According to 
Lopez, there was a small, but progressively increasing, migration to Spain by 
Algerian and Tunisian workers throughout the 1990s (López García et al., 1996). 
Moroccans formed a part of this more general Maghrebian migration to 
Southern Europe, representing the largest number during the course of the 
1990s, with around 400,000 by the early 2000s. Moreover, Spain was itself 
becoming one of the principal locations for Moroccan settlement in Europe. By 
2004 the distribution of Moroccan emigrants by receiving country was as follows: 
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France led the list with 1,125,000 and Spain followed with nearly 400,000; the 
Netherlands had 300,000; Italy 280,000; Belgium 220,000, and Germany 
110,000 (Berriane, 2004b: 25). The major shift in Moroccan migration to Spain 
came in 1997 (Belguendouz, 2002). These figures contrasted with the 
distribution of Moroccans obtaining citizenship in Europe: of the almost 300,000 
Moroccans acquiring citizenship in European destinations during the period 
1990-1999, 42% were resident in France, followed by the Netherlands with 29%, 
then Belgium with 15% and Spain with 3% (Lee, 2002: 20). 
France remained the main destination country for the Moroccan diaspora 
after increased restrictions on migration were introduced in the 1970s, and their 
political, social, and cultural links reflected a very special bilateral relationship 
based on their colonial history (Lamchichi, 1999). Nevertheless, Belgium and 
the Netherlands are also important destination countries for Moroccan settlers, 
as well as other members of the Maghrebian-origin population (Refass, 2004).4 
However, the shift in destinations routes to Southern Europe, specifically Spain 
and Italy, was marked in the early 1990s by two main factors: the establishment 
of a visa system to restrict “Southern migration” and changes in Spanish labour 
market demand. Spain introduced a visa quota to show that this illegal migration 
caused by EU visa restrictions had been dealt with while also providing cheap 
labour for its growing agricultural and service sectors (Muus and van Dam, 
1996). 
Destination is also determined by the origins of flows. Migrants from Nador 
have the most diversified destinations, while most of those found in France are 
from the Souss region (Tiznit). Khénitra has a tendency to be the supplier of 
Moroccan flows to Italy and France, while migration to Spain seems to be 
preferred by those from Larache (Lee, 2002: 59). As in the case of Mexico, 
different researchers noted the preference for specific destinations based firstly 
on the regional labour market which led to the settlement of migrants who 
                                            
4 
For instance, in 2004, the Belgian-Moroccan communities were celebrating 40 years of 
the Convention signed by the Government of Belgium and Morocco in 1964 which allows the 
immigration of “travailleurs a l‟etranger”.  
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developed links as transnational communities and perpetuated migration (Lee, 
2002: 82). 
The social networks subsequently developed not only support an 
increasing number of migrants, but also forge links to support transnational 
communities from a strong communal organisational perspective as is analysed 
further in subsequent chapters .  
The case of Moroccan immigration to Spain challenges some of the main 
explanations for migration, whether based on push-pull factors or social capital 
theories. Spain‟s shift from being an emigration to immigration country is 
intrinsically related to changes in its economy and labour market (Commission 
Européenne et Eurostat, 2000). According to López5, there has been a major 
shift in the migratory position of Spain. The country has moved from a position 
where many in Spain sought to escape the Franco regime and/or economic 
underdevelopment (whether to Latin America or other parts of Europe) to one 
where it is a destination country as a result of returning migrants or the arrival of 
migrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Eastern 
Europe.  
The Spanish Government has recognised the link between immigration 
flows and labour market conditions. From this perspective, historical links 
between Spain and Morocco or Latin America cannot fully explain new 
migratory trends. In response to increasing labour demand, Spain issued 
10,575 permanent work permits and 13,672 temporary work permits in 2002 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2002). Economic research has 
highlighted growth as the main factor influencing the increased presence of a 
foreign labour force in Spain.  Alonso stresses the country's relatively high 
growth rate and the labour market absorption capacity as well as the immigrants‟ 
availability to take jobs that are unattractive to Spanish workers, specifically 
those categorised as "triple D jobs": dirty, degrading and dangerous.6 According 
to Munarriz, the empirical and statistical data reflects a segmented labour 
                                            
5 
Interview with Dr. Bernabé López, Autonomous University of Madrid, June 2004.  
6 
Interview with Dr. Jose Antonio Alonso, Director from the Center for International Affairs, 
in the Complutense University, June 2004. 
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market concentrated in particular sectors. Agriculture, as an activity mainly 
developed in Mediterranean Spain, represents one of the main sectors for 
Moroccan migrants while in the Atlantic coastal regions the informal sector is 
important (Munárriz Guezala, 2004: 367).  
The assumption that Spanish labour market changes are a factor creating 
demand for specific jobs in the agriculture, service, and construction sectors 
and driving new trends in Spanish immigration flows is highlighted by Bernabé 
López's research from the mid-1990s. He argues that the Spanish Government 
established quota agreements to recruit and regularise the immigrant labour 
force, indicating that demand was not fully satisfied by the local workforce 
(López García et al., 1996). 
Emigration flows to Spain were considered to originate primarily from the 
Northern Mediterranean Provinces, such as Tangier, Tetouan-Larache, Al-
Hoceima-Tza-Taounate, Grand Nador, Chefchaouen, and Berkane Oujda. 
However, some data collected by Spanish non-governmental organisations 
researching clandestine flows indicates that the Centre-South as the main 
province of origin for these flows rather than the North. This apparent 
inconsistency is difficult to resolve in the absence of accurate statistical data 
from either the receiving or the sending country. Nevertheless, linguistic, 
historical, and geographical closeness may be influential factors facilitating the 
decision to emigrate. Northern Morocco has strong links with Spain, not only 
because it was a Protectorate in the recent past but also because four-hundred 
years of Andalous rule in Spain shaped Southern Spain and Northern Morocco 
as a unique bi-cultural unit (albeit one divided culturally by religion and 
geographically by the Mediterranean Sea).  
Exhaustive fieldwork performed  by a Moroccan and Spanish research 
team led by López and Berriane has identified North-Eastern and Central 
Morocco as the main sources of the Moroccan-origin migrant population in 
Spain (Berriane, 2004b; Berriane and Refass, 2004: 128). The research study 
carried out by the Taller de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos (TIEM) at 
the Autonomous University of Madrid describes and analyses the evolution of 
Moroccan immigration in two different stages. It demonstrates changes in 
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Moroccan immigration in Spain, where numbers have increased five-fold in one 
decade. This influx notably increased from 70,000 registered in 1991 to a 
Moroccan origin population of nearly 400,000 throughout Spain in 2003. The 
registered population includes both regular and irregular immigrants (Izquierdo, 
1996: 216). These numbers represent an increase in the share of the 
Moroccan-origin population from 13.76% of the Foreign Resident Population in 
Spain in 1991 to 21.35% in 2002 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 
2002).  
Moroccan immigration evolved from being comprised of a minority group 
of Jewish Moroccans settled in Barcelona to an extended phenomenon linking a 
wide spectrum of origins and destinations. As described by the previously 
mentioned research work, the Moroccan community established in Barcelona 
was the product of Morocco's political turmoil that expelled diverse groups as 
well as the closure of European Community borders in the early 1970s. These 
two factors transformed Spain from being a transit country for migrants 
expecting to re-enter European Community countries into a destination country. 
Those settlers were the pioneers of a growing social network which comprised 
the biggest foreign origin group in Barcelona and up to 37% of the total 
Moroccan-origin population in Spain (Aubarell, 2004).  
The composition of the Moroccan migrant community relative to other 
migrants in Spain is rather different. In terms of gender, there are relatively 
more males amongst the Moroccans, whereas women prevail in the Colombian 
group and Europeans are distributed in equal terms. Regarding age, there is a 
notable difference between Europeans on the one hand and Africans and Latin 
Americans on the other: the former are grouped in the range 45 years and over, 
whereas the latter fall into the range of 25 to 44 years old (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística de España, 2003). 
Sex, age, unemployment, and social status differentiate North Africans 
from other migrants in other European, American, or Arab destinations. Data 
collected by the European Commission in 2000 concerning Moroccan 
immigrants settled in France described international migrants as predominantly 
men in their 20s and 30s, more often single than non-migrants, and more often 
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living with their parents before leaving to go abroad (Fadloullah et al., 2000). In 
addition, their level of education was at the level of primary school or lower 
while the motivation to migrate was triggered by unemployment conditions at 
home.  In Spain, 40% of Moroccan migrants had not received formal education; 
if the numbers having only a primary education are included their share of the 
migrant community rises to 70%, leaving a small proportion that had studied at 
secondary school or university  (López-García, 2004: 217). In addition, in terms 
of destinations the Moroccan community is highly concentrated in Catalonia 
(especially Barcelona), Madrid, and Andalusia, ( See Fig. 2.1)(Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística de España, 2004). 
Figure 2-1 Total Moroccan Population in Spain. 2004 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Immigration. Yearly Statistical Book, Spain 2005.  
 
According to Berriane and López, the distribution of Moroccan migrants in 
the economy is differentiated on the basis of gender. Men are equally 
distributed between agriculture and construction, followed by industry and 
services in terms of importance; women, however, are mostly to be found in 
domestic and commercial services (Berriane and López García, 2004: 217) 
Regarding the age and sex of foreign workers, data based on the Spanish 
Population Census of 2001 shows greater participation by women, nearly 40% 
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of the total Moroccan population (López García, 2004). The phenomenon of 
women‟s immigration in Spain is one of the most significant changes in 
Moroccan trends. According to Ramirez (Ramírez, 2004), Moroccan women in 
the 25-27 age range are attracted to “feminised” economic activities and regions 
in Spain. Most of the women are not married (73%) and are employed as 
housekeepers (86.3%) principally attracted to cities such as Madrid and tourist 
resorts. The sources of emigration are the cosmopolitan region of the Atlantic 
Garb (43.7%) and the Tangier Peninsula (33.7%), which means they come from 
urban areas (although they might have migrated from the rural areas in the first 
place). 
Berriane and López (2004) highlight a noticeable shift from Morocco as the 
main sending country to Ecuador, a development which some scholars argue 
was a consequence of a favoured migration policy towards Ecuadorians after 
the terrorist attacks in Casablanca, Morocco (in May 2003) and Madrid, Spain 
(in March 2004). At the national level, compared to 2004 figures we can see 
that at the end of 2003 Moroccans formed one of the largest groups of legal 
residents with 333,770, followed by Ecuadorians with 174,289, Colombians with 
107,459 and the British with 105,479 (See Table 2.4). In 2004 the number of 
Moroccans increased to 386,958 and Ecuadorians to 221,549, which 
maintained Morocco as the leading Non-EU foreign group of residents (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística de España, 2004).  
Table 2-4 Total Migrant Population holding a valid permit of residence in 
Spain by country of origin and year. 2000-2004 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Morocco 199,782 234,937 282,432 333,770 386,958 
Ecuador 30,878 84,699 115,301 174,289 221,546 
Colombia 24,702 48,710 71,238 107,459 137,369 
Peru 27,888 33,758 39,013 57,593 71,245 
Cuba 19,165 21,467 24,226 27,323 30,738 
Argentina 16,610 20,412 27,937 43,347 56,193 
Dominican 
Republic 
26,481 29,314 32,412 36,664 42,928 
Romania  10,983 24,856 33,705 19,933 83,372 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Immigration 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. Ministry of Labour 
and Immigration. Government of Spain. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that the municipal census registered a difference in 
numbers with those migrants holding a resident card explains the changes in 
the share of Latin American migrants in Spain versus the North African, mostly 
Moroccan migrants. Table 2.5 indicates that in 2004 the number of Ecuadorians 
registered by the municipal census rose from the 137,185 registered in 2001 to 
463,737 in 2004, while the number of Moroccans increased from 216,470 in 
2001 to 388,046 in 2004. The difference between those registered in the 
municipalities at the end of the year and those migrants, who were granted a 
residence permit at the beginning of the following year, can be regarded as the 
irregular population. This is explained by the fact that all migrants independently 
of their migratory legal status are required to be registered in the municipality 
(Recaño and Domingo, 2005).Thus, this methodology is commonly accepted as 
a way of calculating the levels of irregular migration in Spain.  
Table 2-5 Municipal Registration of selected non-EU immigrants by 
Nationality. 2001-2004. 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2004% 
Total 137,0657 1,977,946 2,664,168 3,034,326 100% 
Total European 557,600 728,746 965 217 1,079,555 36% 
Total EU 442,679 520,285 622 085 676,286 22% 
Total non EU European 114,921 208,461 343 132 403,269 13% 
Romania 31,316 66,226 134 811 203,173 7% 
Total nonEuropean 813,057 1,249,200 1,698,951 1,954,771 64% 
Morocco 216,470 286,333 352,452 388,046 13% 
Cuba 24,936 32,383 39,060 40,501 1% 
Dominican Republic 30,312 36,898 43,270 46,878 2% 
Argentina 37,625 66,296 128,757 157,323 5% 
Colombia 86,927 190,226 242,540 246,243 8% 
Ecuador 137,185 255,350 382,169 463,737 15% 
Peru 34,690 44,488 55,773 68,591 2% 
      
Source: National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE)  
 
While undocumented Moroccans are not included in this data there is a 
strong perception of massive illegal flows towards Spain as the gateway to 
Europe, a concern for both Morocco and Spain. Sub-Saharan migration has 
caused greater alarm in terms of tackling illegal migration while Moroccan 
migration is being controlled by both the sending and receiving country 
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(Belguendouz, 2002; Belguendouz, 2003). Readmission agreements between 
Morocco and the EU are addressing these flows as well as bilateral agreements 
between Morocco and Spain to control the maritime border (Botsford, 2001). 
While migratory policies are discussed in further chapters, it is important to 
understand how southern flows are placing stress on the control of borders 
further south of Morocco. The role played by Morocco as a transit country is 
intrinsically related to the analysis of cooperation for development policy as a 
mechanism to negotiate stricter migration control.  
2.4 The Roles of Mexico and Morocco as Receiving and Transit 
Areas 
An important development in the dynamics of migration is the way in which both 
Mexico and Morocco have come to play the roles of sending, receiving and 
transit countries. Geography situates Mexico as the link between the North 
American region and Central and South America. Morocco is also a pathway 
linking Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. The borders between Mexico and the 
rest of Central/South America on the one hand, and between Morocco and the 
rest of Africa on the other, have become part of the migration control issue for 
Southern US and European borders. These borders have effectively moved 
south as the attempt to halt would-be immigrants is taking place on the northern 
and southern borders of Mexico and Morocco. According to border control 
authorities, moreover, drug flows coincidentally share traffic routes with 
migrants, often a justification for tightening border control by the US and 
European authorities (European Union, 1995; Governments of US and Mexico, 
1997). 
Irregular migration across the Northern Mexican border has commonly 
targeted specific crossing points; Tijuana and Matamoros were well known as 
strategic gateways for both Mexican and South American immigrants. The 
routes through the Gulf of Mexico are mostly used by Central American 
migrants, while migrants from further South have attempted to cross by flying to 
Mexico City as a point of transit to Tijuana in Baja California. The extension of 
the border fence, however, has now forced flows to be diverted towards more 
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risky crossing points meaning that California‟s ports are now being displaced as 
the main source of migration flows by the Sonora-Arizona border points.  
Increasingly, however, the enforcement of border controls by Mexican 
authorities starts further down at the border with Guatemala. This reflects the 
perception that migrants from south of Mexico are able to enter the country. The 
south has a traditionally porous border and migrants from Central and South 
America are easily confused with similar looking Mexican indigenous groups. 
The states of Veracruz and Chiapas have been identified as a corridor for these 
Central American migrants. Moreover, they are also receiving a percentage of 
Central American flows and sending their own origin population. According to 
the National Institute of Migration, which is part of the Secretaría de 
Gobernación (the equivalent to the US Office of Homeland Security), Mexico 
receives between 40,000 and 50,000 visiting agricultural workers from 
Guatemala, some of whom try to stay in Chiapas, while the rest attempt to 
reach other Southern states. This population is composed mainly of people in 
the age range 15 to 48 years old (89%) and mostly male (87.8%) (Centro de 
Estudios Migratorios, 2005). One third of this population is of indigenous origin 
and is without formal education. There is both documented and undocumented 
migration; some of them are commuting to work in the agricultural fields or 
construction services. Meanwhile, indigenous women participate in this labour 
force as domestic workers in the Mexican border city of Tapachula  (Angeles 
Cruz, 2002; Angeles Cruz and Rojas Wiesner, 2003) . 
Not all those who cross the border have the intention to go further north. 
Those Central American refugees who arrived in the 1990s are now regularised 
as residents in Mexico, especially in Chiapas. Guatemalan and Honduran 
nationals lead this group according to the Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM): 
in 2004 Guatemala received 1,335 resident permits and Hondurans 1,092 out of 
4,608 resident permits. Of the 1,552 registered in Chiapas, most were of 
Guatemalan origin. The figures contrast with the high levels of refugees from 
the Guatemalan civil war (10,686 in the period 1996-1999, and just under 5,000 
in 2000 and 2001) (INM, 2005). In more recent periods they have received work 
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permits from the Mexican government (Organización Internacional para las 
Migraciones and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, 2002). 
Mexico received 10,686 Guatemalan refugees in the years 1996-1999, a 
number that has decreased more recently with 4,951 in 2000 and 4,725 in 2001, 
mainly due to the civil war being officially declared over. This removed their 
chances of claiming legal status and meant that they have had to settle for work 
permits issued by the Mexican government. It is worth noting that in 2000, of the 
4,951 refugees considered documented migrants in the Southern states of 
Chiapas, Quintana Roo and Yucatán, 4,471 held resident permits. More 
important is the increasing number of agricultural migrant workers that have 
settled in the southern states and which are now replacing the Mexican workers 
(Cortez Pérez et al., 2005). The Mexican government, through the National 
Institute of Migration has issued the Migratory Form for Agricultural Workers 
(FMVA) as a temporary working permit to allow Central American migrant to 
work in Mexico, mostly in Chiapas.  On average, there were 40,000 agricultural 
workers formally hired in the last decade (Centro de Estudios Migratorios, 2005). 
It is clear, however, that some migrants from Central America may settle 
only temporarily in Mexico. Once they can cover the financial costs, they may 
seek to cross the Northern border. An example of such behaviour was 
encountered during a fieldwork trip near the southern border of Chiapas. The 
bus was full of returning migrants apprehended in the city of Veracruz, a filter 
point for Central American migrants. One woman seated next to me started to 
explain her trip from Chiapas to Matamoros, the Gulf of Mexico route to the US; 
she was coming back from leaving her husband at the Matamoros border. Her 
family had been settled in the Chiapas rural area for some years already and 
her husband had decided to migrate, following his brother who had already 
migrated to the US and had sent back enough money for the journey. This 
Guatemalan woman was not being guarded by immigration officers on the bus 
and the reason was that she was holding her voter‟s card, official Mexican ID 
that can only be granted to citizens or permanent residents as a form of national 
identity card. 
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From the perspective of a Central American refugee in Chiapas, civil war 
rather than poverty was the original reason for fleeing her home country. 
However, her family‟s economic condition in Mexico failed to reach minimum 
living standards. Once the possibility existed to finance a trip and use well-
established social networks, the migration option became feasible. Without 
these resources, the degree of poverty faced by Guatemalan migrants and 
Mexican indigenous communities settled in Southern states, as well as by the 
national population living under the poverty threshold, would serve as an 
economic constraint on international migration. 
A similar pattern of transit is apparent in the Moroccan case where sub-
Saharan migration flows are known to cross the country‟s territory. The 
Moroccan government faces a problem in terms of integrating these flows and 
controlling its Southern borders. The migrants come from Mali, Senegal, and 
Nigeria, among other African countries, and try to reach Tangier and cross the 
Mediterranean Sea. However, they often do not reach this crossing point due to 
a lack of resources, police controls or smugglers who take them to the Canary 
Islands and tell them they are in Europe. According to Belguendouz, 7  the 
Moroccan Government has been reluctant to provide meaningful statistics 
regarding Sub-Saharan migrants captured by Moroccan police. Figures are 
therefore taken from newspapers, and in his opinion, they may be inexact and 
exaggerated. Accordingly, 15,000 illegal immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in 
Morocco are believed to be in transit, waiting to pass to Spain (Angola Press, 
2006). In most cases, they will attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea from the 
Northern coast, heading for the Iberian Peninsula, or from the Atlantic coast in 
Southern Morocco towards the Canaries. Newspapers usually report dramatic 
deaths. Another 1,000 immigrants, approximately, are held at a state-run 
internment centre in Melilla (Wilkinson, 2005). Moroccan authorities have 
deported several more by leaving them on the Northern border with Algeria. As 
in the case of the US-Mexico border, there are Moroccan commuters between 
the Melilla-Ceuta Spanish territories and African Morocco. In Melilla the Spanish 
                                            
7
 Interview with Dr. Abdelkrim Belguendouz, Rabat, Morocco. July 2004 
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population accounts for 69,000 inhabitants while commuters total 30,000 (López 
Guzmán et al., 2007: 13-14). 
According to local Moroccan researchers, Sub-Saharans in Morocco find 
themselves in a difficult situation vis-à-vis the rest of the Moroccan population 
and try to remain out of public sight given police persecution (Alvarado, 2005). 
While the government is channelling resources to control the border, it is 
arguable that those resources will never be enough when the border itself is 
porous. It is therefore easier to detain illegal migrants at the international 
airports of Rabat or Marrakech, where even African students whose purpose is 
to attend University in Morocco are being detained. As Belguendouz explains, 
this is part of a migratory policy responding to Moroccan-European Agreements 
to control “Southern” flows (Belguendouz, 2003). 
2.5 Conclusions 
From a research perspective, Morocco and Mexico offer an interesting 
comparison in terms of the characteristics of their migration flows. Both share 
an emigration rate of almost 9% of the population and a history of migration 
spanning more than a hundred years. Geographical location and socioeconomic 
differences with their respective Northern neighbours serve to shape the 
geopolitical dimension of the migration issue. The "push and pull" framework 
explains the migratory history between Mexico, the US and Canada, and also 
between Morocco and its European counterparts. This approach can also 
explain diversification of destination countries along with polarisation of the 
global market: low skilled migration supplies those productive sectors that are 
not attractive for natives in terms of wages and working conditions while highly 
skilled migrants are welcome since they are required to support the highest 
stage of production in a globalization process which mainly favours the high-
tech economic sector. However, various authors argue that the persistence of 
migration is the result of a growing social network structure.  
From the perspective of sending countries, emigration is also a source of 
development and a safety valve for high unemployment rates. On the one hand, 
disparities between the rural and urban sectors explain internal migration, 
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although in the two cases analysed rural sectors were also a source of 
international migration. The need for a low-skilled labour force to sustain 
competitive agricultural and service sectors in the receiving country is combined 
with the supply of a young population with high rates of unemployment.  
Given the persistence of migration, a policy of migration control appears to 
be a core issue for receiving countries. The demand for labour in the case of 
Spain needs to be shaped according to the needs of integration policies. 
Moreover, illegal migration has been declared an emergency for migration 
control policies in both cases. "Frontiers" are therefore moving further south as 
migration flows attempt to move further north. Central America for Mexico and 
Sub-Saharan countries for Morocco, have become central to the migratory 
policies of receiving countries. There is increased pressure from these northern 
neighbours which are seeking to enforce stricter migratory policies.  
It is also important to differentiate the driving factors behind Mexican and 
Moroccan migration. The phenomenon is a response to economic factors as 
well as social networks developed through time. Moroccan immigration in Spain 
and Mexican migration in the US represent flows interconnected by labour 
markets. In sum, those changes identified by various research studies carried 
out in both regions show a specific socio-demographic profile that has been 
transformed over time as a consequence of immigration policy measures such 
as the reunification of families which in some cases allow the participation of 
women in these flows. However, changes in the labour market on the one hand 
and economic interdependence on the other have led to an increase in the 
number of immigrants in the US and created a new receiving country in the 
case of Spain. On the other hand, Mexico and Morocco are playing a three-
dimensional role as sending, receiving and transit countries. 
In the following chapters, we examine how the policies governing 
migration have taken into account these characteristics of the migration 
processes in both regions. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENT 
PARADIGM AND MIGRATION: DIAGNOSING 
CONDITIONS IN MEXICO AND MOROCCO 
3.1 Introduction 
Following our review of the theoretical debate on the possible interactions 
between development and migration in Chapter 1 and our overview of migration 
trends in Mexico and Morocco in Chapter 2, it is clear that the migration-
development nexus is highly complex. In this chapter, we focus on the 
development aspect, examining the two countries‟ economic conditions and the 
reforms which they have introduced in recent years, drawing upon the analyses 
of international development organisations such as the World Bank.   
The pursuit of economic reform has been part of a wider trend in 
development debates – the embrace of neoliberal economic policies as 
advocated by the mainstream global development organisations. In recent 
years, the World Bank (WB), as the most influential of these organisations, has 
led a debate on the nature of that relationship. This chapter examines the way 
in which these institutions have diagnosed the development problem in general 
terms and with regard to the cases of Mexico and Morocco. It also examines 
how migration has emerged as an issue in these analyses. While the 
inequalities produced by the economic gap between neighbouring countries 
(such as Mexico-US, and Morocco-Spain) have been considered as causes of 
migration within the classical theoretical debate, the complexities of the 
migration-development nexus were not fully taken into account in the 
mainstream perspective. More recently, however, international organisations 
such as the WB have given more attention to migration issues and the role of 
remittances in development policy at the macro level and the development of 
businesses at the micro-level (Adams and Page, 2003; Wodon et al., 2003; 
Taylor and Mora, 2006). This represents a shift from trade and aid to 
remittances-based initiatives which target the migrant as an agent of 
development, one of the core principles of the co-development debate (Lucas, 
2004b: 1). 
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Indeed, there has been an evolution in the way in which migration appears 
in the programme statements of the multilateral organisations regarding the 
development plans for high-migration rate countries. At this point, it is worth 
reiterating the need to differentiate the concept of co-development from 
mainstream aid-development cooperation. Both concepts share the central 
element of incorporating the migration-development nexus, but differ in their 
treatment of migration. The theoretical debate surrounding co-development as a 
practice refers to a “transnational” process affecting the migrant population in 
both receiving and hosting countries, whereas co-development policy focuses 
primarily on the effects of migration solely in the sending country and it is 
related to return migratory policies. This chapter focuses on the development 
priorities and programmes advocated and carried out by the mainstream 
development institutions, exemplified by the WB, and the changing treatment of 
migration within their thinking.  
 The chapter is divided in three main sections. The first part describes the 
"conventional wisdom" on development as promoted by the international 
economic and finance institutions, primarily the WB. It looks at the suggested 
mechanisms for boosting economic development and their impact on poverty. 
Some critics argue that their diagnoses focus mainly on endogenous factors 
such as the countries' own “Southern” economic characteristics. Those critics 
claim that the economic problems affecting these countries might be more a 
result of exogenous factors imposed by the multilateral organisations´ recipes 
for reform. In other words, the economic policies followed by these less 
developed countries are shaped by an international orthodoxy which stresses 
economic liberalisation. However, these neo-liberal policies do not contain 
adequate instruments for addressing the socio-economic inequalities which are 
one of the main drivers of migration out of countries such as Mexico and 
Morocco.  
The chapter then examines how these general principles are applied in 
practice by comparing the WB documents focusing on Mexico and Morocco. 
We consider the economic diagnosis provided in these documents and critically 
assess how far they address these countries‟ problems of poverty, 
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unemployment and social inequality as well as the regional and sectoral 
challenges which they face. We also discuss the steps taken by these countries 
to open up their markets, as recommended in the WB reports. Although the 
effects of globalisation may clash with national economic needs, export–led 
policies have been promoted as the most effective instrument for boosting 
economic growth and diminishing unemployment, (thereby addressing one of 
the reasons to migrate).   
The final section considers the way in which migration has been treated in 
the mainstream development paradigm, focusing in particular on the changing 
attitudes towards the role of remittances. We also follow up the way in which 
this changing perspective was reflected in the analysis of the Mexican and 
Moroccan economies. 
3.2 The International Development Orthodoxy and the 
Migration-Development Nexus 
Nowadays, Morocco and Mexico are considered as economies open to 
international capital, privatisation, and trade liberalisation, economic reforms 
adopted by political elites in line with the priorities of the international financial 
institutions.  In the same context, migration was seen as a result of the “failure” 
of development as well as consequence of poverty that perpetuates the 
phenomenon. Increasingly, however migration is perceived as a mechanism 
bringing development in the sending countries as well as economic benefits to 
the host countries (Lucas, 2004a: 26; UN General Assembly, 2006b; DFID, 
2007). 
Understanding the shift from a negative to a positive perspective on 
migration and its relationship with development requires an analysis of the 
conventional wisdom on development and the role of migration. The 
“Washington Consensus” on development was for many years highly influential, 
particularly in the principal international economic organisations, but was 
equally blamed by critics for failing to eradicate – or even for causing – poverty 
(Rosser and Vcherashnaya Rosser, 2001; Thompson, 2002).  The Consensus 
referred to the strategies designed by the Washington–based financial 
institutions (such as the WB, the IMF, and the IADB), for reforming economic 
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policies in “emerging” or “developing” economies. 1 It was regarded as part of a 
worldwide policy shift following the coming to power of the Reagan and 
Thatcher governments in the 1980s and has been highly criticised because of 
its neo-liberal orientation. This concept was initially used to refer to a common 
set of policies applied to the Latin American countries, but was also increasingly 
applied to other developing countries. 2 Leaving aside the question of whether 
the economic policies implied in the Washington Consensus gave rise to more 
crisis and negative consequences (Saavedra, 2003; Rodrik, 2006), migration 
and development were implicitly related in the argument: negative economic 
growth, low productivity, and hence high unemployment rates were seen as 
factors contributing to high rates of emigration in developing countries .  
For much of the last 25 years, a central component of the Washington 
Consensus has informed policy debates: the assumption that trade would boost 
economic growth and that poverty reduction would follow from integration into 
the global market. A number of countries, which have undergone the reform 
process and became members of regional trade agreements, were successful 
in their aim of reducing the existing trade barriers (especially non-tariff ones). 
However, many argued that such trade would help to reduce poverty only if 
there were also mechanisms which mitigated the impact on the most vulnerable 
groups and allowed them to participate in the global market. Indeed, some 
institutions were conscious of the cost and benefits from trade. As was noted by 
the Global Poverty Report 2001 (a working paper prepared for G8 Genoa 
                                            
1  
John Williamson characterised the financial institutions‟ formula for boosting 
development as including such policies as competitive exchange rate to provide an incentive for 
export growth, import liberalisation, the generation of adequate domestic savings to finance 
investment (primarily by tightening fiscal policy), and cutting back the bloated role of 
government to allow it to concentrate on the provision of core public services and a framework 
for economic activity. 
  
2
 Although many countries carried out this economic formula, economic growth goals 
were not always reached, giving rise to increasing criticisms of the economic policy 
recommendations. Williamson defends those reforms recommended especially on Latin 
America, arguing that slow and even negative economic growth in cases such as Argentina and 
Mexico were the result of limited economic reforms, which diverted from the original approach. 
However, Williamson subsequently recognised that the Washington Consensus required 
amendment: see Kuczynski, P.P. & Williamson, J. (2003) After the Washington Consensus: 
Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America Washington: The Institute for International 
Economics.. 
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Summit), “the benefits and costs of trade reforms do not flow simultaneously 
(...and...) adjustment costs are often borne over the short term while the 
benefits of reform are realised over the long run” (G8. Genoa Summit, 2001: 1). 
On the same note, the report underlines trade as the most important 
mechanism to increase economic growth and reduce poverty, but only if a 
proper environment is created to offer opportunities to the poor. Moreover, it 
asserts that it was mainly the already-established export-leading businesses 
that might be able to export, marginalising those medium and small enterprises 
incapable of participating in a “global” market.3 
Despite the recognition of the potentially negative effects from forced 
market openness on “non-developing countries”, the international consensus 
has continued to argue for the pursuit of free trade as the ultimate means of 
diminishing poverty. Equally, immigration has been diagnosed as a result of 
underdevelopment and poverty though there is some recognition that there 
might be a link between trade liberalisation and inequality. The Report of the 
High-Level Panel on Financing for Development presented by former Mexican 
President Ernesto Zedillo to the United Nations Development Summit in 
Monterrey in 2002 (also known as the Zedillo Report), described a world 
polarised into the wealthy and the non-wealthy which would be characterised by 
“lack of markets for one‟s product, illegal immigration, pollution, contagious 
disease, insecurity, fanaticism, and terrorism” (United Nations, 2002e: 3). It 
continued by stressing the need for a commitment to the Millennium Declaration 
which aims to halve extreme poverty by 2015. 
This report also stressed the importance of foreign capital for investment in 
productive sectors, with privatisation highlighted as one way of attracting such 
investment. Another important strategy was to encourage fair trade policies 
which would reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, a topic that has been at the 
heart of negotiations within the WTO meetings. Unfortunately, the latter 
                                            
3
 Apparently, the US Government had previously taken this into account when it created 
the US Community Adjustment and Investment Programme (USCAIP), a loan programme 
administered by the NADBank and addressed to the private sector that might be affected by the 
negative impacts from NAFTA. 
 http: //www.frbsf.org/publications/community/investments/cra99-1/page3.html. 
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recommendation has not been fully addressed, given the fact that world-trade 
arrangements are driven by the interests of the world‟s leading economies, 
rather than the needs of the developing and least developed countries.4 
However, the factor which undoubtedly marked out the Zedillo Report from 
previous statements on development was the high profile given to migration as 
a systemic issue, which required cooperation between the host and sending 
country, and as a factor in development. The Report's proposal for “liberalising 
of migration” (United Nations, 2002b: 10) was based on two central factors: the 
ageing population in developed countries, and the growing rate of remittances 
flowing to developing countries. While the report did not identify a venue or a 
timetable for serious discussions on migration at the global level, the fact that 
remittance flows could be considered as more than a source of short-term 
foreign exchange for developing countries indicated a change in the perspective 
of the international institutions. At the same time illegal migration, increasingly 
perceived as a problem affecting developed countries, was recognised as 
resulting from conditions in their underdeveloped neighbours in the “global 
village” (United Nations, 2002d). 
3.3 The Country Strategy Papers for Mexico and Morocco, the 
mainstream development perspective 
These notions of development and the appropriate policies for 
encouraging growth have informed the analysis and recommendations of 
bodies such as the WB. What was the Bank‟s view of the particular problems of 
Mexico and Morocco? In this section, we review the two countries‟ economic 
conditions and difficulties, drawing upon the WB´s own analysis as presented in 
its Country Assistance Strategy documents.  
Mexico and Morocco have been classified as emerging economies with 
the WB defining them as “Middle Income” Countries (MIC)5 and amongst the 
                                            
4
 See the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, where ministers agreed to 
start negotiations to further liberalise trade in non-agricultural goods. Nevertheless, negotiations 
ended in a deadlock in the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, September 2003 and 
negotiations failed to meet the specified deadline of 1 January 2005. 
  Http: //www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief05_e.htm#mandate 
5
 Middle Income is a broad category. Mexico is High Middle Income and Morocco Low 
Middle Income. 
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top emigration countries. A comparison of macroeconomic indicators shows 
significant economic problems, as reflected in such indicators as the rates of 
poverty, migration and economic performance (See Table 3.1.)6.  
Table 3-1 Mexico and Morocco Macroeconomic Indicators 2004 
 Economic and Demographic Indicators Mexico Morocco 
 Emigration rate (migrants as % of 
population)  
8.50% 8.60% 
GDP (average annual growth)  3.50% 3.50% 
Growth rate of Population (annual rate) 1.44% 1.80% 
Country Income Category  Upper middle income Lower middle income 
 Population  106.4 million 
inhabitants 
30.1 million 
inhabitants 
 GDP (US$) FY 683.5 billion 43.7 billion 
GNI per capita (US$)                             
$7,310.00 
$1,730.00 
Total % of Population in Poverty  Rural  46.08%         22% 
Urban  8.45% 7.9% 
 Total % of Population in Extreme Poverty  20.30% 40% poor and 
vulnerable  
Total %Rural Population 24%  45% 
Urban Population  76%  55% 
Unemployment 3.79% (Nat.  average) 11% (Nat. average) 
Urban Unemployment 18% 18.40% 
Rural   *3.2% 
Source: WB Country Strategic Papers for Mexico and Morocco, 2005, Direction of Statistics of 
INSEA Morocco, CONAPO Statistical Database, Mexico, SEDESOL(United Nations, 2002d). 
 
This data is collected as part of the WB's CAS and Governmental 
Statistics Units in both Morocco and Mexico. These CAS reports give us a good 
understanding of the Bank's priorities and how it considers poverty reduction 
can be achieved as well as providing a perspective on the political factors 
shaping policy. As an expression of how the Bank defines the development 
                                            
6
 As regards this data, it is worth noting that international organisations are generally 
working with national sources of statistics to assess the link between poverty, trade, and 
migration. Even though poverty and unemployment statistics are key indicators of socio-
economic conditions in a sending country, they are gathered on the basis of different national 
methodologies and these may lead to diverging reports of the levels of income. On migration in 
particular, moreover, such information is difficult to verify: the United Nations Reports recognise 
the problems of identifying migration trends given that the information is “diffused among 
Government bodies as well as among international organizations" and that "in many countries 
the information is neither available nor produced on regular basis “Williamson, J. (2002 ) Did the 
Washington Consensus Fail?. Outline of speech at the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies.   Institute for International Economics November 6, 2002 Washington, DC Center for 
Strategic & International Studies,  The lack of detailed evidence of migration dynamics and its 
causes and effects, limits the development of an economic policy that not only assures the 
incorporation of vulnerable communities into the productive sectors, but also reduces migration 
pressures.  
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agenda, the CAS also indicates how the WB's guidelines for development are 
designed in conjunction with other international agencies, although the latter are 
intervening to differing degrees. In the case of Morocco, for example, the WB is 
focusing more on the analytical work while the EU and its financial affiliates are 
the main actors in overseeing the application of the program. The CAS for 
Morocco has established that WB funding is being reduced, as the EU has 
become the main source of funding. In the case of Mexico, the IADB, the IMF 
and the USAID are the main protagonists.  
Comparing the Morocco‟s CAS 2001-2004 and Mexico CAS 2000, it 
appears that both countries are in economic and political transition, achieving 
major goals in terms of macroeconomic stability, financial system, education, 
and democracy. Nevertheless, poverty and infant and maternal mortality are 
common problems and their governments are struggling to fulfil the 2015 
Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2002a). In addition, the 
analyses take into account the political risk factors associated with the degree 
of democratisation and have made funding conditional on the development of 
democracy. Mexico is presented as a country which has already reached a 
democratic political stage while Morocco is presented as a country still facing 
the challenge of democratisation. The assumed lack of democracy is linked to 
the degree of corruption; a more democratic country is associated with greater 
transparency in terms of administering development resources.  
Morocco “faces challenges..(such as).. restraining government spending, 
reducing constraints on private activity and foreign trade, and achieving 
sustainable growth” (USAID Morocco, 2005). As a consequence of this 
diagnosis, the Moroccan CAS recommended the implementation of a structural 
adjustment programme supported by the IMF, the WB, and the Paris Club.7 
Reforms included making the Dirham convertible for current account 
transactions and encouraging trade and foreign investment through a free-trade 
                                            
7
 The Paris Club is an informal mechanism to reach agreements between creditors and 
debtor countries, and it is called so since 1956 when Argentine agreed to meet its public 
creditors in Paris. See on line http: //www.clubdeparis.org/sections/qui-sommes-nous. 
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agreement with the US and the privatisation of the state telecommunications 
company and the largest state-owned bank.  
Overall, the report noted a mixed economic performance, highlighting that 
in the period 2001-04 the budget deficit averaged 5.2% of the GDP, because of 
substantial increases in wages and oil subsidies, along with extraordinary 
expenses in infrastructure and security related projects after the 2003 
Casablanca terrorist attack (World Bank, 2005: 3). Thus, one of the main 
concerns was to decrease budget deficit through civil service and budget 
reforms in the very short term. The long-term challenges included preparing the 
economy for freer trade with the US and EU, improving education and job 
prospects for Morocco's youth, and raising living standards. It also noted that 
Morocco is due to receive support from the EU to improve its infrastructure for 
export services (including highways, ports, railroads, etc.) as part of the MEDA 
programmes (these programmes are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).  
The report identified economic reforms as an important catalyst for 
development and argued that rural and social programmes  were important for 
improving the quality of life and reducing the social inequalities between the 
rural and urban areas (the “two Moroccos” as defined by the CAS 2001-2004) 
(World Bank, 2001: 1). Interestingly, the subsequent CAS, for 2005-2009 gives 
greater attention to tackling pockets of poverty in both the urban and the rural 
areas. As the Bank established, this shift was due to an upsurge in terrorist 
activity, notably the suicide attack on the “Casa España” in Casablanca in 2003. 
One of the sources of support for radical Islam was the urban slums where 
levels of poverty are high (World Bank, 2005).   Social tension is expected if 
economic growth is not sustained. Since 40% of the population is categorised 
as “poor” or “economically vulnerable”, the WB sought to identify the major 
areas of poverty in order to support “specific economy wide reforms” and the 
“design of sustainable local infrastructure", encouraging economic opportunities 
in poor areas and improving access to health services (World Bank, 2005: 16).  
The report also highlighted the problem of absorbing the fast growing 
labour force. It attributes the causes of unemployment to the low level of 
economic growth and increases in the economically active population, and 
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argues that, as a consequence, there may be an increase in “unmanageable 
social tension”. However, it does not take into account international migration in 
this analysis, though it does emphasise the role of emigration from rural to 
urban areas as a factor for unemployment, particularly among the young and 
educated (34% and 26% respectively). Despite a favourable combination of 
falling rates of population growth (1.5%), high rates of employment growth 
(3.1%), and the increasing participation of women in the labour market, there is 
a need for higher investment that could create employment for the country‟s 
educated youth (World Bank, 2005). According to Moroccan scholars, rural-
urban migration – along with a deteriorating wage in urban areas - has 
accelerated the international migration process (Agénor and El Aynaoui, 2003; 
El Aoufi and Bensaïd, 2005; Kachani, 2005).  
In sum, the Country Assessment Strategy documents for 2001-2004 and 
2005-2009 indicate the WB‟s priorities for the Moroccan economy. They 
highlight development aims in line with the Millennium Development Goals for 
2015.8   They also claim to address those endogenous factors such as the high 
rate of unemployment and young population which intensify the pressure to 
migrate (World Bank, 2005). The Bank‟s recommendations focus on 
programmes designed to improve the economic and political environment for 
foreign investment by encouraging the pursuit of economic and political reforms. 
Furthermore, the strategy is seen as operating within a cooperative framework 
with other financial institutions as the EU and the African Development Bank  
Overall, the WB‟s CAS 2002 for Mexico highlights the well managed 
macroeconomic policy after the Mexican Economic Crisis in 1994 as well as the 
democratic changes which occurred with the 2000 Presidential elections (World 
Bank, 2004). Democratisation in Mexico facilitated closer relations between 
senior officials in the Bank and the Mexican government and raised the Bank‟s 
expectations that economic performance would improve on the basis of less 
                                            
8
 Official Development Assistance was recognised as the main source of development 
and the members established to donor 0.7 per cent to support a world development program, 
which aims to reduce poverty and increase development aid. 
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corruption. According to the CAS report, there were signs of improvements in 
development and this was attributed to the strategies suggested by the Bank.  
Though the CAS 2002 report is broadly positive in its analysis of the 
Mexican economy, it highlights the challenges for Mexico in diminishing socio-
economic inequalities and unemployment. It underlines the fact that 51 millions 
of people live in poverty despite the important decrease in poverty levels as well 
as the regional, gender and ethnical inequalities inherent in Mexico‟s historical 
development(World Bank, 2002: 9). Table 3.2 describes an overall decrease of 
poverty at the national level, but a continued gap between the rural and urban 
level of poverty. While 8.5% of the population were in extreme poverty in the 
urban areas, the equivalent figure for those in rural areas was 46.1%(World 
Bank, 2002: 7).  
     Table 3.1 Indicators of Poverty in Mexico 1989-2000. Share of the  
     Population in Extreme and Moderate Poverty in Mexico (%) 
Extreme Poverty9 
 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Urban 18.1 16.8 10.9 18.2 16.3 8.5 
Rural  41.4 44.7 49.8 60.5 57.0 46.1 
National  27.0 24.4 21.5 29.7 27.3 18.0 
Extreme and  
Moderate 
Poverty 
 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Urban 50.7 49.1 40.6 53.2 49.1 36.3 
Rural 69.3 73.3 78.8 84.8 82.1 73.3 
National 57.8 55.7 51.0 61.9 58.7 45.7 
     Source: World Bank, 2002 
 
Critics of the Mexican Government and the WB have focused on the 
methodology used for measuring poverty, challenging the reliability of the data 
and accusing them of conveying a false impression as regards the extent of 
poverty reduction. According to an evaluation done by Cortés et al. (2007),the 
central question is on the definition of poverty and its measurement. Based on 
those different categories of poverty classification, poverty alleviation 
                                            
9 
World Bank staff estimates based on the ENIGH surveys. The poverty measures are 
based on a comparison of total per capita current consumption (not adjusted to the national 
accounts) with poverty lines representing the cost of basic needs and computed following the 
INEGI/CEPAL method. 
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programmes designed by the WB are focused on food poverty only, without 
taking into account capabilities and patrimonial poverty, thereby making it 
possible to assert that there was a decrease in poverty levels. Moreover, the 
cycle of poverty produced by lack of educational capabilities and infrastructure 
are not addressed by the programmes. 
Subsequent reports, such as the CAS for Mexico in 2004, have underlined 
the need to create at least 1.5 million new jobs per year and contrasted this with 
the lack of employment opportunities. The report also raises the issue of 
migration in relation to poverty alleviation challenges. Migration here is still seen 
as a safety valve for poverty. Also, the remittances were, in this report, 
considered as an important determinant of development:  
“Migration to cities and abroad will continue to be a major route out of 
poverty for some areas; continued efforts to develop a more efficient formal 
system to reduce the cost of remittances and make them more transparent, as 
well as measures to facilitate rural financial services, would harness the 
development potential in worker remittances”  (World Bank, 2004: 10) 
The CAS 2004 also highlighted the country‟s agricultural problems, the 
lack of competitiveness of the Mexican industry, and questions of health and 
education (though its main concern was with the environmental issues affecting 
Mexico). It did not explore the link between these problems and the high rates 
of migration (aside from the increased attention given to remittances). While it 
might have been expected that such an important economic and social issue 
would have been addressed in the CAS reports, migration was not integrated 
into the heart of the Bank‟s analysis of the country‟s economic problems.  
The Bank has supported Mexico's efforts to increase trade as a motor for 
development in the Southern Mexico and Central American Countries, a source 
of increasing migration flows towards the “North”. Research documents 
released by the WB emphasise the need for economic policies for Southern 
Mexico, where the levels of poverty are seen as related to their growing 
migration rates (Wodon et al., 2000). However, despite highlighting the lack of 
human capital, infrastructure, health services and the extreme poverty being 
suffered by this population, the Bank emphasises an economic policy based on 
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trade and the development of transport infrastructure. However it is debateable 
whether such a policy addresses the problems facing such economically 
backward regions which are unable to attain market competitiveness. 
3.4 Changing Perceptions of Migration and Development 
The shift to the inclusion of remittances as tool of development in the 
mainstream worldwide spheres was established in the Monterrey Consensus on 
Financing Development as the Agreements from the UN International 
Conference on Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002. While the main 
conclusion is that financial aid for development will continue to provide the main 
mechanism for reducing poverty and hence migration, there was increasing 
attention paid to the role of migrants‟ remittances as a factor which can facilitate 
development and thereby stem migration. From this point, the question 
addressed by such organisations has been how to channel remittances 
effectively so that they benefit the productive sector instead of solely goods 
consumption.  The Monterrey consensus called for mechanisms “to reduce the 
transfer cost of migrant workers´ remittances and create opportunities for 
development-oriented investments, including housing” (United Nations, 2002c: 
8).  
Along with the United Nations, the Institute of Migration (IOM) also 
highlighted the relative absence of international migration on the development 
agenda. The IOM‟s Peter Schatzer (2005)  has emphasised the need to bring 
up the migration issue in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Common 
Country Assessments and Country Strategy Papers, suggesting that 
remittances should complement rather than replace Official Development Aid 
(ODA) with the latter being used as a key tool for poverty reduction (Schatzer, 
2005).  
In this section, we consider the changing stance of international 
organisations such as the Bank on the relationship between migration and 
development. Initially the Country Assessment Strategy, the diagnosis and 
guidelines which the WB Group agreed with national Governments, did not 
explicitly mention migration as an issue, even though they focused on poverty 
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and unemployment factors which are considered by many neo-classical authors 
to be linked to the migration phenomenon. In the previous CAS for Mexico 
(2002-2005), there was no clear link between migration and development; 
instead, projects such as the PPP were highlighted and supported in 
collaboration with the IADB “to expand integration to the south as a way to fight 
poverty in both Mexico and Central America” (World Bank, 2002: 40). Overall, 
the emphasis of the programme was on addressing the regional development 
differences between the North and the South. Still, in the same document, 
remittances were mentioned as part of a strategy to promote micro and small 
business funded with migrants‟ savings along with subnational and state 
government in a joint programme with the World Bank. In the CAS 2005-2008 
for Mexico, however, the link between migration and development is more 
explicit. The report identified poverty as a cause of urban and international 
migration, and considered remittances as a source of development. It noted that 
programmes to expand labour incomes are being addressed in different sectors, 
formal and informal and agricultural and non-agricultural. Improving 
competitiveness by offering better quality infrastructure and financial services to 
small firms, regulatory reform to reduce costs of doing business and technical 
assistance to micro and small enterprises were also seen as ways of boosting 
job creation. In an effort to connect remittances with development, the CAS also 
recommended improvements and cost reductions in the provision of rural 
financial services, a reform which would also make  such transactions more 
transparent (it has been said that laundered drug money has been mixed with 
remittances) (World Bank, 2004). 
Why did the WB come to recognise that migration was a consequence of 
poverty, and needed to be alleviated through specific programmes? It seems 
that there was a greater political willingness for cooperation between the Bank 
and the Mexican government. However, it may also have been part of a wider 
change in attitudes in international organisations. As noted, the United Nations 
was also emphasising the relationship between migration and development and 
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stressed the importance of poverty-reduction programmes (UN General 
Assembly, 2006b; UN General Assembly, 2006a). 10 
By contrast, in the case of Morocco, even if it is recognised that there are 
social and economic inequalities between and within the urban and rural areas, 
migration was not recognised as a consequence of these inequalities and there 
were no programmes to address development specifically using remittances. 
Taking into account the changing treatment of the issue by the WB and the 
IADB in the case of Mexico, the EUROMED still lacked a strategy to channel 
the investments produced by remittances. Nevertheless, the benefits of such 
funds were clear for the Moroccan government, insofar as they helped to limit 
the country‟s balance of payments problems.  
The importance of remittances at the macroeconomic level is stressed in 
the recent Country Assistance Strategies for Mexico and Morocco. Mexico 
relies on remittances – along with oil revenues – to maintain macroeconomic 
stability as they reduce the country‟s external deficit. In the case of Morocco, 
remittances accounted for nearly $3.4 billion in 2001, representing almost 9% of 
its GDP, compared with tourist receipts which account for 7.4% (World Bank, 
2005: 3).  Moroccan migrants are participating in their home country‟s economy 
by helping their government to tackle the current account deficit. It has been 
said that remittances are not considered highly productive since they are not 
invested in productive activities but in consumer goods, festivities or, in the best 
cases, agriculture. Yet it is also clear that such investments have benefited 
other sectors, such as construction, and thereby have stimulated development 
to some extent (Boughba-Hagbe, 2004). 
 
 
                                            
10
 In this sense, Schatzer (2005) emphasises the need to bring up the migration issue in 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Common Country Assessments as well as in the 
Country Strategy Papers, although he suggests not replacing official development aid with 
remittances while applying the latter as a key tool for poverty reduction. Conference paper 
“Migration and the Millennium Development Goals" presented by Peter Schatzer Director, 
Regional Office for the Mediterranean, International Organization for Migration, Conference 1st 
International Conference on Migrations and Development Madrid, 30th November 2005.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 The definition of development in terms of international financial institutions 
focuses on the goal of poverty reduction. Migration as a development issue was 
for a long time excluded from the analysis given the assumption that the poorest 
were the most likely to remain in their countries because of the lack of financial 
and network resources to migrate. As was analysed in this chapter, economic 
reforms such as trade liberalisation were regarded as the principal drivers of 
development, in the process contributing to poverty reduction. Since poverty 
was not linked to migration according to the institutional and academic neo-
liberal development approach, inequalities shown by the gap between the 
highest concentration of wealth and the extreme poverty levels in both rural and 
urban areas were not considered to be significant causes of migration. The 
assumption that migration and development were not related was called into 
question by the emergence of remittances as both a factor of development and 
a financial resource to support would-be migrants‟ travel costs. The link 
between migration and development started to emerge as a topic in the 
worldwide financial institutions.  
Over time the WB Strategic Assessments for Mexico and (and to a lesser 
extent) Morocco analysed in this chapter show a shift in the goals addressing 
poverty and the emergence of remittances as a development-driving factor. 
Even though trade liberalisation is still regarded as the main mechanism for 
development, the factors involved in the migration are now considered as part 
of the financial instruments to reduce poverty. The inclusion of remittances in 
their analysis marked a new phase in the migration-development debate. 
Development in the sending regions as a factor to halt an emigration pattern is 
now seen as feasible based on international financial institutions‟ cooperation 
with sending countries.  
Unemployment in both rural and urban sectors rather than solely poverty 
needs to be at the centre of the development-migration nexus debate. The 
cases of Mexico and Morocco have shown an important change in terms of their 
economic policies; however, it is the lack of opportunities for their young 
population which continues to be a factor for emigration. The changes in the 
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profiles of their migrants show a more expanded phenomenon in both countries. 
Trade liberalisation is only helping to increase the inequalities and dislocate the 
labour force at the regional level. The question that needs to be tackled is how 
to create jobs for the 20% of the Moroccan population - mainly male under 25 
year olds in Morocco, who are seeking employment (World Bank, 2001: 4).  It 
should also tackle the consequences of agricultural fields abandoned by their 
owner, who migrate to urban areas and abroad to escape from poverty.  
Economic as well as political cooperation is central to the design of 
mechanisms to reduce the emigration pressure. Thus, the willingness of 
international institutions to expand the financial benefits of remittances requires 
the involvement of migratory policies harmonised with the economic goals. The 
next chapter analyses the limits and opportunities for achieving such economic 
and political cooperation on the migration-development issue at the regional 
level.  
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CHAPTER 4 REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS AFFECTING 
THE MIGRATION DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: NAFTA-
PPP AND EUROMED-MEDA. 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyses the regional frameworks in North 
America and the Euro-Mediterranean as they impact upon trade, development 
and migration issues. In each region, there is mix of programmes which aim to 
facilitate economic integration and foster development.  The chapter compares 
NAFTA and EUROMED as Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) designed to 
facilitate trade, examining their origins and institutional arrangements and the 
PPP and MEDA as the principal development projects which emerged either as 
part of or as complementary to those RIAs. In the course of this analysis, we 
highlight how these trade and development arrangements impacted upon 
migration, whether directly or indirectly. While their principal objectives were 
trade-oriented, they had consequences for migration.  
Given our interest in understanding the regional aspect of the migration-
development nexus, particular attention is paid to the development aspects of 
these regional frameworks. The main assumption in this chapter is that both the 
MEDA and the PPP share the goal of carrying out a development programme 
based upon an open market-oriented policy (European Commission 2001; 
Gobierno de México, 2001). The financial provisions of the agreements have 
been designed principally to support the infrastructure required to increase the 
exchange of goods and capital, which would arise from the construction of a 
free trade area, and to alleviate the imbalances created in the short term by the 
economic transition. The MEDA envisages the construction of highways and 
port improvements in Morocco while, the PPP also proposes the construction of 
a Mexico-Central America transborder highway (Union Européenne, 2003; 
Inter-American Bank of Development (IABD), 2003b). While the question of the 
link between development and migration receives relatively little official attention 
in the agreements, other policy documents and statements of regional leaders 
indicate a concern to promote development as the means to stem migration. 
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Moreover, in both cases there is an attempt to cooperate with sending countries 
on migration control: both projects assume that trade will deter migration in the 
long run, but in the short term, cooperation on migratory control instruments is 
required. 
After a brief review of the way in which trade and migration issues have 
been debated in the regional integration literature, the chapter is divided in two 
main sections, each one addressing the broader regional integration framework 
and the associated development programme: the NAFTA and PPP and the 
EUROMED and MEDA. In each case, I outline the main characteristics of the 
regional integration framework and discuss the way in which migration has or 
has not been a part of those agreements. I then examine the associated 
programmes for economic development, noting their institutional origins and 
achievements and the way in which they integrate the regional migration issue.  
While both the PPP and MEDA were primarily envisaged as mechanisms to 
expand trade, they have, to some extent, evolved into mechanisms for dealing 
with migration control.  
Indeed, in each case the evolution of the trade and development 
agreements in each region has been matched by the emergence of regional 
migratory regimes which are arguably at odds with the principles of trade 
openness and regional integration. I focus on the fact that policies of migration 
control have emerged in both the North American and Euro-Mediterranean 
contexts. Over time, and given the growing impact of migration, a range of 
dialogues and contacts have developed which have created a framework in 
which migration is discussed between sending and receiving countries in both 
regions. However, the focus for such regimes has been largely on migration 
control, a tendency reinforced by increasing security concerns. Yet the 
emphasis in these policies on strengthening security at the borders interferes 
with the much-sought smooth transit of goods and capital and arguably 
contradicts the development goals of integration. Migration issues are seen 
primarily as security rather than economic issues and in the process the 
relationship between migration and development has been to some extent 
marginalised.  
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4.2 Regional Agreements:  The neoliberal paradigm of 
development and migration   
Although migration is often a characteristic of regional economic 
interaction, intrinsically linked to questions of trade and investment, most 
Regional International Agreements (RIA) have “dealt with movements of capital 
and labour asymmetrically” (Serra and Stiglitz, 2008: 60). In the cases 
examined in this chapter, migration was only an implicit or at most, an indirect 
consideration: neither NAFTA nor the EUROMED directly addressed free 
movement of labour as part of their agenda. Instead, such issues have arisen in 
an array of venues and agreements between the participating states. Amongst 
the members of NAFTA, aside from an agreement for the free movement of 
specific high-skilled professionals, the migration issue has mainly been 
addressed in collateral agreements linked to security or economic dimensions. 
In the case of the EUROMED, the Association Agreement for trade liberalisation 
with Morocco identifies border control, readmission and regional security as 
being predominant concerns.  
NAFTA and EUROMED are at the heart of wider interdependent regional 
relationships which address migration as well as trade. According to integration 
theory, it can be argued that regional integration is the logical consequence of 
shared borders and increased trade (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Bustamante et 
al., 1992; Morata, 1997). Both Mexico and Morocco have experienced an 
increase in this economic interdependence with their corresponding neighbours. 
In 2004, 65% of Morocco's imports came from the EU, while 70% of the 
Moroccan exports go to EU (European Commission, 2002b).  Mexico has 
increased its commercial exchange with the US and Canada after signing 
NAFTA, with the US remaining its most important trade partner: 54% of 
Mexico's imports come from US while 86% of its exports go to the US 
(Secretaría de Economía, 2005). 
It might be argued that such economic interdependence is equally 
reflected in immigration rates and the transfer of remittances. Yet attempts to 
exploit the benefits of geographical closeness between regional partners seem 
to focus on the flow of capital and goods, whereas migration flows are seen 
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more in geopolitical terms. Along with drug trafficking, migration became a 
source of tension in both regional relationships and in recent years, there have 
been further complications due to concerns about terrorism and security. Thus, 
the regional context has to take into account both economic aspects of trade 
and integration on the one side and political issues of stability and security on 
the other. Increasingly, therefore, the regional treatment of migration has 
focused on the control of borders and restrictions on migration. 
4.2.1 The Neo-Classical Approach to Development and Migration. 
As noted, the Washington Consensus centred on the need for economic 
reforms which included domestic and international liberalisation. Shifting away 
from protectionism to free trade was of particular importance. Such an objective 
of course had implications for migration. The neo-classical migration theory 
assumes the existence of income disparities between host and sending 
countries (Todaro, 1986). At the micro level, maximising income is the migrant‟s 
main motivation. It is a rational decision, selected from a range of options which 
offers an optimisation of the potential migrant‟s capabilities as reflected in a 
higher wage in a more productive regional market (Borjas, 1989a; Borjas and 
Ramey, 1993). From a macro perspective, the neoclassical approach assumes 
that wage differences between countries will lead to competition between the 
non-skilled in the immigrant and the native workforces, where the former gains 
an advantage on the basis of lower wages than the latter one. Hence, a 
continuing deterioration of wages affects the less skilled and economically 
vulnerable workers in the receiving country (Briggs, 1999: 8).  Therefore, 
slowing down immigration should be the priority for the host country‟s migratory 
policy. 1  On this basis, one motivation for policy makers to adopt trade 
agreements would be to pre-empt an influx of migrants from poor neighbours 
(Briggs, 1999: 7). Along with the global financial institutions, regional 
agreements such as NAFTA and the EUROMED have been a focus for a free 
trade based programme of cooperation for development.  
                                            
1
 See the debate and articles presented by the CIS research group based in Washington, 
DC, a conservative public think tank advocating restrictive US immigration policies. www.cis.org.  
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Different economic perspectives have considered the role of trade as a 
substitute (Taylor et al., 1996; Johansson de Silva and Silva Jáuregui, 2004; 
Taylor, 2006: 14) or perhaps a complement to migration (Tapinos, 2002; Martin, 
2003b: 11) and these views have influenced mainstream economic policies. 
The goal of a free trade policy is to improve the population‟s overall welfare 
(Friedman et al., 2007). While there may be transitional costs to trade 
liberalisation, as labour is dislocated from protected sectors and firms adjust to 
tougher competition, this view considers that over the medium term, 
employment gains are achieved, and unemployment rates fall. Thus, GDP 
growth expands and the benefits of trade liberalisation are spread throughout 
society (See Papageorgiou et al., 1991). Wages in open economies are higher 
than in others, it is claimed, due to the access to – and more aggressive 
adoption of – new technologies as well as to the demand for higher skill levels 
in the labour force. New jobs being created in economies that are more open 
tend to be “good” in the sense of demanding more of workers in terms of human 
capital (International Labor Organization (ILO), 2001: 6). However, the benefits 
from the liberalisation of the markets between asymmetrical economies, as in 
the case of NAFTA, could harm those sectors with less technological 
adjustment capability. Research on NAFTA‟s impact raises doubts about the 
benefits of liberalisation given the fact that Mexico‟s expected rates of 
employment were not accomplished, leading to an increase in migration (Bean 
and Lowell, 2004).  Moreover, the agricultural sector was one of the most 
affected after the liberalisation of the markets, increasing the poverty in the rural 
Mexico which is the source of 44% of the Mexican emigration to the US 
(Burstein, 2007: 9).  
North Africa has followed a similar pathway to solve its economic problems 
(Cogneau and Tapinos, 1995). Development policy was based upon the 
liberalisation of the market, with the aim of “combating poverty, improving living 
conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating 
democratic states” (European Union, 2000: 9). The EUROMED as a RIA, 
served as a platform for achieving political as well as economic and financial 
goals within the region.  
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These regional agreements consolidated a process of liberalisation which 
had already begun. In the case of Mexico, there had been an earlier move to 
liberalise as demonstrated by its accession to the GATT in 1986 (del Castillo 
Vera 1987). In the case of Morocco, a liberalisation of its market was initiated in 
1983 by the Structural Adjustment Programme followed by its accession to the 
GATT in 1987 and continued with the Additional Protocols signed with the EU in 
1998 which was antedated by the Cooperation Agreement from 1976. A trade 
agreement with the EU was signed in 1988 as a short-term instrument to foster 
market liberalisation (Escribano, 1994; Royaume du Maroc, 1997).  
Despite the increased trade liberalisation, it is evident that the forecast 
benefits for Morocco and Mexico were not achieved. Overall, the results from a 
decade of NAFTA in the case of Mexico should have included a reduction in 
poverty and unemployment. However, so far these economic conditions have 
not been met (Weintraub, 2004a).  The economic growth produced by this trade 
agreement is negatively correlated to the increasing poverty rate; instead, 
greater socioeconomic inequalities were the consequence of neoliberal policy 
(Scott, 2004). Therefore, the anticipated reduction in the immigration rate was 
not realised given the demographic pressure, the structural reforms in the 
economy, and the vulnerability and non-competitiveness of unprotected sectors 
facing market liberalisation.  
By the same logic, the Association Agreement between the EU and 
Morocco was expected to foster economic growth and financial structural 
changes which could diminish migration flows from this country. Nevertheless, 
the benefits of this Trade Agreement are already in question given the unequal 
terms of exchange between the two partners. Moreover, the diagnosed negative 
impact from an economic liberalisation of markets, was supposed to be 
alleviated by additional funds in the form of European aid to Morocco to cope 
with structural changes.  
Nevertheless, one could argue that a neo-liberal export-led policy would 
lead to poverty reduction as a result of increased trade. An abundant and cheap 
labour force would constitute a competitive advantage in this trade-driven 
approach (an expectation which the Mexican government shared) (Szekély, 
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2003: 3). Investment in developing countries should be directed towards 
boosting exports. From this perspective, the cases of Southern Mexico and 
Northern Morocco could be regarded as trade zones which require development 
through economic policies that increase international trade. 
In any case, it might be argued that the political benefits have proved to be 
more tangible than the economic ones. From a political dimension, RIA can play 
a more inclusive role of positively influencing the relationships between member 
states, since they promote a more intensive communication. This is based on 
the idea that trade can lead to an increase in the institutional and informal 
interaction among policy makers. Therefore, the fact of being member of a RIA 
can create trust in the relationship between sending and hosting countries 
which could be a useful element to reach cooperation in the migration 
management field. 
4.3 NAFTA: Trade liberalisation, cooperation and the migration 
Issue 
NAFTA was the result of an approach from President Salinas de Gortari 
seeking to expand trade with its North American neighbours. It was part of an 
on-going process of regional integration established by the US and Canada 
FTA in 1988. NAFTA was designed to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers 
between the three member countries, thereby facilitating trade and investment 
and, ultimately economic development. The agreement was portrayed within 
Mexico as the country‟s best option, promoting trade liberalisation and foreign 
investment and leading to increased employment and reduced emigration 
(López and Schiff, 1995).  US policy makers broadly supported the proposal 
with the US Congress approving a fast-track process to secure the agreement, 
despite opposition from labour unions, agricultural organisations, and NGOs. 
Fears in both countries about the negative consequences for employment in 
vulnerable sectors were marginalised by claims about the overall benefits of the 
Agreement, notably the expected reduction of immigrants from Mexico. After a 
decade of NAFTA, however, it is possible to conclude that the positive 
predictions were not correct (at least for Mexico): employment growth did not 
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improve to the extent that was expected, wage disparities increased and 
emigration continued (Bean and Lowell, 2004). 
Even before these agreements were signed, however, the North American 
region had long been characterised by a high degree of economic integration 
(Weintraub, 1998: 169). Indeed, it could be said that a borderless economy had 
been taking shape in the region prior to NAFTA. In the mid-eighties, the 
population in the Northern Mexican border towns increased abruptly due to a 
growing inland migration towards the “prosperous” border, mostly attracted by 
the employment opportunities in the maquiladora export zones located in the 
area straddling the US-Mexican border (Hilker et al., 1989; Hanson and 
Spilimbergo, 2001; Martin, 2001). The Mexican government‟s economic policy 
envisaged that these labour intensive assembly activities would become the 
pivot for economic growth that could help to absorb an expanding labour force. 
The establishment of the maquiladora along the Northern Mexican border drew 
upon a cheap labour force, absorbing the migration coming from other parts of 
Mexico. However, the maquiladora‟s capacity to absorb internal migration had 
limited results and was unable to halt Mexican emigration (Martin, 2001: 95). 
The pattern of interdependence created by this integration can be seen in 
the case of the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo border area. It accounts for most of the 
US-Mexican trade that passes through Texas (the state‟s overall share is 38% 
of total trade between the two countries)(1999 figures) (Papademetriou and 
Meyers, 2001).2 Hagan and Rodriguez (2001) identify four levels of economic 
activity in the integration of the border economy. The most visible is trade of 
manufactured goods coming from Laredo to Nuevo Laredo where 1.6 million 
loaded trucks crossed the border in 1999 (Hagan and Rodriguez, 2001: 98). 
Another level of interdependence is created by the maquiladoras located in 
Nuevo Laredo which have office, distribution, or manufacturing facilities in 
Laredo. There are also businesses in Laredo that import low-to moderately 
priced merchandise from Asian countries to sell to Mexican customers who then 
                                            
2
 See details on border towns engaged in active transnational trade. http: 
//www.businesssouthtexas.com/stories/story-0708c.htm. 
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resell merchandise in Mexico. A fourth level of economic interdependence 
consists of those involved in a wide range of informal economic activities 
between the two cities such as the selling of used clothing to Mexican vendors 
in Laredo, and the daily crossing from Nuevo Laredo into Laredo to work in 
construction and domestic service. 
The expansion of the economy in the border cities had a variety of cultural, 
social, environmental and economic consequences. The increase in trade was 
matched by greater interaction in a variety of settings at different levels 
(Ganster, 1998).  Indeed, following the signing of NAFTA there has been a 
proliferation of interactions amongst political, social, and economic actors 
(Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001). The NAFTA negotiations had 
themselves accelerated transnational cooperation among non-governmental 
organisations which led to the inclusion of a side agreement on environment 
(Hogenboom, 1996). Changes in the border region have been intensified as a 
result of an internal migration with people seeking a better life in these relatively 
prosperous cities. Their rapidly growing and increasingly diverse population 
present environmental and urban planning challenges in the cities themselves 
and the border regions more generally. These challenges are sources of conflict 
and cooperation amongst the authorities on both sides of the border. Thus 
economic interdependence is reflected in more intensive interaction at the 
various levels of government. 
4.3.1 The mechanisms and institutions of NAFTA  
In other respects, the process of integration resulted in greater political 
interdependence and a variety of frameworks for cooperation. NAFTA itself is 
relatively uninstitutionalised. While there is a small Secretariat to coordinate 
activities between the states, it is not equivalent to the EU‟s European 
Commission; instead, the main mechanism is bilateral and trilateral meetings of 
national officials. Such institutions as exist – for example the NADBank and the 
Dispute Settlement procedure – are quite limited in their scope. However, 
whereas there is very little in the way of a formal structure there is an extensive 
network of other arrangements. NAFTA has favoured the multiplication and 
strengthening of channels of communication, both institutional and non-
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institutional which have sought to address a variety of common problems such 
as the environment and labour. A striking early example of this interdependence 
was the financial assistance from the Clinton administration following the 1994 
Tequila effect, as was the Clinton-Zedillo initiative for a “New Border Vision”, a 
binational programme that would transform the border into a model” of bilateral 
cooperation (US General Accounting Office, 1999: 3).  
Table 4.1 shows the different instruments developed within the NAFTA 
framework. The main institutions of NAFTA are the Commission created in by 
the NAFTA side agreements on environment and labour. The central institution 
is the Commission of Free Trade jointly with the NAFTA Secretariat and working 
groups that were created to carried out the NAFTA‟s implementation (Storrs, 
2005).  
4.3.2 Regional Cooperation on the migration issue: from trade 
liberalisation to security 
There is a contrast between the economic dynamism at the border and 
increased restrictions on migration from the South. These concerns were 
reflected within the NAFTA‟s negotiation process, especially those regarding the 
environmental and migration field. Free movement of labour was largely outside 
the NAFTA‟s scope aside from an agreement to establish a “NAFTA visa” to 
facilitate the exchange of certain high-skilled professional migrants. More 
generally, however, and in contrast to other policy areas such as the 
environment, the fact that Mexico and the US shared a border did not guarantee 
cooperation on managing migration beyond the issue of border control (where 
the increasing number of Central American refugees as well as low-skilled 
Mexican workers presented a growing political problem). For example, the 
Conference of Border Governors, a long-standing bilateral forum, has not in the 
past addressed the issue (these bilateral issues are discussed further in chapter 
5). 
Regional cooperation on migration issues increased after 9/11 with 
security concerns increasingly informing the management and control of 
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migration. The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP)3 revives the trilateral 
relationship among NAFTA‟s members, centring its agenda on security and 
trade issues. In March 23rd 2005, the Prime Minister of Canada Paul Martin, US 
President George W. Bush, and the Mexican President Vicente Fox signed this 
treaty in Waco, Texas. The state‟s executive-level offices from the three 
member countries were appointed to coordinate nine Ministries (three for each 
country) to follow up the trilateral agenda (Governments of US Mexico and 
Canada, 2005). 
Two main objectives are sustaining the regional agreement: economic 
development and trade, and regional security. It was under the Fox and Bush 
administrations when Mexico was called to secure borders against terrorism as 
a matter of bilateral cooperation as well as an issue to remove obstacles to 
regional trade provoked by the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Secretaría de Relaciones 
Exteriores, 2005). An evaluation of the results of SPP‟s first phase would centre 
primarily on its role in encouraging bilateral cooperation on security rather than 
its role in enhancing NAFTA‟s prosperity. 
4.3.3 The Impact of NAFTA on the Mexican Economy and Migration 
There is an extensive literature on the effects of NAFTA on the Mexican 
economy and regional integration, highlighting positive and negative effects. 
From a positive perspective, some studies show an increase in trade between 
member countries, particularly in terms of the growth of Mexican exports to the 
US. Weintraub explains that NAFTA followed a unilateral move by the Mexican 
government to open up its markets and that this delivered benefits in terms of 
direct and portfolio investment and of Mexico‟s GDP (Weintraub, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
3 
In Spanish : Alianza para la Seguridad y  Prosperidad de América del Norte (ASPAN) 
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Table 4-1 Institutional Dimensions of NAFTA  
Trilateral  
US–Mexico-
Canada 
Summits 
NAFTA 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation  (CEC) 
Commission for  Labor Cooperation (CLC) 
Free Trade Commission (FTC)  
NAFTA Working Groups and Committees 
Committee on Trade in Goods  
Committee on Trade in Worn Clothing  
Working Group on Rules of Origin  
Customs Subgroup  
Committee on Agricultural Trade  
Working Group on Agricultural Grading and Marketing Standards  
Working Group on Agricultural Subsidies  
Advisory Committee on Private International Disputes regarding 
Agricultural Goods  
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:  
SPS Technical Working Group on Animal Health  
SPS Technical Working Group on Plant Health  
SPS Technical Working Group on Dairy, Fruits, Vegetables and 
Processed Foods  
SPS Technical Working Group on Meat, Poultry and Egg Inspection  
SPS Technical Working Group on Pesticides  
SPS Technical Working Group on Food Additives and Contaminants  
SPS Technical Working Group on Fish and Fishery Products  
SPS Technical Working Group on Veterinary Drugs and Food  
Working Group on Emergency Action  
Committee on Standards Related Measures  
Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee and its various working 
groups:  
Driver and Vehicle Standards  
Vehicle Weights and Dimensions  
Traffic Control Devices  
Rail Safety  
Dangerous Goods/Hazardous Materials Transportation  
Telecommunications Standards Subcommittee  
Automotive Standards Council  
Subcommittee on Labelling of Textile and Apparel Goods  
Working Group on Government Procurement and Small Business  
Investment and Services Working Group  
Financial Services Committee  
Working Group on Trade and Competition  
Temporary Entry Working Group  
Chapter Nineteen Operation Working Group  
Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes  
 
North American Energy Working Group (NAEWG) 
North American Leaders Summits 
ASPAN North American Security and Prosperity Partnership Initiative  
(SSP) 
Source: NAFTA webpage. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexican Government.  
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From the same positive perspective, there are studies claiming the positive 
effects of NAFTA by comparing the differential impact at the regional level in 
Mexico that explain the backwardness of Southern Mexico due to its lack of 
global market integration (Wodon et al., 2000).  Less positively, Pastor et 
al.(2005b) examine the increase of total Mexican exports from $51 billion in 
1993 to $166 billion in 2000 (Pastor, et al.2005b: 9). The outcome is explained 
by the greater access to the North American market and partially to the 
maquiladora participation in the exports. Moreover, according to their estimates, 
there was an increase in non-maquila exports from $30 billion to $86 billion in 
the same period. In contrast to the conventional view that the export-led 
maquiladora have been a driver of economic growth, Pastor et al. consider its 
contribution is less important compared to the non-maquiladora industry given 
that 85% of the growth in exports was based in different sectors(Pastor et al., 
2005a: 15). Taking into account that the maquiladora imports most of the 
assembling parts to export the final product, they calculate that maquila value-
added increased from under $4 billion in 1990 to $18 billion in 2000(Pastor et al., 
2005a: 16). Despite a positive trade balance, Pastor et al. argue that the rate of 
economic growth is not sufficient to close the development gap with its fellow 
NAFTA members. Further criticism regards the link between migration and 
development in Mexico as a vicious circle created by neoliberal policies. 
According to Raul Delgado Wise, emigration to the US increased to a major 
degree after the signing of NAFTA. The model of development since then has 
been the exportation of labour to the US in exchange for remittances to balance 
macroeconomic levels4. 
Whether the findings were positive or negative, analyses of NAFTA have 
highlighted migration as a central issue. From a pessimistic perspective, 
migration is expected to continue for as long as there is no real attempt in 
Mexico to develop a framework which could tackle the unemployment and 
socio-economic and regional inequalities which have increased since NAFTA 
entered into force (Pastor et al., 2005a: 16). Audley et al., consider how far 
                                            
4
 Conference “Migración y desarrollo: lecciones de la experiencia mexicana” held at El 
Colegio de la Frontera Norte, June 16, 2008. 
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NAFTA has been responsible for the increase on migration. They argue  that 
“historical migration patterns, the peso crisis, and the pull of employment 
opportunities in the US provide better explanations for the increase in migration 
than NAFTA itself” (Audley et al., 2004: 7).  Even so, they consider that 
inequalities at the levels of regional output, household income and the wages of 
skilled and unskilled workers increased as a result of increased trade. 
Highlighting similar effects, Pastor proposes to close the development gap 
between Mexico and the United States by following the example of the 
European Union‟s system of Structural Funds support for poorer regions (Pastor, 
2005). 
4.4 The Plan Puebla Panamá (PPP) 
Nonetheless, it was clear that the mainstream view of NAFTA was broadly 
positive.  Indeed, its apparent success triggered interest in expanding the scope 
of free trade in the region. In 2003, the US began negotiations on the 
development of the Central American Free Trade Agreement. From a Mexican 
perspective, the poor economic conditions in the South of its country and the 
potential for exploiting its natural resources provided a justification for extending 
trade-based integration and providing financial aid to develop its infrastructure 
as a support for such integration (Dávila et al., 2002).  However the prospect of 
closer integration also raised questions of regional migration and security. 
Investment in infrastructure and communications would facilitate not only the 
movement of goods but also the migration of labour and illegal commodities. 
Thus, the PPP replicates the Northern border paradigm of increasing trade 
relations, reproducing it at the Southern border with consequences for 
international migration and regional security.    
The Mexican National Development Plan presented at the Executive Level 
in 2000 emphasised a policy of regional development to address the country„s 
regional inequalities (Gobierno de México, 2001). Those regional disparities 
were starkest in the contrast between, on the one hand,  Northern Mexico - 
which represents the most integrated and well-developed industrial region, 
politically supportive of  President Fox‟s policies - and, on the other hand, the 
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Southern region which was poorer and politically more diverse and even 
antagonistic to the centre-right government.  
In this period, moreover, there was an overriding political consideration 
which motivated investment in Southern Mexico: the Chiapas revolt and the 
Zapatista movement were regarded as a political threat to be tackled 
economically and politically. The region was also important as a trade as well as 
a migratory pathway. These political and economic factors raised the 
importance of addressing the development problems of the Southern region of 
Mexico after many years of the conflict, starting in 1994, and the subsequent 
pacification process.  
The origins of the PPP can be traced back to the Tuxtla Summit of 
Mexican and Central American governments, held in El Salvador in 2001. The 
Joint Declaration of the Summit of the member countries of the Tuxtla Dialogue 
and Coordination Mechanism was signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Panamá, 
Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Accordingly, the PPP 
was regarded as a key element of the Mesoamerican Sustainable Development 
Initiative (IMDS) (Declaración Conjunta de la Cumbre Extraordinaria de los 
Países Integrantes del Mecanismo de Diálogo y Concertación de Tuxtla, 2001). 
The main objective was to coordinate and finance regional projects in the areas 
of sustainable development, human development, energy inter-connection, 
trade facilitation, the prevention and mitigation of disasters, and the integration 
of roads and telecommunication systems. The regional agreement focused on 
the development of Southern Mexico and Central America, given their similar 
economic background, and was based on the assumption that more 
communication infrastructure would increase trade which would foster 
integration and in the process deliver development (President Vicente Fox, 
2001).  
The sources of the region‟s underdevelopment are contested. According 
to one researcher in the IADB, “the backward stage in the Southern Mexico can 
be explained by the lack of infrastructure. Its indicators show a deficiency in the 
quality of institutions‟ performance as well as (in the) level of violence and 
corruption, whereas the North has the advantage of closeness and 
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infrastructure allows it to integrate easily to the US. Therefore, a FTA does not 
bring automatically the benefits to the signing countries; it should come along 
with a series of internal policies”. 5   An alternative explanation for this 
“backwardness” is given by other scholars who consider that Southern Mexico 
and Central America have remained in a post-colonial regime where most 
productive sectors –particularly natural resources - are held by a monopolistic 
group (Bartra, 2001). Land distribution is still an issue between government and 
the indigenous population. The lack of democratic institutions and equal 
representation for indigenous groups has created a governmental 
administration with little legitimacy and unable or unwilling to manage equitably 
an infrastructure-led economic policy. Civil turmoil, moreover, has prevented 
government from taking control over local resources, thereby undermining the 
injection of further investment. According to interviewed Mexican officials, the 
lack of political consensus among the different political actors, rather than the 
lack of resources to boost development in the Southern states, has been the 
main factor inhibiting economic growth and possibly contributing to emigration. 
Local autonomous indigenous governments claim that the problem lies in the 
lack of political spaces in which to negotiate with central and state authorities.  
Organisationally, the IADB has acted as the financial and technical 
institution where the guidelines for the PPP‟s economic policies are designed 
and implemented. This is a complex process; the participating actors are not 
only the institutions, but also the technical and political representatives of the 
countries. As a political process, it involves different levels of governmental 
institutions from member countries leading to constant discussion on how to 
implement the economic plan. To the extent that NGOs were involved in 
consultations over the Plan, they conflicted with the government (Villafuerte 
Solís, 2002). 6 According to the interview given by Gabriela Rangel, 
                                            
5
 Interview with Ernesto Lopez, IADB. Washington, DC 
6
 See the Americas Program´s notes on cross-border citizens‟ demonstrations and NGOs 
challenging the Plan Puebla-Panamá.http://americas.irc-online.org/citizen-action/series/02-
ppp.html. 
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representative from REMALC, 7 the Mexican NGOs were opposed to the 
economic and political orientation of the PPP.8 They saw it as being shaped by 
the so-called “neoliberal” Fox administration and reflected US policies in the 
region. In addition to this general hostility, there were specific local social 
movements halting projects developed by the central and local administrations. 
Given its difficulties, therefore, the PPP was primarily pursued by Mexico in a 
less visible way through local programmes rather than as a high profile project.  
The economic and political objectives of governments were largely shared 
(and shaped) by the main international organisations such as the WB. From the 
perspective of a technical advisor in the lending branch of the IADB, it is 
responding to the proposals of the member countries in developing the PPP. 
The IADB does not impose an economic plan, but reacts to the credit needs 
identified by the partner countries.9 From his point of view, migration was not an 
issue in the working meetings held in the IADB's Washington Office.  
An Advisor to the Sub-Secretary of Latin American Foreign Affairs from the 
Mexico‟s Foreign Affairs Office argued that the PPP was a Mexican initiative 
based on obtaining "a financial instrument of the Tuxtla Agreement10 in order to 
boost the economy in the Central American Countries”.11 In order to promote 
their integration, and the integration and development of the South of Mexico, 
there needed to be greater investment in infrastructure. To pursue this, 
                                            
7  
Interview. México, DF, 2004. REMALC represents the following NGOs Asociación 
Latinoamericana de Micro, Pequeños y Medianos Empresarios (ALAMPYME) Centro de Acción 
Laboral y Asesoría Sindical (CILAS), Centro de Apoyo Comunitario Trabajando Unidos 
(CACTUS), Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria (CIEPAC) 
Centro de Derechos Humanos Tepeyac del Istmo de Tehuantepec A. C. (CDH Tepeyac), 
Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social A.C.(CENCOS), Colectivo Bia´lii, Asesoría e 
Investigación, A.C, Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco (CEJ) , DECA Equipo Pueblo, A.C. (Equipo 
Pueblo), FIAN México, A.C., Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), Frente Democrático 
Campesino (FDC) , Mujer y Medio Ambiente, Otros Mundos, A.C., Red Nacional Género y 
Economía (REDGE), Sindicato Democrático de Trabajadores de Pesca y Acuacultura de la 
SAGARPA. 
8
  According to Onésimo Hidalgo from CIEPAC, their acitivities in Chiapas were jointly 
agreed by the organizations integrating REMALC. The opposition to the PPP was regionally 
organised by every NGO and focused in specific projects at the local level. Interview with 
Onésimo Hidalgo, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas. September, 2006. 
9
 Interview with Alejandra Vallejo, IADB, Washington., DC. 
10
 Officially named The Dialogue and Consensus Mechanism of Tuxtla. (Mecanismo de 
Diálogo y Concertación de Tuxtla in Spanish). 
11
 Interview to the Advisor to the Sub-secretary of Latin American Foreign Affairs. Mexico 
City, June 2005.  
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President Fox as President of Mexico invited the Central American countries to 
engage in  a joint effort  to facilitate economic integration which could promote 
investment and trade (Ruiz, 2004).  
4.4.1 The Plan Puebla Panamá as a mechanism of the Mexican 
Foreign Policy. 
In addition, the PPP needs to be seen in terms of the Mexican 
government‟s diplomatic goal of increasing political and economic closeness 
with its North American Partners. For example, the expansion of the free trade 
zone towards South America was an American foreign policy priority, along with 
Security in the Western Hemisphere, even though the issue had been a point of 
conflict at recent Summits of the Americas (Torres, 2005). 12  The Mexican 
government sought to act as the intermediary between the US and South 
American governments to achieve a political consensus regarding the proposed 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA/ALCA), believing that deeper 
integration across the region was needed at a time when there were growing 
concerns about regional security and border control.  
The PPP is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The role of 
the Foreign Ministry is important because, while the PPP lacks an explicit policy 
towards Southern migration, administratively it is part of the same foreign policy 
agenda. The migration issue involves several institutions such as the Sub-
Secretariat for Central and South American where the PPP is coordinated. 
According to an advisor to the Sub Secretariat for Central and South America, 
the PPP is managed in the context of a “continuous and well structured 
migratory policy towards the Central and South American flows”. 13 
Coincidentally, Senator Cecilia Romero, President of the Commission for 
Central and South America (the equivalent of a US Congressional Committee), 
declared she had an intensive and regular communication with the PPP´s 
Coordination office in terms of exchanging information on migratory flows and 
                                            
12
 In the last America Summit, the Mexican President was lobbying to reactivate the  
negotiations for the Latin America FTA, a project rejected by leading Latin American  
economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and also Cuba. 
http: //www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/131706.html.  
13 
Interview with the Advisor to the Subsecretary of Latin America, Ministry of Mexican  
Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, 2004 
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international trade. Senator Romero refers to the protection of human rights of 
migrants in transit from Central South American as one of the main concerns of 
the Commission of Foreign Affairs at the Senate.14  
Therefore, while migration was not formally included as an issue in the 
PPP, it is a long-standing issue on the bilateral agenda between Mexico and 
Central American countries (Sandoval Palacios, 2001). Moreover, in practice, 
the issue is considered in high-level meetings of PPP member governments 
along with such issues as energy privatisation projects and (more recently) 
security.  
4.4.1.1 Objectives and mechanisms of the Plan Puebla Panamá 
Accordingly, the PPP pursues a programme of sustainable development 
as outlined in the Mesoamerican Sustainable Development Initiative (IMDS). 
The main objective is to coordinate eight main initiatives in the field of financing 
regional project in the areas of sustainable development, human development, 
energy inter-connection, trade facilitation, the prevention and mitigation of 
disasters and the integration of roads and telecommunication systems (Inter-
American Bank of Development (IABD), 2003a). 
The implementation of the PPP involves local, regional and central 
governments in the participating countries. Private sector and civil society 
actors were also to be involved but the rejection of the plan by the latter has 
undermined this aspect of the PPP‟s implementation (Velasco Yañez, 2001; 
Ruiz, 2004). The participating states from Southern Mexico in this development 
plan are Puebla, Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Oaxaca, 
and Guerrero. At the multilateral level, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá and Colombia, are 
participating countries in the PPP. Given the complex nature of the political 
coordination between governmental and non- governmental actors, the Mexican 
government created an Executive Office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The organisational structure includes: the Presidents‟ Summit which includes 
                                            
14 
Interview to Senator Cecilia Romo, member of PAN‟s political party and President for  
the Commission of Foreign Affairs, for Central and South America. The Mexican  
Congress has to approve international agreements. Mexico City, 2004 
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meetings under the Mechanism of Tuxtla; the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Commissioners‟ Conference which meets before the Summit takes place; the 
Executive Commission which coordinates the PPP through regular meetings, 
having the Co-Presidency permanently settled in Mexico and a Pro-temporé 
Presidency rotated among the members countries; and a Executive based in El 
Salvador (VI Cumbre Ordinaria del Mecanismo de Diálogo y Concertación de 
Tuxtla, 2004).  
According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the financial 
assistance to the PPP had as a priority to support the regional strategy led by 
Mexico – the Plan Sur. In 2001, the IADB agreed to finance the Executive Office 
operations for US$ 1 million annually until 2006, although it was prorogued until 
2008. The main reason for supporting this initiative was the IADB´s policy to 
encourage regional development based on South-South trade (Devlin and 
Castro, 2002).  Thus, the Mexican government‟s economic and political 
interests coincided with those pursued by the IADB such as the development of 
regional markets which requires infrastructure and market access.  
The projects covered a wide range of economic sectors at the local and 
state levels, necessitating coordination between the intra-governmental bodies 
and the Congress. However, this task was made more complicated by the 
different political affiliations of the Presidency on the one hand and the 
subnational authorities on the other.  
4.4.2 The Political Dimension of the Plan Puebla Panamá 
Responsibility for the PPP has shifted across the Mexican government. 
Given the foreign and national affairs agenda defined at the start of the Fox 
Administration, the PPP was initially a project coordinated from the President‟s 
Office itself.  Given its market–oriented approach, however, the coordination of 
the PPP was then placed under the charge of the Ministry of Economy, Luis 
Ernesto Derbez. When Derbez took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
coordination of the PPP followed him to his new ministry. The fact that the 
Coordination of the PPP moved across different Institutions, from the 
President‟s Office, then the Economy Ministry, and currently the Foreign Affairs 
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Ministry, is explained by the involvement of political actors rather than 
Institutions. The then Foreign Affairs Minister sought to pursue a more active 
foreign policy. The main priority for the Fox Administration was to improve 
relations with the US. Since the migration issue was at the top of the political 
agenda between the US and Mexico, it became an issue within the context of 
Mexico-Central American relations and the FTAA initiative  (Pellerin, 1999a).  
However, as noted, programmes such as the PPP risk failure given the 
lack of consensus among political actors within the country. Mexican NGOs – 
along with groups in Central America and the US as well as academic experts - 
have been very critical of plans such as the PPP on the grounds that they were 
informed by a neoliberal economic model. Ironically, the NGOs were supposed 
to be an active actor through their participation in consultations on the PPP. Yet, 
given their opposition to the PPP, these NGOS were effectively excluded from 
the formal debate in order to prevent an escalation of public opposition to the 
regional plan (Bartra, 2001). In their view, a neoliberal right-wing government 
was attempting to eradicate poverty by launching mega projects that were 
designed to favour transnational exploitation of the vast natural resources in this 
zone while displacing vulnerable indigenous groups from their traditional 
settlements and productive activities. As the author Daniel Villafuerte argued in 
his assessment, the only response from NGOs to this Plan was the “total 
rejection of the PPP as the new demon for NGOs, the one to combat in order to 
avoid that souls condemned on earth go straight to hell” (Villafuerte Solís, 2002) 
According to one of the main organisations in Mexico opposed to 
neoliberal economic policy, Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio 
(RMALC), the dissemination of information and demonstrations organised by 
civil society have been the main tactics of protest. These organisations have 
been able to halt the progress of projects directly affecting local groups. 
Interviewee Gabriela Rangel, a representative of RMALC, describes the case of 
a group of “campesinos” that were able to halt construction of a road which had 
been planned as a part of the Puebla Millennium Plan (part of the PPP); this 
project required the purchase of agricultural land owned by the local 
“campesinos”. She also explained how the Zapatista movement in Chiapas and 
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its support organisations were effectively able to prevent any progress in the 
construction of infrastructure that could affect ecological reserves, displace the 
population, or lead to the privatisation of public services. In this sense, one high 
ranking official was right to indicate the power of the “Zapatistas” to delay 
“progress” in the South. Overall, therefore, the positions of NGOs involved in 
development issues in states such as Chiapas have been largely those of 
opposition and rebellion (though they have also been criticised for not providing 
alternatives to the PPP). 
The political rejection to the PPP by civil society led the Calderon 
Presidency to rename the programme as the Mesoamerican Plan in 2006. A 
political strategy was launched to avoid the problems of opposition which 
emerged in the previous period. The Mesoamerican Plan sought to achieve 20 
projects rather than 100 and target three main pillars of the Plan: Transportation, 
Telecommunications and Energy. 
4.4.3 The Economic dimension of the Plan Puebla Panamá 
The projects of the PPP are financially supported by from the IADB in 
combination with private investment. PPP member countries use these loans to 
attract private investment from companies to develop projects in transport 
energy and telecommunications infrastructure. Table 4.2 shows how the budget 
in 2002 was distributed by Ministry, highlighting the concentration on the 
transport and communications sectors.  
Map 4.1 shows the plan for modernising the highway system in Mexico as 
projected to 2006. The red lines correspond to those highways that were 
already reconstructed in 2001, while the blue and the green ones are the on-
going and planned highways within the PPP as part of the transport projects. 
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Table 4-2 Plan Puebla Panamá´s Annual Budget. Chapter Mexico. 2002 in 
Millions of Dollars 
Government‟s Office    Budget in Millions Dollars*  
Executive Office of the President                       $ 1.3 
Ministry of Transport and Communications                    $625.1 
Ministry of Economy                     $10.7 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment                      $32.5  
Ministry of Social Development                     $17.7 
Ministry of Tourism                      $50.8  
Plan Integral Projects                         $5.0 
Total Budget                   $745.7 
*Exchange rate in 2002 US$1=10.0  
Source: Executive Office for Plan Puebla-Panamá, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
Mexico.  
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4.4.4 Impact of the Plan Puebla Panamá 
According the Executive Office of the PPP in Mexico, 33 projects with 
budgets of totalling up to US$ 4,500 million have been funded. The bulk of the 
investment has been concentrated in the development of physical infrastructure 
in the sectors of roads and highways, energy and telecommunications. At the 
regional level, the total budget accounted for US$7,900 million as of 2008. The 
main beneficiary of the funds was the transport system with the design of the 
International System for Mesoamerican Highways with 13,000 km along the 
Pacific and Atlantic corridor of Mesoamerica. Regarding the distribution of 
electricity, nearly 2,500 kilometres of transmission lines were developed as part 
of the Electrical Interconnection System in the Central American countries.  In 
terms of the telecommunication project, the Mesoamerica Communication 
Highway was designed to reach marginalised regions along with the system of 
electrification in the region (Martí Ascencio, 2008). Investment in other areas 
such as environment, health and natural disasters was on a much lower scale. 
Indeed, while such human development initiatives were supposed to take 
priority over infrastructure development in the Plan‟s original design, in practice 
this was not the case.  Instead, the PPP emphasised the strategic importance of 
developing ground, aero and maritime transport infrastructure to create the 
conditions for regional competitiveness. Following the objective of linking the 
Central American markets to the NAFTA, the PPP projected the International 
Network of Mesoamerican Highways, paving 1,820 kms. with a budget of 
US$ 993 million and the maintenance of 4,565 kms. with a budget of US$ 66 
million (Comisión Ejecutivo del Plan Puebla Panamá, 2005). 
An important part of the PPP was to improve the integration of business 
activities across the region. As part of that process, the PPP included projects 
to support the construction of a “round the clock” customs gate, and measures 
to facilitate the issuing of business visas on a “fast track” basis. The regional 
banking system is also an important actor to provide credits to the regional 
business (Comisión Ejecutivo del Plan Puebla Panamá, 2005: 13).  
The table 4.3 describes the main budget lines per project, showing that 
transport (80%) and energy (8.95%) accounted for most of the estimated 
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investments, while human development remained low. Moreover, the PPP 
reports to have accomplished by 2006 6.1% of the total of projects, 47 projects 
were under implementation (47.5 % out of the total) and 27.3% were seeking 
funds and 19 were under planning (Comisión Ejecutivo del Plan Puebla 
Panamá, 2005: 11).  
Table 4-3 Summary of the Plan Puebla Panamá Projects 2005-2006. 
Initiative Total of 
Programm
es  and 
Projects 
Programm
es  and 
Projects 
Programm
es  and 
projects 
on 
developm
ent 
Administ
rative 
Projects 
Projects 
to be 
designed 
Estimated 
investment 
(US Million) 
Allocated 
budget 
(US 
Million) 
Human 
Developme
nt 
12 3 6 3  $402.61 $163.87 
Sustainable 
Developme
nt 
25  9 16  $322.03 $111.78 
Prevention 
of Natural 
Disasters 
4  2  2 $25.87 $13.08 
Transports 22  16 Most 
done 
6 $6,167.85 $3,302.3 
Telecommu
nications 
7   1 6 $61.5 $0.750 
Energy 14 2 6 3 3 $688.45 $479.62 
Commerce 
and 
Competitiv
eness 
8 1 4 1 2 $21.88 $21.28 
Tourism 6  3 3  $3.197 $1.397 
ICP 1  1   $1.13 $1.13 
TOTAL  99 6 47 27 19 $7,684.52 $4,095.26 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexican Government 2006. 
It is clear that the implementation of the PPP has been problematic with 
very few projects being fully completed. According to the IADB, only 3 
investment projects funded by the Bank have been completed, accounting for 
US$136.1 million out of the PPP‟s initial budget of $8b. (Banco Interamericano 
de Desarrollo (BID), 2008).   
Overall, therefore, the PPP has been highly contentious in its origins and 
highly problematic in its implementation. Nonetheless, from our perspective it is 
significant as a component of the regional integration framework. The PPP's 
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primary goal is to increase trade by integrating Central America into the North 
American market even though, in contrast to the Euro-Mediterranean case, it is 
outside of the NAFTA‟s institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, there is 
arguably an indirect relationship between PPP and NAFTA. As the CAS 2002 
for Mexico establishes, “since the integration of Mexico with the rest of North 
America through NAFTA is proceeding satisfactorily, IADB support in this area 
would be for the PPP which seeks to expand integration to the south as a way 
to fight poverty in both Mexico and Central America” (World Bank, 2002: 40). 
To some extent, therefore, the PPP aims to extend NAFTA‟s model in the 
Central American region by integrating the so-called Mesoamerica or Isthmus 
region (Southern Mexico and Central America). Moreover, the US made the 
Central America-US FTA conditional on the regional integration of these 
countries which would allow them to increase their potential to achieve an 
export-based economic growth (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), 
2008: 13). 
4.4.5 The impact of the PPP on the governance of migration in the 
region  
How does the PPP address the migration issue? Regarding the migration 
phenomenon in Southern Mexico and Central America flows, the PPP‟s 
coverage of migration is limited to a provision for the exchange of information 
on migration flows. This statistical exercise, involving the member states‟ 
National Directors of Migration (World Bank, 2002: 40), is a project partially 
financed by the IOM  under the Puebla Process.15  According to its original 
objectives, the Puebla Process entailed a range of activities to manage 
migration at the regional level, covering activities such as the safe return of 
migrants, research on migration trends, human rights protection and 
mechanisms for the promotion of development in the sending regions 
(especially Central America).  As part of these projects, the Statistical 
Information System on Migration in Central America (SIEMCA) launched in 
2001 within the Regional Conference on Migration, evolved into the Statistical 
                                            
15
 See Puebla Process Programme on line http: //www.rcmvs.org/plan_accion.htm 
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Information System on Migration in Mesoamerica(SISMM) after its incorporation 
in the PPP (Development, 2004). As part of the IOM initiatives in the region, it 
was  approved by the 11 member-countries of the Regional Conference on 
Migration (RCM) to support the exchange of information on the migration from 
and towards Central America (Hakim Simón, 2003). The initial budget was 
US$ 1,684,848 to support the collection of data at the Southern Border of 
Mexico and within the Central American countries (Inter American Bank of 
Development, 2004).  
Trade and migration in the Southern Mexican Border gained relevance in 
the meetings of the Tuxtla Mechanism, the setting in which the Mexican 
government had originally presented the PPP. The architects of the PPP 
consider that this porous border requires better monitoring and control of the 
transit of goods and persons. While only some of the Central American 
countries are strongly involved in the migration flows, the border as a receptor 
and a transit point for Central American migration has made the issue of border 
control very sensitive.  
This sensitivity is reflected in the political discourse of high-ranking officials 
from Mexico, who constantly related migration to the PPP. Moreover, migratory 
policy towards the Central American countries was a central point in all on-
going multilateral meetings. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Derbez, called 
for the inclusion of the issue of migration in the 2004 Americas Summit(García, 
2004). Certainly, Southern Mexican and Central American flows were the focus 
of a geopolitical strategy associated with the PPP as well as in Northern Border 
Plan 2025 announced by President Fox in 2003. Fox contrasted the role of the 
PPP - as a development programme which would inhibit emigration - with the 
Northern Border Plan 2025 which would address its efforts to the limiting of 
further transiting and settling of Southern immigration to the US (President 
Vicente Fox, 2003). 
4.5 The EUROMED 
The history of the EU‟s policy towards its Southern Mediterranean 
neighbours is one framed by geopolitical and economic considerations. The 
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geopolitical aspect was driven by the international context of the 1970s – the 
cold war. North Africa was regarded as strategically important for Western 
Europe but was also seen as a politically volatile region which needed to be 
stabilised. Even after the end of the cold war, moreover, the area remained 
strategic and the EU‟s foreign policy maintained the objectives of strengthening 
relations and ensuring stability, particularly in the light of the emerging “Islamic 
threat”.  Economically, the region was seen as important as a market for the EU 
in terms of trade and investment opportunities.   
The EU has therefore sought to develop frameworks for economic and 
political cooperation over the years beginning with its 1972 Global Policy for the 
Mediterranean. This was followed by bilateral Cooperation Agreements with 
countries in the region (the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
in 1976 and the Mashreq countries of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 
1977). These agreements were intended to foster access for Mediterranean 
exports into Europe as well as to provide aid for development (the latter on the 
basis of five-year renewable financial protocols). Despite these agreements, 
there was no strong coherent policy towards the region for many years. 
However, the emergence of immigration and drug trafficking as security issues 
became a source of tension between Southern Europe and Mediterranean 
countries, prompting Spain and France to re-emphasise the strategic 
importance of the region. Developments such as the political instability in 
Algeria in 1992 highlighted the need for a reformulated EU policy toward the 
region (Parfitt, 1997). 
The EU‟s Mediterranean policy entered a new phase with the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), also known as the Barcelona Process, 
in 1995. This sought to foster economic liberalisation between the EU and 12 of 
the Mediterranean countries and to promote political, social, and economic 
cooperation (European Union, 1995).  The Barcelona Process set up a 
mechanism of political dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean 
Partners (see table 4.4). From the very beginning, issues of migration were high 
on the agenda. At the Barcelona Conference, held on the 27-28th November 
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1995, the need to halt illegal immigration as well as to encourage political 
stability and combat terrorism were major issues of debate. 
 
Table 4-4 Euro-Mediterranean Key Summits, 1995-2005 
Milestones of the Barcelona Process 
27-28 November 1995 1st. Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona 
15-16 April 1997  2nd.  Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Malta 
1 July 1997  Entry into force of the Interim Association Agreement between the EU 
and the PLO on behalf of the Palestinian Authority 
1 March 1998 Entry into force of the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement 
3-4 June 1998 Ad-hoc Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Palermo 
28-29 January 1999 3rd. Euro-Mediterranean Conference on regional co-operation, Valencia 
15-16 April 1999 Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Stuttgart 
1 March 2000  Entry into force of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement 
25-26 May 2000  Euro-Mediterranean Think Tank Meeting, Lisbon 
1 June 2000  Entry into force of the EU-Israel Association Agreement 
15-16 November 2000  Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Marseilles 
5-6 November 2001  Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Brussels 
22-23 April 2002 Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Valencia 
1 May 2002 Entry into force of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement 
26-27 May 2003 Mid Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Crete 
2-3 December 2003 Sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Naples 
5-6 May 2004 Mid-Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Dublin 
29-30 November 2004 Mid-Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, The Hague 
30-31 May 2005 Seventh Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Luxembourg 
Source: European Union website. 
 
Following the establishment of EUROMED, new bilateral agreements – so-
called Association Agreements - were negotiated between the EU and the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) states. The Association Agreement 
between the Moroccan Government and the EU was signed in 1996 and 
entered in force in 2000 (European Commission, 2000b).  The terms of such 
Agreements vary from country to country depending on the economic and 
political circumstances. There are, for example, clauses that refer to the 
domestic political system regarding their respect for human rights and 
democratic principles. Given that economic and political openness and 
democratisation are defined as “essential elements” of the agreement, they may 
set conditions on the financial benefits received from the EU (Gillespie and 
Whitehead, 2002).  
The balance of effects from these agreements varies. In the case of 
Morocco, for example, there have not been the same benefits as there were in 
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other cases where much closer ties have been established (e.g. with Cyprus, 
Malta and Turkey). Whereas those countries have secured membership or a 
customs union, Morocco obtained few concessions. On the contrary, it faced a 
quota import restriction in the case of tomatoes and was unable to renew its 
Fishing Agreement with the EU.  
4.5.1 The economic dimension 
The Euro-Med envisaged a trade and employment-boosting project to 
create the economic conditions that would in the long run increase the 
attractiveness for the native community of staying in their country of origin.16 
The most important aspect of the EUROMED has been the economic package 
of trade and aid arrangements. However, from the Non-EU Mediterranean 
countries‟ perspective, the impact of such policies has been quite limited.   
The trade agreements have been restricted in their scope: primary 
(particularly agricultural) products faced many obstacles due to the interests of 
local producers within the Community and, while manufactured products coming 
from the non-EU Mediterranean countries were allowed to enter the European 
market, they were generally at a competitive disadvantage to  the EU‟s 
manufacturing products (Kaditi and Swinnen, 2006: 147).  According to the 
EuroMed‟s Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (European Commission, 2002b), 
the liberalisation of the markets in the Mediterranean countries would attract 
investments from EU member states which had primarily been targeting their 
foreign direct investment towards the Eastern European or Latin American 
markets. Given the assumption that more FDI would  translate into economic 
growth, the EuroMed tended to emphasise “private sector supporting policies” 
(European Commission, 2002b: 10).  By contrast, policies which might have 
strengthened the region‟s industrial capacity to manufacture products which 
could be competitively exported, or which would have provided concessions 
                                            
16  
Nevertheless, the Mediterranean countries are treated distinctively under a geo-
economic division. They could be divided according to their geopolitical criteria into North Africa 
(Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, Jordan) the Middle East (Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine) and 
the likely to be EU members. In terms of South-South cooperation, the EU also boosted the 
Agadir Process, which ended up in the Agreement on a Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area 
between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, signed on Feb 25, 2004. 
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regarding trade in sensitive sector such as agricultural and fisheries products 
were not primary objectives of this open-market oriented policy. 
Indeed, from the point of view of some scholars, the development strategy 
implicit in the agreements, being based on free trade, was more beneficial for 
the EU member states than for the MENA countries. According to Sami Nair, 
before he was appointed to the French administration (1997-1999), the 
Barcelona Process attempted to expand the trade area for the European 
Community in response to the process of globalisation. He argued that the 
liberalisation of the markets for manufactured products would be more 
beneficial to Europe than Morocco whereas the latter‟s comparative advantage 
in agricultural products was not included in the final agreement (Naïr, 1996).  
Nonetheless, the injection of foreign capital and the possibility of gaining access 
to the European market were of economic interest to the Southern 
Mediterranean economies. With this in mind, the Moroccan authorities have 
strengthened the liberalisation and privatisation of state owned companies 
(such as telecommunications) as an attractive foreign direct investment 
opportunity which according to the WB was vital to the Moroccan economy.17  
The provision of aid for development has been the other major component 
of the EU‟s economic relationship with the Mediterranean economies. It is worth 
noting that the EU was traditionally the largest provider of Official Development 
Assistance to the Mediterranean countries. However, the nature of the aid 
relationship has been coloured by debates within the EU on the priorities for 
such aid. While the Northern member states have tended to favour aid focused 
on alleviating poverty, the Southern states have taken a more political approach 
in targeting aid. In that respect, questions of migration have become bound up 
with the provision of aid, particularly to North African countries.  
Another important contrast in the attitudes of EU member states regards 
their respective geopolitical preferences. Regional competitiveness, migration 
and security have been the principal driving forces defining the relationship with 
the Non-Euro Mediterranean partners. For example, at the beginning of the 
                                            
17
 See the Country Assistance Strategy paper discussed in the previous chapter 
regarding the economic policy recommendations issued by the WB in the case of Morocco.  
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process, the Southern member states perceived the Northern member states as 
the source of financial funds to invest in the Mediterranean, while the Northern 
members had an interest in a more liberalised agricultural sector 
notwithstanding its potentially detrimental impact on the Southern members 
(Gillespie, 1997).  Over the evolution of the policy, moreover, the balance of 
preferences amongst the EU member states effectively downgraded the 
position of the Southern Mediterranean states. In the words of a European 
official interviewed in Morocco,18 EUROMED was a political tool to foster closer 
relations with the Mediterranean countries; assisting development was the 
means to this political end. From his perspective, the fact that the EU‟s policy is 
tending to favour the integration of the Eastern European19 rather than the Euro-
Mediterranean countries indicated a greater interest in development in one 
region than the other one. Comparing the total budget per capita allocated 
during the period 1996-1999 in the Mediterranean and in the Eastern European 
countries, it is estimated that the latter received up to four more times the 
amount of aid as the former (Gillespie, 1997; King, 1998: 121).  In other words, 
if the priority had been to develop the Euro-Mediterranean countries, then aid 
and even structural funds would have been deployed to bring these 
Mediterranean economies into the EU regime. Instead, it was the Eastern 
European countries which received the bulk of the economic support and which 
emerged as the principal target for the expansion of European Markets and 
investment.  
The seventh meeting of experts on economic transition in the EUROMED 
held in April 2003 highlighted the contrast in conditions which favoured 
integration of the Eastern neighbour partners rather than the Southern 
Mediterranean ones (Berriane, 2004a). The EU‟s Regionalism sought to extend 
membership towards those countries which shared its values and complied with 
the EU‟s membership criteria whereas the MENA countries‟ attempts to develop 
                                            
18
 Interview with the Director for Commercial Exchange in a European Embassy, Rabat, 
July 2004.  
19
 It refers to Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.United Nations (2002b) International Migration Report 
2002. ST/ESA/SER.A/220. Washington. 
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closer relations (such as Morocco‟s proposal for membership in 1987) were 
rejected. 
4.6 The MEDA 
At the heart of the Barcelona Process have been the MEDA programmes. 
These constituted a significant part of the EU‟s financial aid programme. The 
Commission reported that in 2000 “the share of aid granted by the European 
Union to the Mediterranean countries, primarily under the MEDA programme 
(B7-410), represented 11% of the overall volume of external aid commitments 
from the general budget” (European Commission, 2000d: 4; Berriane, 2004a). 
These funds sought to bring about structural economic transformation of the 
region. An important component of the policy was a series of projects to 
modernise the region‟s infrastructure. The programmes‟ main objectives have 
been to improve the transport, energy, and telecommunications sectors, with 
the aim of interconnecting them to accelerate the transit of goods.  In this first 
phase, projects like the Mediterranean Rocade (see Map 4.2), a road link 
designed to improve communications with rural areas in the North of the country, 
were designed to foster infrastructure to underpin trade and development 
(European Commission, 2000a: 37). 
The first MEDA programme was intended to address questions of 
development as well as facilitating trade but there was a lack of clarity with 
regard to the way in which development was to be supported. In particular, 
there was no real linkage between migration and development considerations in 
the multi-sectoral programme. The question of migration was identified in the 
programme: according to the Council of the European Union‟s regulation on 
MEDA, one of the objectives was the “cooperation and technical assistance in 
order to reduce illegal immigration, drug trafficking and international crime” 
(European Council, 1996: 9). However, resources for migration control were 
only deployed in the second phase of the programme (MEDA II). 
The European Commission's MEDA Regional Strategy Paper provides an 
economic plan for the Mediterranean Basin Region including Morocco, drawing 
on the European Community's MEDA assistance programme, the latter 
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comprising an overall budget of €8.75b (1995 to 2006) (European Commission 
2005: 6).  While MEDA was intended to support the range of objectives 
addressed by the Barcelona Process, its main goal was to prepare the 
Mediterranean zone to become a Free Trade Area by 2010 and thereby to 
foster stability and prosperity in the region. Moreover, although the agreement 
was established as an arrangement to strengthen relations within the region, 
bilateral cooperation predominates over multilateral cooperation: 12% of the 
total budget is directed to regional activities shared by the 12 Mediterranean 
countries and 86% is allocated on a bilateral basis.  
From interviews with different officials from the Spanish Office for 
Technical Cooperation in Rabat and Spanish scholars, there appears to be a 
consensus that the multilateral aspect of MEDA is less important than the 
bilateral aspect. Morocco was one of the main beneficiaries of this bilateral 
cooperation, receiving €670 million in the period 1995-2004 (European 
Commission, 2000a). As Table 4.5 shows, out of the total budget, the value of 
commitments was slightly smaller: under MEDA I, covering the period 1995-
1999, €3.06 b. were committed for bilateral agreements of which Morocco was 
to receive €656m (European Union, 2007: 17). 
Table 4-5 Budget for MEDA I and II, total of Commitments and Payments, 
1995-2004 
 
Year Commitments 
million € 
Payments 
million € 
 
Ratio 
P/C 
1995 173 50 29% 
1996 370 155 42% 
1997 911 208 23% 
1998 809 222 27% 
1999 797 240 30% 
TOTAL 
MEDA I 
3,060 875 29% 
2000 569 315 55% 
2001 603 318 53% 
2002 612 454 74% 
2003 615 498 81% 
2004 698 801 115% 
TOTAL 
MEDA II 
3,097 2,386 77% 
 
Source: The European Commission, 2005. 
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In the case of Morocco, the total budget allocated was €656m., but only 
127m.was translated into payments in the period 1995-1999 (European 
Commission 2005: 20).  Political considerations meant that priority was given to 
the Northern provinces of Morocco, receiving 77% of the MEDA budget for the 
country, as the European Commission decided to concentrate resources to 
alleviate poverty in an area which was perceived as a major source of migration 
and drug trafficking. One of the most important projects was the construction of 
the previously mentioned Mediterranean Rocade (€ 80 million) which was 
intended to facilitate communication between the Northern rural communities 
(European Commission, 2000a: 38).  The project was also designed to facilitate 
trade between the Eastern and Western sides of the country, coinciding with the 
transit pathway for southern migration (see Map 4.2). As noted in the table, the 
Tangier-Ceuta and Ras Kebdana – Saidia were funded by the Moroccan 
Government. The commitment can be seen as reflecting the efforts of the 
Moroccan government to increase its control over areas that were considered to 
be sources of migration and drug trafficking.  
Table 4-6 Description of the construction project for the Mediterranean 
Rocade Road.  
Road sectors  (Km) Funding 
Partners 
Totals (Mdh) Projected Date to 
end construction 
road  
Tangier - Ksar Sghir 30 Ministry of 
Infrastructure and 
Transport  
100 February 2002 
Ksar Sghir - Fnideq  30 Agency of Northern 
Morocco  
120  August 2002 
Autoroute Fnideq -
Tetouan 
28 National Society of 
High-Ways of  
Morocco 
1,200 2006 
Tetouan - Jebha 120 JBIC  (Japan) 1,980 2009 
Jebha - Ajdir (Al 
Hoceima) 
103 European 
Union  (MEDA) 
1,330 2007 
Ajdir (Al Hoceima) - 
Ras Afrou 
 
84 Government of 
Italy 
780 2006 
Ras Afrou - Ras 
Kebdana 
92  Foundation Abu     
Dhabi 
600  2005 
Ras Kebdana–
Saidia 
      2  MET + ADN             60 2001 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Kingdom of Morocco, 2004. 
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In its initial phase, implementation of MEDA was marked by a number of 
problems. In particular, there were significant delays to payments, with only 
€860 million disbursed out of the total €3.06b. committed for the programme 
(European Commission 2005: 13).  In the case of Morocco, the budget in the 
period 1995-2000 was €796.6 million and of this amount actual payments 
accounted for just €166.8 million. The main problems encountered in the 
implementation of the MEDA programmes under the EUROMED framework can 
were primarily political and administrative.  
Politically, the primarily inter-governmental nature of the EUROMED 
relationship is reflected in the low degree of institutionalisation and the limited 
development of informal interactions at the governmental level (Toplu, 2004). 
The way in which the EU defined its policies towards the MENA countries 
created tensions between the parties. Moreover, the scope for a coherent EU 
policy was undermined by the distinct and quasi-colonial bilateral relationships 
between Spain and France, on the one hand, and Morocco on the other.  
At the administrative level, there were a number of problems with support 
from MEDA, most notably relating to delays in payments for projects planned 
under MEDA I. This is because the diverse projects differed in their period of 
duration and the procedures for payment. The 1999 Annual Report from the 
European Commission explained that prolonged negotiation over many projects 
had delayed their implementation. The most delayed projects were those 
relating to economic transition and structural adjustment. The Commissioner for 
Migration in the Office of the EU in Morocco explained that one problem has 
been the inefficient administration of the Moroccan bureaucracy and that this 
problem was being addressed through the so-called “Green Circle” initiative, an 
inter-governmental programme to reduce administrative obstacles20. The lack of 
favourable conditions for the development of the private sector and for further 
trade liberalisation contributed to a slow economic transition. 
  
                                            
20
 Interview with Louis Dey, EU‟s Delegation in Morocco. Rabat, June 2004. 
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4.6.1 MEDA II: Cooperation with Third countries  
In September 2000, the Commission issued its proposals for 
“Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process”, subsequently endorsed at the Foreign 
Ministers meeting held in Marseilles in November 2000 (European Commission 
2001).  The MEDA programme was designed to make the link between MEDA 
funding and the Association process “more explicit; improving the delivery of 
MEDA through reforms involving the Commission, the Council and the 
Mediterranean partners in a more strategic approach; co-operating on human 
rights and democracy; introducing regional cooperation on the critical issues 
relating to justice and home affairs and raising the visibility of the process” 
(European Commission, 2000d: 2). The budget for MEDA II was set at €5.4 
billion for the period 2000-2006, compared with €3.4b. under MEDA I (European 
Commission, 2000d: 2; European Union, 2007: 17). 
An important difference between MEDA I and MEDA II was the increased 
emphasis on migration control in the projects supported by the Agreement. 
While migration had been identified as an issue in MEDA I, it became much 
more salient in the following years, increasingly being seen as a security issue. 
As a result, substantial resources were allocated to migration control as part of 
MEDA II and of subsequent EU initiatives. To understand why this was the case 
it is necessary to look at how the EU‟s migration policy was developing in this 
period and how migration was informing EU-Morocco relations.  
4.7 The EU’s immigration policy: From Cooperation on 
Development to Cooperation on Control of Illegal 
Migration.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU‟s priority regarding migration was to 
establish the rules of belonging based on EU citizenship and legal residence. 
The principle of the free movement of labour had been incorporated into the 
original Treaty of Rome, but applied primarily to citizens of the member states. 
Questions of citizenship and migration remained largely national responsibilities 
though they clearly had consequences at the EU level which could ultimately 
only be addressed by EU rules. The inclusion of justice and home affairs in the 
Title VI, also known as the “3rd Pillar” of the Treaty on European Union, opened 
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the way for a much broader EU responsibility in these areas (European Union, 
1992: 50). European policy in this area was relatively slow to develop, given the 
sensitivity for national sovereignty of immigration questions and the fact that 
decisions in the “3rd Pillar” were taken on an inter-governmental basis in which 
all member states enjoyed a veto (Monar, 2004).  
Nonetheless, over the following years, it became clear that such a policy 
would uphold the principle of mobility of labour for European citizens and legal 
residents while establishing a restrictive migration policy, in effect a “Fortress 
Europe” (Miller and Stefanova, 2006). From this Euro-centric perspective, 
migration had to be controlled in order to secure the EU from external security 
threats, and even economic and socio-cultural threats (Black, 1996: 64; 
Kelstrup and Williams, 2000).  
At the same time as the EU was seeking to formulate a migration control 
regime, the Union and member states were already engaged in a  policy of 
using foreign aid to address the root causes of migration (Baldwin Edwards, 
2006). As a reflection of the influence of the “root causes approach” in the 
1990s, the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the 1999 Tampere Conclusions 
both addressed migration in the context of development (Stocchiero, 2005). 
Both initiatives envisaged the provision of aid which, it was hoped, would 
address migration as a phenomenon caused by the lack of development. Such 
a policy could be pursued at the same, as a common migration policy was 
developed to control the EU‟s external borders. The Council Summit at 
Tampere was the first forum where the term co-development was explicitly used 
by the EU to link the control of migration and development (European Council, 
1999; Baldwin Edwards, 2006). Over subsequent years, however, the emphasis 
in political rhetoric shifted from making the link between migration and 
development – and identifying the need for associated policies of co-
development – to making the link between migration and security related to 
concerns about terrorism.  
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4.7.1 The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration 
(HLWG) and Action Plans. 
The different strands of EU policy were apparent in its relations with countries of 
migration such as Morocco. In 1998, on the basis of a Dutch initiative, the 
General Affairs Council agreed to the creation of a High Level Working Group 
on Asylum and Migration. Its initial task was to prepare “Action Plans” for 
Morocco, Somalia, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Albania which would be 
approved by the European Council in Tampere in 1999 (Gent, 2002). These 
action plans were designed to address the root causes of immigration by 
providing a “comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human 
rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit” 
(European Council, 1999). However, the plans were criticised for being 
unilateral measures which had been drawn up without consultation with the 
sending countries. This was the case for the Moroccan Action Plan, the 
contents of which were only passed to the country‟s authorities at the end of 
1999.The Moroccan response was highly critical: they considered that “the 
Action Plan as presented to them lacked balance, particularly in its emphasis on 
the security dimension" (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 
1999) . At the same time, they stressed the need to work in partnership with the 
Union in order to enhance the content of the Plan in the framework of the 
European Union-Morocco Association Council. Hence, one of the 
consequences of this dispute was a decision to include third countries in the 
design of the Action Plan by creating spaces for dialogue (High-Level Working 
Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). Given that the Association Agreement 
was about to enter into force in 2000, the EU‟s approach was to go further in 
bilateral cooperation by integrating the migration issue (European Commission, 
2002a).  
The first meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council took place in 
Luxembourg on October 9, 2000 and provided a bilateral dialogue mechanism 
between the EU and Morocco. More significant is the fact that the meeting was 
chaired by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Spanish diplomat 
Javier Solana as Secretary/High Commissioner for the CFSP, representatives 
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of the two member states with the closest relationships to Morocco (European 
Commission, 2000c). The Association Council was intended as a forum to 
discuss the components of the Agreement including the commitment to further 
cooperation in the fight of illegal migration and Moroccan concerns such as 
greater liberalisation of agricultural trade and an improved fisheries agreement. 
The Council was also used as a forum for discussing the question of financial 
aid needed to address the socio-economic causes of migration (European 
Commission, 2000c).   
Co-development was an important part of the EU‟s rhetoric but it primarily 
referred to those programmes supporting the development of infrastructure to 
increase trade. Along with the MEDA resources planned for “development”, 
resources were directed towards aspects of migration control. For example, it 
was agreed by the HLWG that in 2001 €3 million would be directed to 
institutional support for migration issues as part of the MEDA II Programme 
budget (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). More 
significantly, aspects of the Action Plan were funded under the budget lines for 
MEDA (budget line B7 410) and Cooperation with Third Countries (B7-667) with 
nearly €120 million allocated to these tasks over the period 2001-2005. The 
actions performed by different governmental agencies in the Southern 
Mediterranean countries covered a wide range of activities, including research 
into the causes of migration, the allocation of resources for development 
projects, support for human rights associations and cooperation on training to 
combat illegal migrants and smugglers in third countries (European Commission, 
2002a). 
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Table 4-7Budget for EU-Morocco cooperation on migration  
Financial resources programmed for external aid 2000-2006 and linked to the migration (Heading 4 of  the 
financial perspective) 
Amount €  Budget 
Line 
Years Theme Action  Description  
70,000,000 B7-410 2002-
2004 
Roots Development Support  for economic development of 
regions with high emigration such as 
Province du Nord, support for 
reintegration  
5,000,000 B7-410 2002-
2004 
Migration 
Management 
Migration 
Management 
Organisation of legal emigration via 
creation of a migration centre 
40,000,000 B7-410 2002-
2005 
Migration 
Management 
Fighting illegal 
immigration  
Fight against illegal immigration by 
supporting improvement of 
management of border control 
376,276 B7-667 2001 Migration 
Management 
Fighting illegal 
immigration  
CGED-DPG(Spain): Technical 
equipment and training for border 
control , fighting illegal immigration an 
detection of falsified documents 
1,500,000 B7-667 2001 Migration 
Management 
Migration 
Management 
AFD (France): development of the 
country or origin by Moroccans 
residing in France and through rural 
tourism and the creation of SME 
450,241 B7-667 2001 Migration 
Management 
Migration 
Management 
Int Ent (Netherlands): support to 
entrepreneurs of Moroccan origin 
residing in Europe in setting up 
economic activities in Morocco 
665,980 B7-667 2001 Migration 
Management 
Fighting illegal 
immigration  
French MI/National police: financial 
and technical assistance for combating 
illegal migration  
1,055,315 B7-667 2002 Migration 
Management 
Migration 
Management 
IOM-socio economic development of 
migration prone areas 
889,316 B7-667 2002 Migration 
Management 
Migration 
Management 
COOPI- il migrante Moroccochino in 
Italia come agente di sviluppo 
Cooperazione 
Source: The European Commission. (European Commission, 2002a) 
4.7.2  A shift from root causes to the security policy paradigm.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were the principal reason for a shift 
in the emphasis of EU policy from tackling the root causes of migration to 
seeking cooperation for the control of the EU‟s external borders and anti-
terrorism policies. Justice and Home Affairs became a central component of EU 
legislation, accounting for nearly 40% of new proposals in this period. At the 
European Council‟s Laeken Summit, the matter of strengthening border controls 
in the face of external terrorist threats was the main concern. In the summit‟s 
conclusions, the Presidency noted that “better management of the Union's 
external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism” (High-Level 
Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). This aim was later reinforced 
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in the Valencia Action Plan issued at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held 
in Valencia in 2002 which aimed to foster further regional cooperation among 
members (European Council, 2001). 
An important part of the border control strategy was the development of 
return and readmission policies. Readmission agreements forming part of the 
EU objective to achieve cooperation with third-countries were already a priority 
for the Commission (European Commission, 2001),  and were covered by the 
High Level Migration Group‟s Action Plan and subsequent discussions with 
Morocco (Pastore, 2003: 113).  
Such plans were embraced by the EU along with the provision of financial 
aid to reinforce cooperation with third countries. The European Commission‟s 
Green Paper on a Community Return Policy for Illegal Residents recommended 
the inclusion of readmission agreements and the return policy as a central 
component of a common migratory policy. The document stressed cooperation 
with third  countries and underlined the fact that “Community return policy has to 
fit in and to complement the existing Community policies on immigration and 
asylum as described in the relevant Communications from the Commission” 
(European Union, 2002: 3). Co-development was seen as part of this approach, 
with return policies being geared towards promoting development in the home 
countries. For the Commission, “voluntary return of migrants, both temporary 
and permanent, brings back accumulated amounts of financial, human and 
social capital into developing countries. Traditionally, return has therefore been 
seen as an essential aspect in ensuring a positive relationship between 
migration and development” (European Commission, 2002a: 20).  
The policy was already being pursued by a number of member states. In 
France, “co-development policy” aimed to promote development of the sources 
of emigration as well as financial aid to promote voluntary return. Both Denmark 
and the Netherlands approved repatriation legislation which made assisted 
return possible (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). In 
the case of Southern Europe, countries such as Spain also adopted voluntary 
returns as part of international cooperation aid thought micro-credit programmes 
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carried out by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for 
Development (AECID). 
However, at the same time as it was supporting co-development projects, 
the EU was increasingly directing financial resources towards migration control. 
According to the Commission, the budget for “Financial Resources 
Programmed for External Aid 2000-2006 linked to the Migration Issue” which 
describes actions for combating illegal migration under the section of 
Management of migration flows, combating illegal immigration and management 
of the border, accounted for €442m.while the budget destined for development 
was €121m. out of a total external aid  budget for 2000-2006 related to the 
migration issue of €934m(European Commission, 2002a: 50).  
 
Table 4-8 EU’s Budget for Cooperation with Third Countries on Migration 
Issue 2000-2006 
Financial Resources Programmed for External Aid 2000-2006 and Linked to the Migration Issue. 
Heading 4 of the Financial System 
  Community budget  € EDF1 € Total € % 
Management of 
migration flows 
Management of 
border 
             321,971,760                                     
0    
              
321,971,760  
34.5%
Combating illegal 
migration  
               65,042,256                               
2,720,000  
                    
67,762,256  
7.25%
Management of 
migration flows  
               
51,367,336  
                     
1,250,000  
                       
52,617,336  
5.63%
Total management of migration flows 438,381,352              3,970,000                       442,351,352                      47.34%
General JHA programmes 96,500,000               0 96,500,000                      10.33%
Link between relief, 
rehabilitation and 
development 
(LRRD) 
Refugees and 
displaced persons 
42,750,000                37,688,000                    80,438,000                         8.61%
Voluntary return of 
refugees from 
other third 
countries 
157,018,459               36,591,000                    193,609,459                      20.72%
Total LRRD 199,768,459               74,279,000                    274,047,459                      29.33%
Development (sources of emigration)  71,569,477                 50,000,000                    121,569,477                      13.01%
Grand Total  806,219,288               128,249,000                  934,468,288                      100%
 86.30% 13.74% 100%  
1European Development Fund  
Source: European Commission. (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999) 
4.7.3 The AENEAS Programme: 2004-2006 
The shift in emphasis towards migration control coincided with a redefinition of 
the EU‟s relations with MENA countries and Morocco in particular. The pursuit 
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of the EU‟s Mediterranean Policy was reconfigured in 2003 as part of the new 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP sought to clarify the terms of 
cooperation with third countries on the EU‟s borders with particular reference to 
the effects of Eastern enlargement. The Commission presented the new 
strategy to the European Council in 2003 (European Commission, 2003).  
In this context of redefined relations and new strategies on border control, 
the framework for EU-Moroccan relations on migration was also revised. The 
Action Plan for Morocco considered aid for border security and the 
management of migration with Morocco as part of the MEDA Programme which 
assigned €40 million for the management of irregular flows (European Union, 
2004a). A Commission report on the use of financial resources to address 
migration related issues – made at the request of the European Council at the 
2002 Seville Summit – indicated the scale of cooperation with third countries 
based on budget line B7-677 (a resource which funded cooperation with third 
countries on migration issues). This noted that the Commission had provided 
funds to “combat illegal immigration by supporting improvements to the 
management of border checks adopted in cooperation with Morocco for the 
period 2004-06, with a budget of €40 million” (European Commission, 2002a: 
39).However, after considering these funds as insufficient, the Aeneas  
Programme21  replaced the original budget under  B7-667 with €250 million for 
the period 2004-2008 (€120 million were spent  the 2004-2006 years) 
(European Union, 2004b: 4; Geddes, 2005: 798; European Commission, 2006a).  
The scheme applied to all potential countries of migration including Asia and 
Latin America.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
21
 In March 2004 AENEAS was approved by the European Council and Parliament as a 
broader programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of 
migration and asylum (AENEAS) European Union (2004b) Regulation No. 491/2004 of th 
European Parliament and of the Council of March 2004 establishing a programe rogramme for 
financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of  migration and asylum 
(AENEAS),. OJ L 80. Brussels. 
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Table 4-9 AENEAS Programme: Projects completed in the period 2004-
2006. 
 
Action lines Total EU Contribution  %  per action  
Asylum and Protection   € 21,024,186  17.24% 
Border management  € 4,979,532  4.08% 
Irregular migration   € 22,877,303  18.76% 
Labour migration   € 12,053,712  9.89% 
Labour migration, smuggling and trafficking   € 1,989,559  1.63% 
Legal migration   € 5,791,699  4.75% 
Migration and asylum management  € 535,598  0.44% 
Migration and development   € 12,700,824  10.42% 
Migration management  € 14,589,326  11.97% 
Migration, asylum and border management  € 1,307,898  1.07% 
Readmission   € 2,859,642  2.35% 
Return and reintegration   € 9,999,268  8.20% 
Smuggling   € 1,310,005  1.07% 
Trafficking  €         7,039,561  5.77% 
Other  €         2,875,000  2.36% 
Grand Total  €    121,933,113  100.0% 
Source: European Commission (European Commission, 2006a: 39). 
The European Mediterranean Conference at The Hague in 2004 brought 
up the matter of cooperation with Third Countries, in particular Morocco due to 
its role as a transit country (European Council, 2004b). It requested joint efforts 
for the support of monitoring activities and the provision of technical assistance. 
At this meeting, regional programmes covering justice, police, and migration 
were proposed for the Maghreb countries. In the case of the EU-Morocco action 
plan‟s objective of  increased financial support, the Commission made a 
commitment to propose a New European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) and also covered the key issues of cross-border and 
transnational cooperation between Morocco and the European Union 
(European Commission, 2003). The priorities were the management of flows 
and readmission agreements with the EU. 
Later that same year, the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of 
Foreign Affairs was held in Dublin from May 5-7. The main focus was on the 
terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and Istanbul and Madrid in March 2004 
and there was a call for “cooperation on tackling common security threats” 
(European Council, 2004a: 2). The Commission therefore agreed to provide 
financial support for sub-regional cooperation in the field of infrastructure and 
judicial cooperation especially with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Among the 
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main objectives highlighted at the meeting, EU members identified careful 
management of migration, intensified cooperation regarding the root causes of 
migration, the combating of illegal migration, the prevention of illegal 
transportation by sea, and readmission agreements. Not surprisingly, 
development and security were the primary concerns of the European 
Commission, linking poverty and the rise of extremist radical groups in Muslim 
countries. A document on the EU‟s development policy underlined an intrinsic 
link between poverty and development within an approach that mixed different 
aspects of security and migration claiming that “sustainable development is the 
best structural response to the deep-rooted causes of violent conflicts and the 
rise of terrorism, often linked to poverty”(European Commission, 2005: 8) . 
 In the report to the European Council presented by the Commission on 
the “Global Approach and the priority actions focusing on Africa and the 
Mediterranean”, amendments were made to the first proposal presented at the 
Tampere summit with the addition of legal migration and integration. The 
document maintained the rhetorical commitment to the migration-development 
agenda as a key factor for the deterrence of illegal migration, stating that “the 
prime challenge is to tackle the main push factors for migration: poverty and the 
lack of job opportunities” (European Commission, 2006b: 5). Legal migration 
was justified in terms of European labour market needs for high-skilled and 
seasonal migrants without countervailing the Community preference principle 
(European Commission, 2006b: 7). Nevertheless, the document underlines 
awareness of the brain drain and the scarcity of health workers in developing 
countries produced by demand in Europe and hoped that dependence on 
certain migrants could be replaced by increasing the offer within Europe. Also 
worthy of note is the introduction of a proposal for new legislation on penalties 
against employers as the latter represent a pull factor for illegal immigration.  
Despite a developmental rhetoric, which underlined cooperation with 
African and Mediterranean countries to boost development, the security 
approach and “Fortress Europe” considerations were increasingly shaping EU 
migration Policy. The enhancement of external border controls was seen in the 
launch of the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
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Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (FRONTEX) in October 2005. 22  This new agency was created to 
coordinate EU‟s efforts to secure maritime (Mediterranean Sea and West 
African Coast) and land borders (Southern Eastern Europe) as part of the its 
efforts to control irregular migration. Cooperation with Third Countries in North 
Africa and Eastern Europe was required as part of the new ENP. As part of the 
strategy to control the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic (Canary Islands) and 
the Black Sea, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) sought 
cooperation with third countries to operate the surveillance system jointly with 
European Members. 
In sum, the key elements driving the EU‟s immigration policy seem to be at 
odds with one another. While the “root causes” approach was maintained in 
terms of the rhetoric and some initiatives, the link between migration and 
development was not fully developed. At the same time, a security-driven and 
more restrictive policy emerged. This was apparent in the resources allocated 
through MEDA, particularly MEDA II, and in the subsequent initiatives on border 
control. 
MEDA II included both a programme to support the channelling of legal 
migration to those regions in EU where there was a demand for labour and a 
programme which addressed the need to control illegal migration by providing 
technical and financial support to the Moroccan government to improve border 
security. Yet, there was an imbalance between the resources devoted to these 
objectives. In the period 2002-2004, the MEDA II budget provided €5m. for 
institutional support to channel legal migration  and €40m for  border controls 
(European Commission, 2006: 5).  
MEDA I, as a mechanism inscribed in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
was expected to bring much needed resources to Morocco. However, the fact 
that only 29% of the total budget allocated for the period 1995-1996 was 
implemented served as a disincentive for Euro Med partners, including 
Morocco(see table 4.5)  (European Commission 2005: 17). The inclusion of 
                                            
22
 For further information see the Frontex website at:  http: //www.frontex.europa.eu/ 
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migration management was seen as positive for the Moroccan government as 
immigration and the settlement of Sub-Saharan migrants had become a burden. 
However, the security approach which emerged after 2001, and which was re-
emphasised following the events in Casablanca in 2003 and the Atocha 
bombings of 2004, constituted a source of concern for the Moroccan 
government given the xenophobic reactions towards Moroccans in Europe 
(Daki, 2004).  MEDA II concentrated its efforts on improving the management of 
illegal migration, development of the Northern Region of Morocco and providing 
support to private enterprise (Krouz et al., 2002). As discussed above, the 
resources assigned to Morocco were destined more for the management of 
migration and even the construction of detention centres in the North of the 
country, as proposed by the Germans and opposed by the Spanish and 
Moroccans (Kreienbrink, 2005). There are fewer activities reported under the 
budget line of “root causes” than the migration management line. In addition, 
resources are channelled to the North, which has proved to be the principal 
transit point, but not to the new sources of Moroccan migration such as the 
central and more urbanised areas.  
When comparing MEDA I and MEDA II, migration and security become 
more closely linked in the latter. While the main purpose of MEDA I was to 
encourage increased trade (which would indirectly serve as a substitute for 
migration), MEDA II incorporated an explicit mechanism to manage migration. A 
major focus for the MEDA programmes has been aid to develop the 
infrastructure for trade around North Africa‟s Mediterranean basin, and 
specifically the North Morocco area. The underlying assumption establishes 
unemployment and the lack of economic prospects as push factors that can be 
eradicated based on the improvement of effective market access for developing 
countries to the EU and other industrialised countries as well as the integration 
of developing countries into the world trading system (European Commission, 
2002b: 8). 
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4.8  Conclusions 
The conventional wisdom regarding development is reflected in the trade and 
aid policies promoted in both regions. The combination of NAFTA and the PPP 
in North America and the pursuit of liberalisation and aid programmes within the 
EuroMed-MEDA framework in the Mediterranean were both driven by an 
assumption that greater market integration would foster development and 
financial aid should be provided to enhance the infrastructural capacity for 
exports. As such both regimes can be seen as fitting into a “root causes” 
approach to co-development, with export led growth providing the opportunities 
and employment to alleviate the pressure to migrate. 
In both regions, however, the impact of these frameworks is open to 
question. The lack of competitiveness of most Moroccan exports and the 
protectionist restrictions upon those products which could compete, mean that 
the impact of trade liberalisation has been quite limited. While some parts of 
Mexico have benefited from the increased trade associated with NAFTA, those 
gains have not spread to more peripheral regions (such as the South of the 
country) nor to neighbouring states in Central America. The aid programmes, 
which were intended to enhance development, have been plagued by 
implementation problems and payment delays as well as, in the case of PPP, 
significant political opposition from civil society in the region. 
As regards their treatment of migration, the regional regimes appear to 
have been rather different, a reflection of the way in which the issue was (or 
was not) incorporated into the framework. In the case of NAFTA, with the 
exception of arrangements for highly skilled workers, the issue of labour 
migration was not directly addressed institutionally. In the case of EuroMed, 
migration has been more explicitly addressed and policy has been reinforced by 
the evolving EU regime on immigration control. 
In both cases, however, migration has become perceived as a regional 
issue but one which was increasingly addressed on the basis of border control 
and security considerations. By the time that the second MEDA programme 
entered into force a significant part of the budget for Morocco was devoted to 
border control activities. Moreover, those considerations were as much directed 
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towards the Southern borders of Mexico and Morocco as to their immediate 
frontiers. Both PPP and MEDA were used as mechanisms to reinforce border 
control while in the case of EU-Morocco, additional resources were allocated in 
an attempt to restrict migrants transiting across their territory. 
Behind the logic of increasing trade and expanding commercial zones, 
therefore, the control of the borders emerged as a priority to provide smooth 
access to capital and goods while preventing the entry of illegal migrants and 
illicit commodities. The events of 9/11 increased the perceived need for “smart 
borders” in the US and EU and prompted further cooperation on security and 
terrorism questions. New arrangements such as the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership in North America emphasised border controls but did not directly 
address the question of immigration. 
Overall, the role of regional agreements in managing the migration-
development nexus has formally been quite limited but some mechanisms for 
consultation have been developed. However, arguably they have provided a 
framework for the closer development of bilateral contacts between sending and 
receiving countries, the focus for the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE BILATERAL AND DOMESTIC 
POLITICS OF THE MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT 
NEXUS 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we examined the regional governance of the 
migration-development nexus. We analysed the role of co-development policies 
in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions both in terms of the 
broad trade and economic integration frameworks (NAFTA/EuroMed) and 
associated development programmes (PPP/MEDA). We argued that the co-
development aspect of policy was relatively limited at the regional level; instead 
security considerations tended to be more influential in shaping the regional 
governance of migration. 
Below this regional level, the central question of the "governance" of 
migration with respect to co-development initiatives involves a much wider 
range of actors working at various policymaking levels. Perhaps the most 
important level is the bilateral political dimension where domestic and foreign 
policy interests constitute the principal driving forces behind the governance of 
immigration and co-development. In co-development terms, this bilateral 
relationship can be seen in the respective priorities of the sending and host 
states, such as, the importance of remittances for home countries and the logic 
of addressing the root causes of migration for host countries. Nevertheless, the 
control of external borders for alleged security reasons and concerns about 
ongoing irregular immigration are increasingly shaping bilateral relations with 
consequences for the way in which co-development policies are pursued. This 
chapter therefore attempts to describe and analyse state-led policies involving 
Mexico and Morocco as sending countries on the one hand and the US and 
Spain as host countries on the other.  
For Mexico and Morocco, the governance of migration has become a 
source of conflict in bilateral relationships with Northern partners despite 
ongoing trade and security cooperation. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
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the Euro-Mediterranean and North American regimes have arguably used 
trade-oriented cooperation for development as a policy to contain migration 
flows. Generally, development and migration are largely separate topics with 
distinct bilateral political agendas, although they converge in the rhetorical 
discourse surrounding border control programmes, policies and debates. In 
practice, the different treatment of migration and development issues is 
reflected in unbalanced relationships between Northern and Southern 
protagonists. Both Morocco and Mexico seem to be willing to cooperate with 
their Northern partners on matters of border security despite the negative 
political consequences for their relations with Southern neighbours, but there is 
little reciprocity from the North in the development of favourable migratory 
agreements.  
Indeed, it could be argued that, in effect, the North American and Euro-
Mediterranean regimes contradictorily seek to decrease obstacles for 
expanding markets whilst increasing controls on the cross–border movement of 
people. 1  Therefore, there is a tension between the dynamic of economic 
integration in each region and the preferences of political leaders and domestic 
political considerations which shape bilateral relationships. Thus, the question 
posed here is the extent to which economic-political and migratory outcomes 
are the result of an interaction between national interests and regional 
commitments. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections, covering the impact of 
national interests in each region. In each section, we examine how far the 
bilateral relationships between sending and receiving countries have been 
shaped by their respective national economic and political priorities. In particular, 
we consider the extent to which national interests serve to define the regional 
treatment of migration issues. We then examine those policies which have been 
developed at the bilateral level and which are broadly oriented towards co-
development. The core questions in this chapter concern the extent to which 
                                            
1 
See the discussion in Chapter 1 on the theoretical debate and the discussion in Chapter 
4 on the political discourses provided by political actors concerning the effects of trade 
liberalisation on migration trends.  
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cooperation on development is linked to the migration issue at the bilateral level 
and how this cooperation for development has been included in bilateral 
negotiations as a quid pro quo for cooperation on border control.  
In the first section, we examine the case of the Mexico-US relationship, 
highlighting the factors which have defined governmental positions in bilateral 
discussions. We then focus on attempts to link migration and development in 
the US-Mexico context. Even if the concept of co-development is not explicitly 
referred to in migration-related policies between these two countries, we are 
able to describe processes and initiatives in North America which have an 
equivalent effect. The discussion analyses the development of migratory policy 
of the US and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The section also attempts 
to explain the state‟s interest driving the migration issue.  
The second section assesses bilateral relations between Morocco on the 
one hand and Spain and the EU on the other. Based on the assumption that co-
development is a policy related to migration that involves both sending and 
receiving countries, these bilateral relationships represent an important factor in 
migration governance. By looking at the Spanish relationship with Morocco we 
are able to examine the particular relationship between one of the Southern EU 
member states and Morocco, how their understandings of co-development differ 
from the EU as a whole and how has this been reflected in the management of 
co-development with Morocco. Given that co-development in the Spanish 
context is been related as a policy to manage migration and promote local 
development in the sending country, the section analyses the impact of this 
policy on the Moroccan immigrant population and the Morocco‟s migratory 
policy.  
5.2 The US-Mexico Bilateral Agenda 
The immigration issue has been on the US-Mexico bilateral agenda for a long 
time along with other political priorities such as drug trafficking, trade and 
hemispheric security. In order to distinguish the level of cooperation on these 
subjects, we need to analyse the outcomes from bilateral meetings involving a 
variety of governmental bodies. As noted in the previous chapter, there has 
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been a proliferation of regional and bilateral meetings at different levels over the 
last two decades, from trilateral North American Presidential Summits serving 
as the highest level of interaction to structural mechanisms of dialogue for 
migration such as the Binational Commission and informal communication 
meetings between stakeholders on both sides of the US–Mexico border.  
While US-Mexican discussions have traditionally been difficult on issues 
such as migration, the political changes in both countries have led to a shift in 
relations: the underlying attitude to their approach to common problems 
changed from one of “distant neighbours”2 to one of “shared responsibility”.3 
The turning point for the US-Mexico relationship appears to have been the 
decision of Presidents George H. Bush and Carlos Salinas to create a North 
American Free Trade Agreement.  NAFTA was finalised in 1992 and entered 
into force in 1994. The presidencies of Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo were the 
focus for a bilateral agenda which addressed issues of drug trafficking, 
migration, trade and the economic condition of Mexico after the 1994 peso 
devaluation (an event that jeopardised plans to increase trade with Mexico). 
The presidential terms of George W. Bush and newly elected Vicente Fox in 
2000 raised expectations of an even more positive and collaborative partnership 
between the two neighbours.  
While overall relations have considerably improved since the end of the 
1980s, the issue of migration has remained difficult. Although both Presidents 
Carlos Salinas and George H.W. Bush4 indicated that migration was going to be 
on the NAFTA negotiation table, ultimately it was not in the interest of either 
government to address the issue as immigration could have jeopardised the 
overall negotiation (Papademetriou, 2003:45). However, institutional 
                                            
2
 Alan Riding, in his book “Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans” coined this term 
to describe the US-Mexico bilateral relationship as complex despite the growing 
interdependence which was conditioned  by different system of political, economic and cultural 
values (Riding 1985). 
3
 After the 9/11, the US and Mexico Governments engaged in cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism and migration as common goals (Délano 2009). 
4
 Both US and Mexican Presidents defended NAFTA as a mechanism to promote trade, 
foreign direct investment and employment, implying a decrease in the Mexican immigration to 
the US (Fernández de Castro 2004). 
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cooperation on migration did increase at US - Mexico bilateral level, particularly 
in the post-NAFTA period. At the diplomatic level, the post-NAFTA period was 
distinguished from previous periods by the multiplication of communication 
channels, both informal and formal, and the institutionalisation of regional trade 
and economic activities. Thus, the outcomes of the policy on migration are 
determined by the interaction on different level and degree of the bilateral 
mechanisms set in place before and after NAFTA.  
The US–Mexico relationship has been further institutionalised post-NAFTA 
(Rosenblum, 2004). While prior to NAFTA the bilateral relationship was intense 
and relied on multiple informal channels of communication, it lacked institutions 
and consultative mechanisms and negotiations (del Castillo Vera, 1987). Table 
5.1 describes the different institutions and mechanisms that currently regulate 
the bilateral relationship. In an attempt to illustrate the multiple levels of 
operation, the table is divided by level of governmental interaction. The most 
frequent annual meetings are the Border Governors Conference (BGC) that 
date back to 1980, but which have extended their scope in the years since 
NAFTA was signed. At the state and local levels, the extent of transborder 
cooperation has been continuously evolving over the post-NAFTA period, while 
the Executive level shows greater unevenness over the period. While meetings 
at the regional and executive levels are held sporadically, those related to 
binational mechanisms and transborder cooperation are continuous and include 
the participation of organised civil society. 
Despite the reinvigorated US “Good Neighbour Policy”, which used a non-
interventionist and cooperative approach in its foreign policy towards Mexico 
(Spokes, 2006, Valenzuela, 2007), US governmental bureaucracy considers 
immigration a matter of inalienable national interest (Briggs, 1992; Briggs, 2003). 
Hence, at the state level there is growing cooperation and a multiplication of 
communication channels in the economic arena which is unbalanced in 
comparison with the limited cooperation on the migration issue (Andreas 2002). 
Thus, the creation of migration regulations at the Congressional and Executive 
Levels has been characterised as unilateral with little or no attempt to consult 
with Mexican counterparts. The response to growing Mexican immigration in the 
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US traditionally has therefore been characterised as largely unilateral. Over 
time, however, Mexican officials have sought to engage with the US on 
migration issues. The Mexican Government has long been aware that Executive 
Summits are pivotal for bilateral dialogue and has sought to pursue other 
channels to address Mexican immigration as a binational matter. Thus, the 
Conference of Border Governors and the Mechanism of Border Liaison have 
become more effective local bodies for tackling cross-border issues. 
 
Table 5-1 US-Mexico bilateral institutions and mechanisms 
Bilateral/ 
Institutional 
Partnership for Prosperity 
Interior Mechanism of Liaison  
Binational Memorandum for Safe Repatriation  
Binational Commission  
Inter-parliamentary Summits 
Border Legislation Conference 
US-Mexico Commission for Education and Cultural Exchange 
Merida Initiative 
Plenary Group for Justice Enforcement 
US–Mexico Senior Law Enforcement Plenary (SLEP) 
US-Mexico Border Environmental Programme – Border 2012 
Transborder/  
Gov. Bodies 
US-Mexico Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning  (BBBXG) 
International Boundary & Water Commission (USIBWC) 
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) 
Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM) 
US–Mexico Border Health Commission  (USMBHC) 
 State Gov. Border Governors Conference 
Conference of Gulf of Mexico Governors 
Chihuahua-New Mexico Commission 
Arizona- Sonora Commission 
 
 Local Gov Meetings of Border City Mayors  
Local Understandings for Migrant 
Repatriation  
Binational Group for transborder facilitation. 
 Civil Society Environmental Groups 
Human Rights Protection for Migrants 
Societal Organisations  and Clubs 
Source:  Elaborated by the author 
 
Nevertheless, despite the proliferation of institutions and bilateral 
mechanisms there have been criticisms that their impact on resolving the 
migration issue has been limited. In order to assess the limits and achievements 
of such bilateral frameworks as the Binational Commission, the Inter-
parliamentary Meeting Group, and the Mechanism of Liaison, the following 
section discusses the politics of the bilateral agenda. 
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5.2.1 Migration in the bilateral agenda: from distant neighbours to a 
shared responsibility policy. 
5.2.1.1 The appraisal of the Pre–NAFTA period: The distant 
neighbours 
In order to assess the scope of bilateral discussions and agreements 
regarding Mexican Immigration to the US, it is necessary to consider the multi-
level channels of consultation and cooperation which developed before and 
after the signing of NAFTA.  
One of the first attempts to develop the bilateral relationship dates back to 
1977 when US President Jimmy Carter and the President of Mexico José López 
Portillo established a Consultative Mechanism  to seek collaboration on border-
related issues such as trade, crime, health and the environment as well as 
migration (Henrikson, 2000: 127). The Consultative Mechanism opened an 
institutional channel for consultation between the two countries‟ executives. At 
around the same time, other arrangements were being established to address 
the consequences of the growing integration between the two countries. The 
establishment in 1977 of a Regional US Border Commission and the 
Coordinating Commission of the National Programme for the Border and Free 
Trade Zones provided a framework for discussing border issues (Henrikson, 
2000). The focus of these working groups was commercial activity across the 
US–Mexico border and its effects on the regional economy. However, the 
migration issue was excluded from the bilateral agenda despite the increase in 
regular and irregular border crossings of Mexicans to the US.  
At the beginning of the 1980s, the two governments established the 
Binational Commission (BNC), a binational dialogue structure which held an 
annual summit involving different ministerial and governmental departments. It 
was to serve as a permanent working group which consulted and collaborated 
on specific topics of common interest (Ayón et al., 2009: 9). Even if trade and 
the free customs area were the main issues on the Commission‟s agenda, the 
intensive movement of workers and cargo across the border inevitably made 
these issues important features of the agenda until the last meeting held in 
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2006.5  While it came to be regarded as ineffective, the Commission served as 
one of the main channels of communication between the two Administrations 
until it was replaced by other multiple and diverse formal and informal channels. 
The main accomplishment of the binational summits was to provide a forum for 
ongoing discussions of the management of immigration flows to the US, the 
protection of migrants‟ human rights and the root causes of migration. Those 
discussions were influential in the ensuring such matters were included in 
subsequent legislation (such as the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)).  
Despite these bilateral initiatives, immigration was mainly addressed in the 
domestic political sphere, with legislation being agreed unilaterally. One early 
attempt to establish such controls was the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA), approved by Congress in 1986. IRCA sought to discourage illegal 
immigration by imposing penalties upon firms that employed undocumented 
migrants. 6  However, this legislation was also notable for being the first 
mechanism to address immigration from an economic and development 
perspective. The IRCA created the Asencio Commission, headed by Diego 
Asencio, former Assistant Secretary of the US State Department, as a review 
body consulting and researching on how to boost local development in Mexican 
communities with high emigration rates. Despite the lack of follow-up to the 
Commission‟s work, it is worth noting that its recommendations took into 
account economic development rather than solely control and regularisation 
programmes to deal with illegal Mexican immigration (Alarcón, 1995b). The 
report stressed the importance of accelerated development as the most feasible 
and desirable instrument for stemming migration from Mexico and outlines the 
migration-development nexus:  
                                            
5
 In 2006, the Presidents of the USA and Mexico decided to cancel the Binational 
Commission Meeting given its lack of efficiency for tackling major issues.  
6 
The agricultural sector has been historically a high-demanding labour sector of Mexican 
undocumented migrant, which was favoured by IRCA under the regularization of undocumented 
workers through the Seasonal Agricultural Workers program (SAW) (Hanson, G.H. & 
Spilimbergo, A. , 2001). 
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1. Targeting migrant-sending regions for economic growth. Since 
migratory flows originate in specific regions, the Commission suggested that 
development efforts be targeted not at resource-poor areas with meagre 
development prospects but at nearby regions with greater potential to offer 
improved economic alternatives to prospective migrants. 
2. Developing small business. Since the informal sector often serves as a 
refuge for the urban poor and provides employment to an increasing number of 
women, the Commission suggested that national and international development 
agencies work with governments to reduce legal and bureaucratic impediments 
to the development of small business.  
3. Channelling remittances into productive small businesses. The 
Commission found that most migrant remittances are used to pay for basic 
needs and that little goes to productive investment. The Commission 
recommended that individual migrant remittances be complemented by other 
financial resources from public and private institutions to support development 
of the small business sector. The Commission singled out the Agency for 
International Development to take the lead in fostering such cooperative 
financing arrangements (Asencio, 1990). 
Another of its principal recommendations was to support the creation of a 
North American Free Trade Agreement as a mechanism to expand the 
American market and create employment in Mexico and in Central American 
and Caribbean countries (Asencio, 1990). 
In the early 1990s, the increased immigration of undocumented Mexican 
workers to the US and the unsuccessful enforcement of IRCA‟s sanctions 
against employers led to a xenophobic perception of the Mexican population, 
especially in US Border states. As a result, it became even more important for 
US politicians to be seen to be acting on the immigration issue. The extension 
of free trade to Mexico was presented as an economic mechanism to diminish 
the “push” factors in Mexico. At its 1994 meeting, the Migration and Consular 
Affairs Group of the Mexican-United States Binational Commission agreed to 
conduct research on the subject to understand new trends and propose 
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adequate bilateral policies (US Commission on Immigration Reform and  
Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997: 4).  
Notwithstanding this attempt to pursue a joint analysis and approach to the 
issue of Mexican migration, in practice the most important initiatives in the US 
were unilateral.  
Perhaps the most important - and contentious – initiative was that taken at 
the subnational level by the Californian state authorities: Proposition 187. Public 
opinion blamed immigrants for being the cause of an economic recession in the 
state and there were demonstrations calling for further controls on irregular 
immigration (Calavita, 1996). Proposition 187 was a plebiscite, supported by the 
then Governor Pete Wilson and passed in 1994, which targeted undocumented 
immigrants, requiring that they should “not receive any public social services to 
which he or she may otherwise be entitled until the legal status of that person 
has been verified” (Martin, 1997: 897). The law was criticised by Presidents 
Clinton and Salinas de Gortari (though the Clinton administration was itself 
committed to stopping illegal migration) (Martin, 1997). Moreover, state 
politicians in other parts of the country such as George Bush, then Governor of 
Texas, and Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York, refused to follow Wilson‟s 
example (Weintraub et al., 1997: 461). The controversy surrounding the 
proposition illustrates how responses to the issue of migration differed not only 
between different levels of government but also within them.  
Another sign of tough unilateral controls on migration was to emerge a few 
years after Proposition 187 with the 1996 Congressional approval of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [IIRIRA] of 1996 (US 
Congress, 1996a). The Act sought to reinforce border controls with enhanced 
surveillance systems and to put more resources into detecting irregular 
migration. The Act increased the number of immigration officers along the US-
Mexico border by no less than 1,000 per fiscal year in the period 1997-2001, 
and funded the construction of fences at hub check points such as San Diego-
Tijuana. Another Act passed by Congress during the Clinton Administration was 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
which seemed to follow the earlier Californian initiative by seeking to restrain 
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“aliens who are not qualified or non-immigrants ineligible for state and local 
public benefits” (US Congress, 1996c). 
The question of migration control was, moreover, often considered in 
relation to other aspects of US-Mexican relations. In the same year, the US 
Congress allocated funds to assist Mexico in its fight against drug trafficking 
and money laundering activities (US Congress, 1996b) and the two Presidents 
signed the Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs (also 
known as the Declaration of Alliance) (Government of Mexico, 1997). While the 
Declaration of the Alliance does not explicitly address illegal migrants crossing 
the border, the discourse of Bill Clinton established the need to control the 
border and secure it against the two main threats coming from Mexico: drugs 
and illegal migrants. 
There were also a number of US initiatives at the federal level to increase 
border controls. However, programmes such as Operation Gatekeeper carried 
out in 1994 in San Diego, California, proved to be inefficient to halt immigration 
and jeopardised the security of undocumented migrants before evolving into a 
complex collaboration between US and Mexico at the border gates. One of the 
findings of a study carried out by researchers from the University of Texas at 
Austin revealed that commuting workers were the most negatively affected by 
these operations (US Congress, 1996b). This argument was also supported by 
assessments conducted by US agencies.7  
The “Gatekeeper” and the subsequent “Hold the Line” operations led to 
the “Prevention through Deterrence” border enforcement, failing to distinguish 
between the intensive daily flows of commuters across the US-Mexico Border 
and illegal migrants crossing the border. According to the former INS, the 
                                            
7
 One of the main concerns is that the flow of undocumented migrants crossing the 
border can be accompanied by the illicit traffic of drugs and more recently by terrorists. At the 
root of the discussion is the problem of distinguishing between economic migrants who cross 
the border illegally and criminal offenders who do the same.  This is in part due to the lack of a 
homogenous system for sharing technical information between the Border Patrol's IDENT 
system and the Federal Bureau of Investigation‟s IAFIS database since they use different 
databases; one stores information about “border crossers” and the other is related to criminal 
offenders in the US. ( Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the 
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 2004). 
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deterrence operation relied on the deployment of strong border controls at the 
busiest crossing point, Tijuana-San Diego, to reroute illegal border traffic from 
traditional urban routes to less populated and geographically harsher areas and 
thereby increase detentions (Nuñez-Neto, 2008: 24). However, instead of 
curbing illegal immigration the result was an increase in immigrant deaths with 
at least 1,600 fatalities occurring between 1993 and 1997 (Eschbach et al., 
1999; Cornelius, 2001). The research services of the Department of Homeland 
Security calculated that successful illegal entries grew from 3.5 million  in 1990 
to 11.5 million in 2001(Nuñez-Neto, 2008: 12).  
In this period, questions of border control in Southern Mexico were also 
put on the US Mexican bilateral agenda. In response to US concerns, during the 
Regional Conference on Migration in Puebla in 1996,8 the Mexican Government 
called for an integrated regional policy to protect the human rights of Central 
American migrants while deterring illegal migration. Modifications to the 
Mexican General Law of Population in 1996 addressed the question of illegal 
immigration and the mechanisms used to deter it. The Beta Group was created 
during this period as an unarmed “border police” to deal with illegal migrants at 
both the Northern and Southern Mexican borders. Cooperation between the US 
border patrol and Mexican authorities began to contemplate training and joint 
teams at both of the country‟s border  
While much of the policy in this period was driven by US domestic 
priorities, reflected in the unilateral initiatives such as the 1996 Act, there was a 
degree of bilateral cooperation. In 1996, the two governments agreed upon a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of Mexican and United 
States Nationals (Governments of US and Mexico, 1996). Thus, human rights 
protection and the safe return of deported migrants became part of bilateral 
cooperation. In the following year, Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo held meetings 
in Mexico City and in Washington DC that focused on drug trafficking and 
immigration issues. Concerns about rising violence against migrants crossing 
the border and the protection of their human rights later led to the signing of the 
                                            
8
 This conference launched the Puebla Process discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation against Border Violence 
in February 1999 in Merida, Yucatan (Gobierno de México y de Estados Unidos 
de América, 1999).  This mechanism also required prosecution of those who 
were involved in illegal acts and who acted violently against government officers 
along the border. The aim of this Memorandum was to address complaints from 
the Mexican Government regarding the “hunting” of migrants by civilians and to 
serve as a way to enforce cooperation with Mexico for the prosecution of illegal 
activities related to drug trafficking and smuggling.  
One of the mechanisms created to manage returning migrants was the 
Border Liaison Mechanism involving Mexican consular officials and immigration 
authorities from Border states as well as the Consultation Mechanisms on 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Activities and Consular Protection, 
better known as “Interior Consultation Mechanisms” (Governments of US and 
Mexico, 1996). The main objective was to provide deported migrants with 
access to Consular protection and ensure the proper channelling of this 
population towards Mexican territory. 
 The Repatriation Agreements signed by the then Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, the Mexican National Institute of Migration and border 
state Consulates were derived from the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding 
on Consular Protection of United States and Mexican Nationals and the 1998 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Consultation Mechanism of Immigration 
and Naturalization Service Functions and Consular Protection (Secretariat of 
Foreign Relations of the Mexican United States (SRE) and Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) of the United States of America, 1998). This legal 
framework, together with bilateral mechanisms, embodied most of the daily 
activities of the US and Mexican Immigration authorities in providing attention to 
deported migrants, including women, minors and vulnerable persons.  
On balance, an assessment of US Mexico agreements on migration shows 
that there was only limited scope in the bilateral relationship for negotiating 
favourable conditions for Mexican migrants on such issues as greater 
immigration quotas and regularisation. However, the institutional dialogue in 
such frameworks as the Mechanisms of Border Liaisons, the Binational 
169 
 
 
 
Commission‟s Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs, and the 
Migrant Protection Groups achieved a better understanding of migration issues 
in US Mexico relations. Moreover, it is arguable that, over this period, the 
Mexican Government showed a greater interest in influencing US Legislation. 
This shift to an active policy towards Mexican migrants in the US was effective, 
for example, in securing a Presidential veto on amendments of the IIRIRA which 
sought to curtail social  benefits to immigrants (Rosenblum, 2004: 111). 
A further stage in the regularisation of immigrants followed in 2000 with the 
Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act and LIFE Act Amendments of 2000 
(Pub. L. 106-553 and -554), signed by President Clinton. The Act amends gaps 
in the previous IIRIRA issued by the US Congress in 1996. It granted residence 
to those who applied for a green card between January 14, 1998 and April 30, 
2001 and could prove they had remained in the country during that period. The 
main objective was to regularise the status of family members of legal residents. 
Overall, the LIFE was a regularisation process used to ease the backlog of 
pending immigration petitions rather than an amnesty for immigrants. Still, it 
was the preamble to a positive and major discussion on immigration. 
5.2.2 A Shared Responsibility Approach: Initiatives of the Bush- Fox 
Administrations 
When the PRI lost the Mexican Presidential election in 2000 after 70 years 
in office, the recently elected US Republican President George Bush sought to 
strengthen the bilateral relationship. There were various factors that indicated 
that relations between the two countries would improve. Politically, President 
Fox was both business-oriented and pro-American and was keen on expanding 
the scope of NAFTA while George Bush had been Governor of Texas, the state 
with the most intense trade with Mexico and the rest of Latin America. Moreover, 
there were positive indications that the new relationship would embrace the 
migration issue. In particular, there were expectations that the two countries 
would be able to negotiate a “Seasonal Workers Agreement” to facilitate the 
movement of Mexican workers into the US (Délano, 2009). The perception of 
migration had changed with previously hostile groups (such as the trade unions) 
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adopting a more sympathetic position (Secretariat of Foreign Relations of the 
Mexican United States (SRE)  and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
of the United States of America, 1997). 
However, prospects for a closer agreement on migration issues were 
irreversibly damaged in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in 
the US. At the bilateral level, the dialogue on migration at the national level was 
suspended, cancelling out any possibility of approving the Seasonal Workers 
Agreement. More generally, the US government‟s response to those attacks 
was to reform the policy and process of immigration enforcement fusing the 
functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service with other 
security tasks in a new organisation: The Department of Homeland Security.9 
The Department established the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) in 2003, making it responsible for enforcing and investigating 
illegal immigration into the country (US Government, 2002a: 4). From this 
moment on, irregular immigrants were considered a matter of national security 
and the new agency‟s responsibilities were defined as “identifying criminal 
activities and eliminating vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our nation‟s 
borders, as well as enforcing economic, transportation and infrastructure 
security” (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2006: 1). The detention 
and removal of “aliens” was the major task and implied coordination with foreign 
governments to process those deported. While the fear of a porous US–Mexico 
border served as a justification for the new approach, its indiscriminate 
application had a serious impact on the immigrant community, and resulted in 
many deportations. The categorisation of crime included a wide range of civil 
misdemeanours ranging from minor transit infractions to major drug trafficking 
related crime. Moreover, the new US policy imposed a serious burden on the 
Mexican authorities who lacked the infrastructure to process the deportees, 
making it harder to maintain an effective bilateral relationship with the US. 
                                            
9
As border security became central to the immigration legislations, the  Congress passed 
and the President signed into law the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), and the Enhanced 
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173) along with the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296 (CIS report)). 
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The US government‟s increased concerns about security also made it 
more difficult to conduct the economic activities which had characterised the 
border region. While the level of economic integration and interdependence is 
tangible at border crossing points, the control of illicit drug trafficking and border 
crossings affects the daily life of commuters. The US therefore implemented 
“Smart Borders”, a sophisticated infrastructure used to select eligible border 
residents who commuted on a daily basis as well as fast track cargo from the 
maquiladora sector. In terms of economic benefits, the programme was used to 
distinguish the border crossings of consumers from those of potential 
immigrants. The main programmes included the Secure Electronic Network for 
Travellers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) which was first implemented in 1995 to 
ease the flow of daily commuter traffic using strict security surveillance between 
Tijuana and San Diego.10 As a result, attempts to maintain a balance between 
activities that boost the economy and statecraft used to strengthen security 
have only served to impede the movement of persons and goods with negative 
economic effects being the result. A study carried out on behalf of Border 
Conference Governors showed severe delays occurring when figures from 1994 
to 2008 were compared. For instance, it is calculated that crossing the border 
by car at the Tijuana-San Diego Gate now takes one and half hours on average 
when it previously took 40 minutes. And in terms of economic losses caused by 
border crossing delays, in 2007FY these amounted to US $7.5 billion if we take 
into account all six Mexican border states (Border Conference of Governors, 
2009). 
While the increased concern with security in the US has made both 
economic interaction and policy discussion more difficult, Mexican politicians 
have sought to develop links with the US. In the opinion of Mexican Senator 
Oscar Luebbert, Member of the Mexican Commission for Border Issues, 
Mexico‟s influence on US migration legislation is more likely to be based on the 
regular and intensive exchange of communication between the two legislative 
bodies. In order to assess how influential this bilateral communication can be at 
                                            
10
 See the following website for further information concerning requirements for safe 
passage. http: //www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/sentri/sentri.xml 
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the Congressional level, he referred to initiatives proposed by Senator John 
Cornyn (R-Texas) which arose from an Inter- parliamentary bilateral meeting on 
security issues and the need to identify Mexican migrants to rule them out as 
suspicious persons. His initiative - the Border Security and Immigration Reform 
Act (S. 1387) presented in July, 2003 - proposed a guest worker programme to 
reinforce legal migration by “identifying those who are here to work and then 
return home would allow law enforcement to focus on those who attempt to 
enter the United States illegally, or worse, enter for purposes of committing 
terrorist acts” (Cornyn, 2004). There were pro-immigrant initiatives such as that 
proposed by Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas) to “allow Mexican illegal aliens 
already residing within the United States to apply for a temporary visa which 
would permit them to work for one year in the United States”, which it is claimed 
were influenced by the shift in US–Mexico relations (Camarota, 2001). 
Indeed, it was during the Fox administration that the Mexican Government 
approached both Executive and Congressional members (Storrs, 2005). In 
2001, President Fox attended a session of the US Congress and held meetings 
with different congressmen. This approach resulted in installation of the 
Congressional Study Group on Mexico in 2002 and the US–Mexico Caucus of 
2003 (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2001). It is noteworthy that by this 
point, the overriding importance of the border security issue effectively dashed 
Mexican hopes for further regularisation of migrants. Nonetheless, the shift of 
the Mexican Government  towards a more positive engagement with the US, 
trying to influence country‟s policy making process constituted a major change 
in the Mexican approach to the bilateral relationship (Rosenblum, 2004).  
5.2.3 Co-development Initiatives and the Mexico--US bilateral agenda. 
Whatever the interests behind US and Mexican stances on migration and 
co-development, it is clear that their positions as host and home countries are 
potentially in conflict with each other. For the US, Mexican development was not 
a priority while for Mexico controlling emigration has been of secondary 
importance compared with other objectives (Meyers and O'Neil, 2004: 3). 
Indeed Mexico has for many years relied on migration and sought better 
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treatment for its migrants. Looking back over the country‟s migration policy 
history, the emigration of an increasingly large labour force was perceived as a 
safety valve. Moreover, nationals abroad emerged as a source of foreign 
currency to improve macroeconomic conditions. According to the Central Bank 
of Mexico, the country was receiving US $26,076 million dollars in remittances 
annually by 2007, equivalent to 2.5% of its GDP (Banco de México, 2009). 
Migrants have proved to be a source of funds contributing to the balance of 
payments and reducing local poverty. In sum, emigration flows continue to be of 
national interest for Mexico, with a young population facing a lack of 
employment opportunities. Whereas economic growth resulting from export-led 
policies and market liberalisation may be a long-term objective, emigration is 
still the ultimate resource in the short term to reduce pressure on the national 
labour market. From this perspective, the interest of Mexico has been to seek 
agreements with the US to facilitate this process. 
However, the bilateral agenda has forced border control issues to be taken 
into account and Mexico has been increasingly prepared to accept this process 
and extend it to the Southern border by controlling Southern flows across its 
territory. The question is why Mexico's concerns became focused on the 
porosity of the Southern border, when in the past control was established within 
the country. According to scholars and non-governmental organisations,11 the 
answer is clear: undocumented Southern transit towards the US spurred 
interest in greater cooperation with Mexico to control the Southern border 
(Lohrmann, 1997). According to Dr. Juan Sandoval, researcher from the Centre 
of Research for Chicano Studies in Mexico, the PPP was effectively set up as a 
border control policy based on a trade-oriented plan. In his view, the Fox 
administration convinced Central American partners to follow up this initiative as 
a part of a further regional plan: The Americas FTA.12 NGOs opposed to such 
an agreement also share this perspective. Their argument was that the US was 
                                            
11
 Interview with Dr. José Manuel Sandoval as a member of REMALC and Sin Fronteras.  
12
 Interview with Dr. José Manuel Sandoval as Director of the Seminario Permanente 
sobre Estudios de Chicanos, México DF, 2004. 
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seeking to secure the region by extending trade agreements arranged with Latin 
American allies. 
So, why did the Mexican government redefine its position on regional trade? 
As noted, this policy was a consequence of the shift to liberalisation pursued by 
the last three PRI regimes and particularly by the Fox administration which 
sought to promote the interests of Mexican business by expanding its regional 
market opportunities. Moreover, the shift needs to be seen as part of a broader 
shift in foreign policy pursued by Fox. The new administration aimed to create a 
closer and smoother relationship with the US while moving away from the 
neutral isolationism of the past to play a more active role in the region. From 
this perspective, Mexico planned to extend the logic of the PPP beyond the 
Southern-Central America region to the rest of the continent as part of the Las 
Americas Plan and in the process further underpin the Mexico-US relationship.  
Mexican government enthusiasm for a closer bilateral relationship with the 
US has had consequences for the governance of migration within the region 
and for regional cohesion. Some groups in Mexico and Latin America (e.g. 
small and medium primary sector producers, development agencies, human 
rights groups and others) have found it hard to accommodate US demands for 
an expanded regional trade agreement, particularly as at the same time it has 
toughened immigration controls. Mexico‟s traditional foreign policy orientation – 
built upon historical and cultural links with the rest of Latin America – has 
become complicated by its recent shift to a closer bilateral relationship with the 
US. Thus, a Mexican initiative to reopen negotiations on the FTA received a 
hostile response from most Latin American governments who regarded it as an 
attempt to assert regional leadership and promote US interests in the area 
(Torres, 2005). This response can be explained by a shift in the region towards 
leftist governments whose discourse was more or less anti-American and which 
gave greater weight to social issues than to an agenda mainly concerned with 
trade liberalisation. 
 At the rhetorical level at least, left wing governments in Argentina and 
Brazil would have found it extremely problematic to embrace such neoliberal 
discourses and to accept the leadership of Mexico‟s right-wing government in 
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the region. Instead, bilateral negotiations were held between the US and Brazil, 
Argentina, and Colombia to increase economic and security cooperation, 
including migration control. Changes in Mexico‟s migratory policy towards the 
rest of Latin America were also not welcomed, especially in leading countries 
such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The reciprocal non-restricted visa to remain 
in Mexican territory was modified to a restricted visa. The initiative was seen to 
be part of a pro-American policy which was pursued regardless of its 
consequences for political relations within the Latin American region (Cámara 
de Diputados de México, 2009). 
It is therefore clear that improving the bilateral relationship with the US – 
and ultimately securing a migration agreement - was the main priority for the 
Mexican government under Fox (Castañeda, 2002; Carreño, 2004). It hoped 
that its unemployment problem would be eased by obtaining a migration 
agreement with the US while development would be fostered by greater trade. 
As it turned out, these hopes were not fulfilled given the events of 2001. 
However, it is questionable, whether such a strategy would ever have been 
successful. The US considered Mexico primarily as a trade partner which would 
benefit from increased investment and credit; accordingly, trade would 
effectively serve as a substitute for migration. Moreover, one can question 
whether the Mexican government‟s objective of an extensive migratory 
agreement was realistic. According to former US Ambassador to Mexico, 
Jeffrey Davidow, any possible migration agreement was always dependent on 
the effective cooperation of the Mexican government in controlling its borders, 
both in the north and in the south, mainly due to the country‟s position as a 
transit country.13 The government followed the US policy of imposing greater 
restrictions on Central American migration and pursuing open markets in the 
region, but this did not in the end result in a full agreement between Mexico and 
                                            
13
 Former US Ambassador Davidow referred to “Mexican ideology and policy which 
impels the government to take measures to stop their nationals illegally crossing the US border. 
As a result of the Mexican position, its American counterparts always suspect that any 
agreement on migration issues would be null given the lack of political commitment from Mexico 
to stop illegal immigration”. See “El Oso y el Puercoespin” by Jeffrey Davidow, a book he wrote 
after leaving office during Bush‟s second term as President (translation is based on the Spanish 
edition). 
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the US. Although Davidow characterised the good relationship between the two 
Executives as a good one, it was not enough to secure the desired Migration 
Agreement (Davidow, 2003)– though there was increased cooperation on 
border controls with the Mexican Immigration Office receiving US support for 
the training of border officers.  
5.2.4 The domestic factors in the US Migratory Policy towards Mexico 
Immigration policy in the US is considered an issue of national sovereignty 
which constrains the scope for bilateral negotiations on migratory issues 
(Sassen, 1996: 760). This unilateral approach has historically reaffirmed that 
labour markets are regulated by domestic politics.  
Labour market conditions have been the main factor determining whether 
the US adopts a liberal or restrictive immigration policy towards (Pastor, 2001: 
128). Historically US migration policy sought to accommodate the needs of the 
industrial and agricultural sectors which relied on a cheap and flexible labour 
force. The shortage of labour to support development in the post-war era was 
the key factor in the US seeking migration from Mexico. The Bracero 
Programme as a migratory agreement between the US and Mexico facilitated 
movement of people but did not provide the envisaged guarantees of working 
conditions and wages. Instead, market forces rather than regulated conditions 
for migrants were the means of balancing the US labour market. After 
suspending the Bracero Programme with Mexico in 1964, illegal immigration 
was tolerated by relaxation of immigration controls (Calavita, 1992). Since then, 
the quota system to provide agricultural workers along with restriction to access 
a legal status to undocumented migration and border control are mechanism to 
assure the source of a cheap, unprotected and flexible Mexican labour 
immigrant.  
Beyond the specifics of migration conditions, some interviewees pointed to 
the lack of a smooth bilateral US-Mexico relationship, attributing this to the lack 
of trust in the Mexican Political System sustained by almost 70 years of single 
party rule and the authoritarian, nationalistic and antidemocratic values of the 
PRI. At the same time, Dr. Gustavo del Castillo – a researcher from the Colef - 
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has referred to the complexities of the US political system and its unilateralism 
with respect to national sovereignty concerns as political constraints upon 
securing bilateral agreements on issues such as migration.  
US domestic perceptions have had an important influence on the country‟s 
immigration policy. According to Papademetriou and Meyers, a US-Mexico 
migratory agreement might have been possible given changing attitudes 
towards immigrants on the part of political actors such as trade unions, 
business, religious and advocacy groups which now consider they have a 
positive economic impact (Meyers and Papademetriou, 2002). Certainly, 
concerns over possible labour shortages in the Californian agricultural sector 
were reflected in a change of discourse on the migration issue by comparison 
with 1994 (Watts, 2003: 1377). In contrast to their discontent and opposition in 
previous decades, labour unions such as the American Federation of Labor and 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) began to advocate a 
comprehensive regularisation programme as immigrant workers became a 
major potential cohort of members (Briggs, 2001). As one of the labour unions 
exercising a major influence on immigration policymakers and public opinion, 
the AFLCIO played an important supporting role when the Immigration Reform 
Control Act (IRCA) was issued in 1996 (Sweeney, 1996). Nevertheless, support 
was still limited to the regularisation of illegal immigrants rather than the 
creation of an open-door immigration policy. More recently, during the debate 
on migratory reform at the beginning of the Bush administration, the AFLCIO 
favoured an expansive recognition of immigrants‟ human and labour rights and 
opposed the implementation of employers‟ verification instruments (Sweeney, 
2004; American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO), 2000).  
However, notwithstanding the changing attitudes of important civil society 
groups, the shape of US immigration policy has been primarily determined by 
the positions of officials and politicians at the federal, state and local levels. It is 
evident how the immigration issue plays a crucial role in the voting tendencies 
of the electorate, particularly for the Hispanic community. In all political 
campaigns at all levels, the question of immigration reform is on the agenda. 
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Moreover, state and county elected authorities have some discretion as to how 
they implement immigration policies. An example of the contradiction between 
the central and state migratory approach was the case of the US Treasury‟s 
initiative to make driver‟s licenses an official identification for all residents 
regardless of their legal status. Some state Governors were opposed to this and 
ignored federal policy (Mittelstadt, 2004; Nash and Writer, 2004) . 
While developments at the state and local levels are important, it remains 
clear that the Federal level plays a decisive role in setting the overall direction of 
immigration policy. In this regard, it is important to realise that the beginning of 
the Bush-Fox era was one of upheaval in both countries. Mexico‟s new 
democratic process was taking shape while the US initiated an intensive 
security policy after September 11, 2001. After that event, the need to respond 
to national political fears made it impossible for the US government to continue 
with the negotiation of a migration agreement. US Ambassador Davidow 
referred to the willingness of the White House to offer President Fox a quota of 
100,000 work permits for temporary workers rather than an agreement 
(Davidow, 2003). However, Fox was under pressure to deliver on his campaign 
promise of addressing this historical demand (and had created high 
expectations domestically). Thus Fox, and especially the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Castañeda, did not consider that the offer satisfied their previous 
demands. At the same time, it appears that when Bush realised the limited 
domestic political benefits of increased Latino support, his interest in reaching a 
migratory agreement with Mexico diminished.  
5.2.5 Cooperation for Development in the US-Mexico Relationship 
Domestic political issues undermined an extensive agreement on migration 
between the two countries. In the same period, however, the Mexican 
authorities were willing to comply with tougher US requirements on border 
control. This reflected increased securitisation of the migration debate in North 
America. However, to what extent is it possible to discern elements of a “co-
development” approach in relations between the two countries? 
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Looking at the case of Mexico, co-development is a concept that rarely 
appears in academic literature or the communications of governmental 
institutions. However, some academics and governments have identified policy 
elements in Mexico with a co-development character. The French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, for example, in its publication “Le Codéveloppement” highlights 
the arrangements between various Mexican public authorities and home town 
clubs of Mexican migrants in the US as an example of successful co-
development policy(République Française, 2005). Moreover, the Mexican state 
has in practice sought cooperation for development to inhibit emigration and 
increase the flows of remittances that sustain its balance of payments account. 
As noted, the impressive growth of remittances in recent years has attracted the 
attention of the principal global financial and development institutions as well as 
the Mexican government. This is not surprising since remittances were 
projected to grow by more than 300% between 2000 and 2006. According to the 
Director of Mexico‟s Central Bank, the amount of remittances - US$92.7 billion 
were received during Fox‟s presidential period - is greater than Mexico‟s 
external debt or its stock of Foreign Direct Investment (Banco de México, 2009). 
The channelling of these resources has emerged as a central issue in US-
Mexican bilateral economic cooperation with the evolution of programmes 
launched by US government agencies to tackle Mexican development. The 
most remarkable agreements are those providing a cooperative framework to 
support this remittance-based development. As in the Mexican case, therefore, 
cooperation for development is part of US foreign policy towards Mexico, even if 
it is not explicitly articulated as “co-development” in official discourse.  
Two decades after the recommendations from the Asencio report were 
issued, the very first attempt to include remittances as a development factor 
was the Partnership for Prosperity (P4P)(Instituto de los Mexicanos en el 
Exterior (IME) Banco de México y The Federal Reserve Financial Services, 
2006: 35).  Indeed, in the opinion of Deborah Meyers from the Migration Policy 
Institute in Washington, DC, the bilateral discussion on development started by 
Asencio Commission proposals was comparable to the Global P4P. The Global 
P4P was signed by Bush and Fox in 2001 as a mechanism to promote Mexican 
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development and migration issues – in particular the use of remittances. While 
the P4P attempted to bring together the government and private sectors in 
strategic areas of development such as the construction of ports, airports, and 
housing, perhaps the most innovative element related to the channelling of 
remittances to productive projects in sending regions. The P4P attempted to 
extend the resources of the private sector to incorporate those economic 
sectors marginalised from the financial system (such as small and medium 
businesses and Mexican migrants abroad). Accordingly, the P4P marked a new 
era of economic cooperation in the bilateral relationship, with its main lines of 
action being the reinforcement of NAFTA trade and liberalisation trends in 
parallel to the integration of remittances as a bilateral exercise to enhance co-
development as a policy. The agreement included the following activities:  
• “Governments and financial institutions worked to bring more people into 
the financial system and lower the cost of sending money home. During a nine-
month period in 2002, Mexicans living in California opened more than 170,000 
first-time bank accounts.  
• The US State Department led an effort to train 200 Mexican small 
business owners to use electronic commerce to expand and access new global 
markets.  
• The US Export-Import Bank (ExIm) opened a $100 million fund to finance 
Mexican environmental projects. Projects include renewable energy, water 
supply, and waste management.  
• The US Agency for International Development (USAID) initiated a $50 
million dollar, seven-year effort to enhance the capacity of higher education 
institutions. The first 18 university partnerships have been approved.  
• The US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) awarded $1.5 million 
to study the feasibility of infrastructure projects in Mexico, including 
modernization of Puebla airport and expansion of the port of Veracruz.  
• The Economy Ministry‟s Marcha hacia el Sur programme promoted 
investment in the southern regions of Mexico. In 2002, 68 projects were 
identified generating almost 48,000 jobs.  
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• The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financed US 
franchise opportunities in Mexico. The first investment was $1.2 million for new 
food industry franchises in Yucatan and Tabasco”. 14 
Meyers argues that this agreement embodied a new political willingness to 
support development in Mexico and provided a hopeful sign of an improving 
bilateral relationship. 15  Therefore, it could be argued that, even if co-
development as a concept is not explicitly invoked in this bilateral approach, 
initiatives agreed by the US and Mexico to foster the transfer of remittances 
constituted a de facto process of co-development. Furthermore, this plan was 
based on transnational interaction involving a variety of actors: government, 
private enterprise, and migrants. 
An important complement to the P4P was a series of initiatives by the 
Mexican government to strengthen its relationship with the Mexican diaspora 
and to facilitate financial links with home communities. The increase in funds 
sent by Mexicans in the US to Mexico, as well as other developing countries, 
attracted the attention of governments and banking institutions (Abernathy, 
2003). As a consequence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castañeda, 
launched a programme to provide Mexican citizens in the US with a form of 
national identification through Consulates, in particular those in states with the 
largest Mexican populations. With the declared objective of increasing 
remittances, both Governments sought to reduce the costs of these remittances 
and increase use of the banking system as a legal and formal channel. 
Consulates therefore came to an agreement with banks for acceptance of the 
Consular ID (Matrícula Consular) as a requisite for proving the migrant‟s identity 
as a Mexican citizen and for allowing them to open an account. There are 
currently 45 specific agreements with 17 Consulates which have permitted a 
rapid increase in the number of bank account holders (Instituto de Mexicanos 
en el Exterior (IME), 2007). However, not all states accepted the Consular ID 
and under the REAL ID Act of February 2005, Congress issued standards for 
                                            
14
 For further information on bilateral programmes within the P4P, se the official web page. 
http: //www.state.gov/documents/organization/16197.pdf 
15
 Interview. September 2005. Washington,DC 
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accepting only driver‟s licenses as official US ID for opening bank accounts. 
The other agreement was reached between the US Treasury and the Mexican 
Government to reduce the cost of remittances from any US bank account to 
Mexican banks (Mittelstadt, 2004). 
While taken together, these initiatives can be regarded as embodying a 
form of co-development, they were not as extensive as those debated in the 
Asencio report. Moreover, they contrast with the absence of a full agreement on 
migration between the two countries despite Mexican concessions on migration 
control, and a friendlier bilateral relationship overall and numerous US-Mexico 
Presidential Summits.  
5.3 Spanish immigration policy and its effects on the Moroccan 
community 
Due to pull factors in its labour market, Spain, together with other Southern 
EU members, has become the strategic entrance for migrants from Northern 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. In its relations with Morocco, Spain has been 
important both as a protagonist in shaping the overall stance of the EU and as a 
bilateral partner seeking to address immigration from the “South”. The fight 
against irregular migration has been on the two countries‟ negotiating agenda 
since at least 1992 when the first readmission agreement was signed by 
Morocco and Spain (Gobierno de España y Reino de Marruecos, 1992; Betts, 
2006). However, the Seville Summit of 2002 marked a low point in relations 
between the countries when the Spanish government sought to restrict EU 
development funds in order to discourage Morocco from adopting 
“uncooperative” positions regarding the management of irregular migration. 
This analysis of Spanish immigration policy covers the economic and 
socio-demographic factors shaping labour market needs and the political 
pressures, both domestic and EU-related. From this perspective, the process of 
regularisation followed by the González, Aznar and Zapatero governments was 
influenced by the country‟s labour market needs. The need for a supply of 
workers to fill positions in the health, construction and services sectors is the 
main factor shaping informal and irregular immigration and a major influence on 
Spanish immigration policy. Thus, the challenge for Spain has been how to its 
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labour force requirements in these sectors with the EU‟s immigration policy. 
According to Jose Antonio Alonso from the Complutense University in Madrid16, 
irrespective of whether the government was left or right there has been an 
underlying continuity in immigration policy, particularly insofar as it has had to 
take into account an increasingly restrictive EU policy. 
In Spain, there have been at least six regularisation processes, in 1985, 
1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005. The first three programmes involved the 
granting of legal status to those migrants who were already in the country and 
had failed in their regularising status for different reasons (Arango and 
Jachimowicz, 2005). Although levels of migration to Spain were low in the 
1980s, the prospect of membership of the European Community and the need 
to limit its potential as port of entry to the Community led the González 
government introducing the 1985 “Foreigner Law” (Ley de Extranjería). The law 
sought to accommodate to its condition as becoming a EU‟s member by 
updating its migration policy through the use of visas and to deter illegal 
immigration (Torres Kumbrián, 2008). The 2000 program, however, represented 
a shift in Spanish migratory policy since the objective was to “regularise” 
migrant workers from the informal sector, provide a more comprehensive 
integration policy and deter illegal immigration. Later, the 2005 regularisation 
aimed to regularise all those immigrants that had fallen into the category of 
illegal as a corrective measure to the previous regularisation which were based 
on immigration quotas. Table 5.2 summarises the total regularised population 
during the six processes. 
Table 5-2 Results of Regularisations in Spain.  
Regularisations in Spain  Requested Resident 
permits 
Issued Permits Rejected 
1985 38,181 34,832 3,349 
1991 130,406 109,135 21,271 
1996 25,000 21,382 3,618 
2000 246,392 229,874 16,518 
2001 351,269 232,674 118,595 
2005 691,655 578,375 113,280 
Source: Annual Statistical Book of Immigration. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
Government of Spain.  
 
                                            
16
 Interview at the Universidad Complutense in May 2004. 
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At the beginning of the 1990s immigration became perceptible in Southern 
Europe with increasing flows of migrants from Morocco to Spain (90,000) and 
Italy (130,000) (Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005: 122). According to Antonio 
Izquierdo, Moroccan immigrants increased after the regularisation processes of 
1985 and 1991(Izquierdo, 1996). The lack of proper legislation to provide legal 
channels for migrant workers along with a rise in demand for low-skilled 
migrants led to an increase in irregular migration which was largely absorbed by 
the informal economy in sectors such as agriculture, services and construction 
and services(Alonso, 2004). More important was the increased irregular 
migration prompted by the legalisation process of 1991 which was limited to the 
renewal, and issuing of work permits. Izquierdo calculated that, of the 128,000 
applications for regularisation, there were 82,000 legal migrants seeking the 
renewal of temporary permits. Despite the established quotas agreed between 
the economic sectors and the Spanish labour authorities, the labour demand 
usually exceeded the quota limit, leading to a permissive system which the 
2005 immigration law sought to correct. The law favoured the naturalisation and 
return of Spanish descendants, leading to an increasing share of Latin 
Americans in the immigration statistics. 
Nevertheless, the legalised Moroccan population was higher than the 
legalised Argentinean population at the time (Berriane, 1996: 54). It is 
calculated that until the regularisation process of 2000, the Moroccan 
immigrants received resident permits in greater proportion than other 
nationalities (Van der Erf and Heering, 2002). Moroccan migration also 
benefited from family reunions: in 1998 out of a total of 13,887 resident permits 
granted, this national group obtained 7,548 and in 1999 it was 5,432 out of a 
total of 10,069, 54% of the permits for the total migrant population (Gobierno de 
España, 1998a). However, after the introduction of the immigration Laws from 
2000-2001, Moroccans have been displaced by the Latin American immigrants 
in terms of their access to citizenship, working permits and reunification as 
channels for legal migration (Izquierdo, 2004b). 
The Aznar government started to plan the regularisation of 2000 in a very 
difficult political context. The discussions on regularisation were affected by a 
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more xenophobic political atmosphere, as reflected in the El Ejido events when 
local residents attacked Moroccan communities in Andalucía. The government 
attempted to limit the risk that the regularisation would encourage further illegal 
immigration by limiting the period for applications from March to July, 2000. 
There were 146,781 successful applications from a total of 246,086 and it was 
primarily for those people who had been in the country before 1999 but had 
failed to regularise their status (Kostova Karaboytcheva, 2006) . 
According to some Spanish scholars, Spanish migration policy under the 
PP permitted an increase in irregular migration to supply growing demand in 
some sectors while at the same time being selective in restricting the North 
African immigration and facilitating Latin American and East European 
immigration (Izquierdo, 2004b). Comparing those regular and registered by 
municipality on the basis of data presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in Chapter 2, 
Figure 5.1 shows that the Latin American levels of irregularity were higher than 
the Moroccans. This appears to confirm the view that the prevailing policy to 
fulfil the labour demand with irregular migration was based on an ethnic 
preference for Latin Americans. 
Figure 5-1 Irregular migrants by country of origin in Spain, 2001-2004  
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Immigration and Institute of National Statistics of Spain. 
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Moreover, comparing Morocco as a country of origin to the rest, especially 
with Latin America, the data shows a higher Spanish citizenship rate granted to 
nationals from countries such as Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican 
Republic, and Cuba. Morocco and Peru head the list of origin immigrants who 
received Spanish citizenship, both of them with 25.7% and 11.0 respectively; 
however, the number of Latin American nationals represented almost half of the 
total with 51.7% (See Table 5.3). Overall, this can be explained by the Spanish 
integration policy which favoured the Latin American immigrants on the basis of 
cultural similarities (Van der Erf and Heering, 2002). 17  The growing 
naturalisation of Latin American versus the African, especially Moroccan cohort 
is due to the preference of the Spanish migratory policy which had granted 
citizenship to Latin American after fulfilling three years of residence while the 
Africans had to prove 10 years (Izquierdo, 2004a). These differing requirements 
can be seen as a response to concerns about the integration of immigrants in 
the Spanish society which arguably would be easier for the first immigrant 
cohort (Gil Araujo and Pedone, 2009). 
 
Table 5-3 Citizenship Status Granted in 2002 and 2003 
Country Origin Total 2002 Total 2003 % Total 
granted 
Citizenship 
Status 
Morocco 3,111 6,827 25.7 
Peru 3,117 2,932 11.0 
Dominican Republic 2,876 2,639 9.9 
Cuba 2,088 1,601 6.0 
Colombia 1,267 1,802 6.8 
Ecuador 1,173 1,951 
 
7.3 
Total  “Latin American” 14,304 13,738 51.7 
Total 21,810       26,556  
Source: Annual Statistic Book for Immigration in Spain, 2003. 
The 2005 regularisation introduced by Zapatero was seen as recognition 
by the Spanish Government of the important relationship between immigration 
flows and the labour market. In addition, it was also seen as an attempt to deal 
                                            
17
 According to interviewees from the Spanish Government, the logic of facilitating the 
acquisition of Spanish citizenships over other nationalities, especially Moroccans, was the 
relative low cost in terms of cultural factors, such as language and religion.  
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with backlogs from previous regularisations and the inclusion of undocumented 
workers into the formal economic sector(Aguilera Izquierdo, 2005: 178). In this 
case (as Table 5.4 shows), the total number of applications was 691,655, of 
which 85% were successful (Pajares and Displàs, 2006: 7).  Again, this shows 
the relatively limited share of Moroccans in the total numbers regularised 
(11.9%). 
The 2005 regularisation marked a shift away from previous regularisation 
programmes. Earlier regularisations had been designed to help fill those jobs 
that were not taken by Spanish natives and did not require an employment offer 
to obtain the working permit (Aguilera Izquierdo, 2005: 183). In this sense, 
undocumented workers already in Spain were the subject of legalisation 
programmes. However, in the case of those earlier regularisations, the laws 
established workers‟ contracts in their country of origin and prohibited 
regularisation on the basis of residence or any other channel for regularisation. 
Therefore, new immigration flows to Spain at the beginning of the 2000s were 
channelled through legal immigration procedures in the country of origin and 
were linked to the labour demand presented by economic sectors (Aguilera 
Izquierdo, 2005: 184). 
The regularisation process carried out by the Zapatero Administration in 
2005 aimed to reduce the number of irregular immigrants in Spain, estimated to 
be as much as 1.4 million. This new policy sought to provide social rights to 
migrants in line with social democratic commitments, as well as to integrate the 
population into the taxation system. However, while Zapatero‟s policy marked a 
more cooperative approach between the two countries, the policy was also 
driven by concerns over border security and the fight against illegal immigration. 
Even so, the approach raised concerns inside and outside Spain. As it aimed to 
regularise those already settled in Spain, other EU members voiced fears that it 
might encourage further flows, a criticism supported by certain anti-migrant 
conservative PP members (Telò, 2001; Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). 
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Table 5-4 Immigrant population regularised in 2005 by nationality. 
Immigrant by Nationality  Total of 
applications 
Total of Issued 
Permits 
% of the Total 
regularised 
population 
Bulgaria          25,598           22,239  3.8% 
Romania        118,546         100,128  17.3% 
Ukraine          22,247           19,466  3.4% 
Morocco          86,806           68,727  11.9% 
Mali             7,205              6,249  1.1% 
Senegal          10,100              7,265  1.3% 
Ecuador        140,020         127,925  22.1% 
Colombia          56,760           50,417  8.7% 
Dominican Rep.             3,994              3,212  0.6% 
Peru             3,605              2,950  2.6% 
Bolivia          47,325           39,773  6.9% 
Pakistan          15,782              8,602  1.5% 
China          13,416              8,159  1.4% 
Other        140,251         113,263  19.6% 
total         691,655         578,375  100.0% 
Source: Annual Statistical Book. Spain, 2005. 
5.3.1 Moroccan responses to Spanish and EU migration policies 
The Spanish regularisation policies were just one aspect of national migration 
policies which impacted upon Moroccan policies. Indeed, the Moroccan 
authorities had to respond to a variety of Spanish and EU policies. It is 
debateable how far the Moroccans gained concessions in return for their 
compliance on what were often very sensitive policy issues.  
Access to visas for legal migration has been a major priority for the 
Moroccan government given its economic dependence on remittances. 
Therefore, the regularisation laws of 2000 and 2001 were seen as contradictory 
by the Moroccans as being preferential to Latin American and Eastern 
European migrant workers (Khachani and Mghari, 2006). The fact that Latin 
Americans were growing in numbers and receiving work permits, while 
Moroccans who were already settled in Spain were not, contributed to bilateral 
tensions between Morocco and Spain.  
Another example of the sensitivities surrounding bilateral migration 
relations was the 2001 cooperation agreement on migration. With Spain 
becoming both a receiving and transit country for Southern flows, it faced the 
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difficulty of reconciling the need to comply with EU policy on controlling illegal 
immigration on the one hand and its own need for migrants to supply its labour 
force in the face of changing domestic socio-demographic conditions. The 2001 
cooperation agreement on immigration between Spain and Morocco sought to 
balance José María Aznar‟s compliance with the EU pressures and the 
Moroccan‟s expectations of more channels for legal migration.  
In 2001 the Aznar administration announced it had reached an 
understanding with Morocco on a temporary migration agreement based on 
work permit quotas for Moroccans in exchange for collaboration in deterring 
Sub-Saharan Migration18. The legal admission of new arrivals was part of the 
general labour scheme which allowed the recruiting of workers in the country of 
origin (Telò, 2001; Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). Agreements such as this 
were relatively successful at channelling legal migration (Khachani and Mghari, 
2006). However, such agreements were signed to cover specific shortages in 
the agricultural sector. In other respects, illegal immigration continued as a 
result of the high demand for workers not handled by the administrative 
recruitment process in the country of origin.  
While the temporary migration agreement was relatively effective in some 
respects, its potential was constrained by continued tension between the 
Kingdom of Morocco and the government of Spain. The temporary migratory 
agreement signed in 2001 was suspended at the end of the same year due to 
allegations by the Government of Spain concerning Morocco‟s failure to stop 
Southern immigration flows. According to Belguendouz, Morocco was 
considered responsible when illegal migrants attempted to cross the 
Mediterranean sea, headed for the Atlantic shores of The Canary Islands or 
sought to enter Ceuta and Melilla (Belguendouz, 2002). Tensions over 
migration were, moreover, reflected in a more generally tense relationship 
between Morocco and Spain over such matters as fisheries and the Western 
Saharan conflict. Ultimately, Morocco had to accede to pressure from Spain 
                                            
18
 The Agreement for Seasonal Workers was signed in July 25, 2001 in Madrid (Royaume 
du Maroc et le Royaume d'Espagne , 2001). 
 
190 
 
 
 
which enjoyed the support of the EU, given its dependency on external EU 
resources (Mansour, 2001). 
The influence of EU policies on Spanish-Moroccan migration relations was 
apparent in other respects. As was discussed in Chapter 4, migration issues 
were linked to questions of broader economic cooperation.  In the framework of 
the Association Agreement with Morocco, the EU Commission established as a 
priority the cooperation with third countries to address the questions ”how to 
address illegal migration and readmission” (European Commission, 2002a: 23). 
In response, the EU Commission underlines the budget line B7 767 as the 
mechanism to support the implementation of the readmission agreements with 
Third Countries by  “improving national legislation and management of legal 
migration and asylum” and “making national legislation more effective to prevent 
and combat illegal emigration” (European Commission, 2002a: 27). Thus, the 
changes in their national legislation and the readmission agreements became 
conditions for further economic cooperation towards Euro-Med partners, 
including Morocco. The Moroccans‟ cooperation on this issue was shaped by 
the prospect of better economic relationship with the EU:  Association 
Agreements, Direct Foreign Investment19 and Aid for Cooperation were linked 
as incentives to the negotiation of readmission agreements with “Third countries” 
(Trauner and Kruse, 2008). 
The EU-Morocco negotiation of readmission agreements was to be a 
drawn out and ultimately unsuccessful process. Morocco had signed bilateral 
agreements with a number of member states: Spain (Gobierno de España y 
Reino de Marruecos, 1992), as well as Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Belgium. Although a full agreement was not secured, Morocco cooperated 
with the EU on the issue, even if it caused political frictions with Southern 
partners. This was the case after the EU requested Morocco implement visa 
requirements for third country nationals during its mission to Rabat in 2000 (Van 
Selm, 2002). The HLWG Action Plan for Morocco established “Support (for) the 
                                            
19 Spain is the main partner in Foreign Direct Investment. Investment in Real Estate and 
Tourist infrastructure brought €40 million from Spanish multinational companies including the 
ONE in the electricity sector and Repsol in oil and natural gas.  
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adoption of visa requirements by Morocco for third country nationals, especially 
those of the West African region (such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and 
Democratic Republic of Congo), and effective measures to be adopted by the 
Moroccan authorities, to prevent the illegal migration of aliens transiting through 
Morocco” (High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 1999). 
Moroccan compliance with EU requirements was also apparent in the 
country‟s 2003 legislation which represented a shift in migratory policy. Given 
that the country did not possess an up to date migration law, the regulation of 
entry and permanent residence in the country in terms of foreigners‟ rights could 
have been seen as a positive development.  However, the focus on punishing 
illegal immigration and the lack of protection for asylum seekers reinforced the 
impression it had been created to accommodate EU demands. Despite 
controversy about its effects on the Moroccan population, the Kingdom ordered 
the imposition of substantial fines and even prison terms for those violating the 
new legislation. Moreover, the contested issue of Law 02-03 (Morocco‟s 
Immigration Law issued in 2003) appeared to demonstrate Morocco‟s 
cooperation with the EU despite the lack of resources to apprehend both 
national and Sub-Saharan immigrants(Alami M'Chichi, 2005a). Therefore, the 
need for EU assistance to achieve this goal had to be reinforced through the 
MEDA II. 
Abdel Belguendouz asserts that the Law on Migration issued in 2003 by 
the Moroccan Government responded to political pressures from the EU and 
specifically Spain, notwithstanding the difficult political relationship with the 
latter 20 . The penalisation of human traffic, illegal Moroccan emigration and 
immigration from other African countries was Morocco‟s attempt to comply with 
the EU‟s fortress policy. Moreover, the enlargement of Europe in 2004 once 
again brought up the question of readmission agreements with Morocco. The 
Commission prepared the document “Wider Europe” to draw on the new policy 
towards Eastern Europe, partnership with Russia and continuing Southern 
immigration, in which Morocco played the role of a barrier to African immigrants 
                                            
20
 Interview with Prof. Belguendouz in Rabat, July 2004 
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by means of cooperative actions with Spanish border control authorities. In 
Geddes‟ opinion, the external dimension of EU migration and Asylum policy is 
linked to a policy that places “emphasis on the wanted or useful migration in 
terms of its potential contribution to the economies of Member States” (Geddes, 
2005).  
This cooperation on migration control was manifest in a variety of 
Moroccan initiatives. The Moroccan Government created a Police Directorate 
for Migration and Border Guards as well as an Observatory for Migration in 
2004 to work in conjunction with Spanish maritime patrols in the Mediterranean 
Sea and off the Atlantic coast of Morocco and the Canary Islands. According to 
a report from the Moroccan authorities, measures taken by the Moroccan 
government succeeded in deterring illegal migration and the country received 
positive recognition from the Spanish government, although the pressure to 
extend collaboration is constant in the Spanish-Moroccan bilateral relationship 
(Lahlou, 2005b). Certainly, increasing deportations of asylum seekers from 
Morocco have become the focus of criticism from human rights organisations. 
According to Moroccan authorities, 360 human trafficking networks were 
dismantled as part of the fight against smuggling (Geddes, 2005: 799). In order 
to demonstrate cooperation on the control of illegal migrants, the Moroccan 
Government in December 2004 announced the apprehension of 26,000 illegal 
migrants, 9,000 Moroccans and 17,000 Sub-Saharans (Lahlou, 2005b). 
Nevertheless, the October 2005 scenario has been repeated as migrants 
attempting to cross the border to Ceuta are injured in the process, along with 
the “pateras” who cross to the Canary Islands in order to avoid the Northern 
border secured by the Spanish government‟s Integral External Surveillance 
System (SIVE) (Salin, 2006). The SIVE was intended as part of the Spanish 
government‟s compliance with the EU‟s external border control policy. Its main 
objective was to detect and apprehend those illegal migrants traversing the 
Spanish maritime border through the Canary Islands and Andalusian coast 
principally. In 1999, the Spanish government approved a budget of €150 million 
for its development over the period to 2004 (Carling, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
anticipated prevention of illegal immigration had instead humanitarian 
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consequences as there was shift to more dangerous routes which were less 
accessible for surveillance (Alami M'Chichi, 2005a: 78; Alami M'Chichi, 2005b; 
L'Economiste, 2005).  
Moroccan cooperation with the Spanish authorities focused on the 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. According to Spain‟s Ministry of the Interior, the 
measures used to reinforce the physical border controls around these territories 
had successfully deterred attempts to cross the border. It reported a reduction 
of almost 42% in 2006 when compared to the previous year and in the case of 
Melilla, a reduction of 80% (Ministerio del Interior, 2006). Beyond the question 
of effectiveness in stemming illegal immigration, border cooperation with 
Morocco was welcomed by the Spanish Government and it sought further 
cooperation in the readmission of migrants (Abou, 2005). In 2006, the number 
of deported migrants was 12,270 and the majority were Moroccans (Ministerio 
del Interior, 2006).21 
Further institutional cooperation was achieved through regular meetings 
between Ministry of the Interior officials from Spain and Morocco. Accounting for 
the successful cooperation between countries, the reports on illegal migration 
showed an increasing number of apprehensions. According to Spanish 
government statistics, in 1996 Morocco made 6,701 apprehensions and this 
number increased to 12,858 in 2000. During the same period the number of 
apprehensions of Sub-Saharans rose from 142 to 3,431(Lahlou, 2005b).   
However, more significant is the collaboration of the government of Morocco as 
well as those of Senegal and Mauritania in the apprehension of illegal African 
immigrants in their own territories. Spain announced the implementation of the 
SIVE along the Southern Coast of Spain, the Canary Islands and Ceuta and 
Melilla in conjunction with the Royal Moroccan Guard (and claimed that it was 
efficient in terms of apprehensions and the repatriation of illegal migrants). 
Financial assistance, the exchange of information and joint operations to control 
                                            
21
 The consequences of cooperation with Spain and the EU were exposed in 2005 when 
many Sub-Saharan migrants were killed by Moroccan officers while attempting to cross the 
border into the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa. On this occasion, 
Moroccan border forces shot at migrants climbing the fence Abou, G. (2005) Melilla : nouvelle 
tentative d‟assaut. AFP Maroc, 6.10.2005..   
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EU external borders proved to be the principal mechanisms featured in the 
bilateral relationship, pushing aside the priorities of development announced in 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
Another major project involving Morocco in the control of borders, the “Sea 
Horse” project was launched by Portugal, Italy, Germany, France and Belgium. 
It was led by Spain which was to work jointly with Morocco, Mauritania, the 
Cape Verde Islands and Senegal. The main objective of the project was to 
reinforce the maritime border on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts with 
financial assistance from AENEAS. Different actions were projected to jointly 
deliver with each country which, according to the Spanish Civil Guard, had as 
its main object the persecution of “the criminal networks that operate in the 
illegal immigration area are jointly working regularly with drug traffics, smugglers 
and terrorists which are serious scum for the European Union” (Guardia Civil de 
España, 2006).22  
The consequences of pressure on Morocco are accusations of human 
rights violations and the failure to provide legal channels for the country‟s own 
population to migrate. As analysed by different Moroccan scholars, the need to 
migrate is continual and the need to arrange migratory agreements is a priority 
for the Moroccan government. However, the benefits which Morocco obtained in 
exchange for its cooperation could be considered as quite limited, as seen in 
the overall effects of economic integration (discussed in Chapter 4) and in more 
specific arrangements on migration cooperation. In 2004, an attempt to channel 
legal migration was organised as part of the Aeneas programme.23 However, 
according to Manuel Alonso and Spanish NGOs,24  it has been a complete 
failure since the administrative procedures used to match demand to the supply 
                                            
22
Author‟s own translation. 
23
 Here, the European Union and the Government, through the Agence de L‟Emploi, are 
collaborating in addressing specific demands of labour from European employers. However, the 
infrastructure and the financial resources do not cover all the needs to process applications and 
recruitment.  Moreover, the Moroccan government has been blamed when some fraudulent 
incidents arose from these programmes. There is basically a note on a case where certain 
company required specific trained labour force, and the government was asking certain amount 
of money to process the application, so when the company withdrew its offer, the government 
had to face the potential migrants.  
 
24
 Interview in Rabat, Morocco, July 2004.  
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of workers via independent recruitment companies lacked verification 
mechanisms that would make their operations reliable.  
5.3.2  The Politics of Spanish-Moroccan Relations. 
The distinctive relationship between Morocco and Spain was conditioned by 
changes in political leadership, domestic politics and geopolitical interests in the 
two countries. As regards political leadership, the death of King Hassan II 
served as a turning point in the national and international politics of Morocco. At 
the same time, the political momentum created by Spanish President Aznar had 
a major influence on both Spain‟s relationship with Morocco and the shaping of 
the EU‟s position, particularly in the field of immigration and cooperation for 
development.  
Morocco‟s diplomacy was influenced by the change in leadership and 
domestic political circumstances. As the successor to the throne of the Kingdom 
of Morocco, Mohammed VI was strongly influenced by his educational 
experience in France. He favoured an open Moroccan economy where foreign 
investment capital would foster economic growth. However, while he wanted to 
pursue a close economic and commercial relationship with the EU, he also 
wanted to maintain close ties with geographical and historic-cultural neighbours 
in the Maghreb and the rest of Africa as well as with the Arabic and Islamic 
Worlds (Hernando de Larramendi, 1997; Sehimi, 2003). 
The willingness of the Moroccan government under Mohammed VI to 
cooperate with European partners was manifest in various respects. The 
Association Agreement signed between the EU and Morocco required the 
development of a coherent and comprehensive immigration policy, including 
bilateral cooperation against illegal immigration to the EU (Sehimi, 2003). As 
discussed, Morocco‟s willingness to cooperate on this matter was seen in its 
2003 Immigration Law which established procedures to regulate national and 
international illegal migration across its borders. The Association Agreement 
also demonstrated the extent to which Morocco had shifted its economic 
approach towards neo-liberal policies such as privatisation, trade agreements, 
and openness to foreign capital in state-owned strategic sectors. Morocco‟s 
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economy, it was argued, needed to attract foreign capital to increase economic 
growth. 
While generally cooperative in pursuing economic reforms, in other 
respects the regime was prepared to enhance its legitimacy by highlighting its 
defence of Moroccan concerns, thereby steering public opinion in a patriotic 
direction. This was most apparent in the government´s diplomacy with Spain 
where it sought to assert its national interests at a time when bilateral relations 
were deteriorating. Relations with Spain during the Aznar era were particularly 
poor (López Garcia and De Larramendi, 2003). Historical territorial claims 
became sources of tension in the relationship, as demonstrated by 
disagreements over Ceuta and Melilla and the "conflict" over the Perejil Island. 
Another instance of the tension was over the future of the Western Sahara 
(occupied by Morocco in the 1970s following Spanish withdrawal). This had 
become an issue of national sovereignty for the Moroccan people and the 
government was able to channel public support on this issue (According to 
interviews with Moroccan intellectuals, they all agreed that Spain should 
endorse Morocco‟s territorial claims 25  and support Morocco in the Sahara 
conflict). Issues of sovereignty had been at the heart of the monarchy‟s claims 
to legitimacy since its independence from France and Spain. The regime 
invoked this nationalism as a source of cohesion and common identity in its call 
for the return of lost territories (Gillespie, 2004). 
Indeed, it could be argued that the nationalistic pride of Moroccan political 
elites was provoked by the political attitude of Aznar government towards the 
king, a factor that contributed to a deteriorating bilateral relationship.26 While 
various officials and academics from both countries agree that the Spanish 
President‟s personality contributed to this negative bilateral relationship, the 
Spanish approach was also driven by other factors. According to Alonso, the 
toughening of Spanish migratory policy under Aznar was driven by an attempt 
to take the lead in harmonising migration policy within the EU. As Alonso notes, 
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 Interview with Prof. Larbi Benoth, Mohammed VI University, Rabat, Morocco. 
26
 Interview with Jose Antonio Alonso, Director of the Foreign Affairs Studies Centre of 
the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, May, 2004. 
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the policy was not only pursued by the government: the 2000 Immigration Law 
was approved by the Partido Socialista Obrero de España (PSOE) as well as by 
the Partido Popular (PP) even though the Socialists were committed to helping 
vulnerable groups as part of their programme.27 
However, relations were not only conflictual: cooperation intensified as 
regards the security aspect of regional policy. Morocco demonstrated its 
commitment to border security by investing resources in border controls. 
According to Alonso, Spanish-Moroccan cooperation rather than conflict was to 
be expected after the terrorist attack at Madrid‟s Atocha Central Railway Station 
for two reasons: firstly, the effect of the attack on the Presidential elections was 
to bring about the defeat of the PP and return the PSOE to power. This change 
was seen as boding well for the relationship (not least because the new minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Manuel Montesinos, was known as a well-established 
specialist on North African matters)(Hernando de Larramendi, 2004). Secondly, 
Morocco was seeking alliances to support it in its territorial claims in the 
Western Sahara region. Spain‟s support was seen as central to addressing this 
territorial dispute, and Morocco might have been willing to swap better control of 
the border financed by EU and Spanish funds for political support on the 
Western Saharan matter. 
5.3.3 Bilateral Development Initiatives and Migration: Co-
development Policies towards Morocco 
Given this background, how did co-development emerge in terms of 
different member state policies towards Morocco? The Seville Summit of 2002 
saw the Spanish government propose that financial aid be used as a coercive 
mechanism to punish those Third countries failing to cooperate on migration 
control. While opposition to this measure - especially from France and Sweden - 
obliged the Spanish Presidency to withdraw the proposal, it was still perceived 
by Morocco as symptomatic of their difficult relationship with the Spanish 
government of the time (Sehimi, 2003). When the PSOE returned to power, 
there was an expectation of more favourable migration policies. Overall, 
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 Ibid 
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therefore, domestic politics emerged as a key factor defining forthcoming 
bilateral relations, although this axiom is true only if national interests do not 
pose a danger to the regional interest shaped by EU foreign policy in the Euro-
Mediterranean region.28 
In considering the role of development aid in the relationship between 
Morocco and the EU, it is worth taking into account the contrast between the 
EU‟s aid and investments in the eight Mediterranean countries and those in 
Central European countries, a difference that underlines the distinct diplomatic 
strategies pursued in each region and also underlines a distinct regional foreign 
policy towards those geo-political units. In 1994, Mohammed VI noted that EU 
aid represented “1 to 2 % of Morocco‟s development need”29 and compared it 
with “the development aid given by the OPEC members (which) is seventeen 
times superior to those agreed by the ECC. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates are the principal providers” (Alaoui El Hassan, 1994).  However much 
of the aid that Morocco receives is on a bilateral basis from individual EU 
member states. Moreover, Morocco receives substantially more from the EU 
and its members than other MENA countries. 
Thus, a political cost–benefit analysis might help us to understand 
Morocco's reasons for accepting the terms for its negotiations with the EU and 
the outcomes of those negotiations. One of the consequences of Morocco 
negotiating more financial resources is that the EU could claim greater 
reciprocity in terms of cooperation on migration control. This fact could explain 
the Spanish authorities‟ view that Moroccan–Spanish cooperation had reduced 
the illegal entry of Sub-Saharan migrants. In the words of the Spanish Interior 
Minister, there was an “intensification of Moroccan-Spanish collaboration, 
                                            
28
 Financial aid as a coercive instrument was already used by the EU when pursuing 
changes to the Moroccan political system. After January 1992, when the EU refused to ratify the 
4th financial protocol signed by the EU and Morocco, the Kingdom of Morocco was clear that 
the EU multilateral approach was driven by a factor of conditionality given that its political 
system was not based on Western democratic values. This was exemplified by the Sahara 
issue, which led to categorization of the Moroccan Kingdom as one lacking democracy and a 
transparent system.  
29
 See assessment by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Morocco when 
signing CEE-Maroc complimentary protocols in Rabat on May 26, 1988 and cited by 
Mohammed Ben El Hassan Alaoui in his book on the signing of the CEE-Maroc complimentary 
protocols in Rabat on May 26, 1988.  
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mainly through the exchange of information and the reinforcement of common 
patrols as well as control measures, including the SIVE”.30 
As noted, in 2002, the Spanish Government, then holding the EU 
Presidency, proposed using EU Development funds as a mechanism to enforce 
readmission return programmes. France was one of the countries reacting 
negatively to this proposal. There are a number of explanations for the French 
reaction, but the most likely ones would be its traditional policy of seeking to 
accommodate the political leadership in Francophone Africa and its attempts to 
take the lead in the development of EU migration policy. Although Spain, like 
France, has a colonial link with Morocco, their relationships with the former 
colony have developed in very different ways. This difference is apparent in 
their respective migration and co-development policies. As with France, Spain 
has its own co-development policy for its Mediterranean partner. Indeed, while 
the Spain-Morocco relationship can be seen as a component of the overall EU-
Morocco regional framework, it also needs to be considered from the specific 
perspective of bilateral relations. Moreover, the nature of the relationship is 
made even more complex by the Spanish system of regional autonomy (see 
Chapter 6). Although the Spanish government aims to pursue a common policy, 
the nature of politics in different parts of the country emerges as a particular 
shaping element that differentiates itself from the central Spanish government 
regarding co-development.  
The initial attempt to link development and migration in national policy was 
made in the GRECO Plan on migration management (Programa Global de 
Regulación y Coordinación de la Extranjería y la Inmigración 2000-2004). The 
policy was led by the Interior Ministry which was responsible for immigration 
control in Spain. This plan outlined the country's co-development policy and the 
involvement of various institutions in its implementation (Dirección General para 
la extranjería y la Inmigración, 2001). Interviews with the scholar Graciela 
Malgesini and an NGO official highlighted the Plan's objectives as being centred 
on the return of migrants by offering technical and financial aid to migrants 
                                            
30
 http: //www.moroccotimes.com/Paper/article.asp?idr=6&id=14225 Downloaded on 
20.04.06 
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along with cooperation for development in their countries of origin. Bilateral 
cooperation on the readmission of illegal migrants was central to migratory 
policy. 
As the Plan GRECO was seen as part of Spain‟s foreign policy to follow up 
EU migratory policy by supporting Southern border control, the central 
government‟s policy evolved into Cooperation for Development policy through 
the State Secretariat for International Cooperation under the direction of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. On this basis, the current AECID (previously the 
AECI) provides financial aid for Morocco as a key neighbour within the Non-EU 
Mediterranean region. The main objective was to accomplish the Millennium 
goals: the reduction of poverty by accompanying financial aid receptors in 
carrying out development projects is the proposed goal to be followed up 
through the Technical Office for Cooperation established in recipient countries 
such as Morocco. According to interviews with AECI officials, migratory policy 
was never a component of Spanish Cooperation for Development programmes. 
Nonetheless, the Plan Rector de la Cooperation 2001-2004 and 2005-2008 as 
the guideline for the AECID (or AECI) outlines the concept of co-development 
as one of the pillars of Cooperation for Development policy, and also 
establishes the mechanisms to be followed by the main actors implementing 
decentralised cooperation for development. 31   Moreover, official documents 
such as the Annual Plan for International Cooperation highlight poverty as a 
cause of migration. Consequently, bringing development to origin countries with 
high migration rates could give the impression that immigration is being dealt 
with in a humanitarian way. Nonetheless, migration policy was primarily the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Interior prior to 
2004. As a policy, co-development in Spain has evolved from its origins as a 
return policy similar to that pioneered by Nair into a more broadly based local 
development policy. The Spanish government‟s definition of the policy appears 
to cover the main elements as developed by the French government: inter-state 
cooperation to halt illegal migration, visa quotas, and financial aid for return. It is 
                                            
31
 Interview with Jesús Rodríguez Andia, Ambassador under Special Mission for 
Cooperation Affairs in Africa and Asia, Madrid, Spain May 2004. 
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also clear that co-development is carried out by different state institutions in 
response to their particular objectives and circumstances.  
In line with the co-development approach and the voluntary return policy, 
Spain launched its own voluntary return program. Along with integration policy 
actions carried out by the Spanish government, in 2000 organisations and 
governments promoted the return of asylum seekers. Dissemination of 
information and financial aid were the mechanisms used to attract potential 
returnees. Other programmes were elaborated jointly with the International 
Organization of Migration. As in the French approach, Spain promoted co-
development as a return policy through the issuing of micro-credits by the 
Spanish Cooperation for Development Agency (AECID) (Gallego, 2003). 
Apparently, the lack of a well organised infrastructure and information led to the 
failure of the programme in Spain as was the case in the French initiative (2006). 
Co-development appeared to enter a new phase with the institutional 
reorganisation which followed the election of Zapatero. Until 2004, the AECI 
was the main organisation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for 
implementing a programme of development principally in the Northern areas of 
Morocco where there is a colonial legacy. Following the election of the PSOE in 
2004, the State Secretary for International and Ibero-American Cooperation was 
created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This body articulated the link 
between development and migration more explicitly: the 2004 Annual Plan for 
International Cooperation emphasised co-development as a strategy for 
international cooperation (involving a wide range of actors from the Spanish 
Cooperation arena), as well as a mechanism designed to reduce economic 
pressures for migration from particular geographical areas (Cano, 2006).  
Given the complexities of the way in which co-development was integrated 
into the government‟s program, it is necessary to clarify the structure and 
objectives of the Spanish authorities on this issue. The country‟s decentralised 
cooperation system involves a financial aid and co-development policy which 
crosses different state institutions and leads to multi-level intervention from a 
wide range of actors. The main players are Parliament, the General State of 
Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Ministry of 
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Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, NGOs, 
Universities and Trade Unions as well as the Interministerial Commission for 
International Cooperation, the Development Cooperation Council and the 
Interterritorial Development Cooperation Commission. 
The bulk of funds for development cooperation are channelled through 
contributions to the EU‟s development budget and its own bilateral aid 
arrangements. In 2004, the total amount directed from Spain to EU multilateral 
cooperation was just over €495 million while Spanish bilateral cooperation 
represented €842 million (including nearly €224 million of loans, €334 million 
allocated to the Autonomous Community and local government budgets and 
€80 million to NGOs (Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y 
para Iberoamérica, 2004). Geopolitical interests were evident in the distribution 
of bilateral aid for development: North Africa received 7.6% of ODA, compared 
with 44.2% directed to Latin America (Intermon Oxfam, 2003: 4). Moreover, 
bilateral aid allocated to Morocco was part of a resource shared with other 
North African Countries though the Spanish government claims it favours 
Morocco in its cooperation for development policy, pointing out that it benefits 
the most within the region.  
The Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation (2001-2004) explains that 
preferential, although not exclusive, cooperation with Spanish-speaking 
countries is “related to the degree of their historical and cultural links amongst 
other complex intrinsic interests” (Gobierno de España, 2000: 11). 32  This 
justification may have been strengthened by growing direct Spanish investment 
in this region: Spain shared 40% of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the 
region in 2000, displacing the US as the major traditional investor in Latin 
America (Subdirección General de Estudios sobre el Sector Exterior, 2002). 
According to the same document, however, the Maghreb and specifically 
Morocco are also defined as an important geographical area for Spanish 
Foreign Policy. The criterion is also based on historical and geopolitical factors, 
as well as considerations of regional security and migration. Thus Morocco, and 
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 Translated by the author.  
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specifically its Northern region, received special attention in terms of support for 
cooperation for development. Consequently, those NGOs favoured by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by means of the AECI are concentrated in the North 
of Morocco.  
From an economic development perspective, there seems to be limited 
linkage between aid and migration issues. For the most part the funds invested 
in development are, it is claimed, concentrated in various social and cultural 
activities. Thus, for instance, in 2001 Spanish-Morocco bilateral non –
reimbursable ODA was nearly €42 million, of which €19.8 million were used in 
the maintenance of a Spanish academic institutes (Gobierno de España, 
2003b). 33  Indeed, cultural activities consume a considerable proportion of 
Spanish aid which is considered an instrument of foreign policy as Spanish 
language is a tool to expand Spain‟s trade and market opportunities (Fernández 
Blanco, 2005). It appears that other elements of the budget for cooperation are 
focused on the implementation of development projects. Therefore, Spanish 
funds for development in Morocco must be analysed in terms of the political 
benefits that a closer relationship could bring as a result of humanitarian and 
development aid policy.  
The current Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation (2005-2008) delegated 
co-development policy mainly to the State Secretariat for Immigration and 
Emigration and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The geographical 
priorities are Ecuador and Morocco, the two largest migrant groups in Spain. 
Bilateral cooperation with the origin-country implies coordination in terms of 
quotas and voluntary returns. Co-development policy is implemented in line with 
policies defined by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and, specifically, 
the State Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration in coordination with other 
administrations and cooperation agents. The policy embraces those elements 
associated with Nair´s definition of co-development. Financial and technical aid 
accompanies return migration policy along with micro credits and training. 
                                            
33
 The total budget for the Institute Cervantes increased to €61.9 million in 2005 
(Fernández Blanco, V. ,2005). 
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Remittances represent the capital to boost local development in the origin 
communities by means of their optimisation of productive projects. Migrants 
organised in associations are the agents of transnational action to improve 
living standards in their origin country.  
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has shown how both the policies of host countries and the 
responses of sending countries are shaped by a variety of domestic factors and 
pressures and by their respective geopolitical interests. In both cases, the home 
countries have had to adapt to a migration debate in the host countries, which is 
increasingly informed by security concerns, and to cooperate with policies of 
stricter border controls. Their cooperation, however, has not always been 
reciprocated in terms of agreements for managing and improving the conditions 
of migrants in host countries. 
Migratory policies in both contexts are often at odds with a constant labour 
market demand for low-skilled workers. In US migration policy, domestic 
political pressures have prevailed over labour market requirements. Although in 
the past, Mexican governments were able to secure agreements with the US 
federal government; this level of cooperation was not always reproduced at 
lower levels of the US political system which were characterised by unilateral 
actions and failures to implement federal agreements. Even after an 
improvement in bilateral ties marked by a shift from “distant neighbour” to 
“shared responsibility” attitudes and by apparently good relations between 
Presidents Bush and Fox, the Mexican government was able to obtain limited 
improvements on migration issues. Similarly, hopes that the Spain-Morocco 
bilateral relationship would improve once the PSOE replaced the PP in 
government were only partially fulfilled. Both Mexico and Morocco hoped for 
improvements in the arrangements for seasonal migration and for the 
regularisation of their nationals abroad. The Spanish government granted some 
increase in seasonal migration quotas but these were regarded as inadequate. 
Similarly, in the regularisation process, the Moroccan immigrants were less 
favoured than the Latin American countries, indicating an ethnic preference in 
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the migration policy-making process. Mexico‟s hopes for improvements on both 
immigration and regularisation were largely dashed by 9-11.  
Indeed, 9-11 overshadowed both bilateral relationships, directly in the 
case of US-Mexico and indirectly in the case of Spain-Morocco. Cooperation on 
security implied further changes in the immigration rules from sending countries 
since they had been also identified as transit points for illegal immigration. 
Maintaining a smooth flow of goods across the US–Mexico border represents a 
challenge at the same time as upgrading the level of deterrence for drug 
trafficking, illegal migration and terrorist threat. In the Spanish-Morocco case, 
the challenge was to expand the collaboration between governments after the 
terrorist threat of extreme Islamic groups in Spain and in Morocco itself. 
In the dimension of cooperation for development, the approach from the 
US and Spain towards Mexico and Morocco respectively are quite distinct. To 
the extent that there are signs of emerging policies of co-development, these 
too seem to be shaped by the particular circumstances, priorities and interests 
of the countries involved, particularly the host countries. In the case of Spain, 
co-development policies seem to have emerged out of particular political 
circumstances and have had different results from other host countries such as 
France. In the case of the US, a different dynamic is at work, involving 
agreements between the US and Mexico to increase remittance inflows that 
could be translated into local development programmes. In both cases, the 
measures have been related to immigration control policies. In the case of 
Spain, co-development has been linked to policies of readmission and return 
aid. In the case of the US, the changes in national financial rules and bilateral 
agreements to facilitate the transfer of remittances are accompanying 
mechanism to implement the readmission and return of migrants.  
When comparing Morocco and Mexico as sending countries, it could be 
said that neither of them has explicitly adopted the concept of co-development 
as a way of referring to those programmes which link transnational action and 
local development. However, it is clear that Mexico has deployed a more 
sophisticated approach to reach its diaspora and translated this into the 
transnational action of local investment than is the case in Morocco. However, 
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as we will see in Chapter 6 both countries are witnessing a dynamic and 
energetic involvement of the diaspora in the development of their home 
communities. 
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CHAPTER 6 CO-DEVELOPMENT AS A BOTTOM–UP 
POLICY  
6.1 Introduction  
Chapters 4 and 5 have examined the treatment of the migration-development 
nexus from the perspectives of public authorities in the regional, bilateral and 
domestic contexts, focusing on co-development as a top-down policy. In this 
chapter, we shift the emphasis towards a more bottom up perspective. Here our 
view of co-development is based on the core assumption that the migrant plays 
a central role in a bottom-up policy involving interaction with various official and 
unofficial organisations. It also aims to take into account the migrant‟s ability to 
participate in transnational action which could be fully accomplished if it is 
based on an entitlement to two-way transit between the host country and the 
sending country. However, in the cases examined in this chapter, such bottom-
up activities have not been pursued in isolation, detached from public 
authorities. Instead, we have seen a convergence between the top-down and 
bottom up aspects of co-development. Co-development as a policy entailing a 
top-down approach assumes coordination between different institutions and 
state-to-state interaction which may affect the actions of migrants. Capital, 
training, education, employment, investment, health, and urban infrastructure 
are just some of the mechanisms involved in the achievement of such co-
development policies. The extent to which this policy is effective in involving 
migrants and producing transnational action to boost local development in 
migrant communities is the central concern of this chapter. 
For analytical reasons, in this chapter, co-development is considered to be 
a process resulting from transnational interaction between migrants and their 
communities (migrant-led initiatives) whereas co-development as a top-down 
policy implies state intervention (state-led initiatives) as a response to political 
and economic interests beyond the migrant‟s immediate well-being. The 
analysis focuses on the extent to which migrant and home communities develop 
a transnational dynamic as well as the interaction between top-down and 
bottom-up approaches in the sending-regions of both Morocco and Mexico. 
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The main objective of this chapter is therefore to provide analysis of the 
local actors participating in co-development. We analyse the extent to which 
links have been established between state-led programmes and migrants and 
the ways such relationships are organised, focusing on how transnational 
communities influence development in sending regions. My assumption is that 
co-development is shaped by geographical, historical, economic, and political 
contexts. While there are some similarities between the two countries, the 
differing contexts have contributed to different outcomes in each case. For 
example, while both Mexico and Morocco initiated processes for 
institutionalising the state-diaspora relationship, it is Mexico that has managed 
to devise local policies for the migrant population abroad and sending 
communities. There are also important differences in the roles played by the 
host countries in these co-development programmes. When we examine the 
approaches to co-development apparent in host countries, there is a clear 
distinction between the active role played by Spain and the passive role of the 
US. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections dealing with the cases of 
Mexico and Morocco. Both cases demonstrate different forms of engagement 
with co-development, reflecting their respective migratory histories and the 
political and cultural contexts. The sending regions within these two countries 
are classified as new or traditional. Recent migration flows from Southern 
Mexico, such as Chiapas and Veracruz, are contrasted with traditional flows 
from such states as Zacatecas. Meanwhile, in the case of Morocco, recent 
changes in the migration profile show a shift to central urban regions such as 
Casablanca and Rabat from traditional regions such as the Souss. There is a 
clear contrast between the lack of hometown associations in the first category 
and well-structured socio-political networks in the second. Nevertheless, co-
development policies serve as an umbrella for interaction between local sending 
communities, migrant-based organisations in host countries and governmental 
institutions in both host and sending countries. 
In addition, there are differences in the way receiving countries have 
engaged with migrants in the development of such policies. In this chapter, we 
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focus on the case of Spain whose experience as a receiving country is different 
from other European countries with established Moroccan migrant communities. 
In the Spanish case, reflecting their relatively recent arrival, the migrant 
community seems to be less established than the well-positioned Moroccan 
communities in other European countries. We explore the way in which these 
conditions have affected attempts by Spanish government and nongovernment 
organisations to encourage bottom-up co-development policies.  
In the other case under consideration, we find that as a receiving country 
the United States lacks formally defined co-development policies to engage 
Mexican immigrants with development programmes that serve to boost 
development in migrant communities. Nevertheless, we do find mechanisms 
that serve to facilitate increased remittances as well attempts to direct them to 
productive projects through financial institutions.  
6.2 Mexico: Migration and Development  
6.2.1 An introduction to State-Diaspora initiatives in Mexico 
When comparing the migrant-oriented development policies of Zacatecas and 
Chiapas, we find they have received different treatment with regard to national 
development and state-led social initiatives. Faced with a national migratory 
policy seeking to promote the state-diaspora link, local actors have reacted in 
different ways to government initiatives. Local actors in Zacatecas have been 
referred to as pioneers of co-development in Mexico since the late 1980s while 
stakeholders in Chiapas have only become aware of the impact of migration on 
their communities and have yet to respond institutionally (Vila Freyer, 2007). 
In order to understand the different stages of state-diaspora engagement 
at the local level, it is necessary to consider the history of the institutionalisation 
of migrant-oriented policies. One of the best known examples is the so called 
3x1 Programme which has been highlighted as a successful instance of co-
development (République Française, 2005). Preceding this programme, 
Zacatecan social clubs in the US demanded attention from the Governor of 
Zacatecas in order to execute building projects in sending communities. In 
response, the Zacatecas Government created the 1x1 Programme which 
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established cooperation between the government and the diaspora,1 triggering 
an increase in the political and economic demands addressed to the state 
government. At this stage, Mexico‟s central government entered the frame, 
adding US$1 to the US$2 provided by migrant clubs and the Zacatecas state 
government. This additional effort effectively institutionalised the link between 
the state and the diaspora. From 1992 to 1995, the Ministry of Social 
Development (SEDESOL) initiated an unofficial programme incorporating 
demands from migrant communities abroad and their hometowns in Mexico to 
provide social and infrastructure projects in sending regions. Subsequently, 
President Fox converted this local programme into a national project involving 
all state and municipal authorities as part of the Citizen Initiative (Iniciativa 
Ciudadana) Programme which in 2002 became the 3x1 Programme conducted 
by the Ministry of Social Development (Soto Priante and Velázquez Holguín, 
2006). 
From a conventional perspective on development, Zacatecas could be 
analysed as a positive example of a bottom–up policy of using remittances for 
productive projects likely to stem migration from sending regions. However, 
certain scholars have been critical of the way the Government agency focused 
on developing political links with migrant hometown associations and of the 
limited development benefits of remittances. The severest critics have 
underlined the ultimate interest of the state in replacing the government budget 
with funds sent by migrants (García Zamora, 2006; Alarcón and Rabadán, 
2009). Such criticisms cannot be fully assessed given the absence of long-term 
evaluations, however. Moreover, there is evidence that the schemes have had 
positive effects on transparency in the use of resources, local organisation, 
improvements to public services and the promotion of employment. Certain 
                                            
1
See the Zacatecan home towns association web page for further information about their 
foundation and activities:  
http: 
//www.federacionzacatecana.org/index.php?sectionName=projects&subSection=overvi
ew&story_id=131 
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scholars have, therefore, proposed a broader analysis which takes into account 
such factors as the stage of migration under consideration to differentiate the 
immediate benefits for well-being from those of later stages when migration 
decreases as result of sustained development (de Haas, 2003a).  On the basis 
of the broadly positive assessment, international financial institutions have also 
become involved in spreading this model of government-migrant cooperation as 
an example to be followed elsewhere (López Cordova, 2004).  
Taking into account the evolution of the state-diaspora relationship in 
Mexico, certain questions must be highlighted concerning how migrants were 
able to engage with this process of institutionalisation and the extent to which it 
benefited local development. Co-development as a mechanism to inhibit 
migration in the long term is based on the premise of increasing living standards 
in sending regions to reduce the pressure to migrate. However, the ultimate 
goals of both state and non-state actors may include interests beyond simply 
boosting development. Despite the negative assessment of critics of these 
programmes, there is a positive assessment that claims there are immediate 
benefits for high-rate sending regions. The next section therefore explores 
those cases involving current sending regions and their experiences as 
beneficiaries of institutional aid programmes. It appears that, for those 
communities in states participating in international migration, remittances can 
have a considerable impact on economic growth at the local level. German 
Zárate (2004) highlights the importance of the amount of remittances with 
respect to federal spending on state budgets: in some municipalities, 
remittances are greater than revenues received as part of the federal budget. It 
is in the traditional sending regions that remittances are highest and where 
migrant organisations based in the US are most highly developed. Towns in 
these regions clearly benefit from the efforts of community organisations with 
direct remittances being channelled into local infrastructure and housing 
improvements. 
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6.2.2 Transnational Politics in Mexico: The 3x1 Programme  
The most political and well organised migrant organisations in the US 
come from those states with high rates of migration and a long-term 
participation in the international migration phenomenon (Rivera Salgado et al., 
2005).  Given that the Mexican co-development model is primarily focused on a 
limited geographical area, some have questioned its feasibility as a national 
strategy. Local development based on transnational action is clearly a 
consequence of the political consensus and organisation previously achieved 
by migrant organisations. However, there remains a question as to whether 
some form of political commitment on the part of the government could improve 
this situation, specifically in relation to local development already undertaken by 
migrants in communities where remittances have always been a source of 
investment in sectors such as agriculture. In such cases, a similar threefold 
(central, state and migrant) investment arrangement could be directed towards 
creating the infrastructure that in the developed countries is normally carried out 
by the government. Remittances are indeed a source of capital used to 
ameliorate the state‟s limited capacity to invest in local development and are 
also used as a strategy to fight poverty (Mariscal, 2006). 
Bottom-up initiatives for investment in common projects and the use of 
remittances as capital are inherent to the history of migration. In this sense, 
Goldring distinguishes “transmigrant-led” from “state-led” transnational 
processes to differentiate traditional philanthropic initiatives from those boosted 
by the government (Goldring, 2002a: 60). The use of informal channels to send 
family remittances from the US was a regular practice among Mexican migrants 
during the period of circular migration due to the lack of financial mechanisms 
provided by the banking system. Since communal decisions regarding 
investment in projects in sending towns were related to social and religious 
activities, the role of the government as an actor in the policies of local 
development based on remittances was a novelty in local politics. As soon as 
municipal and state government authorities understood the political asset 
represented by Mexicans abroad, however, transnational politics also acquired 
a political dimension at the national level. It is not surprising that, on coming to 
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power, former president Vicente Fox, who previously served as governor of the 
high migration state of Guanajuato, created the position of Special Coordinator 
for Relations with the diaspora and institutionalised the state-diaspora 
relationship through the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) as part of his foreign 
policy. This organisation had as a precedent the Programme for Mexican 
Communities Abroad which was dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
6.2.3  Mexican migrants as transnational political actors. 
The beginnings of a change in the role of Mexican migrants abroad – and of the 
attitude of the Mexican government – date back to the 1970s. In the opinion of 
Ayón, the Mexican government shifted its policy of “no-policy” to an active policy 
to reach Mexicans in the US when Luis Echeverría became president in 1976. 
His government became the very first to approach “Chicano” (Mexican 
American) organisations for economic and political reasons. Emigration was 
used as an escape valve for economic problems in Mexico and a source of 
political influence for lobbying Mexican interests in the US (Ayón, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the Mexican response was limited to cultural and academic 
exchange with the “Chicano” community, that is, those who claim Mexican 
ancestry but are ultimately more involved in identity politics in the US than the 
pursuit of a link to Mexico as their country of origin. 
The interest of Mexican migrants abroad in collaborating with government 
initiatives dates back to the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Los Angeles in 
1986 when it sought to direct remittances for developing projects jointly with the 
Zacatecas state government. This example of a diaspora-government model 
used to support projects via bottom-up initiatives in Zacatecas was later used in 
other states. In 1989, hometown associations (HTAs) from Guerrero and other 
states were organised into federations in the main cities of California, Illinois, 
Texas and New York.  
At the end of the 1980s there were efforts to move beyond the strategy of 
seeking the approval and support of Hispanic or Latino organisations in order to 
establish a relationship with networks of Mexican citizens in the US. Scholars 
who have studied the political relationship between the Mexican government 
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and the diaspora in the US maintain that the shift away from the policy “of no 
policy” is explained by the demand from the same migrants to participate in 
local public affairs (Ayón, 2006; Délano, 2006). Two factors have influenced this 
transformation in the relationship between the Mexican government and the 
diaspora: one is the democratisation process in Mexico that opened channels of 
communication, while the other is a foreign policy that began to address the 
Mexican-origin community in the US by means of specific programmes. 
At the start of the Salinas administration (1988-1994), the Programme for 
Mexican Communities Abroad (PMCA) was launched with the main objective of 
reaching the “pro-NAFTA and generally pro-Mexico lobby among newly 
legalised Mexican immigrants as well as professionals and entrepreneurs of 
Mexican origin” (Goldring, 2002a: 65) in order to contribute to the pursuit of 
Mexican interests in the US. In 2002, during the Fox administration, the PMCA 
evolved into the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IMA) and was established within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thereby institutionalising the state-diaspora 
relationship. One of the most important objectives of this institute was to 
establish a link with the population of Mexican origin in a broad range of 
sectors 2 . In 2002 the IMA established the National Council for Mexican 
Communities in the US as the institutional channel of communication between 
Mexican organisations in the US and the government of Mexico (Sada Solana, 
2006: 24). Even if institutionalisation of the relationship with the diaspora was a 
determining factor for carrying out projects funded by the 3x1 Programme, it 
was the infrastructure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that provided the IMA 
with an extended network linking Mexican migrants to the Federal government 
and the Consular structure in both the US and Canada.  
Indeed, the capabilities of the 47 consular offices in the US served as a 
pivotal mechanism for expanding channels of communication with Mexicans 
abroad (González Gutiérrez, 2006). The structure of the IMA is based on 
representational mechanisms such as the Consulting Council that serves as a 
                                            
2
 The former Executive Director of the IMA has worked with the PMCA. His experience as 
a member of the Consular staff in Los Angeles allowed him to establish a strong link with 
Mexican Clubs and develop the IMA funding strategy. Interview with Carlos Gonzalez held in 
June 2005, Mexico City.  
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channel of communication between representatives of the Mexican community 
in the US and government institutions at the state and local levels (González 
Gutiérrez, 2006). This structure therefore offers a political voice to people who 
live in the US illegally and cannot cross the border, linking them to Mexican 
institutions. In effect, a form of transnationalism takes place independently of 
the lack of mobility of those who cannot physically share the same territory. In 
the case of Zacatecas, for instance, Governor Amalia García indicated there 
were 850 thousand Zacatecans living abroad while 1.35 million were living in 
the state itself (Cano, 2004). The social and political capacity to influence 
decisions both in Mexico and the US is therefore based on both the quantitative 
and political organisational capabilities of the diaspora in the US. Sub-national 
governments have therefore also deployed their own institutional infrastructure 
to reach out to migrants abroad and create their own foreign policy.  
The policy of state-diaspora institutionalisation in Mexico seems to be the 
consequence of political demands initiated by the Mexican community abroad 
which in turn were boosted by the democratisation process in Mexico. An 
indication of the changes taking place was the decree issued by President 
Zedillo in 1997 which reformed Articles 30, 32 and 37 of the Constitution 
regarding the rights of those who were born to Mexican parents abroad (by 
blood or acquisition) to acquire Mexican nationality. However, the right to 
citizenship did not extend to the right to pursue a representative position in 
Mexican politics as this remained restricted to those Mexican nationals born in 
the country (Congreso de México, 2004). The distinction between nationality 
and citizenship was at the centre of the democratisation process as the right to 
vote and to run for representative office was not extended to Mexicans living 
abroad. It was only in 2004, during the Fox Administration, that the House of 
Representatives approved a bill for “double nationality”, thus enabling all 
Mexicans abroad who had acquired the citizenship of another nation to maintain 
their Mexican nationality rights. This was an important shift in the state-diaspora 
relationship in the Mexican case since it opened legal channels for Mexican 
migrants to pursue representative positions and enabled them to vote for the 
216 
 
 
 
very first time in the presidential election of 2006, an initial step in recognising 
the political rights of Mexicans abroad. 
Mexicans in the US were also important players in the process of 
democratisation. For them, the government of Mexico had failed to show 
transparency in the allocation of resources, eradication of corruption, promotion 
of economic development and the granting of legal and transparent elections. 
Therefore, when comparing the political image of Vicente Fox to the other two 
presidential candidates in 2000, Fox managed to create empathy with these 
goals among Mexicans abroad. After his election, Mexican HTAs, which had 
already begun to approach local governments in Mexico, proposed that the Fox 
Administration expand the 3x1 Programme and establish it as an 
institutionalised federal policy.3 
The 3x1 Programme gave a political dimension to the transnational 
activities of HTAs. The governance of migration-development programmes 
involves different levels of government: as well as the HTAs there are local 
Supervision Committees and the local civil society of communities. In a complex 
working structure, the politics of HTAs evolved as a distinct reality from those in 
the community of origin. From a transnational perspective, HTAs in the US are 
political units acting in their own interests while the leadership of HTAs 
becomes a political struggle for status in home-towns in Mexico (Goldring, 
1998). The political struggle leading to the election of a President of the 
Confederation provides a microcosm of Mexican domestic politics (Goldring, 
2002a). Federations and confederations represent the highest level of 
organisation of the Mexican migrant community abroad. The first level includes 
sporadic actions carried out by spontaneous organisations of migrants from the 
same hometown; the second level is that of HTAs as more formal migrant 
organisations from the same locality. The third level corresponds to the 
Federation of HTAs as the umbrella organisation for all HTAs in the same US 
                                            
3
  The Home Town Association for Zacatecans in Southern California (Federación de 
Zacatecanos) recognises Martha Ofelia Jiménez as the co-founder of the nation-wide 3x1 
Program. She negotiated the rules enabling the participation of most HTAs in the US with the 
Fox administration. See http: //federacionzacatecana.orgi 
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state (Zárate Hoyos, 2009: 133) and there are Federations from the major 
emigration states such as Zacatecas, Jalisco, Michoacán and Oaxaca. Since 
many of their leaders support, and even belong to, political parties in Mexico 
political activism is translated into local political dynamics in Mexico. One 
interesting case was the immigrant leader known as “The Tomato King” who, 
even though he resided in the US, was able to participate in local elections 
thanks to a recent State law in Zacatecas that removed residency in Mexico as 
a prerequisite for political candidacy. He ran for the post of mayor of his 
hometown, Jerez, and was proposed by the three major political parties at 
different times (Smith and Bakker, 2005). 
The empowerment of municipalities in Mexico together with the ability of 
HTAs to influence municipal programmes created a micro-space of governance 
that reflected the process of democratisation in Mexico. In parallel to the 
political organisation of HTAs, Mexico‟s governmental administration converted 
municipalities into active participants due to changes to the Mexican 
Constitution which gave them budgetary autonomy 
, 2000). Thus, municipal authorities were empowered to 
participate in the decision making process of community projects that were 
jointly defined with the HTAs, although a struggle is involved when municipal 
authorities try to impose government planning priorities (García Zamora, 2006). 
Therefore, the decision making process implies negotiation at the basic level 
within local authorities which also gives way to a balance of power between 
state and national authorities. In addition, the implications of civil society 
monitoring the spending of HTA resources may create conflicts of interest if 
they belong to different political parties. 
Based on previous empirical research, it is clear that international migrants 
participated in the organisation of communal projects and the investment of 
savings in their own productive projects (Alarcón, 1984). However, these 
initiatives were usually sporadic and did not necessarily imply the formal 
organisation of migrants. However, the launch of “Iniciativa Ciudadana” as the 
first step to formalisation of the 3x1 Programme was supported by the active 
promotion of clubs of immigrants in the main Mexican-origin populated cities of 
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the US, including Chicago and Los Angeles (Sada Solana, 2006). HTA leaders 
themselves recognise that formalisation of their association and expansion of 
their branches at the national level was boosted to a significant degree by active 
promotion of the 3x1 Programme by the Fox administration (Instituto de 
Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME), 2005). Nevertheless, the internal politics of 
HTAs embedded in the Federations could affect any external effort to reach 
consensus or complete projects forming part of a government initiative4.  
The other political aspect is related to the political dynamics of a multi-level 
governmental project. A common interest for all three governmental levels is the 
use of migrant remittances to subsidise public programmes. However, any 
attempt to define community projects considered suitable for the receipt of 
federal subsidies leads to clashes within state and municipal governments as 
well as between migrants themselves. One example was the restriction of the 
3x1 Programme to investment in “infrastructure” or “productive” projects, which 
led to its ruling against the interests of Michoacán migrants wanting to build a 
rodeo. HTAs claimed their right to invest in this type of project regardless of the 
rules imposed by the 3x1 Programme, and the case was resolved in their favour 
after negotiations with municipal authorities (Rivera Salgado et al., 2005). HTA 
influence extended further to include social and community projects as part of 
the 3x1 Programme (Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico (SEDESOL), 2007). 
Since then HTAs have become active in good governance at the local level.  
At the state level, in 2004 recently elected Zacatecas State Governor 
Amalia García also supported the Federation of Zacatecans and its interest in 
launching social projects within the 3x1 programme. In this case, the Governor 
from the left-wing PRD political party, initially responded to political demands 
from Zacatecans abroad who wanted their interests to be included in the state 
government programmes. The response was also politically motivated as it 
prompted a clash with the right-wing President Fox who challenged the 
legitimacy of these proposals on the grounds that such traditional and 
                                            
4
 During an informal conversation with a former Governor of one of the most traditional 
sending states, he expressed his concern at the lack of organization among clubs within the 
confederations and the lack of consensus for intrinsic political dynamics on matters of 
community projects submitted for 3x1 funding. 
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communal HTA projects were not part of the Programme (Cano and Valadez, 
2004). The state government and HTAs therefore represented a joint political 
force for demanding that the construction of churches, the organisation of 
celebrations and the building of rodeos should qualify as suitable projects for 
3x1 Programme funding. 
Taking into account the different studies evaluating the 3x1 Programme, 
their conclusions show the strengths and weaknesses of the project. The 
inclusion of migrants in local development projects is certainly a positive step 
since they become involved as political and economic actors (Burgess, 2006). 
The participation of migrants has contributed to good governance according to 
the development paradigm5. Transparency, the rule of law and participation are 
pillars of good local governance boosted by the 3x1 Programme. However, the 
lack of mechanisms to guarantee balance and equality of participation by all 
three levels of government and HTAs weakens the extent to which it has 
boosted development as a bottom–up practice. As a programme of the Fox 
administration, the 3x1 reveals the logic of the state‟s interest in approaching 
the Mexican community abroad to make them sources of external private funds 
and political assets. However, the concerns of migrant communities for both the 
development of their hometowns and their destination communities in the US 
demonstrates their political interest in participating in both societies. The 
immigrant community have also been able to use the HTA as mechanisms for 
seeking the support of the Mexican government in pursuing the protection of 
their human, labour and political rights in the US, issues that they feel have not 
been resolved.  
In terms of transparency, HTAs have served as a mechanism of scrutiny 
over public finances at the local government level (Fernández de Castro et al., 
2006). One of the main demands of HTAs was the eradication of corrupt 
practices that would negatively affect the quality and efficient use of resources. 
                                            
5
 A broad definition given by UNESCAP refers to Good Governance as ” the process of 
decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)”, 
which is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and 
efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law” United Nations. UNESCAP (2010) 
What is Good Governance? [online] http: 
//www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp.  
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Committees of Validation and Attention to Migrants were therefore created by 
the SEDESOL as mechanisms of scrutiny to observe the progress of approved 
projects funded jointly with 3x1 Programme resources. However, the lack of 
organisation and the internal political dynamics of these Committees in some 
cases led to problems of inefficiency and delays in the conclusion of projects. 
Since trust in local government as an administrator of their remittances is often 
weak, separate Supervision Committees, with their roots in local civil society 
along with NGOs and Universities, were established and became a trusted 
mechanism for continuing this program. Some researchers have accordingly 
highlighted the strength of these local Committees on the basis of their technical 
training and dissemination of 3x1 programmes (García de Alba Tinajero et al., 
2006).  
The economic benefits at the local level are evident, with remittances 
equalling or superseding the budget allocated to the 3x1 Programme by the 
SEDESOL in some municipalities. However, the rules of operation have 
undermined the equity with which resources have been distributed across the 
country. In response, the federal government modified the rules of operation for 
the 3x1 Programme with respect to the participation of HTAs to allow more 
efficient distribution of government funds to the migrants‟ hometowns. 
Previously, any civil association could participate as long as it was supported by 
an HTA. However, under the new rules only those clubs belonging to a 
Federation of HTAs enjoyed access to the program. Data collected by Katrina 
Burgess shows a more equitable distribution of the 3x1 Projects with more 
being carried out in the rural areas which usually correspond to the location of 
the migrants‟ hometowns. Based on information from SEDESOL, Burgess 
states that the period 2002-2005 saw the highest participation of rural areas at 
the national level, although it differed from state to state. For instance, in 
Guerrero and Guanajuato the share of rural projects was 82% whereas in 
Jalisco it was 48% (Burgess, 2006: 113). According to researcher Basilia 
Valenzuela, in the case of Jalisco the weaker participation of rural areas can be 
explained by the fact that local authorities from the Head City of the 
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Municipality6 received federal funds with only written support from HTAs since 
these were not actively involved in the project (Valenzuela V., 2007).  
The risk of the 3x1 Programme falling prey to clientelism has been a 
constant source of concern. The key issue is project selection, which might 
respond to the interests of the Federation of HTAs or one of the three levels of 
government. Despite the fact that the Rules of Operation of the 3x1 Programme 
created the Committee of Validation and Attention to Migrants as a consulting 
and technical body to approve projects with technical and budget justification, 
there is room in the negotiation process to politically influence the approval or 
veto of a project. As Garcia Zamora points out, there is a danger of creating a 
form of transnational corporatism based on political party alliances between 
local governments and HTAs (Burgess, 2006). Since the rules of operation 
require that only organised HTAs form part of the program, excluding individual 
migrants, there is a risk that political pressures will be more influential than 
migrants‟ preferences.  
The resources within the 3x1 Programme are quite modest, limiting its 
effectiveness as a mechanism to stem immigration in the long term. In an 
attempt to illustrate the minimal resources invested in the Program, Rodolfo 
Garcia Zamora (2006) from the Zacatecas research group “Migración y 
Desarrollo”, compares the average annual government budget of 15 million 
dollars during the period 2003-2006, used to fund 6250 projects, to daily 
remittances sent by migrants of 63 million dollars in 2006. Moreover, there is 
considerable criticism regarding the lack of productive projects which could 
have economic multiplier effects. While the inclusion of cultural or social 
projects eligible for the 3x1 Programme is a positive factor to ensure the 
involvement of HTAs and contributes to the “well-being” of origin communities, 
the overall economic effect is questionable. Moreover, the government initiative 
lacks mechanisms to attract the transnational business sector to accompany 
migrant initiatives. It seems that, although there have been attempts to launch 
                                            
6
 According to the administrative organization of decentralised government in Mexico, a 
municipality can include more than one city and rural towns. The Head City of the Municipality 
governs all towns forming the municipality.  
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productive projects within the 3x1 framework; they have been unsuccessful 
given the lack of interest from potential business partners. 
The programme has also been criticised because, although it is intended 
as a mechanism to tackle poverty alleviation, much of the resource have been 
used to fund investment in municipal infrastructure. This association between 
poverty alleviation and the 3X1 Programme is due to the fact that it is 
considered to be a part of national social policy: the 3X1 Programme is part of 
SEDESOL‟s development policy “Overcoming Poverty, Working Together” 
which is in turn part of the National Programme for Development. Indeed, 
SEDESOL has considered remittances as a tool to reduce poverty in high-
migration and marginalised areas (Government of Mexico, 2008). The increase 
in the level of remittances from US$814 to US$1,000 per migrant from 2002 to 
2002 is regarded as  the outcome of a national policy which helped to reduce 
the sending costs, the access to the bank in rural areas and the issue of the 
Consular ID (Gobierno de México, 2002: 9). Thus, the positive impact on 
poverty alleviation through the channelling of remittances is considered to be a 
success resulting from the support of governmental agencies. 
While there is a commitment to poverty alleviation in principle, an 
examination of the 3x1 programme budget indicates a different set of priorities. 
As Table 6.1 shows, most of the budgetary resources are invested in 
urbanisation, electrification, running water and community centres when 
compared to the total invested in productive projects, educational scholarships 
and even the health sector. In effect, the projects for urban infrastructure that 
should be separately financed by the government receive substantial resources 
from 3X1 while educational scholarships and productive projects receive less 
support. 
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Table 6-1 Total of 3x1 investment per category, 2002-2007 in Millions 
Pesos $MX 
Type of Project 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 TOTAL  
Running Water, 
Drainage, 
Electrification 
$226 $274 $547 $440 $236 $376 $2,099 
Roads and 
Highways 
$67 $57 $83 $100 $58 $77 $442 
Health, Education 
and Sports 
$190 $113 $114 $151 122 $186 $876 
Urbanisation and 
Paving 
$276 $282 $477 $591 $452 $623 $2,071 
Educational 
Scholarships 
$0 $0 $0 $15 $25 $66 $106 
Community Centres $127 $143 $160 $298 $317 $220 $1,265 
Productive Projects $40 $22 $53 $77 $45 $50 $287 
Other $16 $8 $2 $19 $19 $15 $79 
Total $942 $899 $1,436 $1691 $1,274 $1,613 $7,855 
($785 US 
million) 
Source. Ministry of Social Development, Government of Mexico.  
Various studies have shown that a range of states and localities in Mexico 
have increased their participation as sending regions and receivers of 
remittances and assert their right to use the latter to cover household expenses 
instead of contributing to 3x1 projects (Alarcón, 2004; Cohen, 2005; Cortina et 
al., 2005; Zárate Hoyos, 2007). Table 6.2 shows that there is uneven 
investment from both the Federal Government and state and local municipalities 
in conjunction with migrant associations. Of particular note is the fact there is a 
steady increase in participation in terms of the absolute number of HTAs as well 
as the increased number of states of origin in the US. Another important detail 
is the increased participation of municipalities and the total number of projects. 
In this sense, the benefits seem to be distributed more widely in territorial terms 
although the total amount invested is less in relation to the number of projects. 
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Table 6-2 Budget, Projects and Participants on the 3x1 program. 2002-
2007 
Budget per participating 
organisation in Mexican Pesos 
2002 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Federal Government $113.7  $99.9 $175.9 $232.1 $192.0 $257.7 
State, Municipal and HTA financial 
contribution 
$266.5 $277.7 $461.8 $619.7 $556.9 $690.8 
Participating actors and projects   
States in the US  as funding origin 8 17 31 35 34 37 
Migrant Associations 20 200 527 815 723 857 
Projects in Canada 0 1 2 0 0 0 
Participating states in Mexico  20 18 23 26 26 27 
Investment Projects 942 899 1,436 1,691 1274 1613 
Municipalities receiving funds. 247 257 383 425 417 443 
Source: Secretary of Social Development, Government of Mexico. 
Most studies measure the general benefits of remittances in relation to 
macro level finances, household incomes and living standards, and their 
participation in sustaining local governments, rather than 3x1 specifically. The 
Map 6.1 shows the percentage distribution of those households receiving 
remittances. As can be seen, Southern states have shown the lowest 
productivity rates according to World Bank reports described in Chapter 2, and 
are also the least benefited by income from remittances. According to Jeronimo 
Cortina et al., just 10 states received 70% of the total amount of remittances, 
with a differentiated HDI (Human Development Index) rate. When comparing 
the ten states, four of them have the highest HDI rate and concentrate 32% of 
total remittances while states like Chiapas and Zacatecas, Tabasco and 
Tlaxcala have a low HDI, and only receive 7% of total remittances. However, 
further comparison of terms or remittances per capita shows there is no 
correlation between remittances per capita and HDI in the case of Mexico City 
and Chiapas which received US$110 and US$117 respectively (Cortina et al., 
2005). However, such studies have not focused on the socioeconomic impact of 
the 3X1 programmes on the cycle of migration. 
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6.2.4 Co-development: a Contrasting Experience between Traditional 
and Non-traditional Regions. 
Taking into account new patterns of migration in Mexico, it can be assumed this 
is a widespread phenomenon that leads to the spatial definition for “traditional” 
and “non-traditional” sending regions (Durand et al., 2001). Following this 
categorisation, my research interests concerning such states as Chiapas and 
Veracruz are based on the assumption that both have developed different 
patterns of state-diaspora interaction, leading to different experiences when 
compared to traditional sending regions such as Zacatecas, Michoacán or 
Jalisco. Remittance-based programmes such as the 3x1 depend on the ability 
of migrants to direct funds that match the government project. Furthermore, 
their ability to form hometown associations is a prerequisite for participation in 
the programme. Therefore, states where migration is more recent have fewer 
possibilities for involvement when migrants abroad are less organised socially. 
Nevertheless, the contribution from these new migrant flows is considerable in 
terms of their impact on sending communities even if they do not take full 
advantage of Government aid and development programmes. Furthermore, 
state intervention is the result of demands from migrants rather than a top-down 
policy designed to pursue their well-being and local development. The state of 
Chiapas, like the rest of Mexico, became involved due to the institutionalisation 
of migrant activities with organised hometown communities abroad participating 
in the 3x1 Social Programme (Iniciativa Ciudadana) launched by President Fox. 
This programme represented an attempt to channel migrant remittances into 
hometown infrastructure projects. The Social Development Ministry contributed 
up to one third of an allocated budget of nearly $US 1 million which was 
invested in 899 projects in 2003 (see table 6.2) (Soto Priante, 2006: 233). 
However, the participation of Chiapas was limited to 11 projects with a total 
investment of US$120,000 (Córdova, 2007).7   State and local governments 
                                            
7
 It was calculated on the basis of the 2003 exchange rate and the total amount in pesos 
was 1,284,881 pesos. 
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allocated another third of the cost of planned projects while migrant 
organisations contributed the remaining third.8  
The development stage of subnational migratory policies achieved by 
municipal and state authorities corresponds to the stage of migration in each 
Mexican region. In the case of Chiapas, its role as one of the new sending 
regions has been downplayed in comparison to its geographically important role 
as a transit and receiving area. Despite the attention paid to migration issues by 
policy makers, the government has not paid significant attention to its role as a 
sending region. Hence, the link between migration and development is not 
clearly established in the policies of the regional authorities. Despite increased 
local economic growth due to remittances, neither federal programmes nor local 
public policies have taken into account the migrant population, including those 
in transit and transnational workers from Central America. Poverty alleviation 
and border control are the driving factors of public policies at the national level, 
whereas initiatives like the 3x1 Programme do not involve all sending 
communities or the majority of marginalised areas (Zenteno, 2008) . 
New migration trends in Chiapas have been affected by more general 
trends within the regional economy. The principal economic sector in Chiapas is 
still agriculture, predominantly the production of corn and coffee. Each has 
faced a critical situation due to the current state of international prices and 
unfair trading conditions. The primary sector, especially fishing, also has 
potential to increase production levels, but current levels of productivity are poor. 
According to scholars from El Colegio de la Frontera Sur, these conditions 
constitute the starting point for an ongoing cycle of poverty and migration, both 
rural-urban and international. Scarcity of land is also a factor for migration and 
is the result of limited agrarian reform in Chiapas that, due to population 
increases, provides just one hectare per family. This has in turn led to the 
search for opportunities beyond rural areas. In addition, the low prices paid for 
agricultural products have also led those who own the land to sell up and 
migrate. The worst cases are those of people who decided to rent an “ejido” and 
                                            
8
See http: //www.sedesol.gob.mx/transparencia/transparencia_iniciativa_3x1.htm 
Downloaded on June 20, 2006. 
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live on a low income with no access to state credit. This is due to the fact that 
they have no land title which is required as a credit guarantee. Therefore, it is 
understandable that, when interviewed, the Chiapas Secretary of Economic 
Development stated that “The agricultural sector is no longer attractive for the 
young economically active population who prefer to migrate”.9  
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that Chiapas is an 
increasingly important new source of migration. In tandem with this, remittances 
are becoming a more significant source of funds for communities in the region 
(Villafuerte Solís and García Aguilar, 2006). In the past, remittances in Chiapas 
were not particularly significant in national terms: between 1996 and 2001 they 
represented only 3% of the total received at the national level. However, for the 
local economy their significance has increased rapidly: between 2001 and 2002 
the share of remittances in the GDP of Chiapas increased from 0.29% to 2.58% 
(Gobierno del Edo. de Chiapas, 2006). They are a particularly important source 
of resources for the 29% of households that receive remittances and are also a 
source for financing international migration. They are also an important source 
of income for the Central American refugee population in the region which uses 
remittances to finance travel costs, as well as for survival in conditions of 
extreme poverty. According to a Guatemalan woman who had been a refugee 
in Chiapas for the past decade, her husband was able to migrate by using the 
financial resources sent by relatives abroad.10 Following a common pattern for 
household economic strategies, the goal of the husband was to continue 
sending money to sustain the rest of the family which included grandparents 
unable to migrate.  
While recent trends show that it has great potential, Chiapas is not 
currently a major focus for co-development activities due to the lack of strong 
migrant-based associations abroad, relatively low levels of received remittances 
and the limited engagement of government offices and NGOs at all levels. 
Studies have identified Chiapas – along with Veracruz - as new sending regions.  
                                            
9
 Interview with Secretary of Economic Development, State Government of Chiapas in 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, September 2005. 
10 
Interview to a Guatemalan woman on a bus with deported Central American migrants 
from Veracruz, Veracruz to Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas. September 2005 
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This is reflected in higher levels of remittances (Chiapas received 655.3 
million dollars in 2005) (Mariscal, 2006). This economic increase is consistent 
with the higher participation of urban and educated young people migrating to 
the US However, while migration and remittances are increasing, it does not 
appear that migrants from Chiapas have been able to develop social networks 
and diaspora organisations to the same extent as traditional sending states and 
consequently their participation in the 3x1 Programmes which foster the 
channelling of collective remittances is low. 
A census of participants in this 3x1 Programme highlights those from 
Michoacán, Jalisco and Zacatecas as the main beneficiaries of the programme 
(See table 6.3).11  
Table 6-3  Share of Participation by States in the 3x1 Program (%), 2003. 
STATE % 3X1 Projects 
Zacatecas 35.8 
Jalisco 20.5 
Michoacán 7.1 
San Luis Potosi 7.1 
Guanajuato 4.2 
Tlaxcala 4.1 
Aguascalientes 3.3 
Chiapas 
Others 
1.2 
17.9 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL), 2003. 
 
Those states with a more recent history of international migration, such as 
Chiapas and Veracruz, play a very small part in this governmental programme 
although they do receive remittances. 12  Given the lack of long-term and 
organised hometown associations able to follow the same approach as those 
from Zacatecas, Puebla and Michoacán, the Government of Veracruz launched 
its own local development programme in sending regions. However, so far its 
scope has been limited. According to interviewee Bertha Alicia Escobar, a 
former official for the Coordination Office for Migrants in the State of Veracruz, a 
                                            
11 
See the list of beneficiaries reported by the Ministry of Social Development for the 3x1 
Programme at: 
http://www.sedesol.gob.mx/subsecretarias/prospectiva/padrones/iniciativa_ciudadana/iniciativa_
ciudadana.pdf Downloaded on June 20, 2006. 
12
 For further analysis of the local impact of remittances in Mexico, see Gustavo Verduzco 
and Alejandro Canales.  
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policy of cooperation for development in the municipalities of Veracruz should 
include a local migratory policy. In her opinion, this programme was limited to 
boosting local development while it should have also supported the receipt and 
transit of migrants as well as those who had been expelled and deported. Along 
with the management of migration, the local development policy should also 
have been used to facilitate a popular consensus with businesses on investing 
remittances and promoting development (based on links with the Mexican-
American population and individual or organised action). Migration trends bring 
together local and central government efforts to deal with the migration issue by 
means of the National Coordination Office for Migrants. Specifically in the case 
of Veracruz, Escobar describes the negative perception of emigration by local 
authorities and the general population. According to Escobar, this perception 
has led to reluctance on the part of the state Governor to pursue a local 
migratory policy. Nevertheless, it was understood as a process in which 
migration could not be stopped given the economic crisis affecting the region 
and the higher wages available in the United States. The development of an 
approach to migration was made more difficult by the fact that Veracruz itself 
also attracts Central American migrants who mainly serve as a labour force in 
the agricultural sector.  
Nevertheless, Escobar believes there is potential to promote local 
development and roll back the negative microeconomic factors spurring 
migration13. For example, the Centre for Migrants, as an office within the Sub-
Secretariat of Political Development in the Veracruz Government, was able to 
detect areas with high migration rates. It then worked with women and young 
people who were potential migrants in order to establish micro-businesses 
supported by both the local government and the Mexican–American Association. 
However, the programme run by this Secretariat disappeared after a change of 
executive officer. To a certain extent, this fact is explained by administrative 
                                            
13
 In the course of fieldwork, the author visited a number of municipalities in Veracruz, 
including Teocelo, Coatepec, near Xalapa, and Tierra Colorada and Paso de Ovejas, 20 km 
from Veracruz in Veracruz State. These are small towns close to urban areas that have recently 
experienced international emigration to the US and which have followed the same pattern 
regarding the investment of remittances in construction and consumer goods and the use of 
these funds to finance migration. 
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changes since the Economic Development Secretariat assumed control of 
micro-business promotion, whilst the Political Development Secretariat focused 
on attention to migrants. As Chief Secretary Alicia González Ceresero 
explained, the objective of the Main Office “is to offer direct contact for the 
Migrant with the Government. What for? To offer assistance, such as legal 
assistance, administrative orientation, requests for documents, the issuing of 
copies of birth certificates and driving licences, or just to communicate with their 
families... We as a government form the link between the family and the 
migrant.”14 
González Ceresero thinks migration is a natural phenomenon that has 
always existed; people migrate because they want a better standard of living, 
thus from her perspective migration cannot be stopped since “social mobility is 
natural”.15 In any case, it is clear that the pressures to migrate remain strong. 
Locals in the municipalities visited believed migration offered the only chance 
for survival despite efforts to spur local development by engaging them in the 
production of arts and crafts with the help of local community organisations.16 
International migration accelerated after the coffee crisis in the coffee producer 
corridor of Veracruz State, specifically Xalapa and surrounding areas (Pérez, 
2007). In addition, the depressed state of cane sugar production and the 
production of other primary sector products which traditionally sustained the 
state‟s economy,17 stimulated rural-international migration to the US as a means 
of finding employment or better employment. Comparison between traditional 
(Zacatecas and Michoacán) and non-traditional (Chiapas and Veracruz) 
sending regions, reaffirms the importance played by diaspora organisations in 
                                            
14 
Interview with Alicia Gonzalez Ceresero, Sub-Secretary of Political Development for the 
Veracruz State Government, Xalapa, Veracruz, January 2004.  
15
 According to Gonzales Ceresero, migration should be analysed as a process of social 
mobility rather than “expulsion” created by economic factors.  
16
 During the fieldwork in September 2005, I visited rural areas that were reported by 
researchers in Veracruz and Chiapas as sources of new migration.  
17
 Interviews with sugar cane producers in Veracruz indicated there was a lack of 
employees for harvesting sugar cane and unfair competition from fructose imported from the US. 
One of the main coffee producers in Coatepec Xalapa was diversifying their products for export 
given the currently low production of coffee and also complained about low prices. Rural internal 
migrants known as “Jornaleros agrícolas” are now occupying the space left by those who have 
already emigrated. 
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spurring co-development. The locally deployed initiative serving as a link with 
migrants is remarkable in all respects. The Zacatecas project started as an 
initiative of Governor Genaro Borrego Estrada, who is now a senator for 
Zacatecas state and long-term member of the PRI party. In 1986 the United 
Zacatecan Clubs Foundation of Los Angeles (Federación de Clubes 
Zacatecanos Unidos de Los Angeles) developed the 1x1 Programme with the 
support of the Zacatecas Governor. Henceforth, the idea of uniting remittances 
and the federal budget to build projects proposed by hometown associations 
gave rise to this “co-development” programme. It is worth noting that Zacatecas‟ 
long tradition of migration has resulted in a pattern of circulatory movements of 
people. Of note here is the fact that Zacatecas has a long tradition of migration, 
especially circulatory movements; the transnational character of these 
enhances their influence as governments recognise them as important 
economic and political assets. Meanwhile, Veracruz and Chiapas as new 
sending and even transiting regions have recently become more organised in 
addressing specific needs. In fact, local authorities started to pay attention to 
the migrants‟ communities, as a way to respond to migrant‟s families 
demanding help with repatriation, transport of dead migrants and localisation of 
families.18 
Other sending states also have initiatives that are currently supported 
within the National Confederation of Governors (CONAGO) framework. As 
Senator Rios and Senator Luebbert explain, states such as Michoacán and 
Tamaulipas have a voice in policy making decisions vis-à-vis the US Congress, 
as well as with Mexican foreign office representations and local migrant 
associations. 19  Even if inter-parliamentary meetings are the most relevant 
means to raise the migration issue at the bilateral level, the relationship with 
nationals abroad also provides input for initiatives approved by the Mexican 
Congress and those launched by local and state government administrations, 
as shown by the presence of the Coordination Office for Migrants in most states.  
                                            
18
 Interview with the Coordinator of the Office for Attention to Veracruz‟s migrants abroad. 
Xalapa, Veracruz, September, 2005.  
19 
Interview to Senator Serafin Rios (PRD) and Senator Oscar Luebbert (PRI), Mexico, 
DF, October 2003.  
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6.3 Co-development in the Morocco-Spain Framework 
6.3.1 Co-development as a policy at the Autonomous Community and 
Municipal Government levels in Spain. 
While the previous chapter tackled the policy of co-development as a 
component of Spanish foreign policy, in this section I examine the way in which 
co-development operates at other levels in the Spanish system. The country‟s 
quasi-federal characteristics make it possible for the sub-national units of 
government, principally the Autonomous Communities (AC) but also Municipal 
authorities, to pursue their own policy on development aid, subject to the overall 
priorities of national policy and the need for coordination by the centre. The 
extent to which these levels of authority engage in co-development activities 
varies considerably with some ACs - such as Catalonia, Andalusia, the Basque 
Country, and the Madrid Community - apparently very active in promoting co-
development on this basis. While these programmes have as a guideline the 
“Master Plan”, the 4-Year Plan for International Cooperation and Cooperation 
Law, each AC is able to draw up its own Plan of Cooperation and Cooperation 
Law as the basis for conducting autonomous co-development policies. Not 
surprisingly, the shape of the policy is the result of local political dynamics as 
well as the Central state - AC relationship. Decentralised cooperation in Spain 
has been referred to as a unique opportunity for bottom up co-development 
(González, 2007). However, the limited participation of immigrant associations, 
especially Moroccan associations, has been seen as a handicap to the pursuit 
of an effective co-development partnership. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the idea of co-development has entered the 
Spanish academic and policy debates. The potential for applying those ideas, 
however, is subject to the interpretation and discretion of governments at 
various levels of the system. While there are national policy principles, different 
subnational authorities are able to carry out co-development in a variety of ways 
and in response to their own immigration-related interests. Consequently, co-
development as a state-led policy conducted by local authorities is subject to 
varying interpretations of how to integrate the immigration issue into local public 
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policies. In some cases, for example, the funds are used for the purposes of 
integrating migrant communities within the region itself. 
Institutionalisation of the international cooperation process involves a 
unique, albeit complex, interaction of state and non-state actors. Spain is 
divided into 17 ACs, 50 provinces and 8,092 municipalities; theoretically, every 
political unit is legally entitled to participate in the Official Aid for Development 
Programme. Each of the ACs in Spain is able to launch cooperation for 
development based on its international priorities.20 Given the extended power to 
conduct co-development programmes from all AC authorities, the Inter-territorial 
Commission for Co-operation on Development is a mechanism used to 
coordinate their co-development policy actions. This Commission was created 
by the central government to regulate these “co-development” actions, focusing 
on state-AC interaction. Institutionally, it is linked to the Secretary of State for 
Cooperation for Development in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and acts as a 
consultative mechanism between central state institutions and autonomous 
governments, including Ceuta and Melilla. However, its consultative character 
means it does not act beyond the issuing of requests for the exchange of 
information that could help bridge the gap between co-development-related 
policies pursued by central institutions and ACs.  
As a consequence of the rules governing each regional and local 
development programme, there has been a proliferation of local and regional 
Development-based NGOs (DNGO) and other civil society organisations. Once 
every AC allocates the ODA's Fiscal Year Budget, participation criteria for 
cooperation for development actions forming part of the support scheme for 
DNGOs are established. Geographical preferences, sectoral priorities and NGO 
registration requirements are amongst the criteria applied.   
The ACs with the largest ODA budgets in 2002 were Andalusia (€22.43m.), 
Catalonia (€23.64m.), and the Basque Country (€30.05m.) (Acona et al., 2002) 
(See table 6.4). There are, moreover, important differences in the regions, 
                                            
20 
According to the Constitution of Spain, Autonomous regions can conduct their own 
foreign policy initiatives as long as they do not conflict with those of the State in areas such as 
the signing of agreements and official foreign representation.  
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sectors and mechanisms which are supported by different ACs‟ development 
programmes. While the Madrid AC primarily favoured Latin American countries 
through the DNGOs, the Andalusia AC promoted cooperation through a DNGO 
support scheme, direct institutional cooperation with Morocco 21  and a 
Transborder Development Programme which represented a joint project 
between the Northern Provinces of Morocco and the government of Andalusia 
(Gobierno de España, 2003a).  
The Law of Cooperation and the Strategic Aid Plan for Cooperation for 
Development are the mechanisms which provide a framework for subnational 
and local entities, overseeing the cooperation for development programmes 
carried out by diverse government and non-government actors (Malgesini, 
1998).  As a legal instrument, the Law of cooperation issued in 1998 sets the 
rules for the conduct such policies, setting the principles of “budgetary 
autonomy and self-responsibility” to define their aid for international cooperation 
(Gobierno de España, 1998b).  
As Tomás Vera Romeo, Director of the Office for Cooperation for 
Development in the Ayuntamiento of Madrid, explains: “In Spain, international 
cooperation is decentralised, this implies that each one of the administrative 
units, and always a priori, formulates its cooperation in terms of what they 
believe appropriate and feasibly efficient, although this does not mean we are 
independent whenever we try to achieve international cooperation”. He also 
explained how constraints on this independence come from feedback with 
political actors as well as from the guidelines coming from the AECI's Strategy 
Plan. He illustrated how this works in the following way: “We exchange ideas 
with the PP representatives in the “Cortes” (Congress)…but they do not have 
programmes, so our coordination is with the AECI, where we coordinate and 
complement programmes”. In this sense, the policy of co-development for the 
Ayuntamiento de Madrid was influenced by the Partido Popular's members 
since they held power during this period, but the AECI provided the main 
guidelines to be followed.  
                                            
21
http: 
//www.andaluciasolidaria.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=208 
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Table 6-4 Co-development in Spanish Autonomous Communities:  
Budget & Total of Non-EU immigrants. 
 
Subnational 
governments 
Cooperation Law(4) OAD (€ 
million) 
2002(1) 
% Budget 
2002 
allocated to 
co-
development 
Total Non- 
EU foreign 
Population 
2003 (3) 
As % of 
total 
Andalucia Yes (Sept. 2003)  22.43 0.12 108,501 11.1% 
Aragon Yes 4.51 0.18 31,482 3.2% 
Asturias No 4.53 0.23 6,242 0.6% 
Islas Baleares  Yes (Draft concluded in 
2002) Approved in 2005 
8.18 0.76 32,650 3.3% 
Islas Canarias No 5.47 0.13 45,292 4.6% 
Cantabria No 1.58 0.16 7,893 0.8% 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
Yes (2003) 12.78 0.32 30,462 3.1% 
Castilla y León No 4.69 0.1 30,609 3.1% 
Catalonia Yes 23.64 0.16 289,326 29.6% 
Extremadura Yes (March 2003) 5.47 0.22 12,641 1.3% 
Galicia Yes (May 2003) 4 0.06 14,758 1.5% 
La Rioja  Yes (2002) 1.58 0.3 11,171 1.1% 
Madrid (2) Yes (Yearly Cooperation 
Plan and Annual Plans)  
7.87 0.1 276,715 28.3% 
Murcia No 2.52 0.15 48,159 4.9% 
Navarra No 11.5 0.48% 18,469 1.9% 
País Vasco Yes (Draft concluded in 
2003) Approved in 2007 
30.05 0.45% 14,370 1.5% 
Sources: (1) Intermon Oxfam, La Realidad de la Ayuda 2003-2004. (2) Community of 
Madrid, Report on Cooperation for Development          prepared by the Madrid‟s Public 
Administration (3) Ministry of the Interior, Spain: Statistical Yearbook, 2003. (4) Cooperation for 
Development: Legal Framework, document prepared by the University of Jaen, Spain. http: 
//www.ujaen.es/serv/vicint/home/docs/coop/documento_sobre_el_marco_legal.doc  
 
Policy formulation seems to follow the same independent pattern, although 
it is interesting to note the differences between these local needs and those 
dictated by the Central Government administration. Here again, our interviewee 
Tomas Vera explains how the divergent co-development interests of the 
European Community, Spain and other ACs affect co-development policy in the 
local municipality (Ayuntamiento) of Madrid:  
 “One step is coordination with other administrations, thus we 
coordinate with the Community of Madrid and we complement our 
programmes. Sometimes we cover spaces and sometimes we 
concentrate efforts in the same space and attempt to do the same with 
the central government‟s programme. One example is the programme 
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“Azar” which is carried out by the AECI and concentrates aid in 
Morocco and which we are supporting. That is to say, our way of 
participating is to include Morocco in our strategic plan. Now we 
consider Morocco a priority, although our main guidelines are in line 
with the master plans, and perhaps the central government is in 
charge of the relation with the EU, so once they are coordinated we 
are also indirectly coordinating with them”. 22 
 
Perhaps the most outstanding point in terms of this coordination is the fact 
that the ACs have an independent budget to address their own co-development 
and this has a potential impact on transnational action. While they do not 
contradict the guidelines of the Master Plan, they have developed a unique 
space to influence and perhaps balance state foreign policy. Thus, examination 
of the Law of Cooperation and the Master Plan linked to regional and local co-
development programmes should allow us to reach some conclusions with 
respect to the influence of either bottom-up or top-down co-development policy 
guidelines. 
The fight against poverty, respect for democratic principles, the protection 
of human rights, gender equality, the environment, the promotion of cultural 
dialogue, free-trade agreements, and the fair distribution of economic resources 
are basic principles for Spanish cooperation according to the Master Plan 2001-
2004 approved in 2000 (Malgesini, 1998). However, policy is driven by specific 
national and regional geopolitical interests as well as by attempts to pursue co-
development through a mix of integration policies at home and the integration of 
action abroad through NGOs of Spanish origin. Thus, the Master Plan 
establishes that “preferential orientation, although not exclusive for 
Iberoamerica and other Spanish-speaking countries, is based on criteria of 
coordination and complementariness pursued by EU Programmes: Spain must 
direct its resources to where it can have a more effective and beneficial impact” 
(Gobierno de España, 2000). 
                                            
22 
Interview in Madrid, May 2004.  
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Indeed, when shaping their own Law of Cooperation and Cooperation 
Plans, ACs and local municipalities take into account the strategic geographical 
regions established by the national Master Plan (MP) and Law of Cooperation. 
Catalonia, for instance, establishes its priorities as the Maghreb, Algiers and 
Morocco which are described by the Master Plan as “the zone(s) of greatest 
interest for Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean and Arab World region, 
since Northern Africa is the closest region to Spain and with which it shares a 
wide-ranging and intense political, economic and socio-cultural 
interest”(Gobierno de España, 2000: 8).23  It also considers supporting an area 
in conflict previously reported to the Council of Development Cooperation.24  
Andalusia and Madrid have established Latin America as a geographical 
priority. For example, in 2001 Andalusia conducted 2,632 activities in Central 
America, 1,642 in Cuba, 1,682 in the Andean countries and 490 in South 
America, a total of 6,446, while in the Maghreb there were 1,113 with 1,111 in 
the rest of Africa. Madrid has also established Latin America as a priority, as 
Rosa María González from the Community of Madrid explained. The local 
authority (Ayuntamiento de Madrid) also participates in supporting this region.  
While many officials stressed that Morocco is the most important region in 
the Maghreb, the resources allocated were limited. Andalusia, for instance, 
directs 3% of its total to Morocco, one of its geographical priorities, yet this is 
equivalent to the amount provided for Colombia (Aspectos Básicos de la 
estructura de la cooperación municipal: el caso de Andalusia: 63). In terms of 
decentralised cooperation carried out by local NGOs, for instance, Andalusia 
has provided €8.50 million in the period 1995-2004 for 52 projects in the 
Northern Provinces of Morocco. The main sectors are female empowerment (17 
projects), health (9), rural development (6), training and education(4), 
productive sectors (5), child protection (4), culture(4) and social enhancement(1) 
(Junta de Andalucía, 2003). 
                                            
23 
In terms of importance, other Latin American countries funded are el El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, The Dominican Republic, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. 
In the African Sub-Saharan region, action is concentrated in Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Senegal 
24
 The full text can be found at http: //www.gencat.net/diari_c/3872/03071098.htm 
Downloaded on July 2, 2006 
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How far have immigration considerations shaped the priorities of AC and 
municipalities‟ development budgets? The growing significance of migration to 
Spain raised the political profile of the issue, with public opinion increasing the 
pressure for more funds to be channelled towards cooperation for development 
and integration projects. In principle, ACs‟ Cooperation Laws have set the 
geographical and budgetary priorities relative to the profile of non-EU member 
immigrants in their territories. Table 6.4 shows the total number of non-EU 
immigrants per Autonomous province and the proportion of the budget allocated 
to co-development policy. 
Decentralised cooperation, along with DNGOs, played a significant role in 
ODA programmes. In 2002, the total budget was €360.5m. which represented a 
higher amount allocated by the Aid Development Fund (Fondo de Ayuda al 
Desarrollo, FAD). The budget for Co-development projects in Spain can be 
measured by the total amount allocated per AC or the percentage per immigrant 
in each AC. Figure 6.2 compares the proportion of immigrants within an AC on 
the one hand with each AC‟s share of the co-development budget on the other. 
In relative terms, a comparison of immigration rates and budgets for co-
development shows, for instance, that ACs such as the Balearic Islands, 
Navarra and the Basque Country (which have significantly lower levels of non 
EU immigrants in their populations) receive an overwhelming percentage of the 
total budget for ACs, compared to ACs such as Catalonia or Madrid which have 
the highest concentrations of non-European immigrants in Spain.  
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 % Non EU Foreign Pop & % Codevelopment 
Budget by Spain's Autonomous Regions, 2004
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Figure 6-2 Total of Non- EU immigrants in Spain and Co-development 
budget by Autonomous Region 
Source: Spain: Statistical Yearbook, 2002 and Oxfam, 2003. 
 
There is a marked difference in institutional and legal mechanisms 
between the different ACs. As noted in Table 6.4, most AC Governments have 
approved their own Law for Cooperation. This legal instrument follows the 
guidelines laid down by the Spanish State Law for Cooperation but moves 
beyond the Plan GRECO in terms of integration policy. Indeed, integration 
policies have become an important part of AC co-development budgets over 
time.  
For example, as Madrid became one of the main destinations for non-
European immigrants (mostly Latin American), it began to increase its budget 
for integration as part of co-development policy actions. Its Autonomous 
Cooperation Policy is summarised by Jose Antonio Alonso in the following way: 
two decades ago its budget was much less than that assigned by the Basque 
Region, it does not have the social and institutional support of that of Navarra, it 
has no associative tissue as in Catalonia and no ongoing institutional support as 
in the case of Andalusia to address aid development tasks (Ararteko, 2002). 
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The map of local co-development policy is now changing in terms of the 
new immigration profile. As we can see in Table 6.6, Madrid increased its 
budget from €7.1 to €17.39 million in the period 2000-2004 and there was a 
74.6% increase in the bilateral Official Development Aid budget in the fiscal 
years 2003-2004 alone. In this latter one-year period, Murcia witnessed an 
increase of 44.6% followed by Valencia with 40.73%. The table also shows the 
Madrid and Murcia ACs as the regions with the highest proportions of 
immigrants in the local population. Yet Andalusia, Catalonia, and the Basque 
Country head the list of the most participative regions in terms of total budget, 
although the share of the immigrants in the population does not seem to be as 
significant as that of Madrid, Valencia or Murcia.  
Table 6-5 Evolution of Official Aid for the Development of Autonomous 
Communities in Millions of Euros (2000-2004) 
CCAA 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004/03% 2004/00
%* 
Andalucía  16.67 16.17 22.43 25.82 32.62 26.33 19,28 
Aragón  3.56  4.41  4.95  4.51  5.32  17.89 11.29% 
Asturias  2.93  4.54  4.53  5.40  6.80  25.91 24.97% 
Islas Baleares   2.82  6.09  7.57  9.70  8.13  16.21  38.11% 
Cantabria 0.66  0.90  1.58  2.52  3.41  35.00  51.64% 
Canary Islands  4.49  2.19  5.81  6.81  4.48  34.26  24,33% 
Cataluña  13.04  17.76  23.27  26.73  31.36  17.32 24.85% 
Castilla-La Mancha  3.83  6.70  17.16  27.47  27.21  –0.7  72.58% 
Castilla y León  3.78  4.00  4.69  3.83  4.78  24.93  7.37 
Extremadura  4.19  4.71  5.47  6.49  4.86  25.17  5,55% 
Galicia  2.80 2.84  4.60  4.91 5.63 14.68 21.24% 
La Rioja 1.34  1,45  1.45  1.90  1.99  4.74  11.02% 
Madrid  7.10  7.37  7.91  9.96  17.39  74,66  27,92% 
Murcia  0.89  1.21  2.49  1.82  2.63  44.66  40,11% 
Navarra 11.52  11.44  11.51  13.34  16.73  25.37 10.29% 
País Vasco 25.22  20.54  27.27  28.46  26.45  7.05  2.88% 
C. Valencia  12.70  7.71  19.60  15.27  21.49  40.73  33.37% 
Other ACs  0.10  0.14  0.07  2.06  – – –   
Total ACs 
(€Mill.) 
117.64  120.17  172.35  197.00  221.27   12.3%  18.05% 
* Annual average increase 
Source: Government of Spain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seguimiento PACI, 2004.  
 
 To explain the regional balance of ACs‟ co-development policies, we need 
to take into account such factors as commercial interests, the preference of 
NGOs to work within national territory rather than abroad or their cultural 
preference to work with Spanish-speaking populations. In the view of José 
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Angel Sotillo, a professor at the Complutense University of Madrid, while the 
Laws of Cooperation are officially broadly based in terms of geographical 
objectives, in practice they are much narrower. He explains that while NGOs 
could be an effective bottom-up tool for invigorating co-development policy, the 
fact there are more NGOs working with Latin American countries than with 
Morocco has limited their impact. This bias is explained by a lack of interest 
concerning the Moroccan diaspora on the part of Spanish society and NGOs 
which in part can be explained by the negative perception of Spanish society 
towards Morocco after the events of September 11, 2001. As he explains, there 
is no pressure group demanding further action on the Maghreb and specifically 
Morocco.25 The preferences of sectoral or geographical DNGOs are conditioned 
by the participation rules established by the Laws of Cooperation and the 
Cooperation for Development Plans at the state and AC levels. Thus, the quality 
and quantitative changes oriented towards DNGOs‟ performance in the 
decentralised cooperation framework are tied to mainstream ODA guidelines. 
As mentioned previously, Latin America is the main ODA recipient and Morocco 
is the main recipient in the North Africa Region.  However, it is worth noting that, 
according to the CONGDE report on DNGOs, India received €25.19 million and 
Morocco just €7.19 million in 2005 (Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo 
(CONGDE), 2006). 
Within this bilateral framework, decentralised cooperation is the main pillar. 
To avoid the dispersion of NGOs, local authorities make an effort to concentrate 
information in one single unit: the Confederation of Funds in Spain. A group of 
organisations and local authorities constitute each Fund. Among the members, 
we find organisations performing actions in various countries which play a 
significant and active role in the ACs. These include: Fons Català de 
Cooperació al Desenvolupament , Euskal Fondoa-Asociación de Entidadaes 
Locales Vascas Cooperantes, Fons Valencià per la Solidaritat, Fons Mallorquí 
de Solidaritat i Cooperació, Fons Menorquí de Cooperació, Fondo Galego de 
Cooperación e Solidariedade, Fons Pitiús de Cooperació, Fondo Andaluz de 
                                            
25
 Interview with Jose Angel Sotillo, Director of the Institute for Cooperation, Complutense 
University of Madrid, Spain, May, 2004. 
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Municipios para la Solidaridad Internacional, and Fondo Extremeño Local de 
Cooperación al Desarrollo. Participant members are organised by ACs and 
local authorities on the basis of geographical location. While links to political 
parties are diverse and participation is open, geographical location prevails as 
the main condition for constituting a Fund. The main purpose of the 
confederation is to analyse autonomous and local programmes agreed by each 
political entity within the regional groups. Following the Millennium Development 
Goals commitment on poverty reduction, Spain and its public administrations 
have linked ODA policy to decentralised cooperation by promoting the 
destination of at least 0.7% of their budget to cooperation with Third World 
Countries. 26  Therefore, co-development as a political debate is shaped by 
overall ODA policy where the relationships of sending countries with their 
diasporas are limited to integration and public services policy pursued by 
DNGOs and regional administrations. There are also national NGOs working 
regionally which belong to the Confederación de Organizaciones No 
Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), a group of at least 100 
DNGOs with regional offices in most of the ACs (Coordinadora de ONG para el 
Desarrollo (CONGDE), 2006). The Spanish Law of Cooperation also considers 
universities, trade unions, and business groups as actors in cooperation for 
development policy. Since the multiple entities involved in ODA programmes 
and the lack of a clear co-development definition create a complex system to be 
coordinated by central government, ACs and Municipal administrations become 
a unit of analysis in terms of decentralised cooperation and its impact on co-
development projects.  
It is clear that, notwithstanding its potential value as a means of providing 
more decentralised and migrant-focused development, the Spanish system is 
characterised by problems of coordination not only between the different bodies 
engaged in co-development policy but also between them and the NGOs 
engaged in implementing such policies. Bodies such as the Interregional 
                                            
26
 See web site for more information concerning actions carried out by the Confederation 
of Funds for Cooperation and Solidarity 2004 (Confederación de Fondos de Cooperación y 
Solidaridad) http: //www.confederacionfondos.org/castellano/3-2-2.htm 
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Commission for Cooperation 27  do not offer a solution to the lack of central 
administrative coordination and centralisation mechanisms for the identification 
of action by the organisation working from all autonomies. Even if local Laws of 
Cooperation or Plans for Cooperation require NGOs to be registered, there is a 
possibility that they could   receive funds from a number of authorities. This 
results in the duplication of funds as well as efforts forming part of the 
programme.  
The case of Andalusia offers a representative case of co-development as 
well as highlighting certain problems in terms of linking government action to the 
spontaneous participation of organised civil society. According to the rules of 
the Master Plan and the Law of Cooperation, local governments and other 
Autonomous governments invite the decentralised sector to participate in the 
co-development initiative as regulated by the Law of Cooperation. However, 
participating NGOs must demonstrate a certain level of experience and 
establish that they have spent a certain number years of working in the sector. 
Thus, out of 62 registered organisations in Andalusia, 41 participate in the 
government initiative. These organisations are broadly dispersed by sector and 
by region. Therefore, the result is that there are probably one or two working in 
one country, although this is alongside those from other Autonomous regions in 
the same country and the same sector.  
Despite an increase in the number of NGOs involved in co-operation for 
development and an increase in the number of municipalities spurring co-
development, there is also a lack of harmonisation for methodology used to 
assess the impact on goals. As Jesús Rodríguez Andia, Ambassador under 
Special Mission for Cooperation Affairs in Africa and Asia, from the AECI points 
out, “Although there is a cooperation framework to coordinate actions with all 
                                            
27
 This Commission was created under International Cooperation for Development Law in 
2000 and attempts to coordinate International Cooperation Law objectives with representatives 
from the majority of Ministries, Autonomous and local government bodies throughout Spain, 
including Ceuta and Melilla. See further information from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
at: http: 
//www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Cooperacion%20Internacional/rganos%20Consultivos%20y%20d
e%20Coordinacin%20de%20la%20Cooperacin%20espaola/Comisin%20Interterritorial%20de%
20Cooperacin%20para%20el%20Desarrollo/Paginas/ComisionInterterritorial_Coop.aspx 
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AC and local governments, the Central Government, in this case the AECI 
cannot force them to perform any action”. Thus, in the next section I analyse the 
role played by those institutional and non-governmental organisations working 
together on co-development policy in Morocco as part of central and local 
governmental policy.  
6.3.2 Bottom-up policy in Morocco 
In assessing the role of co-development in the Moroccan case, it is important to 
bear in mind the high profile of the international aid community within the 
country. The head offices of the principal aid agencies and funding 
organisations are concentrated in Rabat, the administrative capital, with the 
UNDP, the EU, the French Agency of Development, and the Technical Office 
for Spanish Cooperation amongst the most prominent. There are also 
increasing numbers of foreign national NGOs working in Morocco tackling 
development issues, for example European-origin organisations carrying out 
projects along with Moroccan associations. In addition, there are non-state 
organisations working in rural areas, including hometown associations or 
migration-related organisations.  
Interaction between all levels of government institutions and non-
government actors is complex and develops in a variety of ways. Morocco is 
experiencing a process of democratisation in which those domestic NGOs that 
once operated illegally are now at the heart of an urban movement. Arguably, 
the development of this movement has been facilitated by AENEAS28. As Luis 
Dey, EU Delegate for Migration in Rabat, explains, such support “started 
functioning in 2001; the EU Justice Directorate provides a budget to include a 
programme to support those NGOs promoting the human rights of migrants.”29  
Under the same EU co-development scheme, other projects supported 
Moroccan organisations which provided micro-credit loans for those who are not 
considered candidates by the banking system, for example, the Foundation 
                                            
28
 See http: //ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/pdf/themes-migration-
reglement_en.pdf Downloaded on October 20, 2006. 
29 
Interview with Luis Dey, EU Delegate for Migration at the EU Delegation in Rabat. 
Morocco, June 2004 . 
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Sakoura which manages funds directed to micro-business.30 There are also 
other international organisations contributing to micro-credit programmes in 
Morocco. These include the United Nations Capital for Development Fund 
through the MicroStart Programme for the Development of Micro-financing 
Sectors. In addition, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), along 
with Moroccan-based organisations, is sponsoring a micro-credit programme as 
part of its “co-development” programme (Naudet and Delarue, 2008). USAID is 
also contributing through the organisation Al-Amana which competes with the 
Foundation Sakoura, providing 15.5 million dollars over a period of eight years 
(1995-2003) (USAID, 1999). 31 
Such alliances between the EU, the UNDP and the French Agency for 
Development, on the one hand, and Moroccan non-governmental associations 
on the other, provide micro-credit programmes that could be potential elements 
of a migrant-focused co-development process. However, these programmes still 
operate within a top-down cooperation for development framework. Although 
there is the involvement of organisations from the sending country, there is no 
transnational dimension involving the migrant communities.  
Spain also launched its own voluntary return programme which followed a 
co-development approach. Along with integration policy actions carried out by 
the Spanish government, in 2000 organisations and governments promoted the 
return of asylum seekers. Dissemination of information and financial aid were 
the mechanisms used to attract potential returnees. Other programmes were 
elaborated jointly with the International Organization of Migration. Drawing upon 
the model developed by the French government, Spain promoted co-
development as a return policy through the issuing of micro-credits by the 
Spanish Cooperation for Development  Agency (AECID) (Coordinadora de 
ONG para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), 2006). Apparently, the lack of a well 
organised infrastructure and information led to failure of the programme in 
Spain (European Union, 2006).  Overall, it appears that the role of the migrant 
                                            
30  
Information received from the Delegation of the European Commission in Rabat, 
Morocco.  
31  
Interview with Jesus Rodriguez Andia, Ambassador under Special Mission for 
Cooperation Affairs in Africa and Asia, Madrid, May 2004 
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in such schemes has been quite limited. By contrast, an effective co-
development policy would have the migrant as a central player. It is the migrant 
and their forms of association that serve to construct fair development as 
transnational agents, bridging the gap between host countries and ethnic 
sending regions.32 We now turn to examine the extent to which such policies 
have emerged in Morocco. 
6.3.3  The Moroccan Associations as agent of development 
The origins of local associations in North Africa are to be found initially in the 
anti-colonisation protests of the pre-independence era. Such groups were 
declared illegal and were not recognised by the colonial authorities. Later, 
following the struggle for independence, these associations sought legalisation. 
State controls on these associations differ according to each South-
Mediterranean political system and its degree of democratisation. In the case of 
Morocco, these organisations have only been able to operate freely in the last 
decade and it is only recently that they have expanded their scope of action to 
include more diverse issues(Porter and Mourjui, 1997). Ammor highlights the 
way in which NGO development and active participation is a consequence of 
democratisation. He notes a distinction between urban and rural organisations, 
where the latter respond to projects supported by the Moroccan–origin 
population abroad. His assessment is that social capital and the need for 
internal democracy are characteristics of these new associations. They are also 
characterised by their relatively short histories and their fragility in the face of 
administrative and political obstacles, for example over registration, and of 
restrictions on the urban and intellectual elite and local peasants (Ammor, 2003: 
80).  Nonetheless, it appears that they have been able to develop a degree of 
associative capacity, though this is not always recognised by Spanish NGOs in 
Northern Morocco.  
                                            
32
 Here I make a distinction between national identity and ethnic identity. In cases such as 
Mexico and Morocco, ethnic identity comes before national identity when referring to rural-
international migration. Therefore, transnational action performed between host and sending 
ethnic communities will be separate from a foreign policy which does not distinguish between 
the different cultural values and needs of ethnic groups and which may in fact clash with those 
of the State. 
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Focusing on those rural organisations supported by Moroccan 
organisations abroad, Lacroix classifies co-development NGOs by 
distinguishing hometown organisations and migrant–related organisations 
based in Europe (Lacroix, 2005). Notwithstanding the apparent state promotion 
of co-development, the lack of a larger number of diaspora organisations in their 
programme prompts a question concerning state-migrant collaboration. 
According to a Moroccan government list of participating diaspora organisations 
in France, there is only one successful migrant hometown association involved 
in co-development in Morocco, Migration and Development (M&D). According to 
this well known association, co-development funds and actions are 
concentrated in the South of Morocco as a traditional sending region which 
represents 91.3% of the joint French and M&D funding.33Thus, the research 
conducted looked at Moroccan migrant associations in Spain to understand 
their relationships with the Moroccan State and the sending regions.  
Through interviews conducted in both Spain and Morocco, it was possible 
to identify Moroccan migrant-based organisations working in both host and 
sending countries. One of these is the ATIME (Association of International 
Moroccan Workers) which has its main office in Madrid and offers a wide range 
of social services to the Moroccan diaspora. This organisation is the oldest and 
most recognised organisation among Moroccan migrants in Spain. One of their 
main activities is to offer legal advice to migrants regarding their labour rights. 
However, its main concern has been with the political rights of the Moroccans 
(whether in Spain or Morocco) rather than local development. It maintains a link 
with another Moroccan based organisation in Spain, Red Euromediterránea de 
Cooperación al Desarrollo (REMCODE), 34  an organisation which primarily 
works in the Northern region of Morocco, more specifically in the Riff area. They 
conduct rural development programmes and work jointly with Moroccan 
hometown associations. Cooperación y Desarrollo en el Norte de Africa 
(CODENAF) is another association, based in Andalusia, with projects seeking 
to promote development in both host and sending countries. Yet, according to 
                                            
33 
Interview, Rabat, June 2004.  
34 
Interview, Madrid May 2004 
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interviews with ATIME and CODENAF, these organisations in Spain were more 
concerned with the well-being of Moroccans in the host country rather than 
actively organising local development in Morocco. Moreover, their relationships 
with the state (host and sending) were difficult and even antagonistic.  
Lacroix argues that there is a transnational space defining a co-
development approach which is distinct from the official state-led policy. From 
his point of view, while there are different categories of developmental 
organisations successfully intervening in Moroccan sending regions, it is only 
the migrant-led organisations which can be the channel for a broader 
transnational approach to co-development (Lacroix, 2005: 18). Yet, 
notwithstanding some successful examples of so-called productive projects 
carried out by the migrant themselves at the local level on the basis of 
remittances, co-development seems hard to accomplish without an 
accompanying state-led policy pursuing economic growth. Thus, state 
interventions to reduce the cost of channelling funds and to encourage their use 
in productive projects are seen as priorities for both supranational and national 
institutions. It is questionable, however, whether Morocco is able to develop a 
model equivalent to the Mexican 3X1 Programme given the relatively recent 
emergence of NGOs in the country and relatively limited capacity of the state to 
engage at the local level. 
It may be that the late emergence of both well organised associations and 
of urban and international migrants engagement has constrained the scope for 
bottom up co-development in the country. This may be changing, however. 
Moroccan scholars assert that the liberalisation of communications empowered 
the relationship between those who stayed and those who migrated. At the 
same time, the Moroccan government‟s slow but steady opening-up of the 
political system created a need to find a channel of communication to express 
their needs. Fatima Mernissi suggests that the “democratisation” of access to 
telecommunications helped to facilitate greater youth involvement in civic 
initiatives. According to the Government‟s register the membership of NGOs 
increased from 7000 in 1995 to 30000 in 1999 (Ammor, 2003: 80). Moreover, 
the Moroccan government‟s inability to address most of the immediate demands 
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for social development may lead to a greater organisation in both the rural and 
urban sectors.  
From the perspective of Fatima Mernissi, M&D was successful not just in 
bringing together the diaspora and their communities of origin, but also 
reproducing a model which was followed for other towns such as the case of Ait 
Itkel (Mernissi, 1997). In 1995, Ali Amahane created the organisation Ait Iktel 
Association for Development. This organisation is an example of how the local 
J‟maa along with the communities and with the financial support from their 
migrants, have been able to organise in order to bring development to their 
towns. The projects facilitated the provision of water, electricity and education to 
the villagers, with considerable impact on economic activity. Irrigation channels 
have enhanced agriculture, electrification has changed social life and education 
for women has become possible. 35  According to its founder, the rural 
organisation has been strengthened by the adoption of a legal framework which 
has modernised the way the traditional communities are administered. 
Remittances are the tool for investment, but the accomplishment of successful 
projects must rely on democratic organisation at the local level (Lacomba, 2004). 
According to research conducted by de Hass, the migrant communities in 
the Souss have shown a level of organisation to invest in the agricultural sector 
based on the traditional organisation of the J‟maa. However, international 
migration has changed the hierarchical traditional organisation, which used to 
be based on the ownership on the land, to have influence in the community‟s 
decisions (de Hass, 2003). Property has become the most attractive sector for 
migrants seeking to invest their remittances. On the basis of my fieldwork, it 
was clear that towns in the traditional emigration area from the Souss were 
characterised by improvements in the urban infrastructure, household, and 
social-religious buildings. Thus, the enhancement of the town appears to be 
linked to the investments in property achieved by the migrants from the 
community. At the same time, international migration has empowered to a new 
                                            
35
See the note on the Aga Khan Prize awarded to this association.  
251 
 
 
 
migrant elite that, supported by their “wealth”, are able to conduct and invest in 
local projects.  
From the Moroccan government‟s perspective, the links between migrant 
organisations and the government should be institutionalised, and should 
constitute a political extension of Morocco‟s foreign policy. However, the 
Moroccan migrant organisations are still struggling to become incorporated into 
the institutional framework despite the existence of Moroccan governmental 
bodies created for that purpose. The Foundation Hassan II and the Minister for 
Moroccans Abroad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the main institutions 
which are attempting to strengthen the links with the Moroccan diaspora. 
However, the process is highly personalised in terms of the relationship 
between the King and his subordinates. One of the main activities during the 
year for the Foundation is to organise the return of migrants for the summer 
holidays.36 The King himself welcomes migrants coming from Europe at the 
border gate in Tangier, a symbolic gesture designed to consolidate the link 
between the Kingdom and the diaspora. The Foundation‟s goals are described 
as follows:  
“The Foundation Hassan II considers the richness, the diversity 
and the importance of the associative tissue created by Moroccans 
abroad in the host countries and is conscious of the important role 
they could play in defence of Morocco and our community abroad, it 
intends to develop a relationship with them based on permanent 
consensus, cooperation and consideration.” 37 
The Foundation Hassan II claims to have 1,464 registered associations 
that are recognised as pursuing development action in Morocco. Accordingly, in 
2005 there were 124 projects evaluated, although only 50% were already 
accepted. Interestingly, these projects are only for the benefit of Moroccans 
abroad, mostly those based in European countries such as Belgium, Spain, 
                                            
36 
Interview with official from Foundation Hassan II, June 2004 
37 
http: //www.alwatan.ma/html/Associations/index.asp Downloaded on June 25, 2006. 
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France, Italy, the Netherlands, Senegal, Switzerland, and even Canada. 38 
These projects are incorporated into the Strategic Plan of the Hassan II 
Foundation as part of a broader outreach programme to enhance institutional 
links with the Moroccan community abroad. The spheres of action are not only 
concerned with development, but also the promotion of studies on Moroccans 
abroad, social and cultural activities, and initiatives to promote Moroccan 
heritage among the young in the diaspora. The investment of each project is 
variable and its acceptance depends on the extent to which it is helping to foster 
the link between the diaspora and the Moroccan institutions (Rouyame du 
Maroc, 2003).  
While the roles of the Foundation and of the Ministry are supposed to be 
distinctive in terms of infrastructure and goals, in practice there is often an 
overlap that leads to a waste of resources. Moreover, it is worth noting that in 
none of the interviews carried out with Moroccan Officials was there any 
reference to co-development as a state policy. They spoke of Morocco‟s efforts 
in cooperating on migration control and in increasing political links with the 
European Union members. From those interviews, one must conclude that the 
"official" Co-development approach remains a rather unilateral policy from 
European governments which is implemented through “their” NGOs rather than 
with the cooperation of home governments or associations. 
Remittances have become a pivotal instrument for economic growth as 
well as a source for local development provided by the diaspora for “home 
towns”. Indeed, while Morocco‟s development policies are mainly funded by 
financial aid, foreign investment and trade oriented programmes, remittances 
are becoming increasingly important for the national economy. As regards 
development aid, Moroccan officials believe that the EU authorities did not 
pursue an effective strategy. In their view, enlargement of the EU had taken 
priority, leading to a focus on development in the prospective member states 
rather than in Morocco or other parts of North Africa and the Middle East. 
                                            
38
 Information on some of these projects are online:  
http: //www.alwatan.ma/html/Associations/index.asp 
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Instead, the Moroccan government relies on remittances sent by its population 
abroad rather than on French or Spanish cooperation for development. As 
Table 6-7 shows, there an obvious increase in these remittances. In some 
cases, these remittances have been directed towards local schemes. The 
J‟maa, which traditionally regulate the distribution of waters and settlement of 
disputes regarding the conflicts on water and communal labour, have become 
the basis for a broader organisational scheme to invest in communal projects 
(Lacomba, 2004). Some studies emphasise the importance of agriculture as the 
target for migrants‟ investment capital (de Haas, 2003a; Lacomba, 2004) while 
others highlight the channelling of remittances towards property (Sefrioui, 2005).    
Table 6-6 Evolution of Remittances from Moroccan Residents Abroad, 
1999-2003 (Thousands of Moroccan Dirhams) 
 Years Evolution 2003/2002 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 MDH % 
Bank 
Giros 
    11 509.9  13 108.9  17 689.8  18 912.2  21 263.7  +2 351.5 +12.4 
Postal 
Giros 
3 286.5  3 051.1  2 967.1  3 847.9  3 651.3  -196.6 -5.1 
Foreign 
Currency 
4 205.1  6 801.6  16 201.2  8 947.8  9 666.8  +719.0 +8.0 
TOTAL 19 
001.5  
22 961.6  36 858.1  31 707.9  34 581.8  +2 873.9 +9.1 
Source: Office des Changes Royaume de Maroc http: //www.oc.gov.ma/ 
 
The relation between the largest areas of recipients of migrants funds in 
Morocco correspond to their communities of origin. Interestingly, the distribution 
of bank deposits of Moroccan migrants is concentrated in the region of Oriental, 
followed by Tangier-Tetouan and the Souss (see Table 6.7). Moreover, there 
are specific localities within the regions that are outstanding as recipients of 
remittances and correspond to the traditional and new regions of migration. For 
instance, Benin Mellal receives 82.2 % out of the 100% in the region of Tadla. 
Similar patterns of concentration can be seen in the cases of  Casablanca 
(94.4%) and Rabat (67.6%).Meanwhile, traditional towns in the Souss such as 
Tiznit (29.9%)  and Agadir (23.9%) are outstanding as recipients as well as 
Nador (37.7%) and Oudja (19.9%)in the Oriental Region (Sefrioui, 2005). 
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Table 6-7 Distributional percentage of bank deposits owned by 
Moroccan migrants by region in 2003 
Region  % of Bank Deposits from   Non-
Resident Moroccan  
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia Al Hamra 0.2 
Marrakech_tensift – Al Haouz 2.8 
Meknès-Tafilalet 5.4 
Oriental  24.7 
Oued-Ed-Dahab-Lagouira 0 
Rabat-Salé- Zemmour-Zaer 6.2 
Souss-Massa-Daraa 9.3 
Tadla-Azilal 1.5 
Tanger-Tétouan 9.7 
Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate 7.2 
Other localities 5.3 
Total  100% 
Source: Foundation Hassan II, Kingdom of Morocco. 
6.3.4 Co-development in Northern Morocco: Bottom-up Local 
Development Supported by the Spanish Government 
To what extent can we see the emergence of bottom up co-development within 
Northern Morocco? Northern Morocco is the site for mega development projects 
designed to increase regional trade (as discussed in Chapter 4). Moreover, 
while the Tangiers Peninsula is not a region with high or intense emigration 
rates, it is an important crossing point for southern migration. In terms of being a 
source of emigration, the centre of the country has been more significant. As 
one of the researchers from Movimiento para la Paz y la Democracia y la 
Libertad (MPDL), Manuel Alonso, explains, while the EU identifies Northern 
Morocco as an emigration zone, it is the area of Benin Mellal in the centre-west 
of Morocco that has the highest levels of emigration. Along with Jurigba, Benin 
Mellal has been the principal new source of emigration to Spain, witnessing a 
seven-fold increase over the period of a decade (Ammor, 2003). In contrast, 
Moroccan researcher Mohammed Berriane concludes that, having compared 
Tangiers with the Riff and Atlantic regions, the latter two are more important in 
terms of the total number of emigrants. However, Tangiers increases its 
importance with regard to the emigration rate as a percentage of total 
population (Berriane and Refass, 2004). In any case, these researchers agree 
with the idea that Tangiers is the “door” to Europe. Legal and illegal migration, 
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smuggling, drug trafficking, the return of migrants, international tourism to 
Morocco, and legal and illegal trade are all focused on Tangiers and its 
maritime links. Pablo de Mass has named this highly dynamic frontier the 
“Moroccan Rio Bravo” in reference to the US-Mexico border. 
For the most part, however, it has been in Northern Morocco that Spanish 
co-development activities have been focused. The rationale for this support is 
contested. A member of the Spanish organisation taking part in these co-
development programmes launched by the AECI is convinced that Spain 
developed a humanitarian policy towards Northern Morocco to compensate for 
the harm done during the colonial era; or, in the words of this Spanish official, it 
assumed a “special responsibility for the development of ex-colonial 
territories”. 39  However, the geographical preference for Latin American is 
evident when comparing the total budget addressed to Morocco (Coordinadora 
de ONG para el Desarrollo (CONGDE), 2005). Table 6.8 refers to the total 
budget for decentralised cooperation achieved by the CONGDE.  
Table 6-8 Total budget and projects carried out by country. CONGDE 2003 
Country  Budget Total Projects Average 
Project  
Budget  
Total 
NGOs 
Peru €38,954,255  386  £100,918  53 
Honduras €30,536,368  336 £90,882  37 
Bolivia €29,469,135  321 £91,804  49 
Guatemala € 29,134,043  272 £107,110  43 
Nicaragua €29,018,286  298 £97,377  43 
El Salvador €23,917,311  232 £103,092  34 
Ecuador €21,148,872  267 £79,209  42 
Mozambique €19,263,252  143 £134,708  26 
Dominican 
Republic 
€14,996,423  153 £98,016  27 
Colombia €14,992,562  188 £79,748  36 
Palestine €14,636,674  83 £176,345  18 
India €14,100,785  389 £36,249  16 
Angola €12,533,413  90 £139,260  17 
Morocco €9,875,247  139 £71,045  23 
Source: CONGDE-Spain. 2005 
 
The Chair of NGOs for the MPDL in Morocco, Manuel Alonso, assesses 
Spain‟s policy of co-development in Morocco as a social and local development 
programme and argues that it is not intended to address the migration issue. In 
his view, the AECI‟s instruments – such as the Mixed Commission for Scientific 
Cooperation and the Annual Plan of Cooperation - do not consider migration a 
                                            
39 
Interview conducted with Manuel Alonso, MDLP, in Rabat, 2004.  
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priority. Indeed, raising migration issues is disruptive of wider development 
negotiations. In this sense, he concludes that migration control by enforcing 
border vigilance programmes is the option for the EU to deal with immigration. 
However, the official view of the development effort does give more emphasis to 
migration issues. This is the intention set forth in the PAIDAR, a development 
programme for Northern Morocco delivered in 2000 by the Spanish government 
as part of bilateral Cooperation. It offered guidelines for development in 
Northern Morocco which served as the basis for the Northern Development 
Agency and EU development actions. According to Jesús Rodríguez Andia, 
Director for Cooperation with Africa and the Middle East at the AECI, PAIDAR 
and GRECO are the two main strategies employed to deal with cooperation for 
development. The first aims to “develop the region and stabilise a constantly 
growing population” which accounts for 38% of emigration from Morocco to the 
EU (Berriane, 1996). The second identifies “co-development as a tool for 
returning migration” as well as readmission agreements with origin and transit 
countries and aims to carry out education and technical programmes to invest in 
the reinsertion of migrants in the labour market of the country of origin 
(Malgesini, 2003). Thus, there are several multilateral and bilateral mechanisms 
with shared similarities involved in the co-development paradigm affecting 
Northern Morocco.  
6.3.5 Decentralised Spanish Cooperation in Morocco 
While PAIDAR is a very specific development programme between the two 
governments, decentralised cooperation is attracting a large number of non-
government and government actors to the co-development scenario. The extent 
to which they can contribute to alternative local development is the question to 
be tackled in the next section. 
According to the scholar John Casey from the Universidad Autonomic de 
Barcelona, decentralised cooperation by Spain has been characterised as 
vertically linked to political parties and associations with corporate relations 
bound by governmental control and the lack of a knowledge base for 
management and organisational issues (Casey, 1997). In contrast to this 
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assessment, I found very enthusiastic Spanish or international organisations 
operating in Morocco with long-term experience in international aid. However, 
there were in many cases political, financial, and even cultural constraints which 
diminished their impact on development goals in Northern Morocco. In the 
interviews conducted during my fieldwork, these organisations themselves 
offered their opinions about these constraints and the Office for Cooperation in 
Morocco.  
In an interview with Juan Peña from the Technical Office for Cooperation 
at the Spanish Embassy in Morocco, he provided a list of the main 
organisations working in Morocco - Intermon, Cideal, CODESPA, Medicos 
Mundis, Medicos Sin Fronteras, Movimiento para La Paz la Democracia y la 
Libertad (MPDL) – that are formally or informally linked to the AECI. The Table 
6.9 summarises the DNGOs approached in both Spain and Morocco, with most 
of these based in Northern Morocco. Despite the limited number of NGOs 
working in Northern Morocco, as compared to those working in Central or Latin 
America, they do represent a potential model of co-development. He also 
explained that even though the assessment and evaluation process was difficult 
to perform, the organisations were reporting on their results and their use of the 
funds. However, it appeared that the activities of organisations were rather 
limited in their scope as far as encouraging bottom-up co-development was 
concerned. While the development sector is mostly focused on alleviating 
poverty, as mentioned previously, there are gaps where the migration issue 
could be addressed on the basis of transborder cooperation but where little 
progress has been made. Overall, co-development is not used as a tool or 
mechanism to either eradicate poverty or prevent migration from Northern 
Morocco. 
Interviews with DNGOs based in Morocco revealed a general view that co-
development is a demonstration of solidarity with the Moroccan population by 
Spanish DNGOs. However, the budget, infrastructure, cultural barriers, and 
extensive competing demands to alleviate poverty limit the impact of these non-
state actors. As Manuel Alonso from MPDL explains “the cooperation is to 
improve the living standards of the Moroccan population, it is not enough to 
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inhibit emigration”. He identifies structural reasons for the high levels of 
migration in such factors as the culture of migration, the inability of the labour 
market to integrate young professionals, the lack of opportunities to improve 
their economic condition as well as wage differences. Thus, a policy of 
cooperation should focus on these reasons to migrate. Sana Desalasi from 
Oxfam Morocco provided a similar assessment. This organisation also offers 
services in the sector working for the education of women and their insertion 
into society and the labour market. However, the goal is also to ameliorate the 
precarious conditions of vulnerable groups rather than attempt to inhibit 
migration. In her view, the reasons to migrate are promoted by the culture of 
migration perpetuated by Moroccan migrants settled in Europe: cars, household 
appliances, and remittances are not only status symbols; they also provide an 
incentive to migrate. 
Given their limited budgets, these DNGOs tend to cooperate with the 
Spanish development authorities in order to increase their impact. One example 
is that of CODESPA, a programme designed to provide training for those 
interested in starting a small business. However, before this step is taken it is 
necessary to secure funds in order to launch the project. NGOs serve as a link 
to financial organisations such as the Popular Bank and Al Amana which offer 
micro-credits. Nevertheless, a necessary prerequisite for making the loan 
application is that the person is already a micro-entrepreneur. Thus, NGOs play 
an important role by bridging the gap between the general population and 
financial actors. The weak associative tissue in Morocco also limits the co-
development potential, a factor identified by CODESPA as an obstacle to the 
expansion of projects. 
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Table 6-9 Summary of NGOs interviewed in Morocco 
NGO DESCRIPTION  Projects 
Intermon 
Oxfam 
The organisation is based in Catalonia, and the 
counterpart is in Morocco. The main office is in Rabat. The 
Office is linked to the central office in Barcelona. Oxfam 
Catalonia promotes the programmes. Here, they receive 
funds from local as well as central Government. 
Pioneer DNGO working in Morocco since 
1994  
The objectives of this organisation are in 
the sectors of health, education, and 
women‟s participation in the labour market. 
Projects address to women empowerment: 
Micro-business, women‟s rights under the 
family code, intra-family violence and 
education.  
MDLP. The main office is in Madrid, however they have a central 
office in Alhucemas.  
Pioneer DNGO working in Morocco since 
1995  
Projects in rural development, women 
empowerment, environment, civil society 
and infrastructure 
Professional Training, educational,  medical 
and legal attention for women in the Centre 
ANNAJDA for women victims of violence in 
Casablanca and Rabat 
Continuing education  and medical and 
legal attention for women in the  Centre 
ANNAJDA.  
Centre created for the legal, psychological, 
scholar and awareness for women victims 
of violence in Kenitra. 
Centre for documentation, training and co-
development 
Centre for the defence and promotion of 
women in Agadir, Southern Morocco. 
CODESPA The organisation has its central office in Tangiers. The 
interview identifies the lack of coordination with other 
NGOs when developing projects as one of the main 
problems. In fact, he identifies socially organised 
participation as one of the goals of this organisation.  
Pioneer DNGO working in Morocco since 
1995.  
Activities are focused on the promotion of 
self-employment, education, and 
democratic participation.  
Caritas 
 
Caritas is a Catholic organisation with offices all over the 
world. In the interviews held in Morocco and Spain, it 
seems that their participation depends upon the political 
environment. One officer in Barcelona denies the link 
between the government and the organisation given the 
political character of the Autonomous Government of 
Catalonia.  
Support to Subsaharians immigrants and 
vulnerable groups.   
 
Medicos 
Sin 
Fronteras 
 
This is an international organisation which has 
representation in most of the world‟s conflict zones. As the 
Director explained, there is no official link between the 
Spanish Government and the organisation; nevertheless, 
given the Spanish nationality of the Director, there has 
been informal coordination. In this sense the joint meeting 
held with other organisations and the Technical Office in 
Rabat serves as a way to coordinate support, although 
they do not receive funds as is the case with other NGOs 
Working in Morocco since 1997 
Health support to migrants and Moroccans. 
Emergency and humanitarian aid in case of 
natural disasters.  
Source: Interviews conducted by the author.  
 
Given their limited budgets, these DNGOs tend to cooperate with the 
Spanish development authorities in order to increase their impact. One example 
is that of CODESPA, a programme designed to provide training for those 
interested in starting a small business. However, before this step is taken it is 
necessary to secure funds in order to launch the project. NGOs serve as a link 
to financial organisations such as the Popular Bank and Al Amana which offer 
micro-credits. Nevertheless, a necessary prerequisite for making the loan 
260 
 
 
 
application is that the person is already a micro-entrepreneur. Thus, NGOs play 
an important role by bridging the gap between the general population and 
financial actors. The weak associative tissue in Morocco also limits the co-
development potential, a factor identified by CODESPA as an obstacle to the 
expansion of projects. 
Cultural differences might also influence the lack of understanding 
between Spanish NGOs and their counterparts. One of the interviewees 
referred to a lack of initiative to become micro-entrepreneurs based on the 
religious belief that everything is in God‟s hands. Furthermore, there is the case 
of low levels of involvement by women in productive activities after marriage. 
Accordingly, within this culture, the preference to migrate has tended to prevail 
over interest in developing entrepreneurial activities. Government interaction 
also seems to be weak given the lack of state resources. Still, Oxfam did 
highlight the efforts of Moroccans to support one of their programmes, although 
NGOs do not usually receive funds from the Moroccan government.  
In terms of the NGOs‟ independence from Spanish interests focusing aid 
on the North, one organisation - Oxfam Morocco - explains that multi-source 
funding allows them to act more independently. Thus, while Northern Morocco 
could be a priority for the AECI, Oxfam works throughout Morocco. According to 
interviews with AECI‟s officials, 95% of Spanish co-development funds and 
actions are concentrated in the Northern Morocco region in the region of 
Tangier and Tetouan.  
One of the criticisms levelled at cooperation is related to objectives as well 
as assessment and evaluation. The Office of Cooperation points to the lack of 
NGO infrastructure to evaluate the impact of action. Thus, once funds are 
assigned it is the responsibility of the NGO to channel them to Moroccan 
counterparts, following the guidelines of Spanish cooperation. This particular 
point leads to the conclusion that the lack of a proper evaluation process is one 
of the weak links in assessing the real impact of co-development as a policy. 
However, it could also be argued that one of its strengths is the proliferation of 
actors involved in this co-development initiative, both government institutions 
and non-governmental organisations, as well as the non-official participation of 
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religious organisations, universities, and civil society. For instance, the 
Complutense University now offers a Masters programme which provides 
training in cooperation for development programmes. The programme helps 
people understand the administrative process involved in applying for projects 
as well as the structure of government institutions in charge of this policy. One 
of its concerns is the development of a methodology to evaluate the impact of 
co-development projects.  
 According to de Haas (2006a), Catalonia is one of the most active regions 
in strengthening transnational development. Local/national NGOs and/or the 
Government, along with migrant-based associations, are engaged in 
development programmes in both Spain and Morocco. On the basis of my 
fieldwork, however, the interaction between Moroccan migrant-based 
organisations in Spain was sporadic and they were not heavily involved in the 
majority of AC co-development actions in Morocco. On the basis of interviews 
and observation, I found Moroccan organisations working in Spain to be 
focused mainly on activities related to employment, integration and legal advice 
for assisting Moroccan immigrants. 
This is a particular concern because those Moroccan migrant 
organisations such as ATIME are working along with REMCODE without any 
support from the Spanish authorities. The lack of a link between Spanish NGOs 
and migrant associations in Morocco and Spain has also been criticised, 
particularly given the formal commitment in the 2004 Plan for Cooperation 
which stressed co-development as an objective.  From the standpoint of 
Moroccan migrant associations, this lack of involvement could be explained by 
factors related to the government–migrant relationship and economic and 
political systemic constraints in Morocco. 
Juan Carlos Andreo from the Junta de Andalucía attributes the 
problematic relationship between Spanish and Moroccan organisations (and 
their concentration of activities in the North of the country) on the late 
emergence of Moroccan DNGOs and the lack of trained Spanish DNGOs. 
These factors constrained the potential for a collaborative development agenda 
in Morocco in the 90‟s. Over the period, however, the democratisation process 
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led to the emergence of an organised civil society which the Spanish DNGOs 
could work with on development projects (Andreo, 2001). At the same time, 
AECI funds were increased after 1995 for the training of professionals to work in 
Morocco. Subsequently, there has emerged a small but well organised cluster 
of Spanish DNGOs in Morocco. 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the extent to which there has emerged a 
“bottom up” co-development strategy. Comparing the specific cases of Mexico 
and Morocco allows us to understand the dynamics between the state and the 
diaspora in this policy as well as the potential of co-development as a 
mechanism to influence local development in sending communities. Interactions 
between migrant organisations and both the hosting and receiving countries, 
together with the possibilities for migrant led transnational actions, were at the 
heart of the chapter.  
The distinction between the process and the policy of co-development 
becomes evident when distinguishing the actors and their objectives. The 
categorisation of participating NGOs requires us to distinguish between various 
groups: groups based in the host country seeking to participate in co-
development in the sending country and groups representing the migrants in the 
host country. The first category embraces those NGOs involved in a co-
development policy implemented by the host country (principally the Spanish 
authorities). The second category refers to the migrant associations in the host 
country carrying out local projects in their communities of origin as part of a 
state-led program, as in the case of Mexico or acting independently of the state 
as in the case of Morocco. 
These groups interact with public authorities in quite distinct ways. The 
emergence of home country NGOs has often been in tension with governments 
in the home countries. By contrast, the state-led programmes for co-
development in Mexico, as in the case of the 3x1, have promoted the increase 
of hometown associations involved in local development projects. Meanwhile, 
the Spanish government has fostered the inclusion and expansion of Spanish 
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DNGOs to work on development projects in Morocco but with limited impact. 
The Moroccan associations in Spain, however, are not involved in the Spanish 
co-development policy and have limited contact with the Moroccan authorities.  
The case of Spain is a singular one in terms of how co-development 
organisations deploy policy within a decentralised and complex system. The 
effects of such decentralisation have been mixed. While potentially providing a 
powerful mechanism for co-development, an assessment in situ of actual 
projects showed an overlap of DNGOS funded by the AECID and the sub-
national governments. More generally, Spanish policy has been limited in terms 
of geographical concentration in the Northern Province. At the same time, the 
DNGOs have faced constraints to reach an extensive action in Morocco in 
comparison to their activities in Latin America. Cultural, bureaucratic, 
organisational and political constraints appeared to be limiting their participation. 
The lack of inclusion of migrant association in Spain into the co-development 
programmes  can only be explain in terms of a national policy which embraces 
solely local NGOs.  
Regarding the North American case, the co-development policy implied in 
the bilateral agreements issued from the P4P (discussed in Chapter Five) was 
principally focused upon channelling the flow of remittances in a more efficient 
way. Compared with the Spanish case, the US as a host country lacks a policy 
which would match DNGOs with local development programmes (with the 
possible exception of the P4P). Instead, it has been Mexico, as a sending 
country, which has carried out a state-led programme to promote migrant 
associations and their involvement in projects in their home communities. The 
increase of associations stands out as an achievement, although the limited 
entrepreneurial and productive projects have raised the question of its efficiency 
in channelling remittances into profitable projects. Nevertheless, the benefits of 
the 3x1 are reflected in enhancing the transparency, distributional equity and 
transnational politics as results of a greater interaction between the HTAs and 
the local governments. 
Regarding the institutionalisation of the state-diaspora relationship, both 
Morocco and Mexico have initiated a more active approach to their nationals 
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abroad. The development of a foreign policy to improve relations with migrants 
abroad has also been accompanied by reforms in the migratory policy which 
grants citizen rights to reinforce the links with the diaspora. However, there are 
important differences between the policies pursued by the Mexican and 
Moroccan governments. While the 3x1 policy represents a tangible involvement 
of migrant associations in the policy, the Moroccan government remains largely 
inactive in this field. The lack of trust in the governmental bureaucracy seems to 
be the factor that explains an autonomous co-development strategy pursued by 
the migrants. Also, the limited organisational capability in the case of the 
Moroccan associations in new destination countries could also explain the 
limited approach from the Moroccan government. Thus, Mexico has been more 
successful in reaching the diasporas by relying on a wide Consular 
infrastructure in the US and greater political and institutional resources to 
involve the migrants in the social programmes.  
Potentially, the Mexican and Moroccan hometown associations could be 
central actors in pursuing co-development, playing a trans-national role in 
promoting the development of their communities. However, the extent to which 
they do so in practice is quite uneven. Indeed, the main constraint to foster co-
development is the capability to allow the transnational interaction, which could 
lead to an increase of remittances. Theoretically, the transfer of development is 
through remittances articulated by a multi-level organisational scenario, 
however most of the time migrants lack transnational ability. A more restrictive 
migratory policy also undermines the transnational movement. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, migration patterns have changed dramatically over the last two 
decades, with family reunification, migration control and integration replacing 
circular migration and affecting transnational action. Communal belonging and 
social capital are elements that facilitate the channelling of hometown 
associations in both the Mexican and Moroccan cases. New sending regions, 
where circular migration is less feasible than in traditional regions, have 
experienced a more disperse use of remittances making communal 
organisation less tangible and resulting in a lack of well-formed associations 
abroad. The extent to which the government can boost co-development in 
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sending countries also depends on the interests of the state and local 
authorities.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
The objective of this thesis has been to analyse the policy of co-
development and its links to migration in the cases of Mexico and Morocco, 
both as polities in their respective regional settings. In order to identify their 
similarities and differences as countries of migration, the review of historical and 
new patterns of migration served to establish the criteria for comparison. 
Subsequent analysis compared the policy of development at the macro-level 
and identified current thinking on the migration–development nexus and its 
overlap with the governance of migration. The thesis adopted an approach 
which drew upon the concept of multi-level governance to analyse the way that 
migration and development were addressed by different tiers of government 
ranging from sub-national units to international regional frameworks as well as 
national authorities. In addition to examining the interaction between different 
levels of government, our analysis also examined the role of civil society in 
these policy areas. Our multi-level governance approach was accordingly 
informed by insights from the literature on transnationalism which provided the 
tools for analysis of the micro-level, including bottom–up initiatives, and its 
comparison with “top-down” policies at the macro level. 
In this context, the concept of co-development has emerged as an 
alternative way of promoting development and integrating the migrant as an 
agent of cooperation. However, underneath the political rhetoric, we can identify 
how the process and mechanisms converge and move towards a single goal: 
stemming migration from the “South”. At the regional level, I found the MEDA 
and the PPP to be trade-oriented economic policies which were partly informed 
by a desire to halt migration in the long term. Meanwhile, the state-led policies 
of sending countries became more oriented towards engagement with the 
diaspora in an effort to increase remittances as a factor in development. To a 
great extent, however, these activities built upon the initiatives of migrant 
associations and sending communities to promote local development.  
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In this conclusion to the thesis, I summarise the findings of my research on 
a comparative basis, looking at the changing patterns of migration, the evolving 
debate on migration and development – with particular reference to the role of 
remittances – and the governance of migration. The chapter summarises the 
multi-level analysis of co-development as a “top down” phenomenon in the 
regional and bilateral settings and as a “bottom up” initiative amongst the 
migrant and sending communities. On this basis, I discuss the usefulness of the 
multi-level approach adopted in the thesis and consider some of the lessons 
which could be learnt from the North American and Euro-Mediterranean 
experiences. 
7.2 Comparing the cases of the EU-Spain-Morocco and the US-
Mexico 
7.2.1 Patterns of migration  
While there are important differences between the countries, particularly 
as regards the aggregate and average levels of income, they also share a 
number of characteristics such as high levels of poverty (approximately 20% of 
the total population1) and of unemployment amongst their predominantly young 
populations(Banque Mondial, 2002; Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
(SEDESOL), 2003). There are also important similarities between the countries 
in terms of their migration profiles. Both countries have similar rates of 
emigration, close to 9% of the population, and there are similarities in their 
relationships with their Northern neighbours in terms of the development of 
interdependent labour markets within their respective regions (though arguably 
this aspect is more apparent in the North American case). As economic 
migrants, Mexicans and Moroccans have clearly contributed to the economic 
expansion of their “Northern” neighbours during the post-WWII period and have 
been subject to hostile immigration policies when economic recessions have hit 
(Bustamante, 1976a; Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002: 19). Analyses of migration 
trends have identified similar dynamics in each case in relation to processes of 
globalisation, the interdependence of labour markets, the development of social 
                                            
1 
Though this figure is contested in the case of Mexico where some analysts claim the 
percentage of people living in poverty is closer to 50%. 
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networks and cultural factors. The Straits of Gibraltar and the Rio Bravo 
constitute geographical reference points serving as borders separating the 
“North” from the “South” and sending from receiving countries, and present 
significant risks and even human disaster for migrants crossing these borders.   
Moreover, the migrant profile in both countries is characterised by 
changing trends in relation to the socio-economic and demographic profiles of 
migrants. In both countries cities have become an increasing source of new 
migrant flows to the “North”. In addition, there are important directional shifts in 
migration as both countries – traditionally classified as senders – are now 
receivers, becoming transit points for “Southern” migrants in search of new 
labour markets. For almost a century, various authors have always referred to 
Mexico as the main exporter of labour force to the US. However, less well 
studied is its status as a transit country for Central American migrants moving to 
the US as a final destination, or its own status as a recipient of migrants, 
primarily in the Southern states. A similar pattern of long-term relationships and 
changes that are more recent can be seen in the Moroccan case. Morocco has 
strong historical migration links to specific countries such as France, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium. While these countries were the primary destinations 
for the Moroccan migrant population over the last 40 years, in the last two 
decades, Spain and Italy have become important destinations. As in the case of 
Mexico, there have also been important changes in the demographic 
characteristics of Moroccan emigrants. 
7.2.2 Migration and development 
A key theme of the thesis has been the way in which the relationship between 
migration and development has been understood- in both the academic and the 
policy realms - and how those ideas have informed the pursuit of co-
development. Trade and migration have been generally regarded as substitutes 
– increased trade would foster development and curtail the need for migration. 
The conventional wisdom on development has accordingly emphasised trade 
liberalisation, drawing on the ideas of the “Washington Consensus” which stress 
macroeconomic stabilisation and microeconomic liberalisation. This emphasis is 
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particularly apparent in the work of the World Bank (whose diagnosis of 
economic conditions in Mexico and Morocco was examined in Chapter 3). The 
policies supported by the Bank in its Strategy Papers for the two countries 
share an emphasis on market openness, democratisation and regional 
integration as determining factors for economic development. It is in this context 
that initiatives such as the Plan Puebla Panamá and the MEDA have to be 
considered. 
Such policy recommendations have, of course, been subject to the 
criticism that they did little to eradicate poverty and contributed to greater 
inequalities within those societies, calling into question how far they could 
address the root causes which were considered to lead to migration. The World 
Bank‟s measurement of poverty – which defines the poverty line as USD $1 a 
day - is inaccurate in the cases of Mexico and Morocco. Moreover, the overall 
measures of income per capita obscure the levels of income inequality in such 
countries. Without an understanding of such income gaps, the World Bank‟s 
assessment of factors contributing to rural-urban and international emigration is 
deficient. 
In any case, for the most part, the World Bank and other supporters of the 
Washington Consensus initially paid little attention to questions of migration 
(with some exceptions such as the Zedillo Report), mainly considering it as an 
indirect consequence of a lack of development which would be solved by the 
adoption of the appropriate economic reforms. More recently, however, the 
World Bank and other parts of the development establishment have given 
greater weight to migration and its potential contribution to development. 
Remittances have been at the heart of this debate. 
7.2.3 Financial Remittances as a tool for development. 
Over the course of the last decade, bodies such as the International 
Labour Office (ILO), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) have given greater emphasis to the importance of remittances. 
Remittances have been studied at the macroeconomic level by these 
international institutions. The WB, the ILO and the IOM have issued 
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recommendations to facilitate the flow of remittances through formal channels 
and to facilitate their use in productive projects (Puri and Ritzema, 2005; Ratha 
and Riedberg, 2005; International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2009).  
However, prevailing ideas differentiate between trade and remittance 
macroeconomic policies on the one hand from the movement of labour as a 
factor of production on the other, emphasising the former at the expense of the 
latter. Moreover, there are some questionable assumptions about the impact of 
remittances on poverty. While the World Bank‟s Strategy Papers have given 
greater emphasis to remittances, there has been criticism about the way in 
which they are regarded as a tool for alleviating poverty. The main criticisms 
offered by Mexican scholars concern reliance on remittances as a part of social 
policy, arguing  that the recipients of remittances in Mexico are not from the 
poorest social groups and that not all Mexican migrants send remittances 
(Cortina et al., 2005). Furthermore, the links between poverty and migration 
override the fact that migration is constrained by the availability of resources 
and it is therefore not the poorest sector of the population that migrates as has 
regularly been assumed in migration studies (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002) . 
However, such shortcomings in the World Bank‟s analysis of the links 
between remittances and poverty alleviation should not detract from the positive 
role which remittances (and, indirectly, migration) can play in fostering debate. 
Hence, the academic debate is shifting its attention to the link between 
migration and development, analysing the positive consequences on 
development due to the intervention of the financial remittances as well as the 
political and cultural remittances which boost development in the sending 
country, at the macro and micro level. The macroeconomic importance of 
remittances is significant for both countries: in the case of Mexico, they account 
for 2.5% of national GDP and 9% in the case of Morocco in 2007. Monetary 
remittances of $16 billion dollars in Mexico outstrip Foreign Direct Investment, 
while remittances of $3.4 billion dollars in Morocco by 2002 were equivalent to 
81.3% of the trade deficit. Both the Mexican and Moroccan governments have 
benefited from an increase in the total remittances received annually which 
contribute to the balance of payments. At the micro levels, migrants are 
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increasingly perceived as a crucial factor of development as remittances have 
been translated into the enhancement of their communities, providing a strategy 
to improve living standards in the migrant‟s home families. 
7.3 The Governance of Migration and Development: “Root 
causes”/Co-development/Migration Control-security. 
When used as a tool to stem migration, co-development serves as a 
mechanism engaging different levels of interaction between state and non-state 
actors. There is multi-level and cross-cutting confluence of actions addressing 
the alleviation of poverty and return or integration. This process was examined 
from three main perspectives and in each case policy objectives, as well as 
intervening actors, were examined to establish the parameters of the co-
development paradigm. 
The findings highlight how the policy rhetoric has stressed a positive 
relationship between increased support for development and decreased rates of 
migration. However, the position of migrants in this rhetoric is less clear: not all 
development-migration linked policies include migrants as active participants 
and many of them consider migrants as mere subjects. The role of the migrant 
in both academic and policy discourses indicated the need to highlight different 
understandings of co-development and to differentiate between state-led 
actions and the spontaneous initiatives of non-state actors. This thesis has 
therefore sought to differentiate “co-development policy” from “co-development” 
in its analysis of the migration-development nexus at the three main levels or 
dimensions: international and regional agreements, host and sending country 
bilateral relationships and organised civil society and migrants as non-state 
actors.  
In the course of the research, it became clear that nature of the migration-
development nexus was increasingly informed by considerations of control and 
security. This tendency was particularly strong after September 11 2001 when 
issues of migration became increasingly associated with security concerns 
regarding the threat of terrorism. Questions of border control were particularly 
important, compounding the sensitivity of an issue which was already 
domestically controversial informed by xenophobic reactions and anti-immigrant 
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responses in host countries. In this context, co-development as an EU policy 
has essentially been designed to ensure cooperation from sending countries, 
firstly as a proposal to address the root causes of migration and secondly to 
secure borders. Meanwhile, with respect to NAFTA, cooperation to secure 
southern borders was linked to the prospect of preferential treatment in the use 
of legal channels for dealing with the labour surplus from Mexico.  
7.3.1 International and Regional Agreements 
As noted, a central part of the development strategies followed by Mexico and 
Morocco (and encouraged by the main international financial institutions) has 
been economic liberalisation. In both cases, those reforms have included an 
engagement with processes of regional economic integration – NAFTA and 
EuroMed. Both regional frameworks are principally based on the promotion and 
enhancement of free trade and economic liberalisation in their respective areas. 
These agreements contemplate cooperation for development based primarily 
on a free trade perspective and, to varying extents, development aid. Each 
region takes a different approach to the migration issue, however. NAFTA 
scarcely addresses migration issues, though they are covered by other 
mechanisms for North American cooperation. In the Euro-Mediterranean 
regional framework, the treatment of migration issues is more explicit and is 
largely shaped by the EU‟s policy on immigration and border security.  
Underlying these frameworks is the neoclassical assumption that it is 
possible to stem migration if trade is increased. The goal of trade policy is 
based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory which establishes that “trade liberalisation 
increases remuneration to the factor whose supply is relatively abundant 
domestically when compared with the rest of the world” (Gordon and 
Spilimbergo, 1998: 18). In this sense, relatively speaking, Mexico and Morocco 
have a surplus unskilled labour force compared to the skilled labour force in the 
US and the EU. According to this logic, trade liberalisation is expected to reduce 
the income gap by raising wages for unskilled labour in Mexico as well as in 
Morocco.  
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This is the development policy that serves as the basis of NAFTA: 
development will raise living standards of the population in Mexico and the long-
term result would be reduced migration. For both the Mexican and US 
governments, NAFTA was to be one part of a broader hemispheric agreement 
on free trade. While the latter has not been attained, the prospect of integration 
was one of the drivers for the Plan Puebla Panamá. The Plan was intended as 
a programme to develop and integrate the economies of Central America and 
the Southern states of Mexico into the broader North American economy. The 
Plan was characterised by a number of challenges - including political 
opposition and implementation problems – and its impact was primarily confined 
to improving the region‟s energy and transport infrastructure, changes which 
had a limited impact on the region‟s economic development.  However, while 
the consequences of the PPP for migration were, in this respect, also limited, in 
other respects it marked an important change. The PPP not only established a 
system of monitoring migration flows but also became one element of policy 
shift towards stricter border controls containing migration from the South. 
Indeed, over the decade the regional treatment of migration issues was more 
focused on security and border control issues than on development. This was 
confirmed when, in 2005, a new trilateral agreement between Canada, Mexico 
and the US - the Security and Prosperity Partnership – set out a policy agenda 
which stressed border security but excluded immigration.  
The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement established a mechanism for political 
and economic cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners. It 
marked a new phase in relations between North and South insofar as there was 
a shift from seeing the Mediterranean as a key player in the balance of power in 
the bipolar system to seeing it as a less-developed region which presented 
challenges for political stability and migration-control. At the heart of the 
Agreement was a commitment to economic liberalisation, including the ultimate 
goal of a Single Market covering all the member countries as well as bilateral 
free-trade agreements between the EU on the one hand and the participating 
MENA countries on the other. However, while this goal would have created a 
much greater degree of integration than in NAFTA, the failure to achieve this 
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objective – along with other limits on the degree of trade liberalisation in the 
region – have meant that the Euro-Mediterranean integration has been more 
modest than that achieved within the North American model.   
In contrast to the NAFTA framework, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
also incorporated a programme of development aid – the MEDA – which sought 
to encourage trade-led growth in the MENA countries by funding infrastructure 
improvements. In the case of Morocco, the first phase of MEDA supported 
projects such as the building of roads to join rural areas in the North of Morocco. 
However, over time, MEDA – and indeed the EU‟s relations with its 
Mediterranean partners such as Morocco - have increasingly been informed by 
considerations of security. Whereas development cooperation was initially 
informed by a root causes analysis which sought to use aid to foster growth and 
reduce migration pressures, more recently migration has been seen as much as 
a security issue as it has been regarded as a development issue. This in turn 
has been reflected in significant elements of MEDA funds (and other EU 
budgets) being directed towards border security in Morocco.  
7.3.2 The Bilateral Dimension  
The regional context noted above has been an important influence and, to 
some extent, a constraint upon the way that sending and destination states 
have managed the migration issue. However, in many respects, this bilateral 
level has been central to the management of the migration-development nexus 
with diplomatic and domestic factors proving decisive. 
At the bilateral level, both Morocco and Mexico have shown similarities in 
terms of negotiating migration with their counterparts. However, my research 
indicates that the US–Mexico relationship has been more cooperative than that 
between Spain and Morocco. Overall, increased channels of communication 
resulting from the NAFTA integration process have facilitated agreements at 
levels from the Executive level down to deal with the migration issue. One of the 
explanations identified in the review of bilateral meetings at different levels is 
that these agreements appear to have increased after the signing of NAFTA 
due to closer economic ties between the countries. Moreover, the benefits of 
275 
 
 
 
the RIA are related to a stronger political relationship and a climate of trust for 
major investment between the two countries (Schiff and Winters, 1998).  In the 
case of Morocco‟s relations with Spain and the EU, there are fewer bilateral 
agreements, whether formal or informal, although these are on the increase. 
However, while each region is becoming more interdependent 
economically, political constraints exist and, in some cases, disrupt the 
relationship. Bilateral relations between host and sending countries fluctuate 
between cooperation and conflict with consequences for migration. Difficulties in 
the general relationship between Morocco and Spain (for example territorial 
claims) and between the US and Mexico have made cooperation on migration 
issues problematic while attempts to address the problems of drug trafficking 
and terrorism have directly impacted on the treatment of the migration issue in 
both cases. The extension of border controls to neighbouring countries in the 
south is also a pivotal element in the governance of migration since, while both 
Morocco and Mexico have made commitments to cooperate further in 
controlling these borders, the advantages they have obtained in terms of the 
treatment of legal migration have been limited.  
Moreover, in both cases there is a tension between the needs of the 
labour market and the conduct of migration policy. Based on the analysis of the 
Spanish and US labour markets conducted in Chapter 5, while the demand for 
unskilled (and in certain cases highly skilled) migrant labour should be 
considered  in the design of migratory policy, restrictive and selective factors 
have instead prevailed in relation to ethnic origin. This is clearest in the case of 
Spain where Moroccan migrants have been in competition with Eastern 
Europeans or Latin Americans for residence permits. Mexican migration has 
been less constrained – with  migrant networks and geographical proximity the 
facilitating factors – though the policies of Federal and State governments have 
often been in conflict (Massey and Espinosa, 1997). 
As a result, in both cases, irregular immigration is the consequence of 
inadequate migration policies that, rather than matching the labour market, 
respond to political and even economic variables. As described in Chapter 2, 
irregular immigration has been on the increase regardless of restrictive policy 
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and this issue has been addressed by both American and Spanish scholars in 
these two cases (Cornelius et al., 1994; Izquierdo, 1996; Bustamante, 2000; 
Cornelius, 2001; Izquierdo, 2005). In the US, since the Bracero Programme 
(1942-1964), illegal migrants seem to have been used as a form of manageable 
stock to keep production costs low and maintain US competitiveness (Calavita, 
1992). Quotas for legal migrants in sectors such as agriculture have proved 
insufficient to satisfy demand. Attempts to develop comprehensive migratory 
reform in the US following the amnesty programmes of 1986 and 1996 had 
limited success when dealing with the backlog of administrative regularisation of 
immigrants. In the case of Spain, different regularisations have also proved to 
be a consequence of inefficient migration policy. The main challenge for 
Spanish migration policy has been to maintain a balance between EU 
membership commitments and increased labour force demands in sectors 
requiring low-skilled migrants. This fact was reflected in the evolution of 
regularisation processes which were based on providing access to citizenship, 
legal residence and entry to those people from 2000-2001 in an attempt to 
balance labour market demands with the offer of immigrants. However, 
increased irregular migration was calculated to be almost double that of legal 
residents by 2004 (Izquierdo, 2004a: 23). This means that, in the case of Spain, 
migratory policy favoured flexible irregular migration as it was convenient for the 
business sector as in the case of the US. Thus, regularisation from 2005 was 
more ambitious in terms of reducing the backlog from previous regularisations.  
Another dimension of cooperation for development (more apparent in the 
North American than the Euro-Mediterranean case) is the emergence of public-
private agreements. An example of this was the Partnership for Prosperity, an 
agreement between the public and the private sectors from both the US and 
Mexico signed at the bilateral executive meeting in September 2001. The main 
goals of this agreement were to increase investment in specific productive 
areas and to promote development in sending regions. There was also an 
attempt to improve the treatment of remittances by reducing the costs of 
sending funds and to facilitate their reception by expanding banking services in 
the sending regions. However, while the initiative included a number of key 
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institutions and actors that were needed to ensure cooperation for development, 
the US perspective on the initiative was more focused upon business-oriented 
projects rather than involving in greater numbers the local communities or 
groups such as the HTAs. 
Trade and market liberalisation as substitutes for migration have 
constituted the principal component of cooperation for development for nearly 
two decades. Yet the impact of NAFTA has been to diversify the sources rather 
than to diminish the levels of migration. Predictions that migration would 
decrease according to the “migration hump” seem far from being the case. 
Instead, structural constraints have limited the competitiveness of Mexican 
producers in key primary economic sectors. Overall, the benefits of economic 
growth in Mexico have not been reflected in a fairer distribution of income or 
increase in employment, and consequently migration has remained at a high 
level.  
Nowadays, the increase in remittances has received most of the attention 
in bilateral efforts to ameliorate the migrant‟s family‟s living standards in the 
short run and to inhibit future migration in the long run. In other aspects of 
bilateral cooperation, however, a number of promising complementary initiatives 
have been constrained by state and local governments. For instance, the use of 
Mexican Consular ID or driving licenses as official documents which can be 
used to open accounts in American banks, thereby boosting the increase of 
remittances, has been rejected in some parts of the US.  
In the Euro-Mediterranean case, the role of development aid has been 
apparently much more significant. However, despite the rhetorical emphasis on 
co-development as a mechanism which implies a link between migration and 
development, Spanish aid projects are directed towards a wide range of topics 
(health, urban infrastructure, vulnerable groups, human rights, etc) and projects 
aimed at the migration-development nexus have to struggle for resources. At 
the same, the geographical preference in quantitative terms also indicates that 
cultural and foreign policy factors have resulted in a greater and more organised 
intervention in Latin American countries than in Morocco. Moreover, the 
absence of participation by the migrant associations, calls into question the 
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commitment behind those policies which do address migration-development 
issues.  
7.3.3 Migration and development from the bottom up: Migrants as 
Agents of Development 
So far, we have focused on the “top-down” aspects of co-development 
policy, highlighting the way in which it has interacted with broader programmes 
of economic liberalisation on the one hand and security on the other. However, 
it is clear that while we have identified the dynamics between different tiers of 
government, there are important aspects of co-development which have not yet 
been addressed.  
The research carried out in Chapter 6 sought to explore this aspect, 
focusing in particular upon the activities of hometown associations in the US 
and their efforts to channel remittances into their home communities in Mexico. 
As we have seen, such schemes have been supported in mainstream thinking 
on development and by agreements between governments to facilitate financial 
transfers. In practice, such bottom up initiatives have also involved the 
participation of home governments, and relationships between migrants and 
those authorities are often conflictual, due to differences in perception over what 
constitutes development (household and community benefits versus the 
promotion of businesses). Moreover, even if bottom-up initiatives from HTAs 
can be incorporated into local development programmes, there are structural 
constraints on boosting remittance–based development in an effort to stem 
migration. 
The bottom-up initiative embracing the cooperation between Spanish and 
Moroccan associations have been shaped by the national organisational 
characteristics of the decentralisation in Spain and the democratisation in 
Morocco. It is worth noting the decentralisation of the aid programmes carried 
out by the central and subnational government through the DNGOs. At the sub 
national level, the Autonomous Communities and Municipal governments have 
been following the guidelines provided by the central governments in terms of 
the co-development policy. Here, the inclusion of the migration issues is related 
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to the policy of immigrants‟ integration in Spain. Moreover, these subnational 
governments have shown also a geographical preference shaped by cultural 
and political interest. Hence, Andalusia and Catalonia, two regions that have 
large immigrant communities from Morocco, seem to be the most active in 
developing joint actions with the Moroccan government. Nevertheless, the 
concentration of resources in the Northern Provinces in Morocco has been 
questioned in terms of its impact on the regions which have been the source of 
migration.  
It has been said that Spanish DNGOs have followed the Spanish foreign 
policy guidelines the field of co-development, though they seek to complement 
the activities of other DNGOs operating in the country. However, it has only 
been recently that they have increased their commitment to the country; hitherto 
they focused most of their activities in Latin America.  
The research on the achievements of Spanish DNGOs working along with 
the AECID has shown that the implementation of such projects has been 
characterised by a number of organisational, cultural and political obstacles. 
The limited number of DNGOs and their concentration in the regions of Tetouan 
and Tangier indicates a failure to reach out to the poorest zones of Morocco 
and those considered source of migration. Thus, the Spanish DNGOs are far 
from being considered an example of good co-development practice. 
Nevertheless, their organisational capabilities and their growing interest in 
working with Moroccan associations indicate that there is the potential for 
improvement.  
At the same time, the democratisation process has contributed to a 
change in the way that home country governments have engaged with civil 
society. In the Mexican case, the growing pressures for democratisation in the 
1990s and the change in the Presidency in 2000 contributed both to greater 
activism on the part of groups and to a more engaged response from 
governments at various levels. To some extent, a similar process is under way 
in Morocco as NGOs and migrant associations have emerged as more 
autonomous entities from the state (in the past the regime had sought to control 
such organisations). However, the lack of professional and experienced 
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organisational capabilities, on the one hand, and, persisting tensions with the 
Moroccan government on the other, are factors which have constrained the 
potential of the NGOs to engage in local development programmes. Instead, it 
is the migrants abroad who, relying on the social capital gained with their 
remittances, are challenging the hierarchical and traditional organisation in their 
local communities to improve their families‟ living standards.  
Comparing the institutionalisation of the relationship of Government –
diaspora in the cases of Mexico and Morocco, both have been able to increase 
their channels of communications. However, the Moroccan organisations have 
not been included in a comparable state-led programme such as the 3x1 in the 
Mexican case. The research suggests that the institutional and consular 
infrastructure of the Mexican government and geographical concentration of the 
Mexicans  in the US have played an important role in the proliferation of the 
HTAs, whereas in the case of Morocco the spread of the diaspora in traditional 
and new destination regions have slowed down the process.  
7.4 The Heuristic Approach to Multi-level Governance.  
The primary contribution of this research has been in terms of its analysis 
of the issues of co-development and migration on the basis of fieldwork. 
However, this analysis was framed by a mixed approach to examining how 
those policies were pursued. Based on the assumption of a multi-level dynamic 
of interaction within the EuroMed and North American regions, the thesis has 
drawn upon the approach of multi-level governance, complemented by insights 
from the literature on regionalism and transnationalism. 
In terms of regionalism, our findings arguably support the use of a broader 
analytical perspective than a basic regional integration theory. Such theories 
tend to address the overall dynamics of integration rather than the specifics of 
particular policy issues. Clearly, the phenomenon of migration in our two case 
studies underlines the importance of understanding regionalism as a 
phenomenon which embraces much more than a particular set of rules and 
institutions. Drawing on Hurrell‟s model, it appears that the North American and 
Euro-Mediterranean constitute spaces of regionalisation beyond particular rules, 
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even if those rules may have an important impact. The movement of people 
from Mexico to the US and Canada and from Morocco to Spain and other parts 
of the EU are signs of an ongoing process of integration through migration. This 
is all the more important to highlight given the way that existing regional 
agreements either do not incorporate migration from abroad as a part of their 
liberalising arrangements or regard it as a problem to be addressed through 
control policies.  
Such a contrast demonstrates the importance of taking a wider view of the 
region than institutional arrangements. That is not to say that the formal 
structures of regional governance are not significant, however. On the contrary, 
they form a very important framework which impinges on the possibilities of 
migration and the pursuit of co-development policies. Similarly, it is clear that 
states are still very much at the heart of the policy process and diplomacy 
surrounding migration issues (as our discussion of the domestic and bilateral 
contexts indicates). We would, however, argue that focusing the analysis solely 
at this level would not provide a comprehensive perspective on the governance 
of migration in either region. In that respect, a wider sense of governance to 
embrace the role of non-state actors such as migrants and their organisations 
has been needed. In particular, understanding the transnational dimensions of 
the migrants‟ action and their relations with public authorities has been 
important. 
Our decision to adopt a multi-level governance approach was motivated by 
recognition that the migration-development nexus has manifest itself in a variety 
of institutional settings, relationships and practices. The way in which the 
processes of migration and development interacted – and more specifically the 
way in which co-development was pursued – required a conceptual framework 
which looked at activities across a number of tiers of authority and which took 
into account the practices and potential of protagonists beyond the state. 
It is clear that a full understanding of how migration and development have 
been treated in the two cases required a perspective which incorporated 
developments involving various tiers of public authority. However, it is also clear, 
particularly when considering co-development as a bottom up activity, that only 
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focusing on governmental actors was not sufficient. In that sense, adopting a 
“governance” – rather than simply a “government” - approach was also 
important, capturing the involvement of other actors as well as public authorities. 
Recalling Peters and Pierre‟s use of governance to convey the way in which 
power is dispersed as much outside the state as above or below it, the role of 
migrant organisations but also other civil society groups - whether engaged in 
managing the allocation of resources or to in discussing or challenging policies - 
has been an important part of the analysis. To understand those dynamics, we 
have drawn on the insights of transnationalism to complement our MLG 
approach. 
As we noted in Chapter 1, MLG is not a theory of regional integration in 
the same way as neofunctionalism or inter-governmentalism and as such it 
does not offer a causal model of integration. However it does capture the 
complexity of the way that issues are addressed in a regional setting: as 
Rosamond summarises the approach, it conveys the overlapping, multitiered 
structures within which government and non government actors operate 
(Rosamond, 2000: 110-111). While our earlier discussion of the thesis findings 
hopefully provides a sense of the multi-level framework, the Table 7.1 maps out 
both the roles of actors and what outcomes can be observed. 
Although MLG has emerged out of the study of the European Union – and 
was useful as a framework in which to examine the EuroMed migration 
development nexus - it is arguably less defined by EU circumstances and 
therefore easier to apply in other contexts – such as North America -than more 
“Eurocentric” approaches to integration noted above. From one perspective, it 
might have been considered to be of less relevance to the North American case 
given that NAFTA is, by comparison with the EU, institutionally thin, less 
endowed with powers and responsibilities, inter-governmental in its decision 
procedures and most importantly with only limited competence on migration 
issues. Yet the intensification of economic links, which followed NAFTA, seems 
to have created a variety of other forms of cooperation within the region.  
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7.4.1 Primacy of the Nation - State  
However, while MLG has allowed us to capture some important dynamics 
which other approaches might have missed, it would be wrong to suggest that it 
vindicates the arguments of those in the governance literature who claim that 
the nation state has been “hollowed out”. In fact, such claims were never part of 
the argument put forward by proponents of MLG. While advocates of MLG 
contrasted it with state centric approaches they did not reject the centrality of 
the state in policy making (Marks et al., 1996: 346) nor did they see MLG 
confronting state sovereignty directly (Marks et al., 1996: 371). 
It is clear that relatively speaking the role of formal regional frameworks for 
migration control is mixed, and that the extent to which it has emerged has been 
largely a function of the willingness of governments to permit the development 
of a shared competence at the regional level. Thus, with some very limited 
exceptions, migration did not figure in the NAFTA context nor in the subsequent 
SPP. In the EU setting, by contrast, it was more developed, reflecting perhaps 
the more “institutionalised” structures of the EU and its relations with 
neighbouring states. The fact that the EU was also developing a wider range of 
competences – such as migration and security – meant that its widening 
agenda was also incorporated into its economic and political diplomacy. 
In both regions, our analysis indicates that relations between nations 
remain at the heart of migration policy and that the preferences of those 
governments are very much shaped by domestic political considerations. Given 
the increased significance of security concerns in shaping migration policy the 
importance of the nation state is not surprising. Considerations of sovereignty 
have been central to this area of policy leaving some such as Guiraudon to note 
that migration control “is a domain rarely associated with MLG” (Guiraudon, 
2000: 251).  Yet as she goes on to show, a “vertical dimension” has emerged 
“given that all levels of governance have acquired prerogatives in this area” 
(Guiraudon, 2000: 252).  That relationship is to some extent apparent in the 
North American case but more in bilateral settings than in regional frameworks 
(though this may be as much due to geographical differences between the 
regions). 
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7.4.2  Subnational actors in Multi-level Governance  
An important strand of the multi-level governance approach is its attempt 
to integrate sub-national actors as a unit of analysis. We have noted a variety of 
roles played by these actors in each country: in Mexico, subnational 
governments are involved in coordinating the allocation of resources with 
migrant organisations and sending  communities; in Spain, subnational 
governments are involved in providing aid to countries of migration and 
implementing aspects of the national migration and integration policies; in the 
US, subnational governments have pursued their own policies on the treatment 
of migrants and implemented federal agreements.  In each case, there is 
considerable diversity in the commitment of these governments: some Mexican 
states are more effective in handling the 3X1 programme; some ACs have 
given more emphasis to providing aid to Morocco than other regions; some US 
states have been more obstructive in applying ID and other reforms to facilitate 
the opening of bank accounts. By contrast, the role of subnational authorities is 
less developed in the case of Morocco, largely due to the political context.  
Moreover, in such a setting, the boundaries between different levels of 
government can become blurred: due to the “absence of clear-cut distinctions 
between domestic and foreign affairs,.... local problems can become 
transnational”  (Rosenau, 1997: 38; Cited in Marks and Hooghe, 2004: 10).  
7.4.3  Multi-level Governance and Transnationalism 
Overall, the MLG approach adopted in the thesis has been usefully enhanced 
by taking into account the insights from transnationalism. Hitherto, there has 
been relatively little engagement between these perspectives. Tarrow‟s account 
of transnational activism refers to multi-level governance as characteristic of “an 
increasingly complex structure of internationalism” (Tarrow, 2005: 9) but notes 
that the approach itself has tended to focus on elite interactions “leaving citizens 
as objects of policy“ (Tarrow, 2005: 82).  By bringing in the insights from 
transnationalism and focusing upon the role of migrants as potential agents of 
development, our approach to MLG hopefully avoids some of the tendencies 
which Tarrow criticises. 
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Perhaps the value of our synthesis of MLG and transnationalism is most 
apparent where we look at the bottom up experience of co-development. It is 
clear that, without the insights from transnationalism, the MLG analysis of 
migration would not fully explain the case of Mexico and the interaction between 
Mexico‟s local governments and the Mexican diaspora in the US. Social and 
political demands initiated by Mexican migrants and addressed to their 
government created the economic and political power necessary to modify 
relations between them. The development of active state policies towards the 
diaspora has helped to shape a new political realm in both the host and home 
countries. Thus, the theoretical framework of transnationalism provided by 
Thomas Faist and Alejandro Portes serves to fill gaps in the multi-level 
approach. Since transnational action develops at different levels in the 
governmental and non-governmental fields, it possible to analyse a variety of 
relationships such as the relations between states (the “Transtate” as T. Faist 
conceives the actions of states across boundaries), State relations at 
supranational and multilateral levels and the relations states maintain with sub-
national entities. 
7.4.4  Multi-level Governance and Co-development 
Bringing together the different dimensions of multi-level governance in 
both regions on the one hand and the policies of co-development on the other, it 
is possible to explore the dynamics of the migration-development nexus in each 
case. 
Institutionally, as noted, the EuroMed region is “thicker” with more 
formalised structures (of treaty agreements, funding programmes, binding 
legislation etc) than the North American region. But in terms of an economic 
space it appears that the North American region is more densely integrated 
than the EuroMed. When we consider the manifestations of co-development 
these institutional and economic factors appear to shape the outcomes. In North 
America, the density of relations (and the associated patterns of migration) have 
permitted the development of a significant (if flawed) role for migrants in the 
diaspora and arrangements for managing the transfer and spending of 
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resources in home communities. By contrast in the EuroMed the mix of strong 
institutions and less dense economic interactions has not been associated with 
an equivalent degree of bottom up activity. Moreover, while arguably the formal 
framework for top-down co-development programmes is more established in the 
EuroMed than the North American region, its impact has been quite limited due 
to problems of implementation and the increasing importance of security in 
structuring the relationship between North and South. This suggests that the 
relative importance of institutionalised integration structures and de facto 
integration associated with economic interactions in terms of trade and 
migration might favour the former over the latter.  
Just as important in explaining these contrasts are the capacities within 
both the home countries and the diaspora communities. Arguably the 
administrative structures in the Mexican case are better geared and more 
responsive to the task of managing development. In terms of the migrant 
communities, it may be that the decisive factor is the more established status of 
the Mexican diaspora in many parts of the US compared with their Moroccan 
equivalents in Spain (a fact borne out perhaps by the less effective bottom up 
activities in hometown associations from relatively new migrant regions in 
Mexico). 
7.5 Lessons to learn 
What lessons can be learnt from the analysis of co-development in the two 
contexts? In particular, are there aspects of policies and practices in either of 
the regions which might be valuable for the other? What might be the 
constraints on transferring such approaches? 
One clear lesson, which emerges from the experience of both regions, is 
that top-down co-development programmes which focus on fostering economic 
integration and trade (or provide aid to facilitate such interactions) do not 
appear to constrain migration in either region. The reasons for this are difficult 
to pin down:  has trade delivered the development which some would argue 
might limit the urge to migrate?; if development has increased, what have been 
the distributional effects?; have the specific programmes (particularly on the aid 
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side) been effectively implemented? One factor which might be addressed is 
the element of discrimination within the regional agreements. In both cases, 
there is arguably a bias against the Southern partners in terms of the coverage 
of the agreement – particularly regarding the restrictions on agricultural 
products which characterised the trade diplomacy between MENA countries 
and the EU. In other respects however, there are clear implications for the 
governments of the sending countries as regards closing regional disparities. 
Turning to more specific aspects of co-development, there are potentially 
examples to follow but there are questions regarding how easy they are to 
replicate. As regards channelling remittances into community development, it 
appears that the Mexican experience is one which is on balance successful and 
which might be worth emulating. Arguably this system depends on some 
important contributory factors such as the establishment of a consular 
infrastructure to keep in touch with migrants abroad and to act as a coordinating 
mechanism, the emergence of a decentralised system of government which has 
empowered municipalities to implement the development programmes, the 
democratisation of the political system to facilitate the participation of 
community groups in both sending and home regions and the underpinning of 
social capital in migrant communities to provide the resources.   While these 
factors have been established in the most successful instances in Mexico, there 
are many cases where they are less well developed and it is debateable 
whether such mechanisms could be replicated in the Moroccan case given 
existing institutional and political circumstances. While migrant organisations 
have emerged in some destination regions, they have been primarily concerned 
with defending and establishing their interests in the host country. The national 
government has also sought to reach out to diaspora communities but it has 
been primarily focused on financing projects in the host countries and 
characterised by a paternalistic outlook, encouraging remittances but not willing 
to match those resources in home community projects. More problematic may 
be the adaptation of the bureaucratic and political settings: while some steps 
towards democratisation and administrative reform have been taken, the 
context is still one where most power is centralised and participation is limited. 
289 
 
 
 
Overall, while some elements might be replicable in other national contexts 
such as Morocco, others may be harder to transfer. 
Potentially the Spanish model of development assistance might be worth 
emulating in so far as in principle it embraces the co-development objective and 
disperses it to the subnational authorities who might be able to gear the 
resources to the needs of their local migrants‟ home countries and communities. 
The practical experience has been mixed given the problems in engagement 
between both sides but it arguably has potential. However, the circumstances 
are too different in the North American case. Given Mexico‟s status as an upper 
middle-income country, it is not likely to be a strong candidate for development 
aid (though USAID does provide limited resources for health programmes in 
poorer regions of Mexico). One possible model – noted in Chapter 1 – would be 
to replicate the system of regional development funds within the EU. However, 
such a distributive scheme goes well beyond the ambitions or the machinery of 
NAFTA. In any case, the record of accomplishment of PPP is not particularly 
encouraging on the potential of such resources to rebalance disparities between 
regions. 
In both regions, the development of regional agreements has either 
included mechanisms for dialogue amongst the governments or provided a 
catalyst for intensified dialogue. The US-Mexican experience - despite a 
number of disagreements and disputes - has been broadly more positive and 
extensive. Replicating that in the case of the EuroMed, and particularly between 
Morocco and Spain, is highly desirable but there are serious obstacles to 
overcome. The latter relationship appears to be more constrained by, on the 
one hand, a more difficult political context and on the other (and perhaps 
paradoxically) the much more institutionalised relationship between the 
countries. Whether such obstacles can be transcended is unclear but perhaps a 
start could be made by fostering better relations between the migrant 
communities on the one hand and destination country‟s public authorities on the 
other. 
However, in both cases, improving relations and establishing frameworks 
to address sources of tension and disagreement are likely to be constrained by 
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the political contexts in the destination countries. Public perceptions of 
immigrants and the securitisation of migration have made it more difficult to 
make such agreements. Indeed, migratory policies have become increasingly 
restrictive, in the process undermining some of the factors which have fostered 
bottom up co-development (e.g. the use of seasonal migration and the 
engagement with migrant communities). 
7.6 Final Remarks 
7.6.1 Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis has sought to provide a comprehensive overview of migration 
governance in the North American and Euro-Mediterranean regions. However, it 
remains clear that not all aspects have been addressed as fully as they could 
have been due to a combination of constraints on funding and timing as well as 
the availability of and accessibility to interviewees and information. In particular, 
a fuller account of the perspective of officials and politicians in the US (at both 
the federal and state levels) would have enhanced certain aspects of the 
analysis. Access to EU officials was mainly confined to Moroccan fieldwork 
while engagement with protagonists in the main institutions in Brussels would 
also have proved valuable.  
This thesis has raised a number of questions relating to the practice of co-
development and its impact. Since I have focused primarily on policy, a full 
evaluation of the effects of co-development has not been possible. However, it 
is clear that such evaluations need to be performed to establish whether and 
how the application of co-development policies and co-development practices 
on the ground affect the welfare of communities and their propensity to migrate. 
7.6.2 A Particular Assessment 
More generally, my research has left me with a number of fundamental and 
principled questions concerning the migration-development nexus. What is 
development? How can remittances be channelled into productive sectors? 
These questions need to be answered in a way that responds to the increasing 
need to create jobs for the 20% of the male population under the age of 25 in 
Morocco now seeking work. The answers should also respond to the problems 
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faced by agriculture where fields have been abandoned by owners who have 
migrated to urban centres and even abroad to escape poverty. 
In the comparison of Mexico and Morocco, it was shown that both 
countries rely on transnational communities which have proved to be channels 
of development for their home communities. These communities help to foster a 
degree of social capital which encourages the channelling of remittances to 
serve as a source of capital to be used to boost the economy in the migrants‟ 
countries of origin. However, Government help together with conscious 
cooperative willingness from receiving countries is needed to make this possible. 
Reducing the cost of sending remittances is also important and this requires 
participation by banks in order to channel and release credit to migrants. There 
is, moreover, still a lack of co-responsibility on the part of sending and receiving 
countries to consider transnational workers as members of both societies rather 
than just units of economic benefit. These people should be granted political 
rights in the country of origin and comprehensive economic and political 
integration in the receiving country. A transnational worker would not hesitate to 
continue investing in his country of origin for sentimental reasons, but at the 
same time, this worker is participating economically in the host country. 
Therefore, co-development is a spontaneous action performed by migrants 
seeking to maintain links with their community of origin. Financial transfers, as 
well as political, social and technological transfers, form part of a complex 
transnational dimension in which co-development emerges. Both receiving and 
host governments should therefore create adequate mechanisms for 
channelling the benefits of transnationalism. Receiving countries would need to 
improve integration policies, temporary labour agreements, and dialogue with 
the sending countries to diminish political misperceptions while sending 
countries should provide guarantees to nationals abroad by increasing their 
human rights protection through consulates and improving their access to local 
investment which requires a combined effort between local government and the 
banking system.  
A mutual understanding in terms of controlling borders is crucial. How can 
the benefits of a globalised liberal economy be received if only capital flows are 
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welcome and the labour force is restricted to “desirable migration”? All forms of 
violence should be punished and prevented. However, should those people who 
attempt to cross borders continue to die as a result of increasingly repressive 
immigration controls? 
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Annex: List of Interviewees.  
ID NAME POSITION  ORGANIZATION COUNTRY On 
record 
1 Alfredo Martínez de 
la Torre 
Under Secretary for 
Investment Promotion 
Chiapas State 
Government 
Mexico yes 
2 Ahmed Ben Amin Coordinator for 
Education's Department 
ATIME Spain no 
3 Francisco Javier 
Bernáldez Fernández 
Chief for the 
Observatory Service in 
Immigration and 
Refugee Policies 
Migration and Social 
Services, General 
Secretary for Social 
Affairs, Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs 
Spain no 
4 José Angel Sotillo 
Lorenzo 
Director University's Institute of 
Development and 
Cooperation 
Spain yes 
5 Berta Alicia Escobar 
Enríquez 
Treasury of Fundacion 
Colosio 
Ex-official for Migration 
Services in Veracruz's 
State 
Mexico Yes 
6 Cecilia Romero 
Castillo 
Senator, President for 
the South American 
Commission 
Mexican Senate Mexico yes 
7 Fernando Margain -B Senator, President, 
Foreign Affairs 
Committee 
Mexican Senate Mexico no 
8 Juan Peña Fernández General Coordinator Office for Technical 
Cooperation, Spain's 
Embassy in Morocco 
Morocco no 
9 Manuel Lorenzo General Coordinator in 
Morocco 
Movimiento por la Paz, el 
Desarme y la Libertad 
Morocco no 
10 Louis Dey Chief for Programs, Delegation for the 
European Commission at 
Morocco, European Union 
Morocco no 
11 Ismail Hijji Chief of the Partenariat 
Department, 
Direction for Cooperation 
and Partnership,  Agency 
for Nothern Region 
Morocco no 
12 Carlos Alberto 
Martinez 
Minister for Economic 
Affairs 
Mexican Embassy USA no 
13 José Antonio Alonso Director, Institute Complutense of 
Foreign Affairs Studies 
Spain yes 
14 Gerald Collange Directeur -Adjoint Agency for French 
Cooperation 
Morocco no 
15 Carlos Gonzalez 
Gutiérrez 
Executive Director Institute of Mexicans 
Abroad, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Mexico no 
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16 Deborah Waller 
Meyers 
Policy Analyst Migration Policy Institute USA yes 
17 Javier Gabaldón General Coordinator Medicos sin Fronteras Morocco no 
18 J. Ernesto López-
Córdova 
Economist Inter-American Bank 
Development 
USA yes 
19 Alejandra Vallejo Coordinator for 
Institutional Affairs 
Inter-American Bank USA no 
20 Andrew D. Seele Director, Mexican 
Institute 
Woodrow Wilson USA no 
21 Julien Millet Attache Commercial Mission Economique, 
French Embassy 
Morocco no 
22 Hipólito Vázquez 
Barragán 
Technical Cooperant Fundacion Codespa Morocco no 
23 Onésimo Hidalgo Member CIEPAC Mexico no 
24 Alicia González 
Ceresero 
Secretary for Social 
Development, 
Veracruz State 
Government 
Mexico yes 
25 María Angustias 
Parejo 
Professor University of Granada Spain no 
26 Juan Manuel 
Sandoval Palacios 
 General Coordinator Seminario Permanente de 
Estudios Chicanos y de 
Fronteras 
Mexico yes 
27 M. Abdessalam El 
Ftouh 
Directeur du Pole 
Economique 
Foundation Hassan II Morocco no 
28 Oscar Luebbert Senator, Committee  for Northern 
Border Affairs 
Mexico yes 
29 Serafín Rios Senator Committee for Northern 
Border Affairs 
Mexico yes 
30 Minister Angel Yunes Diplomat Under Secretary for Latin 
America, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
Mexico yes 
31 Jesús Rodríguez 
Andia 
General Director for 
North Africa 
Agency for Spanish 
International 
Cooperation, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
Spain no 
32 María Gracia Sánchez 
de Torres 
Technical Chief for North 
African General 
Direction 
Agency for Spanish 
International 
Cooperation, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
Spain yes 
33 Rosa María González Chief for Cooperation 
and Development 
Department 
Madrid's Comunity 
Government 
Spain yes 
34 Tomás Vera General Director for 
Cooperation and 
Development 
Madrid's Municipality Spain yes 
35 Bernábe López Professor Universidad Autónoma de 
Madrid 
Spain no 
36 María de los Ángeles North African Migration Institute Ortega y Gasset Spain yes 
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Ramírez Studies Analist 
37 Leticia Delgado Immigration Analist University Rey Juan Carlos Spain yes 
38 Sana Desalasi Coordinator for Morocco Oxfam Morocco Morocco yes 
39 Jesús Nuñez Chief and Inmigration 
Analist 
Institute for the 
Resolution of Conflicts 
and Peace 
Spain yes 
40 Manuel Montes Vice-Minister for 
Inmigration Services 
Ministry for Labour and 
Social Services 
Spain yes 
41 Prof. Belguendouz Professor University of Rabat Morocco no 
42 Prof. Kachani Professor University of Rabat Morocco no 
43 Prof. Mohammed 
Boudoudou 
Professor University of Rabat Morocco no 
44 Antonio Namib Ex Director for the 
Migration Office 
Veracruz's Delegation Mexico yes 
45 Jorge Burguete Professor ECOSUR, Chiapas Mexico no 
46 A. Fajid Coordinator for 
Cooperation 
Immigration Office, 
Ministry of Interior 
Mexico yes 
47 Elizabeth Ramírez Chief for Mexico USAID USA no 
48 Martha Carvallo Researcher Institute Complutense for 
Cooperation and 
Development, University 
Complutense of Madrid 
Spain yes 
49 Maurice Schiff Researcher World Bank USA no 
50 José María Ramos 
García 
Policy Analyst in U.S.A.-
Mexico's Security Issues 
El COLEF MEXICO no 
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